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THE ROLE OF MESSIANISM IN CONTEMPORARY 
RUSSIAN IDENTITY AND STATECRAFT 
 




Russian messianism – the longstanding idea of Russia as a ‘chosen’ nation with a historical 
mission is typically represented as a cliché with little or no relevance in politics. However, an 
increasing deployment of several interrelated messianic ideas and notions has been noted in 
both public and official Post-Soviet discourse, raising the question of how we should 
understand its persistence and contemporary revival. 
 
We first develop a conceptual framework based on insights about identity and statecraft from 
poststructuralist and related approaches, then proceed to trace key characteristics and 
narratives of Russian messianism in history and the secondary literature of various 
disciplines. The study proposes that Russian messianism should be conceptualised as a 
persistent discursive framework, holding a kaleidoscopic range of both complementing and 
contesting discourses, that have the purposes of legitimising the existence and policies of 
Russia as a state and defining Russian identity in ambiguous relation to a broad Western 
Other. 
 
This conceptualisation is then applied to contemporary Russian discourse. By analysing 
samples of key official discourse (2000-2007) the thesis shows how the Russian state adopts, 
negotiates and reproduces certain messianic narratives from public discourse, in which they 
abound. We then compare the convergence and divergence of the official and public political 
discourse with popular discourse, based on the analysis of semi-structured interviews with 
160 semi-elite and ordinary Russians, conducted in 2005. We find that the Russian messianic 
framework is widely used at all levels of discourse and among all categories of Russian 
people, but in ways and contexts different from in public and official discourse.  
 
Overall, this thesis makes contributions to Russian studies by providing a theoretical 
conceptualisation of Russian messianism; and to the study of international relations by an 
analysis of discourses central to the production of Russia as a collective identity, state and 
international actor.   
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1.1.0 Topic: Russian messianism and the crisis of Russian identity   
 
1.1.1 The ambiguous end of Russian ideology and revival of messianism 
 
At the end of his last Address to the Federal Assembly, in April 2007, Putin made a 
jesting referral to Russian messianism: ‚Of course, we should always be thinking 
about the future. Here in Russia we have this old tradition, a favourite pastime, of 
searching for a national idea. This is something akin to looking for the meaning of 
life. It is, generally speaking, a useful and interesting pursuit, and also one that is 
never-ending. Let us not launch into discussions on such matters today.‛ (Putin, 
Annual address, 2007)  Until only a few years ago, there was a rather common notion 
that Russian political leaders, after what can be perceived as the failed attempt at 
Westernisation, had abandoned ideology – whether Western, Soviet or Russian 
nationalist – and were only going to pursue pragmatic national interests. (Fedotov, 
1999:86-87, Gorodetsky, 2003, Light, 2003) Before the presidential elections in 1999, 
Putin declared that there was no need to restore any ‚official state ideology‛ 
(Drobizheva, 2003:73). In 2001, the minister of foreign affairs, Igor Ivanov affirmed 
that:  
[o]ne of the fundamental conclusions drawn from these debates [about 
Russian identity+ is that the country’s foreign policy should be based on 
national interests rather than political ideology. [ . . . ] Russian diplomacy has 
always succeeded when guided by realistic, pragmatic considerations and 
failed when dominated by imperial ideology and messianic ambitions. 
(Ivanov, 2001:8).  
Many Russian political writers welcomed this alleged ‘de-ideologisation’, agreeing 
that only pragmatism should guide foreign policy making. (Fedotov, 1999, Tolz, 
1998, Voronov, 2000) However, the very same authors would often deploy an 
anything but de-ideologised framework for their writing, referring in all seriousness 
to a Russian historical mission, Russia’s peculiarity and spirituality, and Russia as 
being a special, third civilisation. Let us provide a couple of illustrations from 
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mainstream Russian post-Soviet political discourse: Sergei Kortunov, Chairman of 
the Committee of Foreign Policy Planning, routinely writes about a Russian mission 
‘to lead humanity to unification through moral perfection’, Russia as a ‚spiritual 
imperium‛, ‚a nation of high spiritual values‛, and Russians as a people through 
which ‚the spiritual connection of Russia with the world is carried out‛. According 
to him, only by understanding this special mission can Russian history become 
understandable: ‚Over the course of centuries, while surmounting innumerable 
obstacles, the Russian people prepared themselves for the fulfilment of this historic 
mission.‛(Kortunov, 1998b) Similarly, a Russian messianic idea is depicted as the key 
to Russian geopolitical identity in a standard university textbook on Russian 
geopolitics: 
Today the national and geopolitical revival of Russia is related to the revival of the 
national idea as a messianic idea, that is, universal. Will the Russian people be 
capable of understanding its national calling as being universal (vselenskoe), 
all-human (vsechelovecheskoe), interpret and protect the values of the Orthodox 
culture as all-human? This is precisely about spiritual values, new ethics, new 
morals, and the particular responsibility of the nation for these values. Our 
national future depends in much on the answers to these questions. Will we 
be capable of protecting the space fought for and protected by our great 
ancestors? (Vasilenko, 2003:73) 
And a shift in Putin’s own rhetoric could be noted a couple of years into his first 
term. Journalists observed how ‚under Putin realities are fusing with Russian ideas 
to produce a more practical, economic form of Eurasianism.‛(Hahn, 2002) This 
‘fusing’ of Russian ideas with pragmatism was epitomized in Putin’s annual address 
to the federal assembly in April 2005 where he stated: ‚Also certain is that Russia 
should continue its civilising mission on the Eurasian continent. This mission 
consists in ensuring that democratic values, combined with national interests, enrich 
and strengthen our historic community.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2005) The ideas of 
having a historic, civilising mission, are not commonly deployed at the level of 
mainstream and official political discourse in modern European states, and lead us to 




The notion of a Russian ‘end of ideology’ could to some extent include ordinary 
Russians in the 1990s, many of whom were tired of messianic ambitions and Western 
stereotypes about Russia, longing to live in a ‚normal‛, i.e. Western country 
(Gvosdev, 2007:139), viewing grand ideological schemes with scepticism (Prozorov, 
2008:227). But increasingly, with the general disillusionment with the West, attitudes 
seemed to begin to shift. In an opinion poll from 2003, 1600 Russians were asked the 
following question: ‚Would you like to see Russia first and foremost a great power, 
respected and feared by other countries, or a country with a high standard of living, even if 
not one of the strongest countries in the world?‛ 54% said they preferred high standard 
of living to great power status, but 43% would nevertheless prefer Russia to be a 
great power, respected and feared.1 Furthermore, notions relating to spirituality and 
a Russian messianic idea abound at all levels of post-Soviet Russian discourse, from 
graffiti in the streets and cheap novels sold in the metro stations to academic 
literature, political movements, TV-shows and advertisements – for example the 
slogans in the 2005 Slavyanskaya vodka campaign covered almost all the typical 
clichés from the ‘wide Russian soul’ to Tiuthchev’s famous lines on Russian 
exceptionalism.2  Typically, these notions are intertwined with anti-Semitism and 
other xenophobic discourses (Rosenthal, 1997, Stephens, 1997). And in general, 
spirituality in Russian society has boomed since the fall of the Soviet Union, with 
revivals of all kinds of religions and spiritual, often apocalyptic, movements from 
Orthodoxy to occultism.3  
 
The immediate question here is whether these tendencies in post-Soviet Russian 
society and discourse – that is, the official mention of messianic ambitions as having 
guided Russian foreign policy in the past, the notion of a messianic idea and of a 
higher mission, stereotypes of Russian exceptionalism and a revival of religion and 
esoteric spirituality – are linked with each other, and if we can usefully conceive of 
                                                 
1 New Russia Barometer XII (2003), tables available at www.russiavotes.org. [Accessed 2005-11-23]. 
2 The latter read ‚Umom rossiio ne ponyat’ – a mozhno poprobovat’‛ (‚Russia cannot be understood with the 
mind – but one could try‛). 
3 Catherine Merridale has described: 
‚The twilight of communism (a grand secular morality tale in its own right) saw the proliferation of 
alternative eschatologies - astrology, extrasensory perception, magical healing, spiritualism, and a 
popular Orthodoxy whose prophecies were drawn directly from the Book of Revelation. [. . .] Across the 
former Soviet Union, recent ecological disasters, beginning with Chernobyl, have all been traced to 
Biblical prophecies, and the end of Russian civilization is regularly nigh.‛ (Merridale, 2003:24)  
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them as a single phenomenon. This forces us to examine the frequently recurring 
notion of Russian messianism. Russian messianism keeps appearing in both Western 
and Russian literature on Russia, often referred to in brief, as a permanent but 
ambiguous feature of Russian political and historical identity – for example Lilia 
Shevtsova, a prominent Russian liberal, notes that Russia over the centuries has tried 
to establish its identity ‚on the basis of Russian messianism, Russia’s claims to be a 
major geopolitical power center, and its unique history‛ (2000); and historian 
Geoffrey Hosking writes about ‚the Messianic energy of the original Russian 
national myth‛ which eventually finds it outlet ‚in the distinctive Russian variant of 
socialism‛. (Hosking, 1997:209-10) 
The word messianism originates from the word Messiah, in Hebrew mashiah, 
which ultimately means anointed and chosen. (Duncan, 2000:6) Originally, according 
to Collins Concise Dictionary (Collins Concise Dictionary, 3rd ed., 1995) the term refers 
to ‚the awaited king of the Jews, to be sent by God to free them‛, to ‚Jesus Christ, 
when regarded in this role‛ and ‚an exceptional or hoped-for liberator of a country 
or a people‛. However, in a broad secular as well as religious context, messianism 
can concern a Messiah that is not an individual but ‚that may be an entity such as a 
particular nation, class or party‛ (Duncan, 2000:6). The Russian philosopher Vladimir 
Solov’ev provided the following definition: ‚Outside the theological sphere, 
although in connection with religious ideas, in all peoples who have played an 
important role in history, on the awakening of their national consciousness there has 
arisen the conviction of the special advantage of the given people, as the chosen 
bearer and perpetrator (sovershitel’) of the historical fate of mankind.‛ (Quoted in 
Duncan, 2000:7)  
It is not the claim of this thesis that the Russian pursuit of a messianic vision 
or identity by history, culture or faith is unique. A variant of Slavonic messianism 
was part of, for example, Polish culture, with the idea of Poland as a Christ of the 
nations, as Gerard Gillespie describes: ‚Through messianism, the Poles could turn 
defeat into victory; their losses in the political and military arenas were compensated 
for by a spiritual triumph which elevated them to the nation equivalent of Jesus 
Christ. In Europe, and perhaps throughout the Christian world, Poland would fulfil 
a mission analogous to that of Jesus among men.‛  (Gillespie, 1994:265) This 
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messianism was expressed for example in the works of the national poet Adam 
Mickiewicz (Walicki, 1968). More generally messianism has appeared in contexts 
where the idea of the nation has been imbued with mystical properties. Thus,  
Anthony D. Smith, the well-known writer on nationalism, in his work Chosen Peoples 
where he draws on Emile Durkheim’s concept of nationalism as ‘surrogate religion’, 
describes various examples of communities which at certain periods have deployed 
myths portraying themselves as chosen for a covenant or a mission. (Smith, 2003, see 
also Talmon, 1993). It is the claim of this thesis, however, that the Russian 
understanding and deployment of a messianic language and culture is far more 
prominent and persistent than in other societies, and is still a key – perhaps even the 
key – defining referent in Russia’s view of the world.  
The one contemporary Western work that specifically treats Russian 
messianism is Peter Duncan’s Russian Messianism: Third Rome, Revolution, Communism 
and After (Duncan, 2000). This is a useful overview of, and introduction to, the 
subject, and in the introduction provides a useful comparative perspective on 
messianism.4 Duncan’s work lacks theoretical awareness, however, leading it to treat 
Russian messianism simply as a continuous, broad phenomenon in Russian history 
and society rather than interrogating the national and international origins and 
functions of this complex multi-dimensional idea. 
This thesis will pursue this line of inquiry, but it must first address the 
commonplace argument that Russian messianism is an extension of, or perhaps 
distortion of, Russian nationalism. This thesis will argue that messianism relates to 
nationalism in the broad terms of identity construction, but goes far beyond the 
concept of the nation. It is a persistent issue in certain countries’ world-view, perhaps 
most notably Russia and the United States in the past century.  
Messianism of a variety of kinds is embedded in the Russian world-view – it 
appears politically as empire and mission; spiritually as the notion of ‘Holy Russia’; 
and geopolitically as Eurasia. The basis of messianism is the idea of a chosen nation, 
but at the same time it transcends the particularistic idea of the nation through its 
universalistic claims, as this quote from Russian political discourse illustrates: 
‚Nationalism is for small peoples who fear extinction. The Russians are a great 
                                                 
4 For a critical discussion on Duncan’s comparison of Russian and Jewish messianism, see Ilya Prizel’s 
review of  Russian Messianism (2003). 
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people [. . .] Russia speaks like Christ used to speak: come to me and share my 
spirit.‛ (Kunaev, cited in Neumann, 1996:197) From American political discourse in 
the same period we see a very similar line of argument, here put forward by 
neoconservative ideologists William Kristol and David Brooks in 1997:  
American nationalism — the nationalism of Alexander Hamilton and Henry 
Clay and Teddy Roosevelt — has never been European blood-and-soil 
nationalism. [. . .] Our nationalism is that of an exceptional nation founded on 
a universal principle, on what Lincoln called ‘an abstract truth, applicable to 
all men at all times’. Our pride in settling the frontier, welcoming immigrants 
and advancing the cause of freedom around the world is related to our 
dedication to our principles. (Cited in Williams, 2005:318) 
Messianism becomes a form of supra-nationalism that explains the ‘nation’ does not 
suffice to contain the Russian or American ideas. Since messianism ultimately aspires 
to ‘leave the nation behind’ it effectively transforms into the antithesis of 
nationalism.  
Within contemporary studies of nationalism, Russian messianism is related 
but not equated to what Benedict Anderson has described as a particular form of 
official nationalism, functioning to retain dynastic power over multi-ethnic empires, 
in his words ‚stretching the short, tight, skin of the nation over the gigantic body of 
the empire.‛ (Anderson, 2006:86-87) Official nationalism, he argues, ‚concealed a 
discrepancy between nation and dynastic realm.‛  (2006:110) 
But on the whole, nationalism is a political science debate about modernist 
nation-building that rarely looks to international political theory as an explanation of 
why states and societies have the self-identification they do. Though we will draw on 
some insights about messianism as part of identity construction from scholars on 
nationalism, this thesis will not concern itself with the debates within nationalism 
and will not draw on mainstream political science theory, precisely because this 
thesis looks to international political theory to explain the multi-dimensional nature 
of the Russian claim to an exceptional past and future.  
As Putin’s jesting referral to Russian messianism implied, it can be a heavily 
stereotyped notion. ‘The ingrained Russian messianism,’ and ‘the mysterious 
Russian soul’ (zagadochnaya russkaya dusha) can together with ‘the Russian bear’ and 
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the alleged Russian ‘orientalist despotism’ be seen as part of a long-standing Western 
discourse on Russia as an Eastern Other (for this wider discourse, see Neumann, 
1999). In fact, several Russian academics that were approached during fieldwork for 
this study refused even to discuss the idea of Russian messianism, saying that the 
clichés and populist scholarship made it a too painful subject. 
Choosing Russian messianism as a subject of study is thus not unproblematic, 
as we run the risk of engaging in the populist reproduction and reinforcement of 
myths and stereotypes which could further exclude and alienate Russia from Europe 
and the West. However, the persistence of the ambiguous idea of Russian 
messianism, and the contemporary revival of messianic ideas in Russian public 
discourse suggests that beyond the stereotypes, it is a necessary part of Russian 
political and cultural identity.5 
 
1.1.2 Statement of relevance 
 
What makes it important and worthwhile to pursue the study of Russian messianism 
and its revival in post-Soviet discourse and society? A main reason is the crisis of 
identity since the collapse of the Soviet order. The Soviet Union’s complex and 
divisive legacy and disintegration, the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism as a 
statevalue system and the subsequent perceived failure of Westernisation, the long 
wars in Chechnya, the sale of national assets and economic crises have all been 
contributory factors to an undisputable crisis of social and political relations in post-
Soviet Russia. Peter Shearman provides a summary from a conventional foreign 
policy perspective: 
When the empire collapsed along with the communist project, Russia was left 
in limbo, with an uncertain sense of identity and a fundamental conflict 
among the political elite over Russia's future direction. Without a fixed 
identity since 1992, Russia has verged on chaos, with occasional political and 
economic crises, like the dispute in Chechnya and Yeltsin's siege of the White 
House, leading to violent conflict. (Shearman, 2001:254-55) 
                                                 
5 Indeed it is unwise too to discard stereotypes themselves as politically irrelevant: it has recently been 
argued that precisely stereotypes play an important and underestimated role in national identity 
construction. (Rezende, 2008:107)  
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The Russian crisis of identity also forms part of the wider crisis of collective identities 
under globalisation, or what Campbell calls ‚the globalization of contingency‛ or 
‚the erasure of the markers of certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse‛. 
(Campbell, 1991, 1998:171) Politician Igor Chubais had summed up the crisis of 
Russian identity in 1998: ‚Until we restore our identity, until we figure out our own 
value system, until we find our own idea, we will not really be able to solve a single 
other problem.‛(Quoted in Winchester, 2008) The question then, is whether Russian 
messianism is the answer to the post-Soviet crisis of identity. Can we understand the 
wider issues of post-Soviet Russian state- and collective identity by studying the 
phenomenon and concept of Russian messianism? To answer this, this thesis has 
three broad aims which provide the basis for its subsequent hypotheses and research 
questions. These are to: 
 
a) Provide a conceptualisation of Russian messianism which will help us 
to understand some of its key functions and forms.  
 
There are few studies specifically on Russian messianism, and while they may be 
very useful as overviews and histories, they typically lack a deeper theoretical 
conceptualisation, such as Peter Duncan’s above mentioned work (2000), and also 
Russian Vladimir Storchak’s rich historical works on messianism (2003, 2005). 
Furthermore, many important studies from various disciplines provide analyses of 
specific messianic discourses, but not on Russian messianism as a phenomenon in 
itself. This could include Marlene Laruelle’s extensive and excellent work on 
Eurasianism (2004, 2006, 2008), Dmitri Sidorov’s study of the Moscow Third Rome 
narrative in contemporary Russian geopolitics (2006), Andzej Walicki’s seminal work 
on Slavophilism (1975), Stephen Lessing Baehr’s work on the paradise myth in 
eighteenth century Russia (1991), Daniel Rowland’s work on the narrative Moscow 
the New Israel (1996), Julia Brun-Zejmis’ study of messianic consciousness in the 
samizdat movement of the 1960-70s (1991), and Michael Urban’s analysis of post-
Soviet political discourse (Urban, 1998) to name but a few diverse examples. And 
finally, various studies highlight phenomena in Russian history and contemporary 
society which relate to messianism, but have had no need to consider their wider 
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implications for contemporary Russia in international relations. This could include 
David Rowley’s analysis of Russian millenarianism (Rowley, 1999). 
In order to provide a sophisticated and comprehensive conceptualisation, we 
proceed to trace Russian messianism and its key characteristics, narratives and 
categories in history and the secondary literature of diverse disciplines. Following 
our findings, we propose that Russian messianism has continuously been a central 
element in Russian identity and statecraft, and that it should be conceptualised as a 
historically persistent discursive (interpretive and narrative) framework, holding a 
kaleidoscopic range of both complementing and contesting discourses, that have the 
purposes of legitimising the existence and policies of Russia as a state actor and 
defining Russian identity in ambiguous relation to a broad Western Other. While this 
conceptualisation could run the danger of becoming reification, we argue that it 
nevertheless is an important tool in the sense of an umbrella-term which helps us to 
identify and locate contemporary narratives and themes, including many which are 
not evidently explicitly messianic, within a long-standing, broad, discursive 
tradition. This is thus not so much a study of the concept of messianism, as a study of 
various discursive practices which can be usefully labelled as such. 
 
b) Increase our understanding of contemporary Russian collective 
identity at different levels of discourse. 
 
There exists a large body of contemporary studies on Russian nationalism and 
radical/extremist political ideologies (e.g. Brudny, 1998), but few study the resonance 
of these ideologies among ordinary people, beyond opinion polls. Furthermore, 
undertaking a systematic mapping and analysis of messianic discourse in Russian 
public discourse would have been an unfeasible project given both its proliferation in 
many different social domains, and the limits of this study. Instead we have centred 
our analysis on the official and popular discourse planes, where the resonance and 
manifestation of Russian messianic discourse is less known. For these two planes we 
have selected specific samples – the President’s annual addresses to the State 
Council, 2000-2007 respectively semi-structured interviews with ordinary and semi-
elite Russians from Moscow and St Petersburg. As we explore the ‘texts’ from these 
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samples, we will compare and contrast their use of messianic and related discourse 
with the same in texts from public discourse, using also findings from the secondary 
studies of Russian nationalism, etc.  
How then can field research, asking ordinary people on the street and in their 
homes questions, comparing their answers with what politicians and academics say 
and write, actually help us understand the meta-problem of Russian state and 
collective identity? Regardless of how authoritarian Russia as a political entity might 
be becoming, what ordinary people in Russia think, feel and perceive is important 
for, and reflective of, the state as a whole. This is particularly so in terms of state 
stability – ever important in the vast and diverse state, so fraught with disintegration 
– which doubtlessly is dependent on a sense of cohesion in Russian society at large. 
Furthermore, drawing on insights from discourse analysis and theory, it can be 
argued that we are likely to better understand the role and functions of messianic 
and related narratives in relation to the crisis of social and political relations by 
studying their more ‘common sense’ deployment and resonance among ordinary 
Russians, not only among the intellectual elites among whom representations of 
Russia can be very far-fetched from Russian social realities. 
 
c) Enhance our understanding of contemporary Russia as a state and 
international actor.  
 
Russia is a vast country whose central role in global politics cannot be denied. 
Perceptions of a ‘new Cold war’ between Russia and the West are only one of many 
reasons for seeking to enhance our understanding of contemporary Russia. The ways 
in which its identity as a state and international actor is being constructed is 
therefore of great political importance. We will argue that mainstream IR studies 
often simplify international actor identity construction, failing to take into account 
influences from public and popular levels of discourse on the process of defining and 
legitimising Russia as a state and international actor. Ideas, perceptions and ‘stories’ 
from these levels of discourse can thus constitute important subjects of study for IR.  
There are some excellent works within International Relations (IR) on Russian 
state and collective identity building on self/Other studies, particularly by Iver 
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Neumann (1996, 1999) and Andrei Tsygankov (e.g. , 2005, 2007, 2008), but again, they 
do not study Russian messianism as a single phenomenon, although their works are 
highly useful as part of its study, and so this is another gap in scholarship this thesis 
aims to fill. 
Overall, this thesis seeks to make a contribution to Russian studies by providing 
a theoretical conceptualisation of Russian messianism; and to the study of 
international relations by an analysis of discourses central to the production of 
Russia as a collective identity, state and international actor. The following section 
outlines the specific hypotheses, research questions and methodology we have 
developed in order to meet these aims. 
 
1.2.0 Hypotheses, Research questions and Intellectual Approach 
 
Three hypotheses will be put forward as basic presumption according to the research 
topic – the role of Russian messianism in contemporary identity and statecraft – and 
the thesis aims – to conceptualise Russian messianism to understand its key 
functions and forms; to increase our understanding of contemporary Russian 
collective identity at different levels of discourse; and of contemporary Russia as a 
state and international actor.  
 
H1. The persistence, and contemporary revival, of messianic ideas in Russian public 
discourse suggests it is a necessary part of Russian political and cultural identity.  
 
We will base our study on the assumption that Russian messianism is closely related 
to Russian identity, since its ideas and narratives constitute representations of Russia 
and the Russians. We suggest that it is particularly necessary to Russian political and 
cultural identity since it is in these domains the messianic narratives and ideas 
appears most strongly and persistently. Russian politicians denounce messianic 
ambitions (Ivanov, 2001:8), Russians are apparently tired of ideology (Gvosdev, 
2007:139), and Western academics denounce studies of Russian exceptionalism as 
‚tired forms of explanation‛ (Engelstein, 1998:877). And yet messianic ideas and 
narratives are appearing all over Russia, from restaurant names to party ideologies – 
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even mainstream parties that are not explicitly nationalist or religious reference 
Russia’s spirituality, uniqueness and special path. The persistence, and 
contemporary revival, of messianic ideas in Russian public discourse thus suggests 
that Russian messianism is a necessary part of Russian political and cultural identity. 
In order to investigate this hypothesis, we begin by advancing one research question, 
based both on the domains in which Russian messianic ideas are appearing, and on 
the nature of Russian messianism itself: 
 
Q1. How can the study of discourse enhance our understanding of Russian collective 
identity? 
 
Russian messianism can be validly defined in various ways – as for example an 
ideology (Laruelle, 2008), a concept (Duncan, 2000), a national myth (Hosking, 
1997:209-10), or a religious concept (Rowley, 1999). As all none of these are mutually 
exclusive, and as all fall under the broad and functional category of discourse, our 
study will attempt to define Russian messianism in these terms. It can also be argued 
that discourse incorporates the various domains of social interaction in which 
collective identities, as social realities, are produced. Therefore we will investigate 
how the study of discourse in its different understandings – Russian messianism as 
discourse, and discourse as domains of social interaction and representation – can 
enhance our understanding of collective identity formation, and by extension 
Russian collective identity and its necessary components. We will do so by exploring 
discourse, ideas, and state identity construction from different perspectives of 
International Relations theory: neorealism, realism, constructivism, and 
poststructuralism. Following insights from both poststructuralist and realist 
approaches, we will advance a conceptualisation of Russian messianism as a 
discursive framework.  
 
H2: The messianic framework is in place at different levels of contemporary Russian 




This hypothesis addresses our quest to understand the wider problem of post-Soviet 
Russian state- and collective identity by studying the phenomenon of Russian 
messianism at different levels of Russian discourse. If we follow broad paths of 
discourse theory and analysis, we find that the significance of Russian messianism 
can not be found hermeneutically inside the narratives themselves, but need to be 
understood in their wider discursive social and political contexts. While it would 
appear that Russian messianism indeed is a historically persistent part of Russian 
political and cultural identity, the revival of its ideas and narratives in post-Soviet 
Russia is notable, and suggests a possible correlation to the undeniable crisis of social 
and political relations in Russia following the fall of the Soviet Union, described 
above. This has led us to put forward our second hypothesis, and we advance two 
research questions for its investigation. These each concern popular respectively 
official discourse, two broad levels of Russian discourse on which the role of 
messianic and related narratives are less known compared to public discourse.     
 
Q2. What is the manifestation and resonance among ordinary Russians of the 
messianic and related narratives deployed in Russian public and official discourse?  
 
As stated above, contemporary studies of Russian political and cultural discourse 
often focus on specific writers and movements in public discourse, not involving 
popular opinion, save occasional opinion polls. The unique semi-structured 
interviews with a large sample of both ordinary and semi-elite Russians from 
Moscow and St Petersburg, the two ‘capitals’ of Russia, were developed, conducted 
and analysed in response to this research question, and their findings, presented 
across three chapters, form the core of the original research of the thesis. As we 
argued above, what ordinary people in Russia think, feel and perceive is important 
for, and reflective of, state and collective identity as a whole, particularly so in terms 
of state stability; the role and functions of messianic and related narratives in relation 
to the crisis of social and political relations are likely to be better understood by also 
studying their ‘common sense’ deployment and resonance among a variety of 




Q3. What is the function of official discourse of the messianic and related narratives 
in seeking to resolve the Russian crisis of identity?  
 
As we noted previously, Russian messianic ideas and narratives were beginning to 
be deployed in official discourse under Putin, and we have selected precisely as 
samples of official discourse the Annual Addresses of Putin’s presidency 2000-2007. 
The ways in which a state deploys a particular discourse in the context of state-of-
the-nation addresses ought to reveal key functions of that discourse, since the state, 
unlike writers in public discourse, has to mediate a number of different interests 
through its discourse, which thus has to be carefully balanced and considered.  
Even if authoritarian, in a broad sense of the word, the state is perhaps in many 
senses less free than writers and organisations of public discourse. In these samples 
we will study instances of messianic-related intertextuality in comparison with 
public discourse, and we find that the state, despite at times clearly distancing itself 
from messianic discourse, nevertheless adopts and mediates various Russian 
messianic discourses.   
        
H3: One of the core explanations for the persistence of Russian Messianism is as a 
legitimising discursive framework for the existence and policies of Russia as a state 
actor in ambiguous relation to a broad Western Other. 
 
This is a development of Hypothesis H1, based on our findings in addressing the 
previous research questions, which focuses on the dimensions of statecraft, foreign 
policy and, by extension, the international aspects of Russian identity and 
messianism. Typically in the literature on Russian messianism, the question is asked 
if it has directly informed Russian foreign policy.6  We believe that this way of 
framing the question is unhelpful, since direct causal relationships between ideas 
and foreign policy are hard if not impossible to establish.  
Instead we need to ask more broadly how we can conceptualise Russian 
messianism, its functions and role in Russian statecraft and, by extension, foreign 
policy. Our findings through exploring discourse and identity in IR theory suggest 
                                                 
6 See for example an interview with Peter Duncan in Washington ProFile, 2008-04-17, available at 
http://www.washprofile.org/en/node/7601 [accessed 2009-10-11]. 
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that we can usefully talk about narrative frameworks that persist in states because of 
their legitimising function, with stories that may change over time but whose central 
logic – based on a self/Other opposition – and character are continuously 
reproduced. Having advanced the hypothesis that Russian messianism can be 
usefully conceptualised as a discursive framework, we furthermore suggest that one 
of its key functions is to legitimise the state, and that its strength indeed lies in a 
self/Other dichotomy expressed in discourses of danger and Otherness. We have 
formulated our final research question as to investigate this hypothesis: 
 
Q4. How can we understand and conceptualise Russian messianism, its functions 
and role in relationship to Russian statecraft, especially towards the West?  
 
In the case of Russia, its collective and state identity cannot be divorced from the 
perennially ambiguous relation to Europe, later ‘the West’. (Neumann, 1996) The 
contradictions of the relation were summed up more than two centuries ago by the 
playwright Fonvizin: ‚How can we remedy two contradictory and most harmful 
prejudices: the first, that everything with us is awful, while in foreign lands 
everything is good; the second, that in foreign lands everything is awful, while with 
us everything is good?‛ (Quoted in Hosking, 1997:198) If Russian messianism, 
following hypothesis H1, is a necessary part of Russian cultural and political 
identity, then Russian messianism is intrinsically wound up with the relation to the 
broad Western Other. The answer to this research question can by no means be 
uncomplicated, and Hypothesis H3 is addressed continuously throughout each 
chapter of the thesis using diverse methods, data and theoretical perspectives. 
 
1.3.0 Methodology  
 
We have adopted a problem-solving approach for this thesis, believing that 
conceptual pragmatism and openness are essential for solving the problem of 
Russian messianism and collective identity. As Luke Shapiro has argued, ‚if a 
phenomenon is characterized as it is so as to vindicate a particular theory rather than 
to illuminate a problem that is specified independently of the theory, then it is 
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unlikely that the specification will gain much purchase on what is actually going on 
in the world. [. . .] It makes better sense to start with the problem‚. (Shapiro, 
2002:601) Our problem is multifaceted, and we will put forward three broad aspects 
from which to understand this phenomenon within IR:  
o Russian messianism as routine state identity construction 
o Messianism as typical for exceptionalist states: multicultural empires or 
civilisations 
o Manifestations of Russian messianism within particular social, historical and 
intellectual contexts in Russia, the West and worldwide 
Exploring different theoretical approaches we develop a broad methodological 
framework within IR based mainly on insights from poststructuralist and 
multidisciplinary Self-Other studies for exploring Russian messianism from the 
above aspects. It involves mainly three, in some sense interrelated, methods of 
discourse analysis: identification of the functions or strategies of discourses; 
interdiscursive analysis or identification of narratives; and predicate analysis. 
Discourse, thought and identity are all dynamic and relational; we never speak, think 
or exist in a vacuum. Rather, we are engaged in a continuous process of reproduction 
of the world through our words. To understand Russian political life, then, we need 
to contextualise deployed themes of Russian messianism, the representations of 
Russia as self in relation to Others. Following insights from dialogism, by studying 
representations of Others, dangers, enemies and threats, we also reveal the unstated 
counter narratives of the self.  
The Russian messianic framework also has its own particular stories and 
signifiers, some which are quite unique to Russia, which suggests that we must study 
and analyse these stories with a deep understanding of Russian history, religion and 
culture, but also of the wider intellectual and cultural currents influencing Russian 
thought, such as European Romanticism in the time of Slavophilism, as well as 
contemporary anti-globalist and anti-American movements. Chapter Four will focus 
both on the cultural specificities and wider cultural and historical contexts of Russian 
messianism by providing a historical background which shows that there is a clear 
historical continuity of Russian messianism as a narrative framework. Based on 
secondary sources from a range of disciplines it outlines core features of Russian 
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messianism and its persistent narratives and discourses, and in so doing helps us 
better understand the contemporary uses of messianic discourses. Part Two, the core 
of the thesis, will attempt to establish how it fits in with contemporary Russian 
politics, with particular reference to foreign policy implications, and will focus more 
on the understanding of Russian messianism as routine state identity construction 
and as typical for multicultural empires or civilisations. As outlined, we will base our 
analysis on two specific sets of primary data – Putin’s annual addresses for official 
discourse – and the 160 semi-structured interviews for popular discourse – but also 
use a variety of both primary and secondary sources to contextualise and interpret 
our findings, comparing and contrasting popular and official discourse with public 
discourse. 
 
1.4.0 Thesis organisation  
 
The thesis is divided into two parts: apparatus and original research. The first part 
includes, apart from this introduction, a theory chapter, a methodology and a 
historical overview which are aimed at providing a comprehensive conceptualisation 
of Russian messianism. It begins to investigate hypothesis H1 7  on Russian 
messianism as potentially a necessary part of Russian identity by addressing 
research question Q1, how the study of discourse can enhance our understanding of 
Russian collective identity.  
Chapter Two, the theory chapter, explores discourse, ideas, identity and their 
relation to politics from key perspectives of International Relations theory – 
mainstream constructivism, neo-realism, classical and culturalist realism, 
poststructuralism and other approaches. Simple but fundamental insights about 
discourse, identity and statecraft from poststructuralist, classical/culturalist realist 
and other self/Other studies lead us to propose an inclusive conceptualisation of 
Russian messianism as constituting a historically persistent discursive (interpretive 
and narrative) framework, based on a logic of opposition and holding a range of both 
contesting and complementing narratives and signifiers which represent different 
interests but which on the whole function to legitimise the state through the 
                                                 
7 H1. The persistence, and contemporary revival, of messianic ideas in Russian public discourse 
suggests it is a necessary part of Russian political and cultural identity. 
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continuous construction, contestation and reproduction of Russian collective identity 
in relation to Others.  
We then proceed in Chapter Three to explore the different methods, 
associated with the different theoretical approaches explored, which are available for 
addressing our research questions. The chapter shows why the study of discourse is 
essential for understanding Russian collective identity and why it provides the best 
methods for studying Russian messianism. We introduce and justify our intellectual 
and evidence categories, and outline a methodology based on strands of discourse 
analysis and self/Other studies.   
Chapter Four proceeds to trace Russian messianism as conceptualised, its key 
characteristics, narratives and categories in history and the secondary literature of 
diverse disciplines, in order to be able to identify and locate contemporary narratives 
and themes, and their functions, within the historical tradition. In so doing, it begins 
the investigation of hypothesis H3 – that one of the core explanations for the 
persistence of Russian Messianism is as a legitimising discursive framework for the 
existence and policies of Russia as a state actor in ambiguous relation to a broad 
Western Other – and research question Q4, on how we can understand and 
conceptualise Russian messianism, its functions and role in relationship to Russian 
statecraft, especially towards the West. The chapter affirms the centrality of an 
ambiguous-dichotomous self/Other and good/evil framework for both Russian 
messianism and collective identity, showing a persistent, though diverse, production 
and reproduction messianic narratives across centuries.  
Based on the findings of the apparatus chapters, we formulate hypothesis H2: 
that the messianic framework is in place at different levels of contemporary Russian 
discourse as a response to the crisis of social and political relations in Russia.  
Hypotheses H2 and H3 are then investigated by studying Russian 
messianism and related narratives at different levels of contemporary Russian 
discourse, in chapters Five to Eight which form the core of and constitute the original 
research of the thesis. Based on analysis of President Putin’s eight annual addresses 
to the nation in comparison with texts from public discourse, Chapter Five explores 
the role of contemporary Russian messianic discourse in the construction and 
reproduction of the official, or ‘sanctioned’ Russian collective identity, thus 
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addressing research questions Q3, on the function is of official discourse of the 
messianic and related narratives in seeking to resolve the Russian crisis of identity, as 
well as Q4, on how we can we understand and conceptualise Russian messianism, its 
functions and role in relationship to Russian statecraft, especially towards the West.  
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight move onto popular discourse, addressing 
research question Q2 by exploring the manifestation and resonance among the 
Russian population of the messianic and related narratives deployed in Russian 
public and official discourse, based on the analysis of the semi-structured interviews 
with the large and diverse sample of elite and ordinary Russians from Moscow and 
St Petersburg. Here we seek to find out if Russian messianism is exclusive to 
intellectuals detached from everyday life, or whether Russians at all levels of society 
draw upon messianic discourse; and if so, what the role and functions of their 
deployments of messianic discourse appear to be. More broadly, chapters Five to 
Eight thus implicitly address the thesis aim to increase our understanding of 
contemporary Russian collective identity at different levels of discourse. 
Chapter Nine concludes the thesis, addressing Q4, the broad research 
question on how we can understand and conceptualise Russian messianism, its 
functions and role in relationship to Russian statecraft, especially towards the West, 
by summarising the findings, demonstrating the ways in which they enhance our 








As our introduction set out, picking Russian messianism as a subject of study carries 
with it many academic pitfalls, not the least the risk of engaging in the populist 
reproduction and reinforcement of myths and stereotypes which will further exclude 
and alienate Russia from Europe and the West. Because of the both stereotypical and 
ambiguous status of Russian messianism, finding a workable theoretical framework 
within International Relations (IR) for its conceptualisation is a challenge indeed. But 
the abundance of messianic notions and narratives, indeed stereotypes, in 
contemporary Russian, not Western, discourse calls us to take on the challenge.  We 
will seek to advance our understanding of Russian messianism as a social 
phenomenon based on the assumptions that it relates to ideas and identity, or forms 
of Russian collective identity, and that ideas and collective identity in some way are 
relevant to statecraft. We will primarily address the following questions: 
o How can we advance our understanding of Russian messianism, its survival, 
continuity and revival, through IR approaches? 
o What theoretical tools do these IR theories/approaches provide that are useful: 
generally, for understanding identity and statecraft; and specifically, for 
understanding Russian messianism and its functions?  
o What are the weaknesses with these theories/approaches? 
We suggest that neither neo-realism nor mainstream social constructivism is helpful 
in the conceptualisation of Russian messianism. Neorealism does not explore identity 
production at all but takes actor identities as given. Constructivism, despite 
professing to deal with the role of ideas and identity in IR, fails to capture the actual 
politics of identity, hence also Russian messianism. We instead develop a 
conceptualisation of Russian messianism using basic insights about identity and 
politics from several conceptual positions: critical and poststructuralist IR 
approaches as well as certain more sophisticated cultural/historicist realist 
approaches which highlight different dimensions within which we must understand 
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Russian messianism as a social and political phenomenon, and its survival, 
continuity and revival.  
The chapter argues that while a coherent, continuous collective identity is an 
ontological impossibility, the stories we tell about ourselves (in discourse, ideology, 
national symbols etc), and the boundaries we inscribe between us and others 
function as to make-believe we have a coherent identity. But different stories about 
who we are compete with each other, so the stories or discourses that tell us who we 
are and who we are not are thus inherently political.  
We will argue that in foreign policy, the story-telling is made within 
discursive (narrative and interpretive) frameworks that are continuously 
reproduced, and which also function to legitimise the existence of the state, and are 
often reproduced over a long time. In the case of Russia, we suggest that messianic 
discourse 8  has predominantly filled the functions of making believe there is a 
coherent Russian identity, and we provide a new conceptualisation of Russian 
messianism as being a dichotomising discursive framework holding a range of both 




The mainstream developments in the field of IR theory over the last fifteen years 
suggest that constructivism would provide an appropriate framework within which 
to understand Russian messianism. Ideas and identity studies have relatively 
recently entered the mainstream of IR and their entrance are part of what has been 
called the ‘third debate’ in IR (the first being realism vs. idealism, the second 
neorealism vs. neoliberalism) – supposedly consisting of two camps with traditional, 
rationalist, social science IR scholarship on the one side, and challenging reflectivist, 
critical approaches on the other. The biggest difference between the camps is thought 
to be epistemological, with questions such as: What can we actually know about the 
world? Can there be such a thing as a social science, applying the methods of natural 
science to the social world? What is acceptable to study within IR, and what isn’t? 
                                                 
8 We acknowledge that the very use of certain concepts, such as discourse, implies prior philosophical 
commitments which are bound to bear upon and indeed frame the discussion and overview of different 
theoretical positions.  
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Social constructivism, most notably propagated by Alexander Wendt (1992) claims to 
bridge the gap between the two camps, by bringing the social questions of ideas and 
identity from reflectivism and ‘making them accessible’ to the mainstream rationalist 
approaches. (Smith, 1996:394-95) Assuming as we do that Russian messianism is 
about ideas and identity, what tools might constructivism offer towards the 
understanding of Russian messianism as a social phenomenon? 
Theo Farrell, summarises the constructivist research agenda: ‚Uniting the 
constructivist literature is a concern with explaining the evolution and impact of 
norms on national and international security.‛ (2002:72) Norms and ideas carry a lot 
of explanatory burdens in constructivism. So how are they understood? ‚Norms are 
intersubjective beliefs about the social and natural world that define actors, their 
situations, and possibilities of action.‛(Farrell, 2002:49) Antje Wiener provides the 
following definition: ‚Ideas are understood as socially embedded. They represent 
shared reference points which send the same message to different actors causing the 
same behaviour among these actors.  [. . .] [I]deas are not exclusively situated in or 
generated by the brains of individual actors, in addition, they entail a social 
structuring element.‛ (Wiener, 2003:261) They ‚are constructed through social 
interaction on the one hand, and have a constitutive impact on behaviour, on the 
other.‛ (Wiener, 2003:266)  
Norms or ideas thus shape identity; and then identity shapes actor 
behaviour, or policy, and so according to constructivism, states do what they think 
most appropriate, not only what they are materially capable of. ‚In so doing, states 
are guided by norms that define the identities of the main actors in world politics 
(i.e. modern, bureaucratic, sovereign states) and define the formal rules and accepted 
practices of the international game.‛ (Farrell, 2002:52) Tannenwald provides quite a 
clear typology for norms and ideas, with the following categories: ‚policy 
prescriptions, norms, principled beliefs, cause-effect beliefs, ideologies, shared belief 
systems, and broad worldviews. In this typology, Russian messianism could be 
categorised as an ideology or shared belief system: ‚a systematic set of doctrines or 
beliefs that reflect the social needs and aspirations of a group, class, culture, or state 
[i.e. Russia and the Russians]. Examples include the Protestant ethic or political 
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ideologies such as liberalism, Marxism, and fascism. Intellectuals tend to play key 
roles in the development and maintenance of ideology.‛ (Tannenwald, 2005:16).   
Also, constructivist work that continues in the tradition of the social theories 
it has borrowed its main insights from looks at ideas and ideologies not as 
autonomous entities but as discourses (see for example Ringmar, 1996). Overall in 
constructivism, Russian messianism thus appears as a set of norms, a belief system 
or discourse defining Russian actor identity, policy and, by extension, the rules of 
the international game.  
However, constructivism despite its claims to bring the social to an 
undersocialised discipline has a lot of problematic issues. (Wiener, 2003:257) We 
identify three interrelated problems of mainstream social constructivism, both as a 
general theory of international relations, and as a specific approach to understand 
Russian messianism, its survival, continuity and revival and functions. The first is its 
ahistoricist, positivist epistemological approach; leading both to the second problem: 
its failure to recognise the contested nature of ideas and identity; and to the third: the 
failure to account for the origins of identity and actorship.   
Let us begin with the epistemological stance, which is clearly stated both by 
constructivists and their critics. Farrell, writing from within the approach, states that 
the ‚epistemological approach taken by the constructivists discussed in this essay is 
a conventional but not critical one; the purpose is to build knowledge about the 
world and contribute to mainstream IR debate. The big challenge for constructivists 
is deciding how to engage realism.‛ (Farrell, 2002:72) Maja Zehfuss, more critical of 
constructivists, writes that they ‚in contrast to so-called postmodernists, respect the 
established procedures and methodologies of social science and engage in debate 
with rationalists, or so the argument goes.‛ (Zehfuss, 2001:341) The social and 
ideational thus needs to be adapted to fit the mainstream positivist IR debate, and 
the post-positivist approaches from which constructivists have borrowed their 
insights, are often excluded from the ‘legitimate’ debate. With the positivist 
epistemology, the social – norms and ideas, or ‘intersubjective beliefs’ – as a variable 
can supposedly be observed and measured according to objective scientific 
standards. Constructivism thus proposes that by identifying the norms which define 
a particular actor identity, we can predict state behaviour.  
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But trying to apply objective scientific standards to the ideational in Russian political 
discourse is a highly problematic quest. There is a whole conglomerate of different, 
both contradictory and complementing ideas, themes and ideologies which compete 
to define Russian actor identity: various approaches to deal with the Soviet past and 
its ambiguous legacy; and various representations of Russia (e.g. as European or 
Eurasian, as normal or exceptional, as a state or a civilisation). Russian messianism 
alone contains many different narratives and different norms, and they do not 
always correspond. Mainstream constructivism thus does not have the tools to deal 
with the contested nature of discourse and identity production.  
And even if we single out one prevalent idea – say the peculiar Russian 
spirituality –it is unlikely that we would be able to predict a specific actor behaviour 
following this idea. Constructivists claim that ideas ‚send the same message to 
different actors causing the same behaviour among these actors‛ (Wiener, 2003:261) 
but the peculiar Russian spirituality has many different interpretations, some 
implying for example that Russia must isolate itself from the less spiritual world, 
others that Russia because of this peculiarity must actively bring it to the rest of the 
world in one way or another. This constructivist assumption about ideas and norms 
thus overlooks the fluidity of language by which ideas and norms are constructed.  
Because of subscription to a positivist epistemology, albeit with the social 
and ideational as a variable, social constructivism can be said to become structuralist 
(despite its focus on agency) and to assume the rationalist ahistoricity, a move which 
makes it less adequate as a tool for understanding the historically contingent 
development of collective identities. As Zehfuss states, ‚identities as they are 
defined in discourse fail to be logically bounded entities. Identities are continuously 
articulated, rearticulated and contested, which makes them hard to pin down as 
explanatory categories. The stories we tell about ourselves are [. . .] not necessarily 
coherent.‛ (Zehfuss, 2001:338) She uses German post-war identity construction as a 
case study and argues: 
The contingent, elusive and even contradictory character of German identity, 
as it was represented in the debates, must be excluded if the supposedly 
scientific standards are to be upheld. The fascinating, subtle creation of the 
subject in the process of telling history, and thus identity, is not part of an 
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analysis which starts by postulating subjects. Hence, political questions, for 
instance about how subjects come to be in the first place, are ignored. 
(Zehfuss, 2001:341)   
Constructivism neither asks nor explains how states/actors came to be in the first 
place. The inability to deal with the origin of identities is thus another consequence 
of the rationalist, positivist epistemology and superficial understanding of the 
relationship between the ideational and the material, and between agent and 
structure. Ideas and norms are claimed to ‘arise in social interaction’ then ‘define 
identity’. But as social interaction presumes the presence of actors, and as actors are 
defined by ideas and norms, we find ourselves in a circular argument. If identity – 
defined by ideas and norms– is formed in interaction, how can one interact without 
some pre-existing identity? Its circularity is in fact similar to that of the prevalent 
mainstream IR approach it claims to challenge: neorealism. In neorealism, which the 
next section will discuss in more detail, the structure, the international system, is 
constituted by states, yet the states in their turn are constituted and defined by the 
international system. (Ashley, 1984) While constructivism criticises neorealism for its 
reification of the international system – famously summarised in Wendts slogan and 
article title ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ (1992) – it instead reifies the state, as 
states automatically are assumed to be actors and main decision-makers of the 
anarchical system. (Weber 2005)  
Constructivism’s insights about the mutual constitution of ideational and 
material structures thus do not offer any content-specific theories of norms, ideas 
and identity formation, which makes it hard to understand the role of messianism in 
Russian identity and politics drawing only upon mainstream constructivist work. It 
is quite ironic that an approach whose core contribution to IR is claimed to be about 
ideas and identity fails precisely in that area. As Zehfuss aptly concludes, 
‚constructivism and identity may be in a dangerous liaison not only because identity 
is both necessary for and a danger to the approach. The liaison also endangers the 
possibility of considering the political implications of constructing and representing 
identity. As a result, constructivists may just miss the politics in international 




In sum: we cannot advance our understanding of Russian messianism very far 
through mainstream constructivist scholarship. It claims to have the theoretical tools 
needed to study ideas and identity, and by extension Russian messianism, but these 
tools are problematic or inexistent on examination. Constructivism might borrow 
useful concepts (such as discourse) from social theory; observe messianic norms and 
ideas as being part of Russian identity; and claim to be able to predict how Russia as 
a ‘messianic state’ would act in the international system, yet because of its rationalist 
epistemology and ahistoricism, it cannot answer the question of why specifically 
Russian messianic norms and ideas persist and are being revived in Russia, nor 




The term ‘realism’ in mainstream IR usually connotes both neorealism, classical 
realism, and any other of its variants. We agree however with R. B. J. Walker’s 
suggestion that political realism ‚must be understood less as a coherent theoretical 
position in its own right than as the site of a great many contested claims and 
metaphysical disputes.‛ (Walker, 1993:105) ‘Neorealism’ differs considerably from 
‘classical realism’ (or ‘neo-classical’ if referring to its twentieth century thinkers), and 
even classical realism itself contains contradictory, both historicist and structuralist, 
positions: ‚Structuralist positions generally aspire to scientific status, to ahistorical 
laws and explanations. Historicist positions lean towards the categories of 
hermeneutics and practice.‚ (Walker, 1993:115)  
As a result of its structuralism, neorealism, the perhaps still most dominant IR 
orientation since the 1980s, is assumed – following the classic IR opposition between 
realism and idealism, between difference and identity – to privilege structure (the 
international system) over agency (the state), space over history, and power and 
interest over ideals and ethics. In aspiring to scientific status, neorealism as a 
rationalist-positivist approach, sees actors as self-interested and ‚motivated by a 
logic of consequences. Ideas are ‚hooks‛ on which interests are hung, and they 
mostly rationalize actions made necessary by material interests.‛ (Tannenwald, 
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2005:18) Both ideas and state identity are thus determined by underlying material 
structures, by the anarchic international system.9  
The survival, continuity and revival of Russian messianism in political 
discourse should thus be understood in terms of the instrumental use of ideas to 
rationalise actions made necessary by material interests in the anarchic international 
structure; to secure the survival and further the power of Russia as an international 
actor. In order to further our understanding of Russian messianism, we must thus 
deepen our understanding of material structures and of politics as a function of 
power and interest – which makes considerable sense for anyone acquainted with 
Russian history. Problems arise however when we seek to understand structure and 
power through neorealism.  
First of all, it has been argued that neorealism’s structuralism is problematic 
in that it reifies both structure, the anarchic international system, and its parts, the 
sovereign states, and thus cannot problematise and analyse either of them. The state 
is defined by the structure, yet the structure in its turn is supposedly made up of and 
cannot be comprehended independently of the state – for the circularity of 
neorealism, see Richard K. Ashley’s seminal article ‘The Poverty of Neorealism’ 
(Ashley, 1984:254-58). In Walker’s words, neorealism’s structuralism ‚either 
compromise the coherence of structuralist principles as such, as with the ontological 
priority given to the state, which results in an ‘atomist’ or ‘reductionist’ style of 
structural analysis‛ or else ‚reinforce the static and reifying potentiality of 
structuralism, as with the use of various kinds of utilitarianism and rational choice 
theories.‛ (Walker, 1993:115-16)  
Secondly, the neorealist conceptions of power – and politics – is rather 
limited: ‚For all its emphasis on ‚power politics,‛ neorealism has no comprehension 
of, and in fact denies, the social basis and social limits of power. For the neorealist [. . 
.] power must ultimately be reducible to a matter of capabilities, or means, under the 
control of the unreflective actor whose status as an actor is given from the start.‛ 
(Ashley, 1984:259)  The power of an actor, Ashley explains, does not depend on the 
                                                 
9 In Walker’s words, neorealism is characterised by ‚the absence of any serious theory of the state. It 
offers merely something like a theory of the structures of oligopolistic competition in which states 
become ‘units’ and units become synonymous with firms operating within some kind of market.‛  *. . .+ 
It is precisely because of a refusal to come to terms with the historical specificity of the state, and 
particularly with its participation historically in both political and economic activity, that structuralist 
forms of realism are so prone to portray the state in such an empty fashion.‛ (Walker, 1993:117)  
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inherent qualities of an actor or entity, but depends on its recognition within a 
community as a whole, and to get recognition, the actor needs to have competence, 
to do a performance. So, while it is quite possible that the political use of ideas in 
general is related to underlying material structures and interests, it is very hard to 
study these from an ahistoricist perspective. Structures are not eternal, but products 
of history and process, and by ignoring practice, process and ‚the historical 
specificity of the state‛ (Walker, 1993:117) Structuralist neorealism is unable to 
analyse the material interests and structures related to the political use of ideas such 
as Russian messianism; power beyond its simple conception as material capabilities 
and the real power politics of ideas and identity and the state.  
 
2.4.0 Classical, Culturalist and Historicist Political Realism 
 
Other realist orientations, however, do better in this respect. As was argued by 
Ashley in 1984, and later by for example Michael Williams (2004), classical realism is 
very different from neorealism and on close examination reveals a much more 
sensitive understanding of politics, power, ethics, ideas and identity than is 
commonly assumed. Hence it might serve us better than neorealism in seeking to 
understand Russian messianism. By briefly looking at the writings of Morgenthau, 
perhaps most closely associated to modern classical realism, we will suggest that 
classical, culturalist and historicist realist approaches can contribute with important 
insights into the power politics of ideas and identity; and into the conceptual logics 
of Russian messianism understood as universalist nationalism. We also note that the 
classical realist moral critique of universalistic claims can be applied both to 
radicalist ideas and ideologies such as messianism as well as positivist-rationalist 
approaches to politics, including both neorealism and mainstream social 
constructivism.  
We have agreed that following general realist assumptions, we must deepen 
our understanding of material structures and of politics as a function of power and 
interest. Here, Morgenthau’s conception of power is considerably broader than both 
neorealism’s and what is commonly assumed about classical realism:
10 In his own 
                                                 
10 E.g. Morgenthau’s narrowly understood principle of ‘interest defined in terms of power’. 
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words: ‚Power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the control of 
man over man. Thus power covers all social relationships which serve that end, from 
physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind controls 
another.‛ (Morgenthau, 1967:9)  
As we will see, for Morgenthau, ideas and ideology clearly fall in the category 
of things which can establish and maintain the control of man over man. Power in 
this realist orientation is more than material capabilities, and politics and statecraft 
are understood not simply in ahistoricist structuralist terms but in terms of process, 
practice and contest over the determination of values and wills. As Ashley explains, 
within the classical realist tradition, 
statesmanship is not, as objectivism would have it, the ‚execution of a rule,‛ 
or acting in accordance with some external objective necessities, or 
mechanical obedience to a timeless model for which all purposes are 
reversible and time and tempo are no matter. Nor is it reducible, as in 
neorealism, to rational choice, under constraints, on the part of an actor 
whose status as such is pregiven and unquestioned. Rather, statesmanship 
refers to practice, playing off the generative scheme in ways ranging from the 
awkward and uninventive to the artful and creative – and always with an eye 
to the problematic reproduction of the state itself. (Ashley, 1984:267) 
(Ashley refers to this as the balance-of-power scheme.) The state and its identity in this 
orientation is thus not, as often assumed, given, but in constant reproduction, with 
ideas and values playing a central part in this contested process.  
Interestingly, Williams’s reading of Morgenthau reveals an embedded 
critique both of messianism as universalistic nationalism, and of the rationalist-
positivism, the claim to analytical objectivity and stress on the separation between 
fact and value, which defines both neorealism and mainstream constructivism and is 
commonly assumed also to define the whole ‘realist tradition’. Williams argues that 
‚one of the most significant challenges arising from a reengagement with 
Morgenthau’s realism lies in its claim that this vision of analytic neutrality is not a 
mark of scientific responsibility but is potentially a contribution to political 
irresponsibility.‛ (Williams, 2004:654) Any claims to objectivity, whether in messianic 
ideology or IR theories, relate to the universalism-idealism which classical realism 
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sees as so morally dangerous. Williams finds in Morgenthau a conscious political 
relativism which is guided by ethical concerns. (Williams, 2004:649-50,58) 
Following Guzzini and Rengger among others, he unravels in Morgenthau’s 
writings an affinity to certain critical constructivist and poststructuralist theory 
perspectives of collective identity formation. These include particularly self/Other 
studies, their focus on the relation between language and identity, and the 
oppositional process of identity formation: ‚Categorizations are necessarily 
comparisons, and comparisons are dichotomous: in/out, us/them. Relations between 
groups necessarily resemble the nature of the concepts that underlie their 
construction and inevitable opposition.‛ (Williams, 2004:655) Messianism, or 
universalistic nationalism as Morgenthau calls it, is the radicalisation of the self/other 
logic of opposition, claiming moral universality and monopolising identity while 
exacerbating difference to the extreme. This a central concern in Politics Among 
Nations: 
The morality of the particular group, far from limiting the struggle for power 
on the international scene, gives that struggle a ferociousness and intensity 
not known to other ages. For the claim to universality which inspires the 
moral code of one particular group is incompatible with the identical claim of 
another group; the world has room for only one, and the other must yield or 
be destroyed. Thus, carrying their idols before them, each group convinced 
that it executes the mandate of history, that it does for humanity what it 
seems to do for itself, and that it fulfils a sacred mission, ordained by 
Providence, however defined. (Morgenthau, 1967:249) 
As Williams argues, Morgenthau’s ostensibly narrow concept of politics and power 
can be understood ‚as a direct attempt to counter the Schmittian logic of enmity at 
both the conceptual and the social levels‛. (Williams, 2004:648) If we see messianism 
as a framework based on a logic of opposition, classical realism can also be seen as 
providing a both normative and analytical framework through which to understand 
and counter messianism. The normative element again suggests realism’s affinity to 
some poststructuralist approaches. (Williams, 2004)  
One example of realism applied to Russian messianism is found in the work 
of Alexei Arbatov, a Russian culturalist realist who develops line of argument about 
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Russian messianism similar to those of certain poststructuralists. Arbatov defines 
messianic ideology as one of four ‚system-forming pillars of empire‛ common both 
to the tsarist and Soviet empires, which alone could ‚assimilate many diverse 
peoples at different levels of societal development – from the industrial economy to 
nomadic cattle breeding – and living on a vast space in a monolithic society‛ 
(Arbatov, 2006:23-26). A logic of enmity and, using Campbell’s terminology (1991, 
1998), discourses of danger are seen as central to this ideology and to the 
legitimisation of Russia as a state:  
A belief about the security, secrecy and incessant struggle against external 
and internal threats and conspiracies was an inseparable element of this 
ideology. Initially it was based on harsh historical experience, but later it 
became a necessary condition for the regime’s existence. The support and 
legitimization of this regime and the messianic ideology required continuous 
expansion of the empire’s borders. This depleted the national economic and 
manpower resources, brought about new vulnerability and discontent inside 
the state, and evoked fear and hostility in surrounding areas. As a result, the 
fixed idea about external and internal threats became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. The militant foreign and domestic policies, based on the 
supposition of conspiracies inside and outside the country, produced actual 
opposition in the country and abroad. (Arbatov, 2006:23-26) 
In a similar vein, though not involving a logic of opposition, Alfred Rieber 
understands Russian messianism as a powerful, persistent myth of Russian 
statecraft: powerful and persistent because of offering an intellectually compelling 
and sophisticated explanation for the inexplicable, striking continuities of Russian 
history:  
(1) the long process of colonization and conquest that increased the territorial 
expanse of Russia from a small principality in the fifteenth century to one-
sixth of the world’s land surface in the nineteenth century; (2) the remarkable 
longevity of Russia as a great power, lasting from the time of Peter the Great 
to the present, while during this same period other contemporary empires 
had lost their territories and fallen from the ranks of the mighty; and (3) the 
concentration of political power and hence the making of foreign policy in the 
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hands of a small number of people, often just one man or woman – whether 
Peter, Catherine, or Joseph Stalin – which naturally led to the conclusion that 
there were no institutional restraints on the extensions of that power either 
domestically or internationally. (Rieber, 1993:321)  
The real reasons behind these continuities are in Rieber’s account a mix of Russia’s 
geocultural and geopolitical conditions, including its relative economic 
backwardness, its permeable frontiers along its periphery, its multiculturalism and 
its cultural marginality. While Rieber’s account arguably is a form of structuralism, it 
is rather sophisticated, emphasising the social and historical contingency of the 
structures in question. Both Rieber and Arbatov thus point to the central, unifying 
and legitimising role of Russian messianism as a persistent myth and ideology in an 
expanding, diverse multicultural empire with very specific conditions.   
 
What then are the weaknesses with of these realist approaches? We readily affirm 
that classical, culturalist and historicist realist approaches are more sophisticated and 
useful for understanding ideas, politics and identity than both structuralist 
neorealism (with its reductionist structuralism) and mainstream constructivism. The 
problem, as Walker explains, is that while political realism’s statism and focus on 
‘difference’ and conflict are born out of a concern with the dangers of radical 
universalism, or messianism as identity politics, political realism in this manner fails 
to problematise the constructed grand oppositions between particularism and 
universalism, difference and identity, structure and agency, and realism and 
idealism. (Walker, 1993:123-24) 
The previous section stated that constructivism fails to provide useful tools 
for analysing the politics of ideas and identity because of not grasping the agent-
structure problem, and this is the same in the case of realism, though it arguably is 
more sensitive to the political in identity construction. Classical realism, Ashley 
argues, fails as a theory of world politics because it is so deeply immersed in the 
tradition: it lacks any independent theoretical standards for the criticism of that 
tradition’s limits or questioning of the historical conditions underlying its own 
tradition; is unable to grasp the deeper dimensions of crisis in the world polity; and 
because its refusal to engage and learn from opposing theories and arguments. 
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‚Thus, while classical realism is rich with insights into political practice, it fares no 
better than neorealism as a scientific theory of international politics.‛ (Ashley, 
1984:274-75)  
Similarly, the type of realist work on Russia and messianism exemplified by 
Arbatov and Rieber offers general and indeed plausible explanations for the 
persistence of Russian messianism but not necessarily a cohesive theoretical 
framework for analysing contemporary messianic discourse. However, as our study 
does not seek to establish a theory of international politics but is looking for insights 
into political practice which can help us understand the persistence and politics of 
Russian messianism, these weaknesses are not paramount to our study.11  
We will thus proceed with the assumption that some insights from realist 
approaches are useful for studying Russian messianism, though we will draw more 
on analytical tools from the poststructuralist and critical perspectives to which we 
have argued realism often relates.  
 
2.5.0 Poststructuralist and Multidisciplinary Self-Other studies 
 
Poststructuralists are concerned with the relation between knowledge, language and 
power. Their conceptions of power go far beyond the neorealist conception of 
material capabilities: ‚*T+he specifically symbolic power to impose the principles of 
the construction of reality – in particular, social reality – is a major dimension of 
political power.‛ (Bourdieu, quoted in Ashley, 1984:225) Ideas then, rather than 
being some light variables independent from material structures, are understood in 
deeply political terms of interest and power as defined above. The theoretical 
approaches we explore in this section are mainly poststructuralist but also include 
related paths such as critical constructivism, ethnography and social psychology. 
They differ in some respects, and highlight different aspects of identity formation 
and politics, but generally share certain common assumptions.  
 
                                                 
11 Ruth Wodak for example defends the notion of ‚conceptual pragmatism‛, arguing that ‚the first 
question we have to address as researchers is not, ‘Do we need a grand theory?’ but rather, ‘What 
conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problem and for this or that context?’ (Wodak, 2001:64)  
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A first of these basic assumptions is that what we touched upon in the previous 
section, namely the oppositional process of identity formation.12 Meaning is brought 
to language in the first place only through the construction of binary oppositions, 
such as good/evil, dark/light, man/woman (Derrida, 1978:79-153, White, 1988:188) 
Like language, through which it is constructed, identity is given meaning through 
the inscription of oppositions, of boundaries and is thus constituted in difference: 
‚*T+he constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries that 
serve to demarcate an ‚inside‛ from an ‚outside‛, a ‚self‛ from an ‚other‛, a 
‚domestic‛ from a ‚foreign‛.‛ (Campbell, 1991, 1998:11) As Neumann explains, the 
‚basic insight of this literature goes back to Emile Durkheim’s theory of the social 
division of labor: The lineation of an ‚in-group‛ must necessarily entail its 
demarcation from a number of ‚out-groups‛, and that demarcation is an active and 
ongoing part of identity formation. The creation of social boundaries is not a 
consequence of integration; rather, it is one of its necessary a priori ingredients.‛ 
(Neumann, 1999:4)  
There can thus be no self without Other, and the self is constructed in 
discourse where it is defined and situated in relation to various Others or signifiers.13 
To give a specifically Russian illustration of the relativity of identity, we could take 
Dostoevsky’s famous statement that ‘In Europe we are only Tatars, but in Asia we 
shall appear as Europeans’ (quoted in Sarkisyanz, 1954:248). Every state identity as 
any human collective has its own specific setups of significant Others and signifiers 
telling its members who and what they are, by who and what they are not, and 
within every society there are thus different self/other nexuses each with its own set 
of diacritics – ethnic, cultural, religious, spatial, civilisational, and so on – all with 
important political implications. To study a particular human collective we thus need 
to study its competing setups of significant Others, signifiers and diacritics of 
identity. (Neumann, 1999:5)  
This brings us to our second, core assumption, namely that not only 
opposition, but contradiction is inherent to language and discourse – and by extension 
                                                 
12 ‚We view, and this needs to be emphasized, the discursive construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the basic 
fundaments of discourses of identity and difference.‛ (Wodak, 2001:73) 
13 One of few within conventional studies of nationalism who stresses the centrality of the symbolic 
demarcation of the Other for the construction of a collective self is John Armstrong, in his work Nations 




also to identity – from micro to macro levels:  ‚*S+ince meaning resides in language 
and since language is context bound and therefore unable to preserve stable meaning 
over time, contradiction resides in identity formation itself [. . .] Contradiction, then, 
functions throughout discourse, as the principle of its historicity.‛ (Neumann, 
1999:27) At the level of the state (and nation), the contradictions of identity are even 
more multifaceted.  
The basic contradictions inherent to language mean that state identity is 
problematic in itself - its foundation is not a given, the state’s existence continuously 
has to be justified and legitimised. And beyond the legitimisation of its existence, the 
state’s specifics, roles and interests are anything but given: political leaders have to 
continuously negotiate between a number of different and complex interests, 
situations and needs – socio-economic, cultural, political, trade, ethnic and religious, 
and seek to strike a balance between them which will uphold political stability – the 
true ‘balance of power’. States are thus never ‘finished’ as entities, and as Campbell 
notes, there is ‚a tension between the demands of identity and the practices that 
constitute it [that] can never be fully resolved, because the performative nature of 
identity can never be fully revealed.‛  
We can here conclude that a) states are in permanent reproduction; and b) 
that states have no ontological status apart from the practices that constitute their 
reality, that is, they are without ‚prediscursive foundations.‛ (Campbell, 1991, 
1998:12) So, there is contradiction and incoherence residing at all levels of discourse, 
rendering a coherent, continuous collective identity impossible. Yet, humans tend to 
strive to conceive of and represent collective identity as coherent, as an 
uncomplicated given.14 And this is where we find the function of ideas and ideology 
(which in constructivism appeared so abstract): the stories we tell about ‘ourselves’, and 
the boundaries we inscribe between us and others function as to make-believe we have a 
coherent identity.  In disguising the incoherencies and contradictions of collective 
                                                 
14 There are obviously different ways to conceptualise why this is so, why collective identities are 
constructed at all, and this study does not have the scope to explore them in depth. For a helpful 
overview on the literature on identity formation in IR, see the first chapter of Neumann’s Russia and the 
Idea of Europe (1999).  For a more traditional survey of perspectives on nationalism, see Smith’s survey 
Nationalism and modernism. (Smith, 1998) 
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identity, story-telling (or more broadly speaking, discourse) in the form of 
stereotypes, ideas, narratives and ideology has a crucial political function.15  
As an example, just consider Samuel Huntington’s heavily criticised but 
influential theory of the ‘clash of civilisations’ (1996) – incidentally hugely popular in 
Russia – which told a neat story of a number ‘civilisational’ identities, most notably 
‘the West’ and ‘the Islamic world’, and their interaction; and in so doing offered a 
seemingly unproblematic way of conceiving identity in a global and anything but 
unproblematic context. Thus the logic of opposition brings meaning to both language 
and stories, and ideas and stories offer meaning to identity and social reality.  
As characterised by K.D. Bracher, ideology is ‚the attempts of groups – 
nations, states, organizations – to simplify complex realities into one, all-embracing 
truth in a bipolar framework of foe/friend (quoted in Talshir, 2006:1). Stories about 
who we are, and who we are not, are a political necessity, because they offer to make 
sense things that otherwise do not make sense. Story-telling, or identity construction, 
thus ‚establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated‛. 
(Campbell, 1991, 1998) We will now proceed to look in more detail at examples of 
how these core assumptions or insights have been developed in and applied to 
studies of identity and statecraft, both on Russia and Russian messianism and other 
specific and general cases.  
 
Iver Neumann was among the first scholars to bring the insights of social theory to 
IR studies, and provides an extremely useful overview of different theoretical paths 
for understanding identity formation through the self/other dichotomy (1999). His 
own work draws mainly on the insights of dialogism. Bakhtin, its founding father, 
turned away from the dialectical theorizing of identity, redressed what he called 
‚epistemologism,‛ ‚the reification of a knowing and sovereign self, cut off from the 
consciousness of the other‛ and argued ‚that the other has the status of an 
epistemological as well as an ontological necessity.‛ (Neumann, 1999:13) Neumann’s 
IR study of Russian ideas and identity, Russia and the Idea of Europe, is a sophisticated 
historical discourse analysis of the persistent, contending representations of Russia 
reflected in Russia’s since long ongoing debate about Europe. Neumann powerfully 
                                                 




shows how the process of delineating a European Other from the Russian self, in 
other words the debate on how to relate to the Europe/the West, constitutes a 
persistent and integral part of Russia’s identity process, and also explains nineteenth 
century Russian messianism from within this framework – the next chapter will 
present these findings in more detail. (1996)  
A particularly important insight about Russia in Neumann’s work is the 
continued ambivalence, and not only logic of opposition, in the Russian relation to 
Europe as Other. Other examples of where this type of approach is applied to 
specific countries include for example Xavier Guillaume’s application of dialogism to 
Japanese identity formation where he shows how different representations of 
Japanese identity were in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries developed in response 
to external (mainly Western) influences. (Guillaume, 2002)  
In a similar vein, Michael Urban maps and analyse the various dialogic 
discourses of national identity competing to fill what was portrayed as the absence of 
a national idea in post-Soviet Russia. Urban underscores the politic battle of the 
process of collective identity formation in Russia, arguing that ‚the producers of a 
would-be national idea, are in fact politicians locked in bitter struggle with one 
another.‛ (Urban, 1998:970) The methodology of his study involved analysis and 
interpretation of the dialogic discourses generating from these politicians, looking 
‚for the significance of the signifiers in question by examining their associations 
with, and oppositions to, other signifiers prevalent in the discourse from which the 
respective narratives spring.‛ (Urban, 1998:972)  
His findings draw attention to the political, world-creating capacity of 
language, to the function of discourse to, again in Bracher’s words, ‚simplify 
complex realities into all-embracing truths in a bipolar framework of foe/friend‚ 
(quoted in Talshir, 2006:1);  as well as to the contested nature of discourse.  
In short, the tendency is to invest individuals and social or national groups 
(reified) with one or another set of (essential) qualities or characteristics 
(hypostatised and sometimes mystical) that are valorised in the respective 
discourses, and then to unfold a discussion of the world wherein these 
individuals or social/national groups (thus invested) act out their respective 
tendencies. (Urban, 1998)  
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Urban singles out two main discursive regimes constituting the post-Soviet debate, 
both containing different themes and sometimes within themselves contradicting 
discourses, but nevertheless coherent enough for various scholars to identify them in 
basically the same way, the first being an objection to the present state, and the 
second an objection to that objection. The first objection is made comparing Russia to 
an Other – the West – and finds her deficient. The common subtext could be worded: 
‚Things are much better there; our state is utterly failing us and should be replaced.‛  
The second regime, the objection to the objection, is the messianic position, 
and Urban suggests its common subtext could be: ‚Who are you to prefer another to 
your own? You must be someone who either does not understand, or despises his 
own country which is <*‘spiritual’, ‘all-human’, ‘collectivist’, ‘chosen by God’ etc+‛. 
(Urban, 1998:981) This position is however anything but coherent, but as Urban 
notes, it exists largely in the form of irrationally put together myths, symbols and 
Slavophile ideas, mainly in the communist-patriot discourse. Notably, this discourse 
‚deals only in absolutes: good vs. evil, selfless sacrifice vs. treasonous ambition, 
patriot and culture bearers against satanic agents sowing confusion and chaos. It 
makes no distinction between spheres of action – state/society, public/private – and 
norms appropriate to each‛ and Urban argues these radical characteristics ‚confine 
the communist-patriotic discourse to the plane of eschatology‛. (Urban, 1998:981)  
Going back to William’s reading of Morgenthau and classical realism, we are 
reminded Morgenthau saw as the great danger of universalistic nationalism, or 
messianism, precisely its totalitarian refusal to be limited to the sphere of politics, 
instead encroaching all social spheres including morality, economics, art and so on. 
(Williams, 2004:643-46). The kaleidoscopic breadth and incoherence of the 
communist-patriot, or broadly speaking messianic, discourse counter posed to its 
simplistic binary logic leads us to suggests that one function of this logic is to divert 
focus not only from the ontological impossibility of a coherent identity, but also from 
the discourse’s own internal incoherencies, through the exacerbation of the 
difference between self and Other to the extreme. The absolutist, eschatological 
discourse is not only a post-Soviet phenomenon however, but is in Urban’s view 
characteristic of the whole Russian intellectual tradition:   
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[T]he pronounced tendency in Russia today for political expression to take 
the form of intense moral-cultural struggles for the ‘soul’ of the nation reflects 
longstanding practices particular to that country’s political class, the 
intelligentsia. In the discourses historically associated with this class on the 
political field, eschatological considerations overwhelm mundane concerns, 
thus constructing a world in which good and evil are locked in mortal combat 
and political actors assume their significance largely in the act of joining 
battle with evil. (Urban, 1998:970) 
Viewing Neumann’s and Urban’s work together, it can be surely concluded that 
much of political discourse in post-Soviet Russia constitutes reproductions and 
variations of much older narratives, permitting us to discern in Russia a historically 
persistent discursive framework, though Neumann stresses ambiguity, and Urban 
opposition, in the relation to the Other.  
 
Another approach to self/other studies is based on social psychology. Work in this 
vein specifically on Russian messianism includes that of Daniel Rancour-Laferriere in 
his interdisciplinary work on Russian nationalism (Rancour-Laferriere, 2000) and 
Evgenii Barabanov who defines messianism as ‚disctinctivist mentality‛ and views it 
in very negative terms: ‚To Barabanov this mentality is pathological; he believes that 
mechanisms of repression have produced in Russia a widespread ‚neurosis of 
distinctiveness‛ that is manifested philosophically in the specific character of 
Slavophilism and related currents in Russian thought.‛ (Scanlan, 1994b:52) A 
problem with this type of psychoanalysis applied to collective identity is that it tends 
to reify the self, or in Neumann’s words, deal with ‘a self that is not socially situated’. 
An exception is Lacanian psychoanalytical theory which studies ‚identity formation 
as an attempt to overcome a lack, as a process of desire for the power of the other, 
that produces an image of the self.‛ (Neumann, 1999:8) Henriki Heikka is one who 
has taken this path to study contemporary Russian identity.16 Heikka in particular 
                                                 
16 Heikka makes a point of separating his approach from that of constructivists, arguing that 
mainstream constructivists simplify identity in that their theories’ ‚casual claims rest on a modernist 
account of agency, which omits the tension between identity and decentring of the self.‛ Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory, on the other hand, shows that ‚self as a linguistic representation is not the 
original self, as constructivism suggests, but the result of a cultural process by which the first 
understanding of the self, constructed through visual identification, becomes subordinate to the 
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seeks to explain what he terms hypernationalism, which we would argue refers to the 
same phenomenon we term Russian messianism:  
[T]he idea that a lack in the symbolic other is the prerequisite for any identity 
allows us to construct an alternative hypothesis about the phenomenon of 
hypernationalism, one adding a Lacanian twist to Freud’s and Rousseau’s 
criticism of corrupt polities. In hypernationalist discourse, the inferior other 
(the Communist, the imperialist, the Jew, the Black) is the signifier of the lack 
in the symbolic other, the displacement needed to hide the impossibility of 
the collective identity constructed in the symbolic. (Heikka, 1999:88) 
In his case study on Russia, Heikka analyses the (for Russian political discourse 
typical) hypernationalist/messianic/anti-Western worldview of Sergei Kortunov– 
Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Policy Planning (whom we cited in our 
introduction) and argues that its logic is not – contrary to Kortunov’s own claims, 
and what respectively mainstream constructivism and neorealism would have us 
believe – a result of how Western governments have behaved towards Russia, nor 
due to changes in the international structure. Rather, an imaginary desire leads 
Kortunov’s Russia to identify itself with what it is not – the heart of an interculture – 
and this causes Russia to become ‚an alienated, split, and desiring self, fearful of 
losing something it never had.‛ (Heikka, 1999:99)  
Following Lacan, Heikka argues that ‚a deconstruction of the operation of 
[symbolic] desire can help us understand the relation between Russian identity and 
Russian foreign policy‛. (Heikka, 1999:93) Kortunov’s Russia does not want to 
‚define its identity by the master signifiers offered by the currently available 
language‛ (neoliberal economic discourse) and so a desire is created for new master 
signifiers, of which some function to describe the (symbolically represented, 
constructed) self, some represent a threatening Other, some a symbolic Other (e.g. 
God), some inferior Others (e.g. the Jews). 17 The reader of the discourse is a receiver-
other, and participates in this construction of identity by assuming a system of 
knowledge based on the master signifiers presented in the discourse.  
                                                                                                                                            
covenant of representation and to the basic rules on which social and political order is based.‛ (Heikka, 
1999:58-9) 
17 In the symbolic, desire operates in relation to language. Here we find the concept of master signifiers, 
‚which function as the bearers of people’s identity. They derive their power from people’s relation to 
them (from being people’s representative in the symbolic) and from the ensuing split in people, which 
in turn arouses desire.‛ (Heikka, 1999:90) 
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The concept of ‘symbolic desire’ is quite unique to the Lacanian approach 
taken by Heikka, and possibly problematic to pin down as an explanatory category. 
It should be noted though, that both Western and Russian academic discourse often 
refers in psychoanalytical terms to a Russian ‘inferiority complex’ towards ‘the West’ 
and Russian messianism and ideas of great power as having a compensatory 
function (e.g. Bassin, 2006:112). While we dismiss the popular, essentialising related 
concepts of a ‘common Russian psyche,’ the notions of desire, inferiority and 
compensation reiterate the centrality of ‘the West’ as significant Other in Russian 
popular discourse, and again following Neumann, the ambivalence and not only 
opposition, to this Other.  
Overall, we find our two core assumptions reiterated and expanded upon in 
Heikka’s Lacanian approach. Firstly, we find an analysis of the textual politics of a 
specific identity discourse which is based on identifying, locating and examining 
various key signifiers or Others – descriptive of self, threatening, symbolic, inferior, 
and so on. Secondly, the function of the messianic discourse, or essentialising story 
about the ‘self’, or system of knowledge, is again identified as bringing ostensible 
coherence to what is otherwise not coherent – as Heikka writes, the reader/receiver 
of the discourse gets ‚a feeling of security and a sense of direction‛.
 18 (Heikka, 
1999:102)  
If we can accept that states are continuously re-invented in relationship to 
broad internal-external discursive politics, how then should we characterise the role 
and function of Russian messianism in relationship to Russian statecraft, including 
external relations and perceptions? A lot of the literature on Russian messianism is 
concerned with proving the relation between Russian messianism and Russian 
foreign policy (Duncan, 2000:144-46).  
We are of the view that a neat, direct causal relationship between the Russian 
messianic ideas and Russian foreign policy is impossible to establish, since as such it 
could never be empirically verified. As has been pointed out, ideas are indeed ‚hard 
to pin down as explanatory categories.‛ (Zehfuss, 2001) However, what we can do is 
                                                 
18 Heikka, like Barabanov assuming an openly normative position, argues that this kind of discourse is 
corrupt, because the speaker neglects the desire of the reader-receiver (in this case the Russian people) 
which reduces them to a position of slavery. ‚Their right to express their lack is suppressed by the 
masters (probably honest) ignorance of the split in his own identity.‛ (Heikka, 1999:103) 
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to analyse in more depth the functions of foreign policy and story-telling and then 
analyse what power relations and identities are part of certain stories.  
 
A useful poststructuralist approach is found in David Campbell’s (for IR) pioneering 
work on American foreign policy: Writing Security (1991, 1998). It highlights how 
identity construction, or story-telling, or othering, at the level of the state is done 
through the practice of foreign policy, by the use of ‘discourses of danger’: ‚The 
constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is not a threat to a state’s 
identity or existence: it is its condition of possibility. While the objects of concern 
change over time, the techniques and exclusions by which those objects are 
constituted as dangers persist.‛ (Campbell, 1991, 1998:12-13) So ‘we’ are united not 
only against other actors, but also against other signifiers such as dangers. 
What then are the discourses of danger? Campbell traces its origins to the 
church and Christendom as the previous ordering entity before the modern state. He 
sees a correlation between the state project of security and the church project of 
salvation:  
The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its 
citizens who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church 
justifies its role by guaranteeing salvation to its followers who, it says, would 
otherwise be destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and the church 
to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an 
evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in 
the process to the temptation to treat difference as otherness. (Campbell, 1991, 
1998:50-51) 
Danger can be domestic, coming from within, but the discourse on danger 
externalizes it, makes an Other – could be black or Hispanic American in America, or 
a Jew or Caucasian in Russia, responsible for it. For the US, the case study in 
Campbell’s work, he argues that it has an acute crisis of representation, following the 
end of the effective discourse of danger ‘operation anticommunism’. With what 
Campbell calls ‚the globalization of contingency‛, ‚the erasure of the markers of 
certainty, and the rarefaction of political discourse‛, the reproduction of US identity 
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has become more difficult, requiring new discourses of danger. (Campbell, 1991, 
1998:171)  
One example of a new international discourse of danger is the environment. 
In this discourse, Eastern Europe, yet again ‚the East‛ – less technologically 
advanced, not ecological and so on - looms with its environmental disasters as a 
danger to ‚us‛ in ‚the West‛. (Campbell, 1991, 1998:171-72) Interestingly, when we 
look at Russian contemporary discourses of danger, we find the same discourse but 
reversed: the materialistic, decadent West (typically represented as the author of 
globalisation), poses a great environmental danger to the natural, healthy and 
ecological Russia/the East, the defender of the environment, (see e.g. Sokolenko, 
1999) again suggesting that insights on intertextuality from dialogism could be 
helpful in understanding these phenomena.  
If Campbell, and Arbatov from among the realists (see previous section), are 
right about the discourses of danger, it seems that we can again talk about persistent 
discursive frameworks with stories of danger and Otherness, that may change over 
time but whose central logic of opposition is continuously reproduced; and that a 
main reason for their persistence lies in their legitimising and assimilatory functions. 
Our proposal then, is that Russian messianism can be conceptualised as such a 
framework.  
What then are the weaknesses with this approach? Campbell’s work Writing Security 
has been rightly criticised for not accounting for the contested nature of discourse, in 
that it studies only the dominant story of the American self, and not also those 
stories that challenged it. (Neumann, 1999:28)  
It should thus be reiterated that story-telling, being inherently political, is not 
at all a simple, straightforward process – different stories or discourses about whom 
we are, and whom we are not, with different diacritics of identity, compete with 
each other, resulting not only in simple opposition but ambiguity and ambivalence 
in the construction of the self and relation to Other. And different interests and 
power relations are implied in or connected to different stories and different 
signifiers. It should therefore be a central question to IR in general to enquire how 
and why and certain stories (and groups of them) about collective identities, such as 
those of Russian messianism, prevail over others.  
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Furthermore, following for example the insights in approaches taken by 
Urban and Heikka, it is important to note that signifiers defining and legitimising a 
state as a collective self include not only negative ones of danger and enmity, but 
also positive ones of describing the self and its symbolic Others (though strictly 
speaking a negative Other is a logical implication of each positive signifier), 
something which mainstream ethnographic studies of nationalism have for long 
argued, stressing the central role of national myths in legitimating the social order. 
The core theoretical assumption is that: ‚*t+he nation creates and recreates 
itself through continuous symbolic discourse about its present and future, by 
referring to its past. [. . .] Symbols of national identity and myths of national 
past, being employed in the political discourse, serve as legitimation of power 
and political leadership. At the same time, the legitimation of power by the 
rulers on the one hand, and the willingness to accept and appreciate power 
and leadership by the ruled on the other, are mutually reinforced by belief in 
shared national values.‛ (Hellberg-Hirn, 2000:7) 
In conclusion then, the insights and analytical tools from poststructuralist and 
related self-Other approaches, while each having its own limits and weaknesses, are 
the most adequate and helpful for understanding identity and statecraft in general 
and Russian messianism and its functions in particular.  
 
2.6.0 Conclusion: A new conceptualisation of Russian messianism 
 
In general terms of IR theory, we have suggested that the conventional framing of 
the so-called ‘third debate’ between ‘reflectivist’ and ‘rationalist’ approaches with 
constructivism claiming to occupy the middle ground, is unhelpful for students of 
ideas and identity politics (Patomaki and Wight, 2000). Neo-realism and mainstream 
constructivism both fail to take into account politics of identity. Instead we have 
suggested that a shared emphasis on interest and power, defined in broad social 
terms, and a stress of the legitimising and assimilatory functions of discourse bring 
together realists and poststructuralists as unconventional allies.  
Insights from certain strands of these approaches into different aspects both 
of identity and statecraft in general and Russia and Russian messianism in particular 
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have led us to propose an inclusive conceptualisation of Russian messianism as 
constituting a historically dominant discursive (interpretive and narrative) 
framework, based on a radicalised logic of opposition and holding a range of both 
contesting and complementing narratives and signifiers which represent different 
interests but which on the whole function to legitimise the state through the 
continuous construction, contestation and reproduction of Russian collective identity 
in relation to Others; and creating a system of intelligibility, making sense of the 
world for the state as well as for ordinary people.19  
 
The first question arising following this conceptualisation concerns how much 
Russian messianism as defined here should be understood in terms of the 
universality of identity construction and statehood; how much in terms of similarity 
between specific types of political entities – e.g. empires, civilisations – and how 
much in terms of contextual specificities, both Russian and broader.  
If, as we have argued, opposition and incoherence are universally inherent to 
language and thus to any state identity construction, the discursive framework with 
which we equate Russian messianism is this sense a normality and indeed necessity 
to any state as a collective identity. Any state needs to legitimise its own existence 
and actions; any state faces the need to mask the ontological impossibility of a 
‘collective self’ and the complexities and ambiguities of politics in its widest sense, 
the intricate balancing of multiple interests. And in all states, this is done through 
telling essentialising stories about the self in the form of discourses of danger, 
national myths, political ideologies etc, stories containing different types of signifiers, 
locating the self in relation to Others – symbolic, threatening, inferior, etc – stories 
which may vary over time, and which are contested in nature, but whose central 
logic is replicated over and over again as their crucial political functions remain.20  
                                                 
19 Obviously, these are only some of the possible functions of the phenomena of Russian messianism. As 
Shapiro has stressed: ‚There are always multiple possible true descriptions of a given action or 
phenomenon, and the challenge is to decide which is most apt.‛ (Shapiro, 2002:604) 
20 ‘Universality’ here does not refer to some concept transcending time and space as the sovereign state 
to which it relates here is a historically conditioned. Yet, the laws and binary logic of language through 
which the state is constructed can be pragmatically and conditionally termed ‘universal’ or at least 




However, messianic stories of the type told in Russia are not widespread in 
all states/societies today, and especially not at the level of political discourse. Not all 
states tell stories in which they have a mission to save the world; that they are the 
spiritual alternative to an evil West, the Christ to the nations, and so on.21 What 
makes Russian messianism really stand out is the radicalisation of opposition 
between identity and difference in which difference becomes otherness and Other 
becomes enemy; its eschatology and its inherent claims to universality.  
These are not however characteristics unique to Russia: we have seen how 
universalist nationalism of different states was a key concern for classical realists 
such as Morgenthau, and we can note intertextuality and similarity between 
American and Russian discourses of danger and both exceptionalist and universalist 
claims through for example Campbell’s above discussed work on American foreign 
policy. Rieber and Arbatov presented the specific geocultural and ethnographic 
conditions of Russia as a multicultural expanding empire as key explanatory 
categories of Russian messianism as a legitimising and unifying ideology.  
The radicalisation of the self-Other logic of Russian messianism as this type of 
framework could then arguably be seen as specific not only to Russia but to other, in 
key respects similar, political entities such as the United States. Where social realities 
and geocultural conditions are more complex than say in a small, relatively 
homogenous nation-state, it would make sense if the simplifying, radicalist self-other 
framework is more attractive.  
The Russian messianic framework has its own particular stories and signifiers 
and binary oppositions, some which are quite unique to Russia, some which it has in 
common with other identity representations, which again suggests that we must 
study and analyse these stories within specific social, political, historical, cultural and 
intellectual contexts if we want to understand this dimension of Russian statecraft.  
We suggest thus that the core, radicalist logic of opposition masks both the 
kaleidoscopic and incoherent character of Russian messianic discourse as well as the 
ontological impossibility of a coherent identity, indicating both specificity and 
                                                 
21 For example Heikka’s work, discussed above, identifies as the perceived main threat against 
Kortunov’s hypernationalist/messianic Russian self the ‚the ‘new world order’ imposed by the West, 
based on materialism and the culture of consumption.‛ (Heikka, 1999) 
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normality of Russian messianism as a social and political phenomenon. But we do 
not claim to have answered in full the question on the universality/specificity of 
Russian messianism as a social and political phenomenon, only to have highlighted 
some of the different analytical dimensions within which it can be usefully 
understood.  
The concern with the relationship between the universal aspects (in the sense 
of being common to all states) such as the oppositional character of discourse and 
identity and the overall ambiguities and complexities of political and social life; and 
the both historically and structurally specific aspects and conditions both of ‘empires’ 
and ‘civilisations’ as a type of political entity, and of Russia and Russian discourse in 
particular contexts, will underlie much of our discussions in the following chapters 
as we explore the Russian messianic framework and its narratives and signifiers in 
more detail and at different levels of discourse.  
While the conceptualisation of messianism as a persistent dichotomising 
discursive framework could be limited in the sense that it becomes a reification 
(Hughes, 2005), and that of a stereotype, we would argue that it nevertheless is an 
important tool in the sense of an umbrella-term which helps us to identify and locate 
contemporary narratives and themes, including many which are not evidently 
explicitly messianic, within a long-standing, broad, discursive tradition. This is thus 
not so much a study of the concept of messianism, as a study of various discursive 
practices which can be usefully labelled as such. This identification and location is 
important if we are to understand the politics behind the deployment of these 
narratives and themes.  
Much of this thesis is concerned with the forms these discourses take today, 
what objects of concern have replaced old ones in the same old narratives and which 
of the messianic narratives that work best in Russia today. The next chapter, drawing 
on the work of various scholars from different disciplines that analyse different 
dimensions and periods of Russian discourse, will seek to further demonstrate why 








i) Theory and methods 
 
The previous chapter discussed the relative merits for conceptualising the continuity 
and survival of Russian messianism, as set out in some of the leading theoretical 
approaches to International Relations- constructivism, neorealism and political 
realism, before adopting a theoretical framework based mainly on insights from 
poststructuralist and multidisciplinary Self-Other studies.  
Seeking to establish effective methods for studying the manifestations and 
resonance of Russian messianic discourse in official discourse and among ordinary 
Russians, this section will briefly review methods associated with each theoretical 
approach and explain why our theoretical framework leads us to choose certain 
methods and reject others. We will then go on to examine the conceptual tools 
identified in the previous chapter in more detail, and set out how we intend to use 
them and the methods they entail. Specifically, this chapter sets out to answer the 
following:  
o What are the methods that we will adopt to answer the research questions 
and test the hypotheses? 
o Why are these methods better than others for this research project? 
Questions of IR theory and methodology have traditionally been distant to studies of 
Russian foreign policy.22 Peter Shearman pertinently captures an attitude common 
among foreign policy specialists as well as many other less ‘theoretically inclined’ 
conventional researchers:  
Generally speaking, specialists on Russian foreign policy take little notice of 
what they see as arcane and often confusing debates on epistemological 
problems that now seem to dominate in International Relations. Many who 
                                                 
22 Neumann’s work is a notable exception (1996, 1999). 
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try to keep up to date with contemporary writings on IR theory often come 
away confused rather than enlightened. Recent discussions on theory and 
'inter-paradigm' debates often seem to those whose interest is in substantive 
issues little more than attempts at one-upmanship, playing out in the 
academic world a paradigmatic play of a kind of Realist power struggle over 
academic turf. Rarely, in the most recent discussions between positivists and 
post-positivists, for example, are substantive questions relating to the real 
empirical world even mentioned. It is almost as if the world 'out there' did 
not exist. (Shearman, 2001:250-51)  
These essentially positivist scholars thus get on with studying, explaining and 
predicting things in the ‘real empirical world’ instead of ‘following methodological 
fads’.
23  The crux is, however, that methodology matters very much beyond 
academia. As Steve Smith argues, the importance of the discussions that these 
foreign policy specialists avoid lies in ‚positivism’s role in determining, in the name 
of science, just what counts as the subject matter of international relations. Its 
epistemology has had enormous ontological effects, and these have affected not only 
the study but also the practice of international relations.‛ (Smith, 1996:38) The way in 
which we choose to study the ‘real world’ is thus a highly political question, because 
it affects what we find. And what we find out about the world affects action, policy, 
and so on. Walker explains further: 
As even conventional neo-Kantian philosophies of science have insisted time 
and time again, the appropriate conceptualisation of the problem already 
prefigures the solution. It is not a matter of arguing about ontological and 
epistemological issues in the abstract. Philosophical commitments are already 
embedded in concepts like state or state-system, utilitarian accounts of 
rational action, and [. . .] typologies like the so-called levels of analysis 
schema that has played such an important role in this discipline. (Walker, 
1993:100) 
So, what many of the post-positivist approaches explored in the previous chapter 
stress is precisely the politics behind the ways the world ‘out there’ is reified – 
                                                 
23 We here understand positivism broadly as the adoption of the methodology of natural sciences to 
explain the social world. (Smith, 1996:11) 
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represented as an unquestionable given. Because of their positivist and rationalist 
epistemologies, the previous chapter argued, mainstream constructivism and 
neorealism are inadequate as tools for understanding the historically contingent 
development of collective identities, and the origins, persistence and revival of 
specifically Russian messianic ideas. These epistemological stances lead to various 
methodological difficulties.  
Let us begin with constructivism. Firstly, the constructivist claim that ideas 
‚send the same message to different actors causing the same behaviour among these 
actors‛ (Wiener, 2003:261) overlooks the fluidity of language by which ideas and 
norms are constructed. Ideas can signal very different things to different actors in 
different contexts, which is why, in Shapiro’s words, ‚we must operate with a view 
of politics that is sensitive to textuality.‛ (Shapiro, 2001:319)  
As constructivism does not do so, its methods for studying ideas inevitably 
fall short. Secondly, constructivism argues that we need to study the norms which 
define e.g. Russian actor identity, and by doing so we can predict actor behaviour. 
But as there is, competing in official Russian discourse alone, a conglomerate of 
different both contradictory and complementing ideas, themes and norms, and as 
mainstream constructivism does not present any tools to deal with this contested 
nature of politics, it is methodologically difficult to study Russian messianism in 
terms of norms from a mainstream constructivist perspective. This again relates to 
constructivism’s insensitivity to language and its contingent nature.   
Neorealism is assumed to more than anything deal with the ‘real world’ of 
material capabilities, inter-state conflict, and real power relations. But it has adopted, 
among others, a methodology based on microeconomics. In Walker’s words, it offers 
‚something like a theory of the structures of oligopolistic competition in which states 
become ‘units’ and units become synonymous with firms operating within some 
kind of market.‛ (Walker, 1993:117) This creates an ambivalence since neorealism 
makes a lot of claims about pluralism and difference, but at the same time uses ‚an 
epistemology that, in its claim to a universalistically designated model of science, 
affirms the principle of identity.‛ (Walker, 1993:118) So there is little room for 
studying the specificities of particular states since states are assumed to be 
structurally very similar. And seeing Russia as a unitary actor among many others 
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rather limits the study of this country which is so structurally different from many 
other countries with its enormous territory and cultural, economic, ethnic and other 
extreme diversities.  
So while neorealism claims to deal with the ‘real world’ it uses simplistic 
metaphors and analogues (micro-economics, game-theory etc) as basis for its 
methodologies, which means that complex realities are reduced to simplified 
schemes and systems, the academic value of which must be questioned. Central here 
is the unquestioned contradiction between the complex domestic realities (where 
pluralism is acknowledged by neorealists) which is assumed to depend on a simple 
international reality (the balance of power in the unitary international system).    
Within a neorealist framework Russian messianic ideas would be viewed as 
part of the domestic discourse, and since neorealism favours the international over 
the domestic (‘outside’ over ‘inside’) these ideas would be largely irrelevant except 
as instrumentalist ‚hooks‛ to justify international political action domestically, and 
they would depend on the international balance of power. ‚Neo-realists [. . .] will 
argue that the distribution of power among states will dictate which Muscovite 
discourse wins; for example, under unipolarity those discourses wishing to 
counterbalance the United States *. . .+ will win.‛ (Dessler and Owen, 2005:606) So 
unless we question the whole international/domestic dichotomy, there is no room for 
understanding Russian messianism within international relations theory (Walker, 
1993). 
 If neorealist approaches to methodology are too ahistoricist and narrowly 
structuralist, would other conventional positivist methodologies such as historical 
comparitivism fare better? Here one would seek to compare for example policies of 
different countries in different periods, to identify patterns and produce 
classifications. A typical example of this approach with bearing on messianism 
understood as typical for empires is an attempt by Peter Wallensteen to prove that 
relations between ‘major powers’ can be described as shifting between universalism 
and particularism. His ‚focus is on comparing periods of collective major power 
universalism, and on contrasting them to periods of predominant particularism.‛ 
(Wallensteen, 1984:244) He finds that pursuits of universalist policies are 
characterised by fewer wars and confrontations, while periods of predominant 
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particularism are characterised by higher levels of war and confrontations. An 
immediate problem with this approach is, as Michael Nicholson has pointed out, the 
ambiguity of measurement when describing social factors, which often leads to 
arbitrary definitions. (Nicholson, 1996:138) And this, as Walker explains, makes even 
historical comparativism structuralist and ahistoricist: ‚A sensitivity to history and 
time is always in danger of being undermined through reification. This is the 
essential complaint brought against the utilitarian or rationalist approach by those 
who are identified with reflection. Historical practices are analysed as ahistorical 
structures. Conscious human practices are erased in favour of structural 
determinations.‛ (Walker, 1993:100-01) So, to reiterate, any historical approach does 
not do as methodology for studying Russian messianism – we need to adopt a 
sensitivity to textuality, history and human practice.  
Here, as the previous chapter argued, historicist, classical and culturalist 
variants of realism fare better, with their rich insights into political practice and 
process, and deeper understanding of ideology and the self/other dichotomy. In 
Buzan’s words, realism ‚is a broad church. Its core ideas about power, struggle, 
domination and insecurity cross cultural boundaries more easily than those of its 
main rival, liberalism.‛ (Buzan, 1996:62) As Buzan points out, realism is indeed very 
methodologically eclectic and can actually be reconciled with postpositivist 
approaches to methodology: ‚There are traditions within realism that are receptive 
to the idea of language as power, and discourse as a major key to politics [. . .] and 
much of the postmodern debate is precisely concerned with issues of power, 
hierarchy and domination that are congenial to the realist tradition. (Buzan, 1996:59)  
How then does post-positivist scholarship relate to the ‘real empirical world’? 
Post-positivist approaches generally do not dismiss the importance of empirical 
research – but as Walker stresses, ‚empirical knowledge is a more complex and 
interesting process than it is so often made to appear.‛ (Walker, 1993:100) Below we 
will broadly outline of our essentially post-positivist framework for studying 
Russian messianism, which we hope will indeed help us understand how Russian 





ii) Aspects of understanding Russian messianism and their methods 
 
Our methods will inevitably reflect our theoretical conceptualisation of Russian 
messianism. As Shapiro points out: ‚There are always multiple possible true 
descriptions of a given action or phenomenon, and the challenge is to decide which is 
most apt.‛ (Shapiro, 2002:604) Chapter Two singled out three broad aspects from 
which to understand this phenomenon within IR:  
 
o Russian messianism as routine state identity construction 
o Messianism as necessary for exceptionalist states: multicultural empires or 
civilisations 
o Manifestations of Russian messianism within particular social, historical and 
intellectual contexts in Russia, the West and worldwide 
 
The insights about relativism, opposition, dualisms and incoherence as inherent to 
language and by extension to any identity construction leads to a view of the 
Russian messianic framework as a normality/necessity to any state as a collective 
identity, with its core functions including legitimisation, balancing complex interests 
and masking various incoherencies, creating systems of intelligibility, all achieved 
through ‘storytelling’ in the form of discourses of danger and otherness, national 
myths, political ideologies containing different types of signifiers.  
These discourses may vary over time, and are contested and dialogic in 
nature, but their central logic is replicated over and over again as their political 
functions remain, and as their practices become institutionalised. To draw on 
Christopher Hughes, Russian messianism can be treated ‚as a concept around which 
various associated themes are divided, contrasted, regrouped, classified, and 
derived from one another.‛ (Hughes, 2005:267)  
The significance of the narratives can thus not be found hermeneutically 
inside the narratives themselves but need to be understood in their wider discursive 
and political context. To understand Russian political life, we thus need to 
contextualise these themes, the representations of self and Others, and the interests 
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they may represent. In Urban’s words, we need to look ‚for the significance of the 
signifiers in question by examining their associations with, and oppositions to, other 
signifiers prevalent in the discourse from which the respective narratives spring.‛ 
(Urban, 1998:972)  
Our analysis must uncover the hidden dualisms which bring meaning to the 
discourse and coherence to an identity representation. ‚We view, and this needs to 
be emphasized, the discursive construction of ‘us’ and ‘them’ as the basic 
fundaments of discourses of identity and difference.‛ (Wodak, 2001:73) By studying 
representations of Others, dangers, enemies and threats, we reveal the unstated 
counter narratives of the self. Before we take these notions further, let us note that 
this methodology also will apply to the study of Russia as a special political entity, a 
civilisation or multicultural empire. In this understanding there is an emphasis on 
the radicalisation of the opposition between identity and difference in which 
difference becomes otherness and Other becomes enemy; on the eschatology and 
claims to universality within the self-representations.  
These characteristics are not found among all states as collective identities but 
neither are they particular to Russia alone. Chapter Two noted that instances of 
similarity between, for example, American and Russian representations and 
suggested that where social realities and geocultural conditions are more complex 
than in for example a small, relatively homogenous nation-state, it would be 
understandable if the simplifying, radicalist self-other framework is more attractive 
or indeed necessary.  
This understanding of Russian messianism can be usefully studied both from 
a perspective of political philosophy and in terms of comparative studies, but 
because of the focus and scope of our study we will not pursue those paths at length 
but proceed primarily with the methods available through forms of discourse 
analysis. Here, particularly insights on intertextuality from dialogism are necessary: 
‚Individuals, when they speak, do not create their own language, but they use  
terms which are culturally, historically and ideologically available.‛ (Billig, 2001:217-
18) Hence, ‚all utterances are dialogic in that they are responses to other utterances 




Discourse, thought and identity are all dynamic and relational: we never 
speak, think or exist in a vacuum. Rather, we are engaged in a continuous process of 
reproduction of the world through our words. A core insight of dialogism applied to 
self/Other studies is that a prevailing discourse (or representation of self) acquires its 
form by the discourse it opposes, which can help us understand the intertextuality 
between for example Russian and American messianic representations. But the 
Russian messianic framework also contains manifestations, stories and signifiers 
that are particular for Russia as a country and/or for various historical, social, 
political and intellectual contexts. This again suggests that we must study and 
analyse particular stories within their different contexts, and with a deep 
understanding of Russian history, religion and culture.  
Forms of discourse analysis will thus be the central method of this study, but 
taking into consideration the above three core aspects of understanding Russian 
messianism, we have adopted the notion of ‚conceptual pragmatism‛, agreeing with 
Ruth Wodak, an authoritative voice in critical discourse analysis, that ‚the first 
question we have to address as researchers is not, ‘Do we need a grand theory?’ but 
rather, ‘What conceptual tools are relevant for this or that problem and for this or 
that context?’‛ (Wodak, 2001:64) We will thus follow the principle of triangulation, 
to avoid as much as possible being biased: ‚to work with different approaches, 
multimethodically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as 
background information‛. (Wodak, 2001:65)  
On this basis, our study has drawn from different disciplines which highlight 
different key aspects of understanding Russian messianism, both historically and its 
contemporary manifestations. The next chapter, the historical overview, will focus on 
the cultural specificities of Russian messianism and will show that there is a clear 
historical continuity of Russian messianism as a narrative framework, though this 
continuity cannot be explained in structuralist or dialectical terms. Based on 
secondary sources from a range of disciplines, we will outline some of its core 
features and persistent narratives and discourses as well as highlight some of the key 




Part Two, the original research of the thesis, will attempt to establish how it fits in 
with contemporary Russian statecraft and identity, focusing on the understanding of 
as Russian messianism as routine state identity construction and as typical for 
multicultural empires or civilisations, as well as considering key particular contexts 
of the present, such as the collapse of the Soviet order, globalisation and anti-
Americanism. Following our findings in the theory chapter, our methods for this part 
will mainly draw on poststructuralist and related self/Other studies, but will 
continuously be open to other perspectives to gain a more complex understanding of 
Russian messianism.  
We will base our analysis on two specific sets of primary data, one for official 
and one for popular discourse, but also use a variety of both primary and secondary 
sources to contextualise and interpret our findings, comparing and contrasting 
popular and official discourse with public discourse.  
In sum, our methods mainly include analyses of Russian discourses based on 
the assumption that they are dialogic, and that their predicates, metaphors and 
dualisms are politically significant, though other perspectives from fields such as 
political philosophy, history, and occasionally hermeneutics will be used, mainly in 
the literature review.  
 
3.2.0 Discourse, and discourse analysis applied 
 
i) Meanings of discourse 
 
We have argued above that the study of discourse is necessary if we want to enhance 
our understanding of the collective identity of Russians, and this section will outline 
how we intend to do study discourse, clarify the concept and its varied use. In the 
words of Michel Foucault, who developed and indeed transformed the concept, 
discourse should be understood ‚sometimes as the general domain of all statements, 
sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated 
practice that accounts for a number of statements.‛ (Fairclough, 2003:123)  
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Discourse can thus be used in different senses, as Norman Fairclough 
explains, as an abstract noun referring to ‚language and other types of semiosis as 
elements of social life‛ or domains of statements, and concretely referring to 
‚particular ways of representing part of the world‛, or text as representation.24 
(Fairclough, 2003:26) In representing the world, or part of the world, discourses 
construct social realities. In other words, they produce and reproduce the things in 
our worlds, as they define ‚subjects authorized to speak and to act‛ as well as 
‚knowledgeable practices by these subjects towards the objects which the discourse 
defines [. . .] In the process, people may be destroyed as well as disciplined, and 
social space comes to be organized and controlled, i.e. places and groups are produced as 
those objects.‛ (Milliken, 1999:229)  
As Chapter Two argued, discourses make sense of things that don’t make 
sense, and can therefore also be defined as systems, or structures, of signification 
(which define and enable some subjects and objects, and silence and exclude other, 
alternative modes of identity and action). (Milliken, 1999:229)  
In our study, then, ‘Russian discourse’, refers to the general domain of statements 
in Russia and Russian. In this context it can be helpful to think of ‘Russia,’ as the 
subject of discourse, becoming a discursive space, a centre for many competing 
representations, ‚an argumentative texture or a discursive fabric that brings together 
many different threads which can be combined and woven differently‛. (Wetherell, 
2001:25)  
‘Russian official discourse’ refers to the domain of official, or state sanctioned, 
Russian political statements and texts; ‘Russian public discourse’ refers to the broad 
domain of unofficial but published texts and include various overlapping domains – 
academic, political, cultural, religious, etc; ‘Russian popular discourse’ refers to the 
also very broad domain of views, attitudes, ideas and narratives among ordinary 
Russian people, ‘the masses’; ‘Russian messianic discourse’ refers to the 
‘individualisable group of statements’, ‘regulated practice accounting for a number 
of statements’ or indeed ‘structure of signification’ or ‘discursive framework’ which 
                                                 
24 A third definition is provided by Wodak: ‚A discourse is a way of signifying a particular domain of 
social practice from a particular perspective.‛ *. . .+ ‚’Discourse’ can thus be understood as a complex 
bundle of simultaneous and sequential interrelated linguistic acts, which manifest themselves within 
and across the social fields of action as thematically interrelated semiotic, oral or written tokens, very 
often as ‘texts’, that belong to specific semiotic types, that is genres‛ (Wodak, 2001:66) 
58 
 
we suggest is manifested across different discursive domains; and lastly, individual 
discourses can refer to distinctive narratives, ideas and statements that fall within 
this framework.  
The study of Russian discourses in these different senses thus helps our 
understanding of Russian collective identity and social reality at multiple levels of its 
construction, contestation and representation. Discourse analysis becomes the only 
appropriate method for addressing our hypothesis H2, that the messianic framework 
is in place at different levels of contemporary Russian discourse as a response to the 
crisis of social and political relations in Russia; and our research questions Q2 and 
Q3, asking what the manifestation and resonance is among ordinary Russians of the 
messianic and related narratives deployed in Russian public and official discourse; 
and what the function is of official discourse of the messianic and related narratives 
in seeking to resolve the Russian crisis of identity.  
 
ii) Discourse analysis applied to the research project 
 
How then will we use discourse analysis to address these specific questions and 
hypothesis? Fairclough explains that analysis of discourse tends to be not so much a 
detailed linguistic analysis of texts as the analysis of the rules and practices that 
govern discourse as a domain of statements. (Fairclough, 2003:123) Our study will 
deploy mainly three, in some sense interrelated, methods of discourse analysis: 
identification of the functions or strategies of discourses; interdiscursive analysis or 
identification of narratives; and predicate analysis.  
 Narratives as constitutive of collective identity have core functions which can 
be identified through discourse analysis. Following for example Bach, the core 
functions of narratives constitutive of collective identity include: ordering – the 
narrative endows meaning to events; delimiting – a master narrative creates a system 
of intelligibility; perpetuating – reproduction of the hegemonic master narrative; and 
challenging – the counter hegemonic function of marginalized narratives. (Hall, 
2001:106) Similarly, Wodak identifies four types of discursive macro-strategies of 
discourses of national identity:  
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constructive strategies (aiming for the construction of national identities), 
preservative or justificatory strategies (aiming at the conservation and 
reproduction of national identities or narratives of identity), transformative 
strategies (aiming at the change of national identities), and destructive 
strategies (aiming at the dismantling of national identities). Depending on the 
context – that is to say, on the social field or domain in which the ‘discursive 
events’ related to the topic under investigation take place – one or other of the 
aspects connected with these strategies is brought into prominence.‛ (Wodak, 
2001:71-72)  
Different discourses entail different policy priorities and power relations, and to 
understand these, it is therefore important to consider and identify the functions and 
strategies of messianic ideas and narratives in our analysis of Russian texts from 
official, and to some extent public, discourse.  
The main concern in the analysis of our material, however, will be to identify 
the discourses, themes and narratives drawn upon in the material both from official, 
public and popular discourse (interdiscursive analysis); and to identify and explore the 
subjects and objects that are being produced or reproduced in the texts, and the 
hidden dualisms which the significance of the texts rest upon (predicate analysis). In 
other words, we will explore the different representations of a Russian self (or selves) 
as well as those of Others, and their signifiers.  
As we are seeking to understand if and how messianic discourses manifest 
and resonate, and how they can be contextualised in official discourse and among 
ordinary Russians, the texts we have selected are not, unlike the many texts in public 
discourse we will compare them with, directly representative of Russian messianic 
discourse. Instead, different discourses are drawn upon and mixed together, 
typically in a dialogical/polemical relationship. Hence, an ‚interdiscursive analysis of 
texts is concerned with identifying which discourses are drawn upon, and how they 
are articulated together. Even if realization of a particular discourse is very small, e.g. 
just a word or phrase, it is still a case of drawing upon that discourse.‛ (Fairclough, 
2003:8)  
As we explained in the previous section, ‘Russia’, as a subject, can be 
understood as a ‘discursive fabric that brings together many different threads’ or 
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discourses, and so our study will seek to locate and examine the threads of messianic 
discourse which run across very different layers and combinations of the fabric. 
(Wetherell, 2001:25) We have suggested that one of the core explanations for the 
persistence of Russian Messianism is as a legitimising discourse, in its broad sense as 
a framework, for the existence and policies of Russia as a state actor, and that as such 
messianic ideas are a necessary part of Russian political and cultural identity. In this 
context, the concept of master narrative is central.  
A master narrative can be understood both as a founding myth or national 
idea, and as a framework of interpretation which structures a variation of narratives. 
As its contested nature is an essential feature of discourse, there is seldom one master 
narrative. One role of the following chapter, the literature review, has been to 
identify and trace two central master narratives in Russian discourse, both of which 
are messianic but differ significantly. We do not seek to theorise about the historical 
relationship between the two different master narratives, but the analysis of our 
material from official and popular discourse will be attentive to instances when the 
master narratives are drawn upon, and their interplay.  
Predicate analysis too is useful for establishing particular discourses; for 
‚elucidating both how discourses overlap, as well as the structures of meaning that 
they share.‛ (Milliken, 1999:231) These basic forms of analyses overlap and 
complement each other. What then is predicate analysis? ‚Predicate analysis focuses 
on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and adjectives that 
attach to nouns. Predications of a noun construct the thing(s) named as a particular 
sort of thing, with particular features and capacities. Among the objects so 
constituted may be subjects, defined through being assigned capacities for and 
modes of acting and interacting.‛ (Milliken, 1999:232) Studying the predications of 
Russia and its Others in the texts will also help us to identify the core oppositions or 
dualisms which the significance and coherence of the representations rest upon, 
which in its turn will help us understand better Russia’s relation to the West and 
address research question Q425.  
Based on these three methods of discourse analysis - identification of the 
functions of discourses; interdiscursive analysis or identification of narratives; and 
                                                 
25 Q4. How can we understand and conceptualise Russian messianism, its functions and role in 
relationship to Russian statecraft, especially towards the West? 
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predicate analysis – we have formulated questions which will form the basis of our 
analyses of the selected texts and material, the answers of which will lead us to 
answer our research questions Q2, Q326 and ultimately Q4: 
o What themes and narratives can be singled out?  
o What messianic and related discourses from public discourse are drawn 
upon, and what is the relation in the text to these discourses?  
o What subjects/actors and objects are constructed or reproduced, explicitly 
and implicitly?  
o What types of predicates are used to represent Russian collective identity? 
o What narratives are deployed to define Russia as a state actor? 
o In the texts, which predicates and values of Russia/the Russians are 
represented as desirable/needful? 
o What dualisms does the text rest on? Is the relation to difference in the text 
that of radical opposition? 
o What Others, dangers and threats are constructed? 
o What particular discursive strategies, functions, and power relations can be 
identified in the use of messianic and related discourse? 
o Can certain patterns of argumentation be distinguished? 
Some of these questions overlap and many apply only to one of the discourse planes. 
In addition, each chapter will ask subject-specific questions relevant to the dimension 
of identity/statecraft being explored in that particular chapter.  
 
3.3.0 Evidence  
 
i) Categories of evidence 
 
This section will present the different categories of evidence of Russian messianic 
discourse, focusing mainly on Part Two, the core of the thesis, which looks at 
contemporary Russian messianism, but also introducing our next chapter, the 
                                                 
26 Q2. What is the manifestation and resonance among ordinary Russians of the messianic and related 
narratives deployed in Russian public and official discourse?  
Q3. What is the function of official discourse of the messianic and related narratives in seeking to 
resolve the Russian crisis of identity?  
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literature review, which addresses hypothesis H327 and looks at secondary source 
evidence of Russian messianism historically. Having outlined a basic framework for 
discourse analysis and formulated a number of questions to pose in our analysis of 
primary source material of Part Two of the thesis, we now have left to present and 
explain our selection and categories of evidence for analysis. Let us repeat two of the 
research questions which are addressed by Part Two of the thesis as they contain our 
levels of analysis, and as such structure and inform the categories of evidence:  
 
Q2. What is the manifestation and resonance among ordinary Russians of the 
messianic and related narratives deployed in Russian public and official 
discourse?  
 
Q3. What is the function of official discourse of the messianic and related 
narratives in seeking to resolve the Russian crisis of identity?  
 
Recapping from the previous section, our analysis will work with primary sources 
from three broad discourse planes: popular discourse, the domain of views, 
attitudes, ideas and narratives among ordinary Russian people; official discourse, the 
domain of official Russian political statements and texts; and public discourse, the 
broad domain of unofficial but published texts from the overlapping academic, 
political, cultural, religious, etc domains. Using the above developed framework for 
analysis, we will investigate our hypothesis that ‘Russian messianic discourse’ as a 
discursive framework is manifested across these different planes. In addition to the 
primary sources, we also draw on a range of secondary sources to build and deepen 
our academic interpretation of the findings from the primary sources.   
The selection and use of texts from public discourse differs from that of 
official and popular discourse in that very diverse materials are drawn upon, and no 
single sample for analysis has been selected. Undertaking a systematic mapping and 
analysis of messianic discourse in Russian public discourse would have been an 
                                                 
27 H3: One of the core explanations for the persistence of Russian Messianism is as a legitimising 
discursive framework for the existence and policies of Russia as a state actor in ambiguous relation to a 
broad Western Other. 
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unfeasible project given both its proliferation in many different social domains, and 
the limits of this study.  
 
TABLE 3.1  Categories of evidence 
Discourse 
plane 
Primary sources Secondary sources 
Official  President Putin’s annual 
addresses to the State Council, 
2000-2007. 
Russian and Western 
academic works from 





philosophy and religious  
 
 
Public opinion polls and 
analyses. 
  
Public Newspaper and academic 
articles. 
Political TV-show transcripts.  
Popular and academic books.  
Political party/organisation 
websites and programmes. 
 
Popular 160 semi-structured interviews 
with ordinary and semi-elite 
Russians of Moscow and St 
Petersburg conducted in 2005.  
 
 
Instead we have centred our analysis on the official and popular discourse planes, 
where the resonance and manifestation of Russian messianic discourse is less known. 
For these two planes we have selected specific samples – the President’s annual 
addresses to the State Council, 2000-2007 respectively semi-structured interviews 
with ordinary and semi-elite Russians. As we explore the ‘texts’ from these samples, 
we will compare and contrast their use of messianic and related discourse with the 
same in texts from public discourse.  
The public discourse texts range from widely read major newspaper articles, 
transcripts from popular political TV-shows, university textbooks in geopolitics and 
academic journal articles to political party and organisation programmes, manifestos 
and websites.  Each text used from public discourse will be introduced and 
contextualised, its importance and proliferation explained to show the value of the 






ii) Intellectual categories of Chapters 5-8 
 
As our introduction set out, we have developed three broad intellectual categories, 
based on the distinction between the temporal and the spatial dimensions of Russian 
identity: ‘Russia: History, Present and Destiny’ explores Russia as a temporal-social 
entity; ‘Russia and the world: Self and Other(s),’ looks at Russia as a spatial-political 
entity; ‘Russia as messianic,’ assumes that the temporal-social and spatial-political 
dimensions often converge in messianic discourse. This categorisation structures the 
presentation and analysis of each of the seven presidential annual addresses in 
Chapter Five, and each individual category (with slight modifications) is the title and 
basis for one each of the subsequent interview-based chapters. As any intellectual 
categories, these overlap substantially, particularly given the near kaleidoscopic 
character of Russian and Russian messianic discourse, but we expect that they 
facilitate the exploration of this complex subject.  
 
 





Explores the central narratives and definitions of 
contemporary Russia as state and country, as well as 
narratives of its history and future, i.e. Russia as a temporal-
social entity. 
 
‘Russia and the 
World: Self and 
Other(s)’ 
 
Explores Russia as a spatial-political entity; identifies and 
analyses the specific constructions threats, problems and 
‘discourses of danger’; studies the predications of ‘the West’ as 
Other; and the relation between the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ 





Traces and analyses the explicit references to and use of 
Russian messianic discourse as defined and categorised in the 








iii) Official discourse: President Putin’s Annual Addresses 2000-2007 
 
Chapter Five explores the function of official discourse of the messianic and related 
narratives in seeking to resolve the post-Soviet Russian crisis of identity. We have 
selected as our basis for analysing official discourse former President Putin’s annual 
addresses to the State Council, 2000-2007. The state addresses have become perhaps 
the prime sample of the official discourse through which the Russian state constructs 
and defines itself and the collective Russian identity. The President in this context 
provides direction for the state, sets out tasks for the future, but most importantly, 
provides a sanctioned, official and legitimating framework for understanding and 
defining Russia, its past, present and future, Russianness, the world, and Russia’s 
place in it, at the same time establishing himself as the legitimate spokesperson for 
the Russians, using a technique through which ‚the true producer of the ideas and 
beliefs becomes blurred.‛ (Slade, 2006)  
Asking the questions from the discourse analytical framework developed in the 
previous section, we will be looking at several important dimensions of Russian 
identity and statecraft in these eight speeches and their evolution, placed in the three 
broad categories detailed in Table 3.2. The instances of messianic-related 
intertextuality in these texts is studied more closely, comparing the state’s sanctioned 
discourse with society’s unsanctioned discourse – both where similar signifiers, 
narratives and discourses are used; and where the same questions and issues are 
framed differently, paying special attention to the hidden dualisms which bring 
coherence to the official identity representation. Moving in chronological order we 
debate each of these categories in terms of their official/sanctioned and public/non-
sanctioned disclosures.  
 
iv) Public discourse: the semi-structured interviews 
 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight move from official to popular discourse. In order to 
get original, diverse, unpublished and high quality material from popular discourse, 
we chose to conduct semi-structured structured interviews with a large and diverse 
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sample of Russians in Moscow and St Petersburg. The interviews became an effective 
means to explore the resonance and manifestation of messianic and related discourse 
among ordinary and semi-elite people in contemporary Russia; and to compare the 
convergence and divergence of the deployment of messianic and related narratives 
from official and public discourse with popular discourse.  
Based on these interviews we explore the ways in which semi-elite and 
ordinary Russians, ranging from clergy, wealthy businessmen, academics and 
journalists, to students, house-wives, pensioners, manual labourers, immigrants and 
prostitutes, consciously and unconsciously draw upon old and new messianic 
discourses as they talk about and define Russia and Russianness; and present the 
actors and worlds they construct and reproduce.  
The interview questions (see Appendix II) were developed and piloted with 
assistance from native Russians with sociology and psychology backgrounds. The 
interviews were thus structured: the same questions were given, in the same order, 
to each respondent, though for some questions there were different follow-up 
questions depending on the answer. The questions were developed to enhance 
maximum flexibility: the interview could last from three minutes up to two hours, 
making it possible to gain access to both a great number and diversity of people. 
Interviewees were found and selected using different methods: often through 
personal recommendation by friends and acquaintances, typically leading to a chain 
of further recommendations to other people; sometimes through requests by phone 
(academics and other semi-public people); and, as in the majority of cases, directly 
approached in the street, in parks, metro stations, etc across very different areas of 
the cities.  
Most people in the street did not have time for an in depth interview, but 
were often happy to spare ten or fifteen minutes for a short survey-like interview. 
When they found a question interesting, they would elaborate on it. To others, for 
example businessmen, managers, clergy, academics, journalists and very old or 
handicapped people, it would have been quite impossible to gain access lest through 
personal recommendation for a personal interview as opposed to an anonymous 
social survey. The interviews were all conducted by the researcher, recorded and 
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later transcribed by a native Russian.28  
In total, we conducted 160 complete interviews in autumn 2005 with semi-
elite and ordinary Russians in Moscow and St Petersburg. The sample does not claim 
to be representative of the Russian population as a whole but is however large and 
diverse enough not to claim to at least some degree be representative of the two 
‘capitals’ of Russia. Why did we focus our study only on Moscow and St Petersburg, 
given that they are scarcely representative of typical Russian town and cities, and 
what are the implications of our choice of cities for the analysis of the interviews?  
First of all, it can be argued that major ideational movements in Russia were 
rooted first among the educated city-dwellers, then spread to the rest of Russia 
(Storchak, 2003). Our sample arguably came close to being a litmus test of trends in 
contemporary Russian identity perceptions, especially with the interviews conducted 
right in the middle of the decisive decade of Putin’s rule. 
Secondly, the Moscow and St Petersburg populations contain an in Russia 
unmatched diversity of people: from the highly educated, wealthy, and influential, to 
a variety of intellectuals, professionals as well as ‘ordinary’ people. Pilot interviews 
were conducted in Demyansk, a small provincial town not far from Novgorod. Here 
both the interviewees and their answers were much more homogenous. It is of 
course impossible to say with certainty what the results would have been had we 
chosen more typical cities, but judging from the pilot interviews in Demyansk and 
contemporary research on Russian nationalism, the anti-Western and russocentric 
sentiments which were present in our sample would have been more pronounced. 
As this study argues, an ambiguous-dichotomous relation to the West is central to 
Russian messianism. But, there was much less nuance, insight and variety in the 
Demyansk narratives compared to the pilot interviews in the ‘capitals’. Hence we 
concluded that the more diverse population from the two ‘capitals’ would be better 
suited for exploring the different facets of contemporary messianic discourse as 
manifested in public and official discourse.  
Beyond our choice of cities, the main biases lie in an overrepresentation of 
                                                 
28 We saw it as an advantage for the interviews to be conducted by a non-native Russian speaker. When 
the interviewer comes from the same background as the interviewee, there can be a risk of the 
interviewee assuming that the interviewer has the same knowledge as he or she, and he or she might 
not explain for example cultural phenomena in the same way as to an outsider: ‚Some evidence 
suggests that interviewing across class, gender, or ethnic barriers can actually be more effective than 
matching the background of interviewer and interviewee.‛ (Rubin, 1995:111) 
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male respondents (90 male, 70 female), people in their twenties, and educated people 
(75 had higher education, 85 did not). The male bias was not desired, but hard to 
avoid: it was very hard to get interviews with women over thirty. The age bias was 
conscious: we sought to compare ‘Soviet’ and ‘post-Soviet’ generations, and it was 
thus important to have a large number of young people. In total, 80 ‘post-Soviet’ (age 
15-29) and 80 ‘Soviet’ (age 30+) respondents were interviewed.  
The slight over-representation of people with higher education stems from 
our comparison of ‘semi-elite’ with ‘ordinary’ Russians. 30 interviewees were classed 
as ‘semi-elite’, a loose category to define a very diverse group of Russians, including 
academics, clergy, businessmen, journalists and others. Some of them are more or 
less prominent in their sphere of society, and some are virtually unknown but 
nevertheless influence and reflect key aspects of Russian discourse in their 
professional capacity.  
How then did we process and analyse this large quantity of material? A 
common trap when analysing qualitative data such as interview material is 
'anecdotalism', where telling instances of the apparent phenomenon studied are 
included without providing the criteria for including some instances and not others. 
(Silverman, 2001:34) To avoid this, we chose to analyse the data both qualitatively 
and quantitatively, thus preserving the depth and quality of the longer interviews 
while at the same time showing some indication of how typical various tendencies 
would be in the sample. For the quantitative analysis, the respondents’ details and 
answers were coded and fed into the statistics programme SPSS, making possible 
detailed comparisons between different categories of respondents.  
A list of all interviewees, their age-group, sex, education, etc. and their coded 
answers to all interview questions where coding was possible is found in Appendix 
I. For the qualitative analysis, the interviews were read several times to identify 
trends and emerging themes and narratives. Selected interview case studies, 
categorised in terms of the research questions they contribute to answer, are found in 
Appendix III, and all case on which a case study was made are marked with an 







This chapter has sought to establish an effective methodological framework for 
studying contemporary Russian messianism which will help us understand the 
relevance of its uses on the ‘real world out there.’ In sum, our framework is based 
mainly on insights from poststructuralist and multidisciplinary Self-Other studies 
and its main methods derive from forms of discourse analysis. The previous chapter 
sought to understand messianism from a theoretical perspective, based on secondary 
sources. Part Two, the original research of the thesis, is based on primary sources, 
and studies evidence of Russian messianism within a contemporary perspective; and 
Chapter Four, the literary review, is based on secondary sources and studies 
evidence of the Russian messianic framework within a historical perspective. Its 
secondary sources come from diverse fields – history, cultural and religious studies, 
Slavonic studies, philosophical thought and more – but the works which are drawn 
upon (and not only reviewed, as in some cases), by both Western and Russian 
academics, generally have in common a sensitivity to textuality which makes this 
historical and cultural background of Russian messianism as a narrative framework 
and legitimising discourse fit with the contemporary analysis of the core of the 
thesis.  
The review outlines core features of Russian messianism and its persistent 
narratives and discourses, and in so doing helps us understand identify the 








Chapter Two proposed a broad conceptualisation of Russian messianism as 
constituting a persistent discursive framework, based on a logic of opposition and 
holding a range of both contesting and complementing narratives and signifiers 
which represent different interests but which on the whole function to legitimise the 
state through the continuous construction, contestation and reproduction of Russian 
collective identity in ambiguous relation to the West as broad Other.  
We argued that this conceptualisation, despite its limitations (stereotyping 
and reification), could be an important tool as an umbrella-term helping us to 
identify and locate contemporary narratives and themes, including many which are 
not evidently explicitly messianic, within a long-standing, broad, discursive 
tradition. This chapter aims to defend this theoretical conceptualisation by outlining 
this discursive tradition from a historical perspective on the basis of a range of both 
Western and Russian historical, cultural and other secondary sources. We do not 
aspire to provide a comprehensive history and literature review of messianism in 
Russian thought – that would be well beyond the scope of this chapter. Rather, our 
aims for are the following:  
o To provide a theoretical background to our analysis of contemporary 
messianic discourse, both in the interviews with ordinary and semi-elite 
Russians (popular discourse) and in the President’s annual addresses 
(official discourse). In order to do so, we need:   
o To outline of some of the central ideas, narratives and characteristics of 
the broader discourses of Russian messianism within a historical 
framework, with consideration for their key social, political, intellectual 
and cultural contexts. 
o To review a selection of the relevant secondary literature, with particular 
reference to categorisations, conceptualisations, historiography, and the 
question of historical continuity of Russian messianism.  
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In terms of the hypotheses and research questions of the thesis this chapter will 
further explore hypothesis H3: the persistence of Russian Messianism as a 
legitimising discursive framework for the existence and policies of Russia as a state 
actor in ambiguous relation to a broad Western Other; and in consequence address 
research question Q4: how should we understand and conceptualise Russian 
messianism, its functions and role in relationship to Russian statecraft, especially 
towards the West?  
As we have argued in the previous chapters, in order to understand Russian 
statecraft, we must study and analyse the particular stories, signifiers and binary 
oppositions which have been and are being used to construct Russian collective 
identity in both in their specific and broader contexts, seeking to understand the 
politics and wider social issues behind their deployment. And especially in post-
Soviet Russia, there has been a prolific reproduction of messianic and related 
thought. As Vera Tolz explained at the end of the first post-Soviet decade:  
The pre-revolutionary thinkers who exercise the greatest influence on today’s 
discussion about Russian nation-building and to whom current intellectuals 
refer are the Slavophiles of the 1840s, late 19th century Pan-Slavist Nikolai 
Danilevsky and historian Vasilii Klyuchevsky, early 20th-century philosophers 
Nikolai Berdyaev, Georgii Fedotov, Ivan Ilin and Vladimir Solovev, as well as 
the Eurasianists [. . . ] These thinkers of the past are now viewed ‘as if they 
were contemporaries’ and as ‘teachers, to whom *today’s intellectuals+ should 
turn in their search for spiritual and ideological inspiration’.‛ (Tolz, 1998:994) 
We therefore need to have a grasp of the genealogy of messianic discourses. On the 
whole, the chapter will affirm our hypotheses about the continuity of Russian 
messianism and its legitimising functions over the centuries as a necessary part of 
Russian political and cultural identity.  
 
4.2.0 Historiography and literature 
 
Russian messianism, its history and role in Russian identity and politics, can be a 
rather contentious subject among scholars. One position relates to what our first 
chapter discussed, the stereotypes about Russia and Russians in Western discourse, 
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and sees the phenomenon of Russian messianism (as being central to Russian 
identity and politics) as largely a myth and stereotype in itself (Engelstein, 1998, 
Keenan, 1994).  
A typical example of this position is that of Marshall Poe, who begins his book The 
Russian Moment in World History by asserting – quite correctly – that ‚history is not 
written in a vacuum‛ and then sets out to expose and revise all myths about Russia 
and its history, clearing ‚away this accumulated underbrush so that we may better 
see the true visage of Russia and its people.‛ (Poe, 2003:1-2) (Apparently, Poe’s own 
account must not have been written in a vacuum since it will show the true visage of 
Russia and the Russians.) Together with the myths of Russia’s predisposition to 
authoritarian government and inbound expansionism by war, he attempts to 
deconstruct the idea of the innate Russian messianism: 
The idea of Russian messianism was the brainchild of late-nineteenth Russian 
historical philosophers, men who had read a bit too much Hegel for their own 
good. Having misunderstood a number of banal sixteenth-century texts 
concerning translation imperii, they speculated that the Muscovites believed 
they were the true inheritors of the Roman Imperial legacy and its supposed 
mission was to save the known world. Sketchy though it was, the theory of 
‚Moscow, the Third Rome‛ gained considerable popularity among the 
chattering classes in Russia and Europe. By the early twentieth century it was 
quite common to speak of an ingrained Russian messianism. This error was 
only compounded by the arrival of the Bolsheviks on the scene. Soon after 
1917, pundits were explaining the millenarianism of the Russian soul. (Poe, 
2003:3-4)      
Despite the highly contradictory epistemological claims in Poe’s account, a couple of 
points here are right. It is certain that German philosophy and Romantic nationalism 
had an enormous impact on Russian intellectual discourse, and that this period saw a 
great proliferation of messianic-related discourse with the Slavophiles, pan-Slavists 
and other Romantic nationalists; and it is also true that the ideas of ‘the innate 
Russian messianism’ and ‘the Russian soul’ were developed and popularised in this 
period both among Western and Russian intellectuals (see e.g. Carter, 1990:14-15) 
and later with the coming of the revolutions and Berdyaev’s subsequent influential 
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interpretation of international communism as reincarnated Russian messianism. 
(Sidorov, 2006:323-24)  
And populist accounts of Russian messianism persist to this day: many 
contemporary Russian scholars maintain, without evidence from primary sources 
but frequently referring to the mysterious Russian soul, historical fate and eternal 
Russian values, that messianism has always been an inseparable element of Russian 
collective consciousness. For example Vasilenko, widely published political scientist, 
sees ‘the Russian messianic consciousness’ as the basis for Russian geopolitics, and – 
perhaps ‘having read a bit too much Hegel for her own good’ – conceptualises this in 
terms of an age-old dialectic relationship between the Slavonic self-will and freedom 
on the one hand, and the instinct of national preservation and unity on the other. 
(Vasilenko, 2003:66-67) Arguably, this type of literature belongs to the primary 
evidence on Russian messianism in its reproduction of the myths and stereotypes 
that Poe’s position seeks to expose and revise.  
But all this aside, Poe and similar accounts disregard abundant evidence of 
various earlier variants of anything but banal and insignificant Russian messianic 
discourse. Diverse scholars from both Russia and the West, doing painstaking 
analysis of Russian primary sources, find evidence of a multitude of Russian 
messianic narratives and discourses which persistently have been reproduced and 
over the centuries in different contexts and at different levels of discourse, and which 
often appear to have been central to key aspects of Russian collective identity. Based 
the evidence from these sources, we argue that despite the often contradictory and 
contested nature of the different messianic discourses, they all have in common 
certain key features which warrant the use of ‘Russian messianism’ as an overarching 
term rather than the narrower notion of being chosen and anointed, or as a single 
ideology.  
These features include the notions of spirituality and religion, from Orthodoxy 
in Slavophilism and Russian imperial ideologies, to the ‘spiritual harmony’ of 
Eurasianism and the often eschatological and even Christological symbolisms of 
Russian populist and later Soviet discourses; the theme of a special mission: whether 
sacrificial (suffering to save Europe from Mongol Yoke, Napoleon, Fascism, etc) or 
great and political (linked to ideas of empires and utopias); and lastly, the perhaps 
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most fundamental and yet most ambiguous feature of Russian messianism, the 
self/Other dichotomy defining Russia in relation to a ‘significant Other’, parallel with 
the longstanding religious framework of good vs. evil, with a range of connoted 
binary oppositions.  
Furthermore, there is a broad agreement between these diverse scholars on 
the distinction between what have been called two master narratives, national myths, 
traditions, regimes of thought or indeed competing alternatives of Russian identity: 
Holy Russia (svyataya Rus’) and Moscow Third Rome (Moskva Tretii Rim). This 
section provides a brief outline of core features and possible categorisations, and of 
the works of some of the scholars we draw on for our broad conceptualisation of 
Russian messianism as a historically persistent discursive framework, (and others 
who may differ), before we proceed to the chronological historical overview based 
on these sources.  
 
i) Continuity, coherence and categories  
 
A general distinction can be made between descriptive and interpretive scholarship, 
and Duncan’s work on Russian messianism (2000), mentioned in Chapter One, 
belongs to the former category. It is an effective introduction to and broad historical 
overview of Russian messianism, rich in useful citations from prominent Russian 
thinkers, but the sections on each thinker, movement or period are brief and, with a 
few exceptions, very descriptive. Duncan identifies a continuity and coherence of 
Russian messianism as a phenomenon – he writes that it ‚has persisted as a trend of 
thought in one form or another since the sixteenth century, with roots going back 
much earlier‛ and that it tends to come to the fore in crisis times (Duncan, 2000:141) 
but the study lacks a theoretical framework within which to conceptualise this, and 
to justify the use of this single term for a diversity of ideas and movements.  
David Rowley is one Russianist who at first appears to disagree with the 
argument for historical continuity of Russian messianism. He uses the term Russian 
millenarianism for the commonly assumed single tradition in Russia, and argues that 
a distinction must be made between secular and religious and millenarianism, 
between metaphor and belief, between political culture and counter-culture: 
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‚Religious millenarianism cannot be considered part of a national tradition, since the 
defining characteristic of such crisis cults is their counter-cultural nature.‛ (Rowley, 
1999:1594)  
In a similar vein, V.V. Serbinenko argues in favour of an evaluative 
distinction between the metaphysics, or philosophy, of the Russian idea and the 
ideology of it, the two of which are often confused in his opinion. ‚As ideology is 
functional in its nature, and ‘philosophical reflections on the fate of Russia’ are 
precisely philosophical, the two must be evaluated differently: Ideology cannot be 
expected to be consistent and in that sense non-contradictory, as its purpose certainly 
is not the truth *. . .+ An ideological doctrine is judged by its effectiveness‛ 
(Serbinenko, 2001:3)  
These distinctions have their points, but they are helpful only to a limited 
extent to our study. There is certainly a wide gulf between the mass suicides of the 
Old Believers at the time of Peter the Great (perceived as the Antichrist and signifier 
of the End), and the religious metaphors in Russian imperial ideology. Nevertheless, 
the distinctions between secular and religious, metaphor and belief, philosophy and 
ideology, are far from clear cut in the Russian messianic tradition, as we will seek to 
exemplify.  
Firstly, as Russian religious expert Vladimir Storchak stresses, there were 
distinctly religious aspects of the secular anarchist and socialist Russian movements, 
with the religion of ‘man-deity’ (chelovekho-bozhia) and sacralisation of concepts as 
‘human reason’ and ‘human consciousness.’ (Storchak, 2005:74) In parenthesis, 
Storchak’s thesis in two parts on Russian messianism is a descriptive but 
comprehensive work based on analysis of a wide range of primary sources, from 
state and church documents to popular songs and folk tales, and strong evidence for 
both the continuity and centrality to state and collective identity of Russian 
messianism as a relatively coherent phenomenon since at least the independence of 
the Russian Orthodox Church, despite contesting sub-traditions within. (2003, 2005) 
And in a later period, Julia Brun-Zejmis finds that the secular democrats of the 
samizdat movement were following in a messianic tradition, defining themselves by 
sacrifice, even in Christological terms, and were often suffering literal persecution for 
their secular beliefs. (Brun-Zejmis, 1991)  
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Secondly, turning to the religious philosophers, we must note that 
Dostoevsky managed to be both a deeply religious philosopher, dealing with what 
Serbinenko’s ‘metaphysics of the Russian idea,’ and an active proponent of imperial, 
expansionist messianic ideology. And philosophers Nikolai Fedorov and Vladimir 
Solovev both worked together, united in the belief that Russia had been chosen both 
to bring about world unity through Christian messianism and to achieve the 
resurrection of the dead. (Duncan, 2000:43) As Young describes, they parted when it 
became obvious that Solovev envisaged resurrection a metaphorical and spiritual 
sense, and Fedorov literally. (Young, 1994:64-65) While there was a notable difference 
between their personal beliefs, it was not immediately obvious, and it cannot be said 
that they belonged to two entirely different traditions.  
The impossibility to uphold this type of distinctions is one of the reasons for 
our use of the concept of discourse. Discourse theory does not seek to distinguish 
between ‘actual inner beliefs’ and ‘instrumentalist ideology’ but argues that they 
cannot be separated, and this is certain also for the Russian messianic tradition. 
Rather, categories which are possible to uphold are between contesting discourses.  
 
Within the messianic tradition there are two competing alternatives of Russian 
identity: Holy Russia (svyataya Rus’) and Moscow Third Rome (Moskva Tretii Rim) 
Storchak calls them ‘messianism’ and ‘missionism,’ even though both concepts are 
broadly categorised as messianism (messianizm, messianstvo) (Storchak, 2005). These 
are a more appropriate way of conceptualising the difference, discussed above, 
between religious millenarianism (and religious philosophy) and imperial ideology – 
though while their relation is contested, they often overlap.  
Dmitri Sidorov summarises some of the main variations of the Moscow Third 
Rome narrative: ‚its original meaning in Muscovy was eschatological and primarily 
inward-looking, promoting ideals of a protective Orthodox empire; in the nineteenth 
century often had pan-Orthodox meaning and connoted taking over the second 
Rome (Constantinople); in the twentieth century in the West the concept was 
understood as justification of Russian imperialist messianism.‛ (Sidorov, 2006:324) 
This ‘missionic’ master narrative typically relates to the notions of translation of 
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empire and civilisation, at large representing a Russia with a providential role within 
both history and space. 
Holy Russia, on the other hand, has stronger eschatological connotations. 
This is the spiritual, sacrificial, morally superior, God-bearing nation (narod 
Bogonoset’), set apart from the unclean lands of Europe, from the world, and even 
from history in the more apocalyptic discourses. Russia does not just have a mission 
but becomes in this discourse a Messiah of the nations, repeatedly suffering to 
redeem Europe and mankind. Many scholars see a clear continuity and coherence of 
this narrative, and Serbinenko here makes an apt summary: 
Through all the history of Russian thought and literature moves the image of 
Russia suffering, bearing repeated strokes of misfortune, consuming herself 
in historic conflagrations, but ever renewing herself like the Phoenix and 
aspiring to be the true Resurrection. Whatever the historical and intellectual 
gulf that separates the ancient Russian ideal of ‘Holy Russia’ and the image of 
Russia ‘crucified’ in the revolutions and wars of our epoch, it cannot be 
denied that they constitute a single perennial theme of the Russian national 
cultural tradition. (Serbinenko, 2001:6)  
This Christological discourse indeed permeates Russian literature as diverse as 
Pushkin’s poetry (Duncan, 2000:21) and, as mentioned above, the secular discourse 
of the Samizdat movement. (Brun-Zejmis, 1991:656) It began however as a political 
rather than religious concept as the counter-hegemonic discourse to the Third Rome 
doctrine, first used by the boyar opposition against Ivan the Terrible, juxtaposing the 
holy Russian lands to the unholiness of the Tsar (Neumann, 1996:8-9); and was also 
later very much deployed in the same counter-hegemonic fashion to the 
Westernisation from Peter the Great and onwards. It can be defined as ‘messianic 
peasant ideology’ in the sense that it was gradually popularised, and the people and 
the land became the main subjects rather than the state. Hence, to some extent the 
relation between these master narratives, Moscow Third Rome and Holy Russia, also 
reflects a traditional discursive opposition between the Russian state and Tsar, on the 
one hand, and the people, or nation, and the land, on the other – which is only partly 
overcome by the idea of the marriage between the Batiushka Tsar and Matushka Rus’. 
(Duncan, 2000:14, Neumann, 1996:9-10) In some respects these also parallel the 
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contradiction between universalism and exceptionalism, or multiculturalism and 
ethno-centrism, as later chapters will discuss. But because of the contingent nature of 
discourse these distinctions and their relations are not essential and cannot be 
explained in structuralist or dialectical terms.  
 
ii) The Self/Other and religious dichotomisations 
 
Chapter Two stressed that identity is defined by difference, and that specific 
identities are best understood through the studying of how the boundaries between 
identity and alterity are upheld. We suggested that a core feature of messianism, or, 
in Morgenthau’s terms, universalistic nationalism, is defined by a radicalised logic of 
opposition. Works of diverse scholars suggest that a core feature of Russian 
messianism, and Russian discourse as a whole, is the self/Other dichotomy defining 
Russia in relation to a ‘significant Other’, parallel with the longstanding religious 
absolutist construction, in Urban’s words, of ‚a world in which good and evil are 
locked in mortal combat‛ (Urban, 1998:970). Beginning with the latter, this 
dichotomising ‘geography of good and evil’ frames not only religious or cultural 
aspects of society but is closely related to statecraft in terms of legitimisation of the 
state through, in Campbell’s terms ‘discourses of danger’ (Campbell, 1991, 1998); 
justification for expansionism (Rieber, 1993, Rowley, 1999); and ideological 
assimilation of a diverse population in a country of complex geocultural realities 
(Arbatov, 2006).  
Stephen Lessing Baehr’s work on the eighteenth century Russian paradise 
myth is a prime example of interpretive Russianist work which confirms the 
longevity and continuity of Russian messianism as a dichotomising framework with 
the function specifically of ‚propagandizing the Russian status quo.‛ (Baehr, 1991:ix) 
And, we have suggested that messianic discourse functions not only to delineate self 
from other but actually dichotomise them, and Baehr’s work powerfully illustrates 
how in the various Russian paradise myths the boundary between self and other is 




The extension of the typically religious good/evil dichotomy is the self/Other 
dichotomy, mainly referring to Russia’s cultural and historical identity defined in an 
intense oppositional relation to the West. As Boris Groys has argued, Russian 
philosophy is entirely consumed with resisting Western universalism: ‚Russia, from 
the point of view of Russian philosophy, is not a part of the West, and therefore by 
its very existence restricts Western aspirations to the universality of thought. It is this 
restriction that, indeed, constitutes, in the eyes of Russian philosophy, its own 
specific philosophical calling.‛ (Groys, 1992:185)  
And following historian Andrzej Walicki, nineteenth century Russian 
messianism can be understood as an objection to ‘Western’ religion and concept of 
progress:  
Different Russian utopias of earthly salvation and the corresponding 
conceptions of progress represented, therefore, a secularization and 
historicization of the idea of the Kingdom of God. The peculiar eagerness 
with which the Russian intelligentsia committed themselves to the search for 
a ‚horizontal‛ (historical) collective salvation was, in a sense, the other side of 
their intolerance of the traditional Christian ideas of a transcendent Absolute 
and a ‚vertical‛, individual salvation in afterlife. (Walicki, 1994:82) 
Walicki’s earlier, seminal work on the Slavophile-Westerniser debate, The Slavophile 
Controversy, conceptualises ‘the structural pivot’ of Slavophile ideology in terms of 
an antithesis between Russia and Europe, contested in the famous – and arguably 
still ongoing – Slavophile/Westerniser debate (Walicki, 1975:222-24). But – despite its 
basic sociological-structuralist approach – Walicki’s work shows at the same time 
how this antithesis is blurred in the writings of many ‘classical’ Slavophile thinkers, 
reiterating that ambiguity and not only dichotomy is a core feature of Russian 
messianism as a discursive framework. The relation of the Russian self to the Other 
in messianic discourse is thus possibly best characterised as one of intense ambiguity 
which can be conceived within a continuum from radical opposition and superiority, 
to equality, to inferiority.  
This is powerfully illustrated and analysed in Neumann’s Russia and the Idea 
of Europe (1996), briefly outlined in Chapter One. While there are plenty of cultural-
historical and ethnographical works on the evolution of Russian national identity 
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and on concepts of messianism and those related to it, few come from an IR 
perspective, and Neumann’s work was in this sense unique when it was published. It 
is a sophisticated historical discourse analysis of the persistent, contending 
representations of Russia reflected in Russia’s since long ongoing debate about 
Europe. Neumann shows how the process of delineating a European Other from the 
Russian self, in other words the debate on how to relate to the Europe/the West, 
constitutes a persistent and integral part of Russia’s identity process, and he also 
explains nineteenth century Russian messianism from within this framework.  
Based on the above notion of a continuum of the self/Other dichotomy, 
Neumann makes a valuable distinction between xenophobic and ‘spiritual’ Romantic 
nationalists: for the xenophobic ones Europe is definitely morally inferior to Russia 
whereas for the more ‘spiritual’, Europe and Russia belong to different civilisations 
which defy moral assessment. (Neumann, 1996:177-79)  
Both Walicki and Neumann’s works on Russia’s relation to Europe, defined 
by the longstanding, ambiguous ‘inferiority/superiority complex’ illustrated in 
Chapter One by Fovizin, highlight another central function of Russian messianism: 
compensation: ‚The Russian debate about Europe furnishes a number of examples of 
how Romantic nationalists, when confronted with the lower economic output, 
standard of living or military capability of Russia in contrast to Europe, have written 
off such comparisons as insignificant compared to others.‛ (Neumann, 1996:199) So, 
the typical narrative can go, Europe may be more economically advanced but has 
paid for this by its ‘spiritual death.’  
Below, in the historical overview of Russian messianic discourses, we 
highlight the works of various scholars who bring to the fore variations of binary 
oppositions pertaining to this self/Other logic: Russia as morally superior, Europe as 
immoral and decadent; Russia as spiritual, Europe as materialist; Russia as peaceful, 
Europe as aggressive, and so on. Subsequent chapters will then explore 
contemporary manifestations of the outlined Russian self/Other ambiguities and 






4.3.0 Historical overview of Russian messianic discourses 
 
4.3.1 Early variants of messianic discourse 
 
As Russia’s dominant ‘self’ cannot be understood apart from its ‘significant Others’ 
of first Byzantium and later Europe, neither can early Russian messianism as an 
expression of Russian identity in all its interrelated variations – Moscow Third Rome, 
Holy Russia, Russia the New Jerusalem, the Paradise Myth, and so on – be 
understood apart from the Eastern, Byzantine influence on Russia – first its church 
culture, and later its fall; nor from the Western, Roman theories of translatio imperii 
(translation of empire) and the parallel translatio studii (translation of civilisation) 
which were central in Europe in the Middle Ages; nor from Israel and the Bible and 
its framework and narratives within which both the Eastern and Western political 
cultures identified and legitimised themselves.29  
Chapter Two, following Campbell, suggested that a key aspect of messianic 
discourse has always been the ‘evangelism of fear’ and subsequent construction of 
Otherness and a geography of good and evil, which function to legitimise the role of 
the ruling political entity – whether the state promising security to its citizens or the 
church guaranteeing salvation to its followers. (Campbell, 1991, 1998:50-51)  
Baehr shows how in Russia, closely related to this construction of a 
geography of good and evil, has been the idea of the church, and later the state, as 
creating a ‘heaven on earth.’ This early messianic-related discourses dates back to 
Russia’s conversion to Orthodoxy – he cites evidence of this for example from the 
Primary Chronicle, in which round A.D. 987 the emissaries of Prince Vladimir 
reported to their prince about their experience in a Greek Orthodox church, saying 
they did not know whether they were in heaven or on earth, only that God dwelled 
there with men. (Baehr, 1991:15) These influences from Byzantium, Baehr argues, led 
to the search for ‘heaven on earth’ becoming central to Russian culture with first the 
church and later the state as claiming this ‘function’, using it as a prime means to 
propagandise the Russian status quo. (Baehr, 1991:ix)  
  
                                                 
29 See Baehr (1978) for a useful overview of their use in Russia. 
82 
 
i) Moscow - Third Rome   
 
The master narrative of Moscow Third Rome was thus articulated first in religious 
discourse. Its messianic claim is famously articulated in a letter written by the church 
elder Filofei to Prince Vasilii III around 1523: 
The church of the old Rome fell because of the infidelity of the Apollonarian 
heresy. The Second Rome, the Church of Constantinople, was hewn down by 
the axes of the sons of Hagar. And now this Third Rome of thy mighty 
kingdom, the holy catholic and apostolic church, will illumine the whole 
universe like the sun. . . .Know and accept, O pious Tsar, that all the Christian 
kingdoms have come together into thine own, that two Romes have fallen, 
and that a third stands, while a fourth there shall not be; thy Christian 
kingdom will fall to no other. (Carter, 1990:14) 
As Carter notes, Filofei then proceeded to claim that the Russian people were ‚a new 
Israel, a people chosen by God, the first among all Christian peoples, and called to 
fulfil the Kingdom of Christ on earth.‛ (Carter, 1990:14) As can be seen, all three 
significant Others – Europe (as Rome), Byzantium (or Constantinople) and Israel are 
present in the same text. In Russian discourse, passing from Greece, to Rome, to 
Byzantium, to Russia was the role of world-dominant Empire (translation inperii), and 
passing from Israel, to Byzantium, to Russia was religious truth (translatio studii).  
 
Keenan argues that Filofei’s letter probably was not intended as ‘a call to greatness,’ 
but rather as a warning to the Tsar in religious, not political context, and ‚had 
nothing to do with foreign policy or Muscovite manifest destiny. [. . .] There is 
simply no evidence that Muscovite policy or politicians were in any way influenced 
by the scribblings of bookish churchmen until the threshold of modern times – 
roughly the end of the seventeenth century.‛ (Keenan, 1994:26-27) While, as we 
argued in the above section, there is no doubt that the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries saw a romanticisation and exaggeration of the historical importance for 
Russian identity of ideas like Moscow Third Rome, we should not underestimate the 
close relation between the church and the state in early Russian history up until the 
secularisation – Baehr for example more accurately calls the ‘bookish churchmen’ 
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‚ecclesiastical propagandists of the state‛. (Baehr, 1991:21) And, as the next section 
will point to, ‘Holy Russia’ as a political counter narrative to Third Rome in the 
second half of the sixteenth century implies that the Third Rome narrative was 
already central to Muscovite politics and identity.  
 
Storchak, follwing Russian historian Uspenskii, argues that the messianic pretensions 
within the Church arose with the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church 
from Byzantium beginning after the unification between the Eastern and Western 
churches in 1439. The Russian Church vehemently rejected the union made by the 
Orthodox Patriarch and the Roman Pope, as Russian identity as part of a wider 
Eastern, Orthodox identity had been forged by constructing Western Catholicism as 
a negative Other. (Storchak, 2003:10) In 1448 a Russian Metropolitan was elected, 
symbolising the breaking with Byzantium and the beginning of a gradual formation 
of Russian church autonomy, alongside with the forging of a narrower Russian, not 
only broadly Orthodox, identity. New rituals and procedures were instituted, mostly 
oriented towards Byzantine traditions, and yet the break meant the representation of 
Byzantium as a negative Other, with Russian church discourse swiftly pitting the 
purity of the Russian Church against Constantinople’s ‚Plenum of Godless Turcs 
from the foul Tsar.‛ (Storchak, 2003:5)  
Then, in 1453, Byzantium fell - symbolically around the same time as the 
princes of Muscovy realised the centralisation and unification of the Russian lands 
around Moscow, gradually being liberated from the ‘Mongol Yoke’. Russian church 
leaders represented the fall as God’s punishment for the unification with the Catholic 
Church and swiftly assumed themselves to be the new leaders of Orthodoxy (Dukes, 
1998:58-59), ‚making Moscow the site of the only living church‛. (Neumann, 1996:6-7) 
At the same time, the Grand Prince of Moscow began to claim the title of Tsar, a 
claim that was strengthened as a result of Ivan III’s marriage to Sophia, the niece of 
the last Emperor of the Byzantine Empire.  
So, the autonomy of the Russian Orthodox Church became linked to 
Moscow’s pretension to the role of the new capital of Caesar. Evidence for these 
pretensions are found for example in the Account of the Passover by the 
Metropolitan Zosimi (1492), a document in which grand Prince of Muscovy Ivan III 
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is proclaimed ‚Lord and autocrat of all Russia, new Caesar Constantin, of the new 
city of Constantinople – Moscow – and all the Russian lands and other multitudes of 
lands and lords.‛ (Storchak, 2003:6) Baehr describes how from this time forward, 
there was a strong tendency of Russia ‚to depict itself as a ‚perfected theocracy‛ and 
to idealize its present situation‛ (Baehr, 1991:18-19) and Storchak argues that various 
factors had led to a ‘vacuum’ in Russian identity which was filled by the Moscow 
Third Rome narrative. (Storchak, 2003:7)  
 
It must be stressed that while Russia’s self/Other dichotomy certainly is most easily 
equated to the well-known East/West dichotomy, this is partly a generalisation. As 
the Third Rome narrative itself implies, Byzantium – the Eastern Church and ‘second 
Rome’ – played a very central role in Russian identity formation. Byzantium was first 
a model and superior Other for Russia, then, with the union with the Catholic church 
and later its fall, Russia continued to copy the ‘original’ Byzantine model whilst 
through discourses of otherness turning Byzantium into an enemy and inferior 
Other, finally declaring itself to be the true Byzantium and centre of Orthodoxy.  
Similarly, when the ‘old’ Europe of anciens regimes changed, beginning with 
the French revolution and challenge to monarchy and autocracy, the Russian state, 
having previously emulated the European model, began to declare Europe to be 
decadent and itself to be the true Europe. This ambiguity towards the Others, both 
Neumann and Storchak show, was contained in the Moscow Third Rome concept – 
Storchak uses the above discussed concepts of messianism and missionism.30   
Neumann points to the doctrine having two contradictory dimensions, an 
internal-temporal and an external-spatial: ‚The internal significance of the doctrine is 
to equate the ruler with divine history on earth. The external dimension concerns the 
relationship to the Other, to the former areas of the Roman Empire. This is surely 
asymmetrical, inasmuch as the Other has been abandoned by God in favour of 
Moscow. (Neumann, 1996:8) Baehr stresses that when the state itself in the second 
half of the seventeenth century began to deploy the Moscow Third Rome narrative 
                                                 
30 ‚*I+n the idea of Moscow-Third Rome two tendencies were fused – the religious and the political: one 
emphasised the messianic blessing and holiness, and also the latent tuning towards isolationism away 
from the ‚unclean‛, ‚non-Slavonic-other-believing‛ surroundings; the other emphasised power and 




and other variants of this type of discourse as propaganda, it was part of the 
secularisation process shifting authority from the church to the state (Baehr, 1991:21). 
So, while Russian messianism originated with Orthodoxy, it must be noted how it 
came to permeate also the more secular discourses.   
 
ii) Holy Russia   
 
The term ‘Holy Russia’ (svyataya Rus’) was first mentioned by Prince Kurbskiy in a 
letter to Tsar Ivan IV (the Terrible) in which the holiness of the Russian lands was 
juxtaposed to the unholiness of the Tsar himself. Kurbskiy was a leader of the boyar 
opposition, and Neumann points to the fact that as a result of the doctrinisation of 
Moscow-Third Rome, Russian boyars were losing power and were being divested of 
their independence. He supports the view of Michael Cherniavsky that it was the 
boyar opposition that invented the idea of Holy Russia, and ‚that this idea was part 
of their counter-hegemonic thrust, directed at the reigning doctrine of Moscow as the 
Third Rome.‛ (Neumann, 1996:8-9)  
As we discussed above, ‘Moscow Third Rome’ and ‘Holy Russia’ can indeed 
be conceived of as two evolving master narratives or competing alternative 
representations of Russian identity. We also argued that a discourse acquires it form 
by the discourse it opposes, and this explains why these two narratives both compete 
and considerably overlap with each other. Having a directly political origin, ‘Holy 
Russia’ later became perhaps the most popular national myth of Russia, first denoting 
‘the people’ and later embodying the ‚conception of the state as an extension of the 
tsar, the little father, married to the Holy Russian Motherland.‛ (Neumann, 1996:9-
10) The distinction between the people and the state would later be politicised by the 
Slavophiles.  
Storchak describes how towards the end of the sixteenth century the ‘Holy 
Russia’ narrative was firmly founded in popular discourse, representing Russia as an 
exclusive state with a higher providential role, a country of churches and strict fasts. 
A stereotype had been formed, about the ‘holy,’ ‘chosen-by-God’ country, populated 
by the people ‘chosen-by-God’ (narod Bogoizbranniy) or ‘God-bearing’ (narod 
Bogonoset’). Holy, as we have noted, means to be set apart and the Russian people 
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were indeed forcefully set apart from the ‘unholy’ nations and people, perhaps in 
emulation of the Israelites and their explicit prohibition from intermingling with 
other peoples. Chaadaev in his famous letters resentfully wrote about this period 
that ‚we locked ourselves up in religious separatism‛ which is probably a fitting 
depiction of the state position (Chaadaev, 1969:43). Storchak describes some of the 
practical implications of ‘Holy Russia’ becoming state ideology: 
The local population was prohibited from contact with foreign guests. The 
state feared that the Russians could get infected with foreign ‘Godlessness’ 
and sought to separate foreigners into a special social group, literally 
forbidding contact with them. Foreign guests had to live in for this purpose 
separate parts of town outside the town (thereof the German settlement), to 
wear only their own clothes in order to be easily distinguished from the 
Russians, who under the threat of punishment were forbidden to whether 
dress- or hair-wise resemble foreigners. Any unofficial conversation between 
Russians and foreigners aroused immediate suspicion of defection from the 
Orthodox faith and traditions, which would automatically equal political 
conversion. (Storchak, 2003:11)  
It is interesting to note how the construction of Russianness was made through 
‚foreign policy‛ as defined previously by Campbell in a literal as well as discursive 
manner, with clothing and physical borders delineating the self from the Other as 
well together with the stark self/Other binary oppositions as holy/unclean and God-
chosen/Godless. We can without any great leap of faith draw parallels to domestic 
‚foreign policy‛ practices in the Soviet Union, both during the Stalinist terror where 
the other was internalised and during the Cold war with an external enemy. 
Storchak further points out that the ‘Holy Russia’ narrative also was clearly reflected 
in state and religious rituals which likened the Tsar to Christ; that foreigners visiting 
Russia noted how the Russians counted their Tsar as being ‚almost like God‛; and 
that while in Western Europe, unrighteous monarchs were often likened to the 
unrighteous biblical kings, they were in Russia they were likened to Antichrist.  
(Storchak, 2003:13,20) So while the religious framework for legitimising the 
monarchy was common also to Western Europe, the messianic radicalisation was 




iii) Moscow New Jerusalem 
 
Daniel B. Rowland has argued that the Bible, and the theme of Moscow as the New 
Jerusalem or Israel, was much better represented in the Russian literature and 
architecture than images of Rome and the theme of Moscow Third Rome, and hence 
much more significant for early Russian identity and state legitimacy. (Rowland, 
1996:3) Muscovy, he argues, understood and defined itself through the medium and 
narratives of the Bible, particularly the Old Testament, representing itself for 
example in history-writing ‚as the re-embodiment of the Old Testament kingdom of 
David and Solomon, as a completion of fulfilment of Biblical events, as a ‚New 
Israel‛.‚ (Rowland, 1996:595) Muscovite rulers were identified with Old Testament 
heroes and their enemies were identified with Israel’s enemies. (Rowland, 1996:603-
04)  
Attempts in seventeenth century Russian discourse to locate the Muscovites 
in the Biblical history testifies to the overarching importance of the Old Testament 
framework to Muscovite identity – for example, one popular theory was that 
Meshech, the son of Japhet and grandson of Noah, was in fact Moscow (Storchak, 
2003:27). There is also plenty of evidence for the existence of the idea of Kiev as the 
New Jerusalem  and that this idea would be transferred to the new capital should not 
be surprising (Baehr, 1991). Storchak sees no contradiction between the two 
narratives of Third Rome and New Jerusalem but argues that the idea of Moscow 
New Jerusalem from the sixteenth century and onwards was seen as the concretisation 
of Moscow Third Rome, with the idea that ‘old’ Jerusalem had been rejected and ‘out 
of demand’, being defiled by non-believing Saracens, which is why Jerusalem should 
rather be called Moscow. (Storchak, 2003:13) This, to reiterate, is based on the notion 
of translatio studii, the idea of the geographic translation of religious and civilisational 
truth. Moscow New Jerusalem can be seen both, as Rowland shows, as a wider 
discursive framework, as well as a narrative intertwined both with Moscow Third 





iv) The Third Way 
 
One of the first advocates of a Russian particular ‘third way’ can be found as early as 
in the seventeenth century in the writings of the Croatian catholic missionary Yurii 
Krizhanich (ca 1618-1683) who began his service at the tsar’s court in 1659. He was 
among other things responsible for the missionary activity of Russia, which aimed at 
achieving a communion between the Slavonic peoples under the aegis of the Russian 
state. Storchak describes that in his major work Politics, Krizhanich revives the idea 
of the divine nature of the ruling power, as ‚all legal rules have not been established 
by themselves, but by God.‛ (Storchak, 2003:29) The Tsar thus is and should be like 
God on earth in this discourse. Krizhanich is both one of the first to warn of the 
dangers of Europeanisation, and to theorise about the Russian national 
consciousness, looking at the culture and history of Russia in the framework of the 
development of humanity. ‚According to the logic of Krizhanich between the 
(Roman) Western and the (Byzantine) Eastern civilizations, Russia should choose its 
own, different and exclusive middle way of development of its civilization.‛ (Storchak, 
2003:30)  
The Slavonic peoples are posited in relation to four ages of humanity – 
childhood, youth, adulthood and old age – and defined as the youth that whilst 
lacking knowledge ‚soon will play the lead role in the orchestra of world progress 
and greatness.‛ As Storchak points out, similar ideas did indeed permeate the socio-
political and philosophical thinking in Russia two-hundred years later. (Storchak, 
2003:30) The example of Krizhanich shows that this discourse was not exclusive to 
Russian romantic nationalists of the nineteenth century but dates much further back 
in Russia, though its dissemination in the earlier periods was very limited. 
 
4.3.2 Secularisation and millenarianism: the state vs. the people 
 
While it makes sense to distinguish between the early religious variants of 
messianism and the well-known nineteenth century Romantic Slavophilism, there 
are also good reasons to see the modernisation of Peter the Great as a landmark for 
Russian messianism: ‚With the coming of Peter I, the entire Russian political debate 
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changed radically‛ Neumann writes, and mentions that scholars such as Szamuely 
and Riasanovsky hold ‚that the whole history of Russian political and social thought 
can be seen as the history of the development of contrasting views of the Petrine 
reform.‛ (Neumann, 1996:10-11) Karamzin, the historian, concluded on Peter’s 
reforms and Europeanization: ‚We became citizens of the world but ceased in certain 
respects to be citizens of Russia. The fault is Peter’s.‛ (Cited in Neumann, 1996:14)  
As the capital was moved from Moscow to St Petersburg, the significance of 
Moscow Third Rome weakened (Neumann, 1996:10) but a more eschatological, 
religious variant of messianism was strengthened at the popular level. This had of 
course much to do with the great schism in Russian Orthodoxy (raskol) triggered by 
the reforms of Patriarch Nikon and intensified under Peter. As D. Kalkandjieva 
writes: 
The fact that the confrontation between [civil and sacral] powers took place in 
the metropolis contributed a lot for the mass character of the Russian schism. 
In a strange way, defending the old church texts and rituals the believers 
revived the idea of the Third Rome and simultaneously they betrayed the 
same idea in its part concerning Moscow as a fortress of true Orthodoxy, by 
leaving Moscow and going to the ‘desert.’ The Old Believers’ propaganda 
addressed to the rural population, opposed the secular and church powers in 
Moscow and created a gap between rural and urban Russians which had 
long-term effect on Russian culture. (Kalkandjieva, 2000:254) 
In the discourse of the Old Believers, Peter was represented as the Antichrist, whose 
rule signified the end of the world. This idea was taken literally by hundreds of Old 
Believers who committed mass suicide burning alive, which makes understandable 
Rowley’s distinction between millenarian and metaphorical messianic discourse. 
(Rowley, 1999:1594)  
So in this period we see the beginning of the deep rift between the urban and 
rural population, between the elite and the masses, as a result of the reforms and the 
schism. Whereas messianic discourse took on a more millenarian form among 
ordinary people, church, state and cultural discourse underwent a secularisation. But 





i) The Paradise Myth 
 
Russian secular messianism in the eighteenth century is embodied in Baehr has 
named the Russian paradise myth (1991). This cultural discourse or ‚merger of 
various classical, biblical, and patristic traditions of perfect times and places into a 
single ‚megamyth‛‛ came from Western Europe and had peaked during the 
European Renaissance, later reaching Russia. Its key themes and narratives include 
for example the tsar as a political icon, represented as God, or God-like (in the case of 
Peter the Great even portrayed as a creator) with his land as the earthly image of 
heaven.31 As part of the secularisation changing the religious into classical, the tsar 
was not only likened to Christ but to Apollo, Saturn and other gods; and the female 
monarchs as Catherine II to Minerva, Astrea and Diana. (Baehr, 1991:34-40)  
Other key themes were the re-creation of the world, through imageries of 
virginity, childhood, and womb symbols; and of resurrection, cosmogony and 
reincarnation, of tsars, or by tsars, for example Peter the Great resurrecting Russia 
from the dead (Baehr, 1991:10, 41-49). The centrality of Peter the Great in many of 
these themes reiterates the significance of his reign and reforms for the changes in 
the Russian cultural and political identity, and this period saw a strengthening the 
idea of the ‘marriage’ of the Father Tsar to Mother Russia, and the related, 
increasingly stark oppositional relation between the state and the people. (Neumann, 
1996:9-10)  
The most central theme of the paradise myth is the idea of heaven on earth, of 
a spiritual paradise, of a ‘sacred space’, in Baehr’s words ‚a place separated from the 
rest of the universe by some physical or symbolic boundary between ‚good‛ and 
‚evil‛ or between the ‚sacred‛ and the ‚profane‛‛ (Baehr, 1991:10) which reiterates 
the dichotomised structure of the Russian messianic framework.  
Baehr also highlights the connection between freemasonry and Russian 
messianic discourse in the late eighteenth century, with most major writers in this 
                                                 
31 This, Baehr explains, was closely related to the ideology of royal absolutism, ‚the idea of Moscow 
(Muscovite Russia) as the Third Rome; ‚the imperial idea,‛ connecting the rulers of Moscow to the 
imperial line of the Roman Emperor Augustus; the depiction of Russian monarchs as universal 
Christian sovereigns; and the ideology that the Muscovite sovereigns received their authority from 




period being masons, supposedly committed to finding the higher wisdom 
(premudrost’) that would restore the lost paradise. Masonic allegory with myths of an 
earthly paradise, the focus on human self-correction and perfection and general 
mysticism reflects and is reflected in the general Russian religious framework of 
thought, and this part of Baehr’s study can help us understand many themes of 
contemporary Russian messianism: the strong elements of spiritualism, neo-
paganism, New Age and occultism in today’s Russian discourse can be understood 
not only, as Laura Engelstein suggests, as products of the worldwide New Age 
movement and general ‘postmodern eclecticism’ but as phenomena with a long 
history in Russian discourse.32 
 
4.3.3 From Romantic nationalism to Revolution 
 
i) The Slavophile-Westerniser debate and its paradoxes 
 
The westernising reforms of Peter the Great had an enormous impact on Russian 
identity, leading Russian messianic discourse to become both an objection to, and an 
aspect of westernisation. As our introduction described, playwright Denis Fovizin 
complained at the end of the eighteenth century about the great contradiction 
between the extreme inferiority of and equally extreme superiority towards Europe: 
‚How can we remedy two contradictory and most harmful prejudices: the first, that 
everything with us is awful, while in foreign lands everything is good; the second, 
that in foreign lands everything is awful, while with us everything is good?‛ 
(Hosking, 1997:198) This well-known polarisation of Russian identity discourse in 
what is called the Slavophile-Westerniser debate, based on the question of which 
model of statecraft and identity to follow: Europe’s, or a distinctive Russian one.  
As Neumann points out, the variants of Russian messianism in this period can also 
more particularly be understood as reactions in Russia against the Decembrist 
uprising – the Decembrists were represented as having been led astray by 
                                                 
32  She writes: ‚*T+here is nothing peculiarly Russian or specifically post-Soviet about the current 
penchant for horoscopes and New Age. Today’s Russia is certainly burdened with challenges specific to 
the moment at hand, but its spiritual outlook is not out of sync with the times.‛ (Engelstein, 1998:877) 
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Europeanism, so Russia needed to morally reassess its significant other – Europe – 
and as a result, various strands of messianic thinking arose. (Neumann, 1996:20) 
 
The ambivalence towards Europe/the West, as well as the deep rift the westernized 
upper class and the culturally traditional Russian peasantry - both occasioned by the 
interaction with Enlightenment – have defined Russian identity construction ever 
since. Boris Groys extends the split between the elite and masses to a ‚psychological 
split in the soul of every educated Russian individual between his European 
education and the Russian mode of life. One could say that Russia here appears for a 
Russian man endowed with European consciousness as the Other, as his 
unconscious.‛ (Groys, 1992:190) Groys further describes the complication for Russian 
identity which occurred when Europe turned away from the universalist ideology of 
the Enlightenment as a result of the French revolution and Napoleonic wars and 
turned towards a variety of unique national cultures: ‚At that very moment when 
Russia still believed that it was moving along the path of universal Enlightenment, 
the very idea of the Enlightenment collapsed, and the relatively easy task of 
becoming enlightened was replaced for Russia with the much more complex task of 
becoming original.‛ (Groys, 1992:186) German philosophy and Romantic nationalism 
thus came to have great influence on Russian thinkers who, using this array of new – 
western - intellectual tools, developed and popularised both new and old Russian 
messianic narratives in their response to westernisation. 33  The musicologist and 
cultural critic Richard Taruskin highlights the irony of the elitist nature of the 
Romantic nationalist discourse: 
At a time when the inhabitants of the Russian countryside thought of 
themselves simply as ‚Christian folk‛ (krest’yanye) or ‚the Orthodox‛ 
(pravoslavniye) and would never have dreamed of claiming their barin (the 
owner of the land to which they were confined to by law) as their 
countryman, the most enlightened (that is, Enlightened) and Westernized 
barins were already thinking of their ‚souls,‛ together with themselves, as 
constituting the narod, the Russian ‚people.‛ (Taruskin, 1997:3)  
                                                 
33 Neumann sums up this paradox: ‚the core of Slavophilism was a protest against Russia following the 
models which emerged in the Europe of the double revolution. Nevertheless, Slavophilism itself was 
actually an imported cultural programme, an adaptation of ideas whose genesis was inextricably linked 
to the very same double revolution which the Slavophiles despised.‛ (Neumann, 1996:39) 
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So it should be emphasised that the Slavophile-Westerniser debate in this period 
took place in elite discourse. The thinking of both individual Slavophiles and of the 
discourse as a whole developed over time, mutually influencing the state and the 
Westernizing positions, which is why it is impossible to outline any coherent 
doctrine.  
Very generally speaking, the idea of Slavophilism in the 1840s and 1850s was 
that only the backward but spiritual, Orthodox Russia could lead the ‘modern’, 
materialistic and decadent Europe to redemption, and the Slavophiles sought to 
demonstrate the uniqueness of Russia, the organic nature of the Russian nation, and 
indeed its spiritual superiority to the West.34  
 
ii) Chaadaev: an example of the ambivalence towards the Other  
 
A defining moment for this debate was the publication in 1836 of the first letter of the 
intellectual (and ex-follower of the Decembrists) Petr Chaadaev (1794-1856), in which 
he tore Russia’s past, future and present to pieces (in fact he claimed that Russia had 
neither) with statements like: ‚We belong to that number of nations which do not 
seem to make up an integral part of the human race, but which exist only to teach the 
world some great lesson.‛ (Chaadaev, 1969:38) The importance of Chadaev’s letter 
can be indicated by the fact that it is seen by major scholars as triggering both 
Slavophilism (Walicki, quoted in Duncan, 2000:20) and Official Nationality 
(Neumann, 1996:xii).  
While the origins of Slavophilism and Official Nationality of course cannot be 
reduced to Chaadaev’s letter alone, the impact of it on Russian society at the time 
was very great, becoming part of the massive ideational challenge of the French 
revolutions and the Decembrist uprising. In Neumann’s words:   
The Decembrist uprising demonstrated to the state that it could not dominate 
the Russian debate about Europe simply by reiterating a legitimist position, 
and by keeping other positions from being formulated. Other Russians, such 
as Prince Odoevskiy, saw the Decembrist uprising as an example of how 
                                                 
34 The most comprehensive work on Slavophilism remains Walicki’s The Slavophile Controversy (1975) 
but Neumann’s Russia and the Idea of Europe (1996) also provides a rich and detailed contribution on 
Slavophile thinkers within a wider political and cultural context. 
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seemingly positive European ideas could slowly corrupt Russia’s best and 
brightest. Their reaction was to set store by a variant of Russian messianism 
where the Christian idea of Moscow as the Third Rome was played down, 
but where the Christian historicism underpinning this idea was retained. 
Inspired by German idealism, they elaborated on the organic nationalist 
thinking of the ‘Russian tendency’ and established a Romantic nationalist 
position in the Russian debate about Europe. (Neumann, 1996:xi-xii)     
Chaadaev challenged core assumptions of the leading Russian identity 
representations and his statements raised issues that could be disagreed with but not 
ignored:    
One of the worst features of our unique civilization is that we have not yet 
discovered the truths that have elsewhere become truisms, even among 
nations that in many respects are far less advanced than we are. It is the result 
of our never having walked side by side with other nations; we belong to 
none of the great families of mankind: we are neither of the West nor of the 
East, and we possess the traditions of neither. Somehow divorced from time, 
we have not been touched by the universal education of mankind. 
(Chaadaev, 1969:34) 
As Groys evaluates, ‚Russia for Chaadaev appears to be, in that sense, something 
radically Other in relation to the history of reason, culture, spirit or even soul in any 
of its forms: it is something thoroughly excluded from the universal Logos. [. . .] In 
Chaadaev's view, Russia has historical significance only as a unique and terrifying 
example which demonstrates to the rest of the world the devastating effects of total 
isolation from universal spiritual unity.‛ (Groys, 1992:188) Chaadaev later repented 
of his judgments in the first letters and, under mutual influence from the Slavophiles, 
developed a form of Russian messianism where Russia’s backwardness would 
constitute its strength, and Russia’s role as providing a lesson to the world is 
ascribed messianic significance. The evolution of Chaadaev’s thinking is 
symptomatic of the complexity of the identity debates of this period, and perfectly 
illustrates the ambivalent inferiority/superiority complex towards the Other 
underpinning Russian messianism. 
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iii) The reproduction of early messianic narratives 
 
Messianic discourse was most explicit in the Slavophile, anti-Western discourse 
which developed later into pan-Slavism and Eurasianism, together with a multitude 
of similar sub-movements and trends such as narodnichestvo and Dostoevsky’s 
pochvenniki. The Romantic nationalist position reproduced various old messianic 
narratives as well as developing new ones – for example Kalkandjieva points out 
how the discourse Moscow as New Jerusalem under the Slavophiles was used, in its 
national dimension, to overcome the gap between rural and urban Russia. 
(Kalkandjieva, 2000:256) Pushkin contributed to the development of the sacrificial 
theme of Russia suffering to protect Europe through for example his text ‚To the 
Slanderers of Russia‛ in which he defended Russia’s crushing of the Polish uprising 
against the strong critique from various sides in Europe. (Duncan, 2000:21)  
 
And the narratives related to the tsar were revived in their various forms. Foreigners 
visiting Russia in this period noted how the Russians, speaking about the Father Tsar 
as the ideal of the Russian people, called the Emperor ‚the Russian Christ‛. 
(Storchak, 2003:20) The Slavophiles used the old distinctions of messianic discourse 
between the land and the state in an effective way, challenging the official ideology. 
They were not seen favourably upon by the state in the first half of the century, as 
they advocated the idea of the people and the land, the organic nation, as being the 
main bearer of history as opposed to the tsar. As for the state, it used the discourse of 
Holy Russia in the decade following the European springtime of 1848, thus borrowing 
from the messianic discourse of the Slavophiles it had previously sought to restrict. 
(Neumann, 1996)  
 
iv) The Russian soul, and Sobornost’ 
 
It was in the middle of the nineteenth century that the now cliché-like notion of the 
Russian soul developed. Prince Odoevsky, playwright, one of the ‚wisdom-lovers‛ 
(lyubomudrie) and an influential follower of Schelling was one of the first Russian 
writers to develop the theme of Europe’s soullessness: through the industrial 
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revolution Europe, like Faust, had sold its soul and was hence dying from pustodushie 
(empty soul). (Carter, 1990:7) Russia then had a great task of ‚re-infusing‛ the in the 
technically advanced Europe ‚instinctive‛ powers which backward Russia retained, 
and its great mission was ‚to save Europe from Ossification‛. (Neumann, 1996:8,20) 
Stephen Carter traces the development of the concept of the collective Russian soul 
and shows that it was preceded by far by the idea of Western soullessness, that it 
appears that it was born as late as through Belinsky’s praise of Gogol and then 
changed over time, first directed toward a distinctly Russian future, later this used as 
a tool with which to criticize the West.   
The idea that the Russians had a soul, then, appears to have been neither a 
direct borrowing of European theories about national souls in general nor a 
truly Russian invention. [. . .] In a broader sense, the emergence of the 
‚Russian soul‛ coincided in time with the emergence of the Russians in the 
European consciousness, along with the Americans, as a people who were 
young and had a future, not old with a past. (Carter, 1990:14-15)  
 ‘The Russian soul’ is thus a perfect example of a popularised concept that is often 
represented as age-old and ingrained but in fact was developed in the late nineteenth 
century Russia and then greatly boosted by Western intellectuals.  
 
Another key notion of the Russian messianic discourse, developed in this period by 
the Slavophile writer Aleksei Khomyakov (1804-1860), is the principle of sobornost’, 
roughly translated as communality or conciliarity and referring to true Christian 
unity, or ‘the initial form of life from which the religious dogmas of the first 
Christian faith were born’. (Groys, 1992:190-91) It is through its sobornost’ that 
Orthodoxy, having preserved Russian communal life, supposedly can reunite 
Catholicism and Protestantism in mutual love. Again, this messianic notion is 
underpinned by the Russian self/Other dichotomy, as Groys analyses: ‚It is still 
precisely its extra historicity, its Otherness in relation to the history of the world 
spirit, that makes Russia able to incarnate true Christianity in its ultimate synthesis, 





v) Panslavism and other late variants of messianism 
 
Following the revolutionary times of Europe in 1848, the debate between the 
Slavophiles and the Westernizers changed, as the Russian state increased censorship, 
thus restricting public political space. The state around this time began to borrow 
from the messianic discourse of the Slavophiles and did so for around a decade, but 
with the defeat of Russia in the Crimean war, the state returned to Westernisation. 
(Neumann, 1996:xii) The discourse of the Slavophiles and others of the romantic 
nationalist position had in the beginning been rather introvert and expressed within 
a religious framework but towards the middle of the century the religious 
framework had been abandoned and Russia’s superiority of spirit and historical role 
was stressed. The discourse developed into pan-Slavism in the 1860s and 
confrontation with Europe began to be advocated.  
 
Pan-Slavism dominated Russian discourse in the 1880s, strongly influencing the 
official state discourse and functioning as legitimating Russian imperialism and 
eastward expansion. Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886) wrote that ‚*m+ore than once in the 
future Europe will be divided into two camps: on one side Russia, with all Orthodox, 
Slavonic tribes (including Greece), on the other – the entire Protestant, Catholic, and 
even Mohammedan and Jewish Europe put together.‛ (Quoted in Neumann, 
1996:63) The ideas of translatio imperii and translatio studii enjoyed great revival in 
Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism. Pan-Slavist Danilevsky, for example, wrote in 1869 
that: 
From an objective, factual viewpoint, the Russian and the majority of the 
other Slav peoples achieved the historical destiny of becoming, with the 
Greeks, the chief guardians of the living tradition of religious truth, 
Orthodoxy, and in this way the continuers of the great cause, which was the 
lot of Israel and Byzantium: to be the God-chosen peoples (narodami 
bogoizbrannymi). (Duncan, 2000:33) 
Notably, Danilevsky’s categorisation of civilizations into ten historical-cultural types, 
of which the young Slav one must overtake and finish off the old European, 
‚Romano-Germanic‛ one, is strongly reminiscent of Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
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Civilizations’, a work which has had great impact on the contemporary Russian 
intellectual debate. (Tolz, 1998:102) Leontev further developed Danilevsky’s ideas, 
and conceptualised the Russian mission as deriving from the heritage of Byzantine 
Orthodoxy and consisting in saving Europe from herself by ‚uniting the Chinese 
state model with Indian religiousness, and subordinating European socialism to 
them.‛ (Quoted in Duncan, 2000:43)  
 
vi)  Universalism and particularism  
 
Other distinctly messianic writers influenced by Slavophilism are Fedor Dostoevsky 
(1821-1881), Vladimir Solovev (1853-1900), and Nikolai Fedorov (1827-1903). 
Dostoevsky can be called an ideologist of Russian messianism as he developed, 
bolstered, philosophised about, romanticised and politicised various key narratives 
of Russian messianic discourse including the Orthodox mission to save humanity, 
the Slavonic cause as expressed by the Slavophiles, the Christ-like humility and 
suffering of the Russian people sacrificing itself for Europe, its various God-chosen 
and religious qualities, and the universality of the Russian man and many more.  His 
overt politicisation of messianism was in the form of active propagation for the 
Russian imperial expansionism justified by messianic discourse:   
Not only did Dostoevsky support imperial Russian rule throughout the 
territory that it possessed during his lifetime, but he also encouraged its 
further expansion into Constantinople, perhaps even to India. The way 
Dostoevsky mustered support for these claims among his compatriots was 
exactly by appealing to a transcendental version of the commonplace 
nineteenth-century ideas of historical and ahistorical nations, namely that of 
the Russian civilization which according to him encompassed all of 
humanity: ‚Yes, the Russian’s destiny is incontestably all-European and 
universal. To become a genuine and all-round Russian means perhaps to 




Russian messianism, as we have seen so far, thus contains both explicit notions of 
particularism and universalism and there is often a tension within individual 
discourses between the two.  
In some of Dostoevsky’s writings, the Jew figures as negative Other – the 
Antichrist – with eschatological warnings for a Jewish world conspiracy in which the 
Jews, capitalism, socialism and general spiritual and moral decadence are pitted 
against the Christian, pure, pan-human, all-uniting, loving Russian people.35 The 
Jews suffered strong persecution under Alexander III and Nicholas II, first being 
blamed for the murder of Alexander II in 1881 then as subjects to various pogroms in 
the years to come, often justified by variations on the type of anti-Semitic 
messianic/nationalistic discourse developed by Dostoevsky among others. 
(Neumann, 1996:91)  
 
Solovev, the mystical philosopher, distanced himself from many Slavophile and pan-
Slavist writers because of their xenophobic, anti-Semitic and nationalist tendencies, 
instead writing extensively about Russia’s messianic ideal and role based on his 
studies of the Jews and Judaism, dwelling at length on the tension in Russian – and 
any – messianism between particularism and universalism. Judith Kornblatt 
describes how the Jews, for Solovev a people ‘both choosing and chosen by God,’ 
who ‘at their best are both particular and universal’ came to serve as a model of 
Russia for true ‘spiritual nation-hood,’ as opposed to self-proclaimed "patriotic" 
messianism or particularistic nationalism. (Kornblatt, 1997:158-59,73-74) Solovev 
envisaged that the strengths of East, with its Muslim ‚in-human God‛, and West, 
with its ‚Godless human‛, were ‚going to be resolved in a new whole‛ and it was 
‚Russia’s great mission to realise this third and final phase of world history.‛ 




                                                 
35 ‚The Yid and his bank are now reigning over everything: over Europe, education, civilization, 
socialism – especially socialism, for he will use it to uproot Christianity and destroy its civilization. And 
when nothing but anarchy remains, the Yid will be in control of everything. For while he goes about 
preaching socialism, he will stick together with his own, and after the riches of Europe will have been 
wasted, the Yid’s bank will still be there. The Antichrist will come and stand over the anarchy.‛ (Quoted 
in Duncan, 2000:40) 
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vii)    Populism and revolutionary messianism 
 
In the second half of the century, the Westernisers – whose main concern can be said 
to have been to reconcile universalism and nationalism – split into liberals, Russian 
socialists and embryonic Marxists (Neumann, 1996:39). The Marxist position grew 
strong in the 1870s, to be restricted in the 1880s after the assassination of Alexander 
II, a decade in which the state came to lean towards the Romantic, Slavophile 
position. In the 1890s however, the debate between the populists and the Marxists 
dominated the Russian intellectual discourse, only really interrupted by Solov’ev 
from the Romantic, religious thinkers.  
Various elements of messianic discourse can be found in Russian socialism, 
populism, Marxism and even liberalism. This should by no means appear strange, as 
all the various positions on Russia, her national and civilizational identity and path 
of development, about the different Europes with its different models and so on were 
never isolated ideologies but continuously discussed, contested, rearticulated and 
influenced by other discourses – above was mentioned as an example the 
contradictions in the development of thought of for example Chaadaev.  
A key thinker in this group and period is Alexander Herzen (1812-1870), 
leader and founder of Russian socialism. Those who followed Herzen in his hopes of 
a specifically Russian socialism, consolidated around the Russian peasant commune, 
came to call themselves populists (narodniki). They were strongly influenced by 
Marxism in their view not only of the development of capitalism in Russia but, more 
importantly, of Western capitalism. ‚The life and thought of the Russian peasant 
were exalted as a model of European development at large, and contrasted with 
decadent European individualism.‛ (Neumann, 1996:52) Russian populism can be 
effectively understood as working within the same messianic framework of thought 
as the Slavophiles, in which Europe has the role of an inferior and decadent other 
and Russia with various superior qualities being its role model and, ultimately, 
Saviour. This framework is part of the explanation to why Russian socialism and 
Marxism differed so much from their Western counterparts.  
Storchak argues that it was the essentially religious framework based on 
Christian ideas and concepts central to Slavophilism that defined Russian populist 
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and revolutionary thought, and provides a lengthy and interesting discussion on the 
genealogy of their ideas. He highlights their use of the Christian notions of a ‚new 
heaven‛ and a ‚new world‛, which the revolutionaries had learnt to expect and 
hence strived to achieve on earth;  a universal brotherhood of peoples and nations; 
the idea of original sin (the age old sins of the bourgeoisie against the people); the 
idea of the Messiah, whose role is assigned to the Russian people (or the proletariat 
in the more European accounts); the focus on asceticism; the idealisation of the 
communal life; the view of the state as an historically necessary evil;  high 
missionary activity, sectarian organisation, readiness to voluntary self-sacrifice and 
so on.36 (2005:46-78) He also points to the intertextuality between the religious and 
revolutionary discourses in the ‚sacralisation‛ of various concepts:  
Besides the shown quasi-religious (the religion of ‚man-deity‛ *chelovekho-
bozhia+ in Dostoevsky’s terms) ‚symbol of faith‛, the anarchists sacralised 
such understandings such as ‚human reason‛ and ‚human consciousness,‛ 
having given them a status of inerrability in the knowledge of destiny and 
justice. They planned to achieve their missionary goals by two methods: the 
spreading of the rational sciences and socialist propaganda. (Storchak, 
2005:74)  
Duncan also mentions Anatoli Lunacharsky’s (1875-1933) ‚God-building‛ movement 
and its aim to construct the messianic kingdom on earth, using Christological 
imageries to depict the proletariat climbing Golgotha, with blood flowing. (Duncan, 
2000:52) The populist and revolutionary positions were thus similar to those of the 
Slavophiles on many key points – though, as Neumann points out, the positions 
could never merge due to their radically different views on industrialisation. 
(Neumann, 1996:71) 
 
4.3.4 The Soviet era 
 
i) Revolution, Marxism and Bolshevism as messianism 
 
                                                 
36 As an illustration he cites Mikhail Bakunin: ‚It is my deepest conviction that all divine religions must 
be followed by Socialism, which in a religious sense is faith in the fulfilment of man’s purpose on 
earth.‛ (Storchak, 2005:74) 
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Russian identity production and messianism with the Revolution and in the Soviet 
era can be seen as characterised both by radical change and deep continuity. There 
was radical change in terms of the traditional question of Russia being either inside 
or outside history (see for example Kujundzic, 2000) – the revolution can be seen as 
passing Russian collective identity from one realm outside of history – exceptionalist 
feudalism – to inside another – universalist socialism. Messianism is also seen in 
different accounts as an explanatory factor and manifestation of, as well as 
encouraged by the revolutions.37 (Duncan, 2000:53, Gill, 1990, 1998:2) 
And yet, at the political level, this universalism can be seen in terms of continuity of 
Russian imperialism. As Rowley writes:  
Like the American notion of Manifest Destiny, Bolshevik millenarianism was 
secular. It did not propound the literal belief in a Day of Judgment, an end of 
time, and the divine transfiguration of the world. Instead, the Bolsheviks 
were metaphorically millenarian in their belief that the Russian proletariat 
was leading the way to a better future for all humankind. Bolshevism thus 
carried on the essential imperialist and universalist mood (with messianic 
overtones) of Imperial Russian political culture. (Rowley, 1999:1599) 
 And despite the radical changes to Russian state and society, there was a strong 
continuity also of the traditional Russian civilisational identity debate. As Tsygankov 
describes: 
Although liberal Westernizers could no longer be part of the official 
discourse, arguments between those who wanted to ‘‘teach’’ Europe and 
those who wanted to build Russia’s own distinct civilization continued. The 
former line was especially pronounced in the Lenin-Trotski doctrine of world 
revolution which was based on the self-perception of Soviet Russia as 
superior to the ‘‘decadent’’ and ‘‘rotten’’ western capitalist civilization and 
justified a widespread external expansion. (Tsygankov, 2008:767) 
We see thus a continuity of the messianic self/Other framework of the West as 
decadent, dying and unspiritual, pitted against a superior, messianic Russia and the 
New Soviet man. Groys also sees definitive continuity of Russian traditional 
discourse also into the Soviet era: ‚Soviet Marxism also cannot be properly 
                                                 
37 For a useful overview, see Shlapentokh’s ‘The End of the Russian Idea’ (1992). 
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understood outside the framework of the Russian philosophical tradition. Indeed, 
the goal of Soviet Marxism became the realization, in Russian life, of the socialist 
theories formulated in the West, with the aim of achieving the final unity of the 
world. Even the most orthodox Stalinist dialectical materialism, under closer 
scrutiny, reveals a certain continuity of traditional Russian thought.‛ (Groys, 
1992:195-96)  
Many narratives and themes from previous centuries were reproduced by the 
Bolsheviks and other authorities in the first decade of the Soviet state, alongside with 
new ones, based both on exceptionalism and universalism. The creation by the state 
of a new, Soviet man echoed the creationist narratives from the eighteenth century, 
and the creation of heaven on earth through international revolution initiated by 
Russia appeared as a new version of the mission to save the world. And further, as 
Prizel describes, ‚the Bolsheviks’ long-term nationalities policy further blurred the 
Russian identity and bonded it to a ‚civilizing‛ role both universally and within the 
empire.‛ (Prizel, 1998:182)  
 
ii) The early Eurasianists 
 
The early Eurasianists were émigré Russian intellectuals who in the 1920s were 
further developing messianic discourses from the previous century, building 
particularly on themes developed by the Panslavists about the West as Romano-
Germanic civilization and the idea of translatio imperii with Russia ready to take the 
torch and become the centre of world culture. Eurasianism proposed a Russian ‘third 
way’, asserting the existence of a third continent and special, organic, civilisation 
between East and West – Eurasia – with a distinct historical destiny – similar to what 
Krizhanich had proposed two centuries back (Storchak, 2003:30).  
Marlene Laruelle’s recent book Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire 
(2008) is the best available and most comprehensive work on Eurasianism in both its 
historical and contemporary forms. Laruelle finds in early Eurasianism a definitive 
continuity of thinking about Russia’s ‚otherness‛ in relation to Europe; and of 
traditional Russian messianism: ‚Because of its messianism, Eurasianism’s 
philosophy of history conforms with the standard of Russian intellectual history.‛ 
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(Laruelle, 2008:17,48). Prince Nikolai Trubetskoi, perhaps the most well known 
Eurasianist, wrote that ‚Europe is masquerading as the keeper of the world 
civilization to the detriment of all other civilization‛, epitomising the critique of the 
West which appears as the persistent core of Russian messianism. He maintained 
that Russia must stop to follow Europe as a model and instead fight 
cosmopolitanism as ‚there is truly only one conflict: the Romano-Germans versus all 
the rest of the world, Europe and [that is, versus] Humanity‛ (Quoted in Neumann, 
1996:112,14). 
The Eurasianists had a complex often pragmatic relation to communism and 
the Soviet Union, as both ‚united against the West, sympathized with non-European 
cultures by definition, and condemned the European experience out of principle‛ and 
both wanted to make a ‘clean sweep of the past’ – but the Eurasianists rejected 
Marxism and the distinction between proletariat and bourgeois (both Western social 
concepts) and the Soviet internationalism, since their key theme was precisely the 
organic nation and faith expressed in culture. (Laruelle, 2008:26-29) 
Laruelle describes how Russia and Eurasia were used synonymously and 
interchangeably depending on context and purpose, with Russians represented as 
‚the connecting element of Eurasian national diversity‛ and Russia’s inherent 
supranationality was said to have been revealed with Mongol Empire. (Laruelle, 
2008:39-41) Orthodoxy was central to the ideology, despite a superficial openness to 
Eastern religions.38 On the whole, early or classical Eurasianism can be defined as an 
ideology of empire justified in terms of spirituality and the reification of space, with 
a constant internal tension between metaphysical discourse, culturalism and politics. 
(Laruelle, 2008:47)  
 
iii) Berdyaev and the Russian idea 
 
Nikolai Berdyaev (1874-1948), influential theoretician of Russian messianism and 
author of The Russian Idea, wrote extensively on Russian philosophy of history and 
politics from the turn of the century and over the first four decades of the Soviet era. 
                                                 
38 Laruelle describes: ‚Eurasia is depicted as a multinational and polyconfessional space, but the 
Orthodox Church alone is considered as worthy of representing the ideology of the future Eurasian 




His thinking changed significantly with time, having started as a Marxist, later to 
become a Christian existentialist and critic of the Bolshevik regime. Poltoratzky 
distinguishes between his ‘historical attitude before 1920’ and his ‘eschatological 
attitude of the 1940s’. (Poltoratzky, 1967:195) In terms of the distinction between the 
two master narratives of ‘Third Rome’ and ‘Holy Russia’, Berdyaev stressed, in his 
later period, that the Russian idea is ‚not the idea of a flourishing culture and mighty 
kingdom‛ (i.e. not ‘Third Rome’) but ‚the eschatological idea of the Kingdom of 
God‛ (or ‘Holy Russia’). (Cited in Poltoratzky, 1967:205-06)  
His interpretation of Russian history, thought and identity, and the 
development of anarchism and revolution as the antithesis of messianism are the 
most interesting aspects of his prolific writing in the context of our study. Where do 
we position his thought with regards to the central Slavophile/Westerniser problem? 
His own view was that both positions were outdated and flawed because or their 
flawed evaluation of the Petrine reforms.39   
For Berdyaev, precisely dualism had been central to Russian collective 
identity and thinking since Peter the Great’s westernising reforms in the late 17th and 
early 18th centuries. He saw the reforms, at the same time as the consolidation of 
serfdom, as creating a schism between state absolutism and the Russian messianic, 
sacred kingdom, and between the upper, leading stratum of Russian society and the 
masses. Poltoratzky describes: ‚The church schism was thus a result not only of 
ignorance and dark adherence to ritual, but also of doubt whether the Russian 
kingdom was the true orthodox kingdom.‛ (Poltoratzky, 1967:201-03)  
In Berdyaev’s account, the ‘Russian national consciousness’ responded to 
Peter’s revolutionary reforms by constructing the narrative that the Russian 
messianic kingdom was taken over by the Antichrist. The church schism and the 
distrust of the state as the ‘Antichrist’ – instead of the messianic Christ – led to the 
schismatic thinking of the Russian intelligentsia in the 19th century. The intelligentsia 
had accepted Petrine universalism and westernisation but rejected the empire, and 
schism was manifest in its struggle against the empire and the emergence of the 
                                                 
39 ‚Slavophils 'did not understand the inevitability of Peter's reforms for the mission of Russia in the 
world; they refused to recognise that only in the Petrine epoch did thought and word, including the 
thought of Slavophils themselves, become possible, as did also great Russian literature'. Westernisers, 
on the other hand, 'did not understand the originality of Russia, refused to understand the painfulness 
of Peter's reforms, did not see the particularity of Russia'.‛ (Cited in Poltoratzky, 1967:196) 
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stateless anarchist ideal of the 19th century. Ironically the intelligentsia, which 
opposed the state in the name of the people, was persecuted first by the authorities, 
then later by the masses through the revolution ‘which it had itself been preparing 
for almost a century.' (Poltoratzky, 1967:201-03)  
For Berdyaev, revolutionary Russian thought was as a perverted incarnation 
of true Russian messianism, and he concluded on the schismatic nature of Russian 
identity that the ‚Russian people, as an apocalyptic people, cannot create a middle-
of-the-road humanist realm; it can create either a brotherhood in Christ or a 
comradeship in Antichrist.‛ (Cited in Duncan, 2000:55) Berdyaev’s writings must be 
treated both as a primary and secondary source on Russian messianism, with himself 
as both its advocate and its theoretician.  While Berdyaev’s reification of ‘the innate 
Russian messianism’ contributed to an often populist and reductionist Western 
historiography (particularly in the Cold War context) on Russia, his notions of 
schism and dualism in Russian collective identity correlate to the findings of for 
example Michael Urban, cited in Chapter Two, on the dichotomised character of 
contemporary – and historical – Russian public discourse (Urban, 1998:970).  
  
iv) Stalinism  
 
If in Bolshevism and Marxist-Leninism we find reproduced both eschatological, 
universalist and expansionist narratives, the mission of which is to spread 
Communism internationally and create if not heaven on earth then the perfect, 
classless society, in Stalinism we see variations on other more particularistic and 
isolationist messianic themes – a return to exceptionalist feudalism and nationalism. 
‛Socialism in one country‛ in some respects reproduces the master narrative of Holy 
Russia outlined before. Russia – or now the Soviet Union – must, as the bearer of 
absolute truth, separate itself from the rest of the world in order not to be defiled, 
and purge itself from internal enemies.  
This was reflected in the isolationist foreign policy up until the war, and in 
the state’s increasing suspicion, paranoid control of public space and the of private 
lives of its citizens. Storchak’s above description of the state measures toward 
‚ideological hygiene‛ in the sixteenth century could easily be mistaken for a 
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describing Soviet ideological practice: the strict border controls, the separation of 
foreigners from the citizens and the demonisation of internal and external others. 
Anti-Semitism was also part of the state discourse, again intertwined with ‚the 
West.‛
40 The purging of ‘public enemies’ at al levels of society was as we know literal 
during the Great Terror.  
Another traditional messianic narrative that became part of official discourse 
is related to the glorification of Stalin’s person, especially supported and articulated 
in messianic terminology by the Orthodox Church in the years of its more privileged 
position. Apart from reproducing the Russian archetype of power, the family-
metaphor, with the tradition of the ruler being portrayed as a father of the nation 
(batiushka) (Hellberg-Hirn, 2000:10), Stalin was also presented as being chosen by 
God, historical destiny or divine providence, and in some instances is even likened to 
Christ. (Duncan, 2000:58-59)  
 From the mid-1930s patriotism and Russian nationalism had been 
rehabilitated in Soviet official discourse, and there was a culmination of this kind of 
rhetoric in and after the Great Fatherland War with nationalism and patriotism 
expressed in terms of sacrifice and suffering. The defeat of the Nazis was linked with 
the defeat of the Tatar-Mongols and of Napoleon, battles in which Russia was 
portrayed as having sacrificed itself to save Europe from alien invasion. 
Interestingly, Sidorov highlights the little known fact that Stalin, as part of a World 
War II scheme to bring Eastern Europe and the Middle East under Soviet control 
planned – but ultimately failed – to use the Russian Orthodox Church as agent in 
‚the creation of a ‘Moscow vatican’, a Moscow-centered transformation of the 
Orthodox world.‛ (Sidorov, 2006:324)  
 
v) Cold War and Soviet missionism 
 
There was a significant continuity of the messianic framework in the whole Cold 
War discourse with the now radicalised self/Other bipolar framework. The Cold 
War, Campbell argues in his study on US foreign policy, discussed in Chapter Two, 
                                                 
40 Duncan writes: ‚The virulent attack on Western culture, characterised as bourgeois cosmopolitanism, 
continued until the death of Stalin. It developed into an anti-Semitic purge, as ‚cosmopolitan‛ became 
code for ‚Jewish‛. It peaked in January 1953 when Jewish doctors were accused of plotting to kill 
Stalin.‛(Duncan, 2000:57)  
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notes that the term ‘Cold War’ was coined by a fourteenth century Spanish writer to 
represent the persistent conflict between Christians and Arabs and that 
correspondingly, the Cold War as we know it ‘was not a time or context specific 
phenomenon but rather part of the ongoing process of US identity production 
through foreign policy’, that is, through discourses of danger.’ (Campbell, 1991, 
1998:53) It was, he argues, ‚a struggle into which any number of potential 
candidates, regardless of their strategic capacity, were slotted as a threat.‛ 
(Campbell, 1991, 1998:33) The same could be said with regards to Russia and the 
Soviet Union where, as in the US, the conflict was not only geopolitical but 
represented in cultural and ideological terms. (Campbell, 1991, 1998:25) Both Stalinist 
and later Soviet ‚foreign policy‛ in Campbell’s broader sense thus served to forge a 
collective identity by active othering, creating internal and external common 
enemies.  
 
Shearman, writing from a conventional foreign policy perspective, notes how in 
Russia, empire and mission were linked to the self/Other dichotomy: ‚During the 
Cold War Russia's identity and its destination were defined by the Soviet 
empire/state and the mission/ideology of the Communist Party. Identity and 
destination were both linked to the conflict between 'East' and 'West'.‛ (Shearman, 
2001:254-55) Discussing messianism’s possible influence on Soviet foreign policy, 
Duncan points to for example the invasion of Afghanistan as ‚an extension of the 
efforts to subdue central Asia.‛ (Duncan, 2000:146) The discourse of a mission, based 
on the bipolar framework, thus extended beyond the Soviet empire itself and was 
used to legitimise the accession of the various Soviet satellite states as well as 
‘protected’ third world countries.  
 
vi) Romantic messianism in the Soviet period 
 
The later Soviet era from Khrushchev saw a proliferation of Romantic messianism in 
unofficial public discourse. Among these were the literary group nicknamed the 
derevenshchiki who, advocating ‚the protection of peasant morality and customs, the 
villages themselves, and the churches and other historical monuments of Russian 
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culture‛ began to frame their discourse in terms of a conflict between the Russian 
natural environment and technological process. (Duncan, 2000:62-67) This discourse 
would be reproduced in the decades to come pitting the natural, spiritual and 
protector-of-the-Earth Russia against the heavily industrialised, technological 
destroyer-of-the-environment West.  
Various messianic themes were revived in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the 
growing revival of Russian nationalism, and the Russian revolutions and other key 
events in Soviet history were often framed within a spiritual rather than Marxist 
framework. On the whole, Agadjanian describes the 1960s as ‚a period of ongoing 
social and cultural diversification and, at the same time, of a reactive hardening of 
the Soviet regime; it made the institutional framework increasingly at odds with the 
changing society.‛ (Agadjanian, 2001b:473-74) A key publication in this period was 
the literary journal Molodaya gvardiya with the publishing house of the same name in 
which the general messianic discourse of the cosmopolitanism, soullessness and 
Americanization of the Western world would for decades be counter posed to the 
spiritual Russia, often mixed with strong anti-Semitic discourse, and where ‚the 
October revolution was presented as a manifestation of this Russian spirit rather 
than a stage in the international class struggle.‛ (Duncan, 2000:71)  
A key thinker in this period to consider is of course Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 
(1918-2008), who apart from his books published much through the samizdat journal 
Veche. Rowley argues that it is wrong to see Solzhenitsyn as a Russian messianist, 
since Russian messianism is inherently linked to imperialism which Solzhenitsyn 
opposes – in fact he has faced harsh opposition for not, like (mistakenly called) right-
wing nationalists, denouncing the break-up of the Soviet empire. Instead 
Solzhenitsyn is a nationalist in the true sense of the word as he speaks for a Russian 
organic nation, the ethnic Russian people and Russian culture. (Rowley, 1997) 
Rowley’s point is of great importance, especially as the label nationalist is still used 
to depict the growing general Russian chauvinism and imperialism. Yet, again, the 
framework on Russia and the West which Solzhenitsyn uses is certainly same old 
Romantic messianic framework of the previous century, with a strong religious 
imagery arguably based on the Holy Russia master narrative. Solzhenitsyn 
reproduces and reinforces it by his damning critiques of the West with its spiritual 
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inferiority and false ideas of freedom – ‛We see it today crawling on hands and 
knees, its will paralyzed, uneasy about the future, spiritually racked and dejected‛ he 
writes (quoted in Neumann, 1996:143) – as well as referring to messianic concepts 
such as the ‘Russian national mission’. Russia, he argued, should isolate itself from 
the Europe and the world and ‚look to its unspoilt Northeast *. . .+ where ‘free people 
with a free understanding of our national mission can resurrect these great spaces, 
awaken them, heal them’.‛ (Quoted in Neumann, 1996:146) As the next chapter will 
show, Solzhenitsyn’s and related positions of messianism continued to have an 
important place in public discourse in the 1990s. 
 
Just as Storchak shows that the thinking of the Westernisers of the nineteenth 
century was often framed in a messianic discourse, Julia Brun-Zejmis has argued that 
messianic thinking was developed among the secular democrats in the Samizdat 
movement of the 1960s and 1970s. This section of the intelligentsia, who in its 
struggle for human rights was ‘spiritually transformed’ began to deploy narratives of 
martyrdom, in some interpretations suffering through ‚a Russian Golgotha in order 
to fulfil its moral mission.‛ (Brun-Zejmis, 1991:656) Brun-Zejmis draws a parallel to 
the compensatory role of messianism in Chaadaev’s contradictory thinking and 
argues that the ‚messianic consciousness shared by some Samizdat writers of the 
1970s can be viewed as an expression of their overwhelming guilt for the Soviet past 
and their feelings of national inferiority.‛ (Brun-Zejmis, 1991:658)  
 
vii) Glasnost, perestroika, and the – temporary - end of history  
 
The end of the Soviet Union came with a change in the state’s position on the West as 
Other; from enmity and military confrontation against the ‘camp of imperialism’ 
over to one where the West, or the ‘capitalist system’ was depicted as morally 
inferior but possible to cooperate with, not ‛wholly Other‛. (Neumann, 1996:156-57) 
Eventually, ‚those who favored Russia’s strong cultural association with Europe 
persisted and ultimately prevailed‛ (Tsygankov, 2008:767) and in this framework, 
‚Russia was not held to be morally superior to Europe; rather, it was seen as its 
potential equal and in certain respects its contemporary inferior.‛ (Neumann, 
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1999:163-64) While socialist distinctiveness continued to be part of official discourse 
during perestroika, Soviet missionism thus gradually had to give way to an 
increasing desire to become a ‘normal’ European power.  
As Soviet identity and statecraft had been legitimised through Soviet 
missionism and the struggle against the West/imperialist camp/capitalist system in 
the dichotomised self/Other framework, the changes in the view of the Other led to 
fateful changes in the state itself, leading eventually to the collapse of its institutional 
structures. Or, as Prozorov argues, ‚the Soviet system was nonreformable simply 
because in that period nobody could be bothered reforming it. Gorbachev’s 
Perestroika therefore marks a tragic attempt at a grand historical project in post-
historical times.‛ (Prozorov, 2008:218) The change away from the dichotomised 
messianic framework at state level ironically led to an outburst of particularistic 
variants of nationalism and messianism as public political space was expanded. 
(Duncan, 2000:115) As Agadjanian describes: ‚The overall identity crisis that 
developed during the course of this disintegration was essentially dominated by the 
energy of particularism [. . .] A natural outcome of this was the growing importance 
of such symbolically strong identities as those of ethnic, linguistic and religious 
grouping.‛ (Agadjanian, 2001b:473-74) The next chapter will discuss the prolific 
messianic discourse of the politics of the 1990s, showing how the dichotomous 
messianic self/Other framework was not absent from state discourse for many years 
but has gradually returned, testifying to its apparent necessity for Russian cultural 
and political identity.  
 
The collapse of the Soviet Union signified the failure of one grand messianic mission, 
and at the same time ushered in yet another type of messianism – in the sense of a 
timelessness. As Prozorov succinctly puts it: ‚The enormity of the collapse of the 
Soviet order was such that it could well be perceived as the ‘end of time’, which 
indeed calls for a certain suspension of action because everything has already 
happened.‛ (Prozorov, 2008:212) Messianism, in one form or another, thus appears to 







i) Historiography and continuity of Russian messianism  
 
We have sought to show how scholars from several different disciplines – history, 
the history of philosophy, politics, international relations, geography, Slavonic 
studies, the study of religion, and more, from both Russia and the West, find 
evidence of a certain type of messianic and related narratives and discourses which 
persistently have been reproduced over the centuries in Russia. Certainly, key events 
and trends of thought have led to reification, stereotyping, reinforcement and 
sometimes creation of Russian messianism and some of its concepts and 
characteristics: we have seen that the ‘Russian soul’ was very much a product of 
Western nineteenth century Romanticism (Carter, 1990:14-15); the dichotomised 
self/Other East/West framework dates centuries back but was much reinforced by 
classic European Orientalism (Laruelle, 2004:116-17); and the revolutions of 1905 and 
1917 marked the beginning various reductionist, often populist historiographical 
approaches among both Western and Russian intellectuals which were reinforced 
later in a Russophobic Cold War context.  
These often argued in terms of an unambiguous continuity of Russian 
messianism, seeing a clear causal relationship between messianic ideas and foreign 
policy– for example using the original Third Rome concept as evidence of Muscovite, 
Russian and later Soviet orientalism and inherent expansionism (Rowland, 1996:613, 
Sidorov, 2006:323-24). The studies we have drawn upon still point to a definite 
continuity, but generally draw a much more nuanced historiographic picture of this 
framework, pointing to the importance of less known but yet important themes and 
narratives, such as for example the ‘Paradise Myth’ (Baehr, 1991); ‘Moscow New 
Israel’ (Rowland, 1996, Storchak, 2003:13); and the earlier variant of the Russian 
‘Third Way’, by Storchak traced as far back as the mid seventeenth century and the 
writings of court official Krizhanich (2003:29).  
We have also seen how that this production and reproduction of messianic 
narratives has taken place in very different contexts, for different purposes, at 
different levels of discourse, with contradicting and contested narratives, making 
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Russian messianism impossible to pin down as a single explanatory category of 
foreign policy, or as a single ideology. It continues to appear as a persistent but never 
quite tangible part of Russian political and cultural identity. Nevertheless, we have 
sought to present those of its central elements, characteristics and narratives which 
appear to be more or less persistent and consistent, and we will here briefly recap on 
some of them. 
 
ii) Master narratives and missionism 
 
We have outlined the distinction, agreed upon by many diverse scholars even 
though it is blurred, between Holy Russia and Third Rome as master narratives, 
national myths, traditions, and both competing and complementary alternatives of 
Russian identity, in some periods correlating to the rift in public discourse between 
the people and the state, and to a certain extent paralleling the contradiction between 
particularism and universalism – though as we have seen, many individual 
discourses draw on both.  
We have also noted the importance of the – parallel, and intertwined with the 
others – narrative of Moscow New Israel, less known but, as argued, more significant 
for Muscovite identity and statecraft than Third Rome, and which links Muscovite 
culture both with Western Europe and with America. (Rowland, 1996, Storchak, 
2003:13) This theme renders interesting the long-standing Russian anti-Semitism, 
popular among many of the Slavophiles and other messianic Russian writers, 
expressed both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries within the dichotomised 
self/Other framework pitting thus not only the West but the Jews, capitalism, 
spiritual and moral decadence against the Christian, pure, pan-human, all-uniting, 
loving Russian people.  
Central to both of the messianic master narratives is both the idea of being 
chosen and anointed – manifest from the religious Muscovite state rituals to the 
themes of the historically providential role of the USSR in Soviet propaganda – and 
missionism, manifest from diverse narratives of sacrifice and suffering; to the 
political utopianism of many Russian thinkers; to the civilising mission in Tsarist and 




iii) Spirituality, religion and metaphysics 
 
Russian messianism, as we have seen, originated with the Church and the connection 
to Byzantium, and just as it is through the Church much of Russian messianic 
discourses have been produced (e.g. the original Third Rome concept and Muscovite 
ideology), Orthodoxy has continued to feature as a central element in diverse 
messianic discourses at other levels and strands of Russian discourse, from the 
schismatic Old believers (claiming to have the true Orthodox faith) (Rowley, 1999) to 
many Russian philosophers (e.g. Kornblatt, 1997, Neumann, 1996, Poltoratzky, 1967, 
Walicki, 1975, 1994) to the revival of nationalism under Stalin (Duncan, 2000:58-59, 
Sidorov, 2006:324).  
 
We have also sought to demonstrate that religion, Christological sacrifice, spirituality 
and metaphysics as elements of the Russian messianic framework have by no means 
been limited to religious discourse, but have been evident in various supposedly 
secular contexts and discourses, from the paradise myth in the seventeenth century 
(Baehr, 1991); to the populism and anarchism of the late nineteenth century (e.g. 
Storchak, 2005:46-78); to Soviet communism; and later the secular democrats in the 
samizdat movement (Brun-Zejmis, 1991).  
 
iv) Functions of Russian messianism as a self/Other framework   
 
Among the aims of this chapter were the continued investigation of hypothesis H3 – 
that one of the core explanations for the persistence of Russian Messianism is as a 
legitimising discursive framework for the existence and policies of Russia as a state 
actor in ambiguous relation to a broad Western Other – and subsequently the 
continued address of research question Q4, on how we can understand and 
conceptualise Russian messianism, its functions and role in relationship to Russian 
statecraft, especially towards the West. As we have argued, there is a broad 
consensus on the centrality of the ambiguous-dichotomous relation to the West for 
Russian identity, from Groys arguing that Russian philosophy in its entirety sees its 
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calling as to restrict Western aspirations to the universality of thought (1992:185); to 
Walicki arguing that opposition to the West was structural pivot of Slavophilism 
(1975:222-24) to Neumann’s historical discourse analysis on the perennial Russian 
debate on Europe (1996).  
We have also highlighted that while Russia’s self/other dichotomy certainly is 
most easily equated to the well-known East/West dichotomy, this is in part a 
historical generalisation, as both Byzantium and Israel played central role in Russian 
identity formation. Both were first emulated, then depicted as unclean and rejected 
by God, in a process which saw the construction of a geography of good and evil 
where Russia as their rightful successor is defined, contradictorily, in opposition to 
the rejected predecessors.  
A radical self/Other opposition has been evident in a number of contexts and 
discourses: in the abovementioned discourses against Byzantium and Israel as 
rejected, godless messianic states/peoples (Rowland, 1996, Storchak, 2003:5,13); in the 
‘geography of good and evil’ inherent in the paradise myth (Baehr, 1991:10); in the 
great schism in Russian Orthodoxy triggered by the Petrine reforms, with Peter the 
Great represented as the Antichrist; in Panslavism and early Eurasianism – 
Trubetskoy wrote for example that ‚there is truly only one conflict: the Romano-
Germans versus all the rest of the world, Europe and [that is, versus] Humanity‛ 
(Quoted in Neumann, 1996:112,14) – as well as in the doctrine of world revolution, 
pitting a superior Russia against a decadent Western civilisation (Tsygankov, 
2008:767); and later in the Soviet Cold war discourses. In sum, our exploration of 
Russian messianism in different contexts and at various levels of discourse across the 
centuries affirms the usefulness of the concept of a Self/Other framework which 
defines Russia in relation to a ‘significant Other’ and which is parallel with the 
longstanding religious framework of good vs. evil, with a range of connoted binary 
oppositions. We can conclude that the relation of the Russian self to the Other in 
messianic discourse is thus one of intense ambiguity which can be conceived within 
a continuum from radical opposition and superiority, to equality, to inferiority. 
 
Our methodology stressed that narratives, as constitutive of collective identity, have 
core functions which are important to identify. This can include giving meaning to 
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events; creating a system of intelligibility (a master narrative); legitimising, 
perpetuating or reproducing the hegemonic master narrative or legitimising the 
status quo; and challenging the status quo. (Hall, 2001:106) We have seen how 
various scholars identify political functions of messianic discourses. In Chapter Two, 
we suggested that the messianic framework as a dichotomising ‘geography of good 
and evil’  legitimates the state (and earlier the church) through ‘discourses of danger’ 
or ‘evangelism of fear’ (Campbell, 1991, 1998); justifies expansionism (Rieber, 1993); 
and ideological assimilation of a diverse population in a country of complex 
geocultural realities (Arbatov, 2006). In this chapter, Baehr argued that from the 
conversion of Russia to Orthodoxy, messianic and religious narratives, including the 
paradise myth and the image of Russia as a ‚perfected theocracy‛ functioned 
precisely as to legitimise the status quo (1991:ix, 18-19); Rowland alongside with 
others argued that the Biblical framework as a whole – not only the narrative of 
Moscow New Israel – functioned as to give meaning to events and define and 
legitimise  the Muscovite state (1996); Neumann argued that the function of the 
original Holy Russia discourse was counter-hegemonic thrust, ‚directed at the 
reigning doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome‛ (1996:8-9); and both Neumann and 
Walicki’s works have highlighted the compensatory function of messianic discourse 
in Russia’s relation to Europe (Neumann, 1996:199, Walicki, 1975), which Heikka in 
Chapter Two theorised about with regards to contemporary discourse (1999).  
 
And as for messianism as an ideology of empire, or of states with complex 
geocultural realities, we find further support for this argument. While we argued 
that Serbinenko’s proposed re-evaluation of the ‘metaphysics of the Russian idea’ is 
not very helpful for our study, his insights about ideology are, relating Russian 
messianism to ‚the exceptional drama and ultimately incomplete process of 
establishing a single ideological system of values in the Russian Empire‛ (2001:3-4). 
Similarly, while we ultimately declined Rowley’s distinction in Russian messianism 
between metaphor and belief, he nevertheless makes an important point about the 
relation between messianic ideology and empire, arguing that ‚imperialism is the 
only sort of millenarianism that can be considered to be a Russian cultural tradition. 
If Russians are a people of the End, it is their tradition of empire-building that has so 
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structured their consciousness.‛ (1999:1594) And following Laruelle, Eurasianism – 
based on messianic notions, discursively linked both to Slavophilism, Panslavism as 
well as doctrines of world revolution (Laruelle, 2008:16-49, see also Tsygankov, 
2008:767) can be understood best as an ideology of empire, justified in terms of 
spirituality and the reification of space.  
 
As we have argued previously, it is rather impossible to judge to what extent 
messianic discourse has informed and inspired Russian and Soviet imperialism in 
terms of expansionist ideology; and to what extent empire, as a permanent Russian 
geocultural condition, has necessitated messianic discourse for assimilation and 
legitimacy – here for example, Serbinenko appears to stress the latter, and Rowley 
the former. It helps to differentiate – as Sidorov does with regards to Third Rome – 
between messianic discourse as ‘imperialist’ and ‘imperial’ (Sidorov, 2006:322-23): 
and yet, there is little doubt that Russia and its messianic discourses have been both 
imperialist and imperial in varying contexts.  
 
As we have reiterated, the production and reproduction of messianic narratives has 
been persistent across centuries, but taken place in different contexts, for different 
purposes, centring on inherently ambiguous, vague notions such as ‘spirituality’ and 
‘mission’, and as such impossible to define as a single ideology. This makes it 
possible to suggest that the core logic of opposition of Russian messianism functions 
not only to legitimise and assimilate, but also to mask the elusive, kaleidoscopic and 
incoherent character of Russian identity and messianic ideology itself, a proposition 
which we shall explore further in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter One noted how, despite a continuous stress on pragmatism and an alleged 
‘end of ideology’, a definitive deployment of ideological, messianic-related notions 
has for some time been evident in the Russian official rhetoric. Chapter Two 
discussed the need for the state, as an entity without pre-discursive foundations, to 
both justify its own existence and negotiate an official collective identity, employing 
discourse or narrative. In this way the state can balance between various complex 
interests, situations and needs whose incongruity is disguised by the dichotomised 
discursive structures in which the self must be separated and defined in relation to 
various Others.  
 Chapter Four argued that in Russia, messianic discourse has predominantly 
filled the function of the state’s story-telling, and identified one of the core strengths 
of Russian messianic discourse as the continuous dichotomisation between the 
Russian self and ‘the West’ as a broad, inclusive Other. Russian messianism was 
specifically defined as a historically persistent discursive framework holding a 
kaleidoscopic range of both complementing and contesting discourses, with a major 
contradiction between two master narratives – Holy Russia and Moscow Third Rome 
– which also parallel the contradiction between exceptionalism and universalism, 
and ethno-centrism and cosmopolitanism. Chapter Three outlined a qualitative 
methodology based on discourse analysis for selection and analysis of contemporary 
Russian messianic discourse. 
  
This chapter explores the function of official discourse of the messianic and related 
narratives in seeking to resolve the post-Soviet Russian crisis of identity during the 
years of Putin’s presidency, making comparisons with public discourse.  
 Our basis for analysing official discourse is former President Putin’s annual 
addresses to the State Council, 2000-2007, and a wide range of sources from Russian 
public discourse (the broad domain of unofficial but published texts which includes 
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various overlapping domains – academic, political, cultural, religious, etc). Asking 
the questions from the discourse analytical framework developed in Chapter Three, 
we will be looking at several important dimensions of Russian identity and statecraft 
in these eight speeches and their evolution, placed in the three broad categories: 
 
i) Russia as History, Presence and Destiny 
 
Explores the central narratives and definitions of contemporary Russia as state 
and country, as well as narratives of its history and future, i.e. Russia as a 
temporal-social entity. 
 
ii) Russia and the World: Self and Other(s) 
 
Explores Russia as a spatial-political entity; identifies and analyses the specific 
constructions threats, problems and ‘discourses of danger’; studies the 
predications of ‘the West’ as Other; and the relation between the ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ constructions of Russia. 
 
iii) Russia as Messianic 
 
Traces and analyses the explicit references to and uses of Russian messianic 
discourse as defined and categorised in the theory and literary review chapters. 
 
We will study instances of messianic-related intertextuality in these texts more 
closely, comparing the state’s official or ‘sanctioned’ discourse with society’s public 
or  ‘unsanctioned discourse’ - both where similar signifiers, narratives and discourses 
are used; and where the same questions and issues are framed differently, paying 
special attention to the hidden dualisms which bring coherence to the official identity 
representation. We argue that the state, despite at times clearly distancing itself from 
messianic discourse, nevertheless adopts and mediates various Russian messianic 
discourses, narratives and signifiers from its vast supply in public discourse, for the 




5.2.0 The first Post-Soviet decade 
 
In the context of Russian discourse, ‘the end of history’ sounds rather more like the 
realisation of messianic ideology than the assumed victory of liberal democracy and 
Western values to which Fukuyama famously referred (1992). Indeed, Prozorov 
describes this period in Russia precisely in terms of a ‘Messianic suspension,’ but 
sees it as different from Fukuyama’s end of time, not being the victory of one grand 
ideology over another, but the suspension of all grand ideology and ‘teleological 
metanarratives.’
41 (Prozorov, 2008:213)  
 Yet, the first post-Soviet decade saw the expectation, both in Russia and in 
the West, that Russia after the failure of Communism as one of its messianic projects 
finally had abandoned its ‘special path’, joined Europe and would now gradually 
become a ‘normal’, i.e. Western country, sharing values of liberal democracy, human 
rights, market economy, etc. 42  Official discourse centred on ‘integration’ and a 
‘strategic partnership’ with the West. But this official discourse was not without 
opposition in the public sphere – the traditional debate on the West and Russia’s 
civilisational belonging resumed with great intensity, again pitting Westernisers 
against various overlapping messianic-related positions: neo-Eurasianism, national-
patriotism or the ‘Red-Brown mix’, neo-Slavophilism, neo-imperialism, ultra-
nationalism, and more.  
As we noted in Chapter Two, Urban’s apt summary of the post-Soviet 
variation of the traditional debate describes the Westernising regime finding Russia 
deficient in comparison to the Other, its common subtext being perhaps: ‚Things are 
much better there; our state is utterly failing us and should be replaced‛; with the 
second, messianic regime, objecting to this objection, its common subtext being 
rather something like: ‚Who are you to prefer another to your own? You must be 
someone who either does not understand, or despises his own country which is 
<*‘spiritual’, ‘all-human’, ‘collectivist’, ‘chosen by God’ etc+‛. (Urban, 1998:981)  
                                                 
41 See also Shlapentokh (1992) for a colourful perspective. 
42 Interestingly, Sakwa has suggested that the struggle for democracy on occasion became a new form of 
traditional messianism. (1993:109) 
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While the debate on the West followed the same dichotomised, essentialist 
structure as in the previous century, the fall of the Soviet Union led to changes in 
Russian discourse which also affected the debate, for example in the interpretation of 
the fall as the failure of Marxism as a Western ideology. Scanlan explained that the 
post-Soviet Slavophiles could and did ‚argue that the failed Communist experiment 
should be taken as the final refutation of the myth that Western notions can 
adequately cope with Russia’s special, historically generated needs and problems.‛ 
(Scanlan, 1994:56) Over and over in the public discourse the messianic regime was 
deployed by politicians, academics and others, arguing that ‘Western’ values were 
incompatible with, if not diametrically opposed to, Russian values; that only the 
Russian ‘crisis of identity’ had led Russia to ‘import’ these alien values, with 
catastrophic results.  
The assumed ‘victory of liberalism’ in official discourse was thus short-lived 
in Russia, with economic crises together with other factors increasing the 
disillusionment with the West, even by many liberals (see e.g. Shlapentokh, 1998). 
Most discourses of the messianic positions – Solzhenitsyn’s strand of neo-
Slavophilism excluded – regretted the breakup of the Soviet Union. There was a large 
dissemination of paranoid and xenophobic discourses, typically involving 
conspiracy theories linking the fall to a plot of the cosmopolitan/Zionist-Masonic 
West together with Russia’s Westernisers, showing how the Russian identity in crisis 
could be sustained only by blaming its Western, Judeo-Christian other. (Rowley, 
1997:326, Duncan, 2000:121-22)    
 
What essentially happened in this first post-Soviet decade was a gradual merging of 
a lot of previously incommensurable political positions – monarchism, Orthodoxy 
and Slavophilism, neo-Eurasianism, hard-line communists, and other variants of 
nationalism – resulting in a kaleidoscopic but increasingly unified anti-Western 
master-discourse of the messianic, nationalist position. (Prizel, 1998:255-56, 
Neumann, 1999:168) This position changed its attitude towards the establishment 
from opposition to support, beginning when Primakov became Prime minister, and 
increasing when Putin came to power. Laruelle describes: ‛Numerous nationalist 
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figures came to support the authorities while preserving their political structures, 
resulting in a kind of vociferous but fictitious opposition.‛ (2006:21) 
Furthermore, many liberals, centrists and statists were transformed by the 
compelling messianic and related narratives. Neumann describes as the great drama 
of the 1990s they – previously seeing Russia as dependent on all mankind – began to 
go over to the Romantic nationalist, i.e. messianic or national-patriot position, in 
which Europe and all mankind is dependent on Russia. He explains this change, 
surprising given the economic and institutional advantages of the westernising 
position, in terms of the discursive and symbolic capital of the nationalist 
representation, i.e. the messianic framework, which ‚came complete with references 
back to an unbroken and proud national history‛. (Neumann, 1999:169). Richter 
notes that they ‚defined the Russian polity as a unique cultural identity ordained to 
perform an international mission as mediator between the northern industrialised 
countries of Western Europe and the Islamic and Asian countries to the East and to 
the South.‛
43  (Richter, 1996:81) 
 
Messianism thus quite simply became mainstream. This could be noted not only in 
public discourse but also in other fields. For example Kelly noted how a ‚new 
ideological orthodoxy‛ could be discerned in philosophy, writing that: ‚Just as once 
no thinker could be considered enlightened or significant if he could not be shown to 
be a precursor of Marxism, now those who are not seen to have contributed to the 
Russian idea – or, worse, who have opposed it – tend to be marginalized, demonized 
or reinterpreted to fit a prior schema.‛ (Kelly, 1999) This chapter will shortly proceed 
to trace how the official position in the subsequent decade related to this incongruent 





                                                 
43 An illustration of this is the Yeltsin adviser Sergei Stankevich’s definition of the Russian mission, 
which was to: ‚initiate and support a multilateral dialogue of cultures, civilizations and states. Russia 
the conciliator, Russia connecting, Russia combining. A charitable state, tolerant and open within the 
limits drawn by law and good will, but formidable beyond these limits. A country imbibing West and 
East, North and South, unique and exclusively capable, perhaps, of the harmonious combination of 
many different principles, of a historic symphony.‛ (Stankevich, 2004, 1992) 
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5.3.0 Putin’s decade: the wider background 
 
An analysis of the annual addresses of President V.V. Putin has to be set in the 
political, international and economic context of the period in order to better 
understand the implications and evolution of these speeches. Putin’s popularity and 
the rising legitimacy of his government initially derived much from the positioning 
of his regime as the negation of the chaotic Eltsinite years: Putin became the symbol 
of youth, strength and stability, everything that Eltsin had appeared to lack. Various 
factors contributed to the success of this representation.  
First of all, Putin’s first presidency was much defined by the conflict in the 
North Caucasus. As the new prime minister in 1999 Putin had promised ‘to kick the 
shit’ out of the Chechen rebels and sent troops back into Chechnya (Shevtsova, 
2007:36). This quite certainly contributed to his election as president in 2000: ‚The 
success of Putin was that he demonstrated decisiveness in dealing with the Chechen 
rebels and had achieved considerable military success by the time of the election. He 
claimed that the war had been successfully concluded and that mopping up 
operations would occur in the near future.‛ (Shlapentokh, 2003:76) Putin kept 
Chechnya under Moscow's control through military force, and maintained strict non-
negotiation with the rebels. But the price came high, with increasingly violent attacks 
by the rebels, whom the Kremlin were keen to compare with Al-Qaeda after 9/11. 
The terror reached a horrifying level in 2004 with the bloodbath following the Beslan 
school seizure. The rising Russian ethnocentrism in both public and official discourse 
which this chapter will outline related closely to the conflict in the North Caucasus 
and its representation by Putin’s regime. 
Secondly, the Putin decade was also defined by soaring oil prices and the 
resulting revival of Russia as ‘energy superpower’.  As Sakwa describes: 
Buoyed up by high energy prices, by 2007 the Russian economy was back at 
its 1991 level, although it still had some way to go to return to the peak of 
1989. Russia was a major beneficiary of the commodity-price boom of the 
early twenty-first century. Above all, the price of oil remained high, bringing 
in enormous revenues—every $1 rise in the price of a barrel of oil represents a 
124 
 
$1 billion increase in Russian government receipts—and endowing the 
country with a large trade surplus. (Sakwa, 2008:246) 
The rise in oil prices helped secure stability and led to respectable rates of growth in 
the Russian economy. This contributed greatly to Putin’s popularity and his image as 
the ‘guarantor of order’. (Shevtsova, 2007:44) Energy remained a key component in 
Putin's diplomacy – whether with Iran and Iraq, former Soviet republics or the EU 
(Jaffe and Manning, 2001). 
As for Russia’s relations with the West, this chapter will outline their gradual 
deterioration under Putin; though this development was far from straightforward 
and, rather, the relations have been marked by continuous ambiguity. Personal 
relations between Putin and President G.W. Bush were said to be good and Putin 
initially allied himself strongly with Washington's "war on terror". But the turn to US 
unipolarity was strongly opposed by the Kremlin. Russia was most vocal in 
opposition to the invasion of Iraq; and used US unilateralism, as we will show, as a 
new discursive platform to define Russia as the keeper of international law and 
indeed civilization. Putin pursued a policy of ostentatious independence actively 
seeking good relations with those Washington disapproved of in Caracas or Tehran, 
or inviting Hamas to Moscow for talks after their Palestinian election victory. As we 
will argue, this foreign policy that was simultaneously multi-vector (mnogo-vektornyi) 
but also ambiguous in Russia’s position to the West has been politically useful for 
Putin’s discourse about the revival of Russia as a great power under globalisation. 
 
 
5.4.0 2000-2001: Crossroads 
 
5.4.1 Russia as History, Presence and Destiny 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
In Putin’s first two addresses to the state council, attempts to produce an official 
construction of Russia and its past were generally vague, neither speech containing 
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many signifiers of Russia and Russianness.44 Specific definitions of Russia were few 
and typically loose, such as ‚Russia is above all the people who consider this country 
to be their home‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2000), and there was an implicit 
subscription to civic as opposed to ethnic or imperial identity markers.  
 Judging from his subsequent popularity, Putin successfully managed tap 
into the views and feelings of many ordinary Russians who after a decade of 
political, economical and societal turmoil were craving for stability and better living 
standards, legitimising his regime as the negation and overcoming of the 1990s, 
‘Yeltsin’s decade’. (Prozorov, 2008:208) 
The recurring message in the first two state addresses, as well as in the earlier 
Millennium Manifesto, was that Russia did not need ideology (whether ‚communist, 
national-patriotic or radical-liberal‛ 45 ), revolution or counter-revolution, rather: 
‚*s+tate stability built on a solid economic foundation is a blessing for Russia and for 
its people‛. (Putin, Annual Address, 2001) As Prozorov points out, Putin hereby 
effectively ‚delegitimises all determinate answers to the question of Russia’s future 
but refrains from offering his own answer.‛ (Prozorov, 2008:220)  
The state repeatedly and explicitly rejected the notion that empire and 
messianism (the two concepts were often quoted together) should define Russian 
statecraft. As brief examples, Putin claimed in the Millennium Manifesto that he was 
seeking to free patriotism from ‚the tints of nationalist conceit and imperial 
ambitions‛ (quoted in Slade, 2006); and foreign minister Igor Ivanov would discuss 
the negative historical experiences following a Russian ‚imperial attitude‛, asserting 
that Russian foreign policy ‚should be based on national interests rather than 
political ideology‛, and that Russian diplomacy had always failed ‚when dominated 
by imperial ideology and messianic ambitions.‛ (Ivanov, 2001:11)  
Overall, the Russian state avoided grappling with its inherently complex and 
difficult dimensions such as empire, nation, and the Soviet legacy, but these 
questions themselves did not lose actuality, being intensely debated as we shall see 
in public discourse. Even though the Soviet state had defined itself in vehement 
opposition to imperialism, it was doubtless an empire of a kind, and how the 
                                                 
44  The Millennium Manifesto of 1999 began many of the trends that would follow in the annual 
addresses, for an excellent analysis of this speech see Slade (2006). 
45 President Putin in the Millennium Manifesto, 1999, see Slade (2006). 
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multicultural Russian Federation ought to relate to these predecessors was by no 
means clear even a decade after its birth.  
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
While the construction of Russia and its past was fairly vague in the state addresses, 
far more distinct representations could be found in public discourse. Since the 
economic backlash of 1997-98, the liberal, westernising positions of Russia had been 
almost completely obliterated by the national-patriotic positions, which, as we 
outlined above, have reversed their locations on the periphery and the centre of 
Russian discourse. It was precisely the questions of empire, nation and the Soviet 
past which divided popular messianic discourse in the 1990s and first years of Putin.  
  While both the Russo-centric nationalism espoused by figures like 
Solzhenitsyn and the supra-national imperialism advocated by the national-patriots, 
or rather imperialists, were fundamentally anti-Western, their key difference was 
their relation to empire and the Soviet legacy: the imperialists celebrated both, 
typically as part of a coherent messianic tradition, while the Russo-centric 
nationalists attacked Marxism and Bolshevism for being a western ideology and 
argued that Russia should let its empire go, thus representing the Soviet period as a 
disruption to Russia’s history (Rowley, 1997).  
So, even though the state largely avoided the questions of empire and the 
Soviet past, and claimed to distance itself from ‘imperial ambitions,’ this was hotly 
debated in public discourse, with distinct support in large segments of the public 
sphere for the identity of an expansionist ‚Russian Empire‛, with the idea that 
Russia must restore the lost world balance of power. (Tsygankov, 2005, 2007) 
 
In public discourse however, the concept of Russian ‘imperial ambitions’ was often 
used in a different context. In an article entitled ’The ‘Imperial’ and National in 
Russian Consciousness’, representative of mainstream political discourse, Sergei 
Kortunov, the Chairman of the Committee of Foreign Policy Planning and prominent 
academic who was introduced in Chapter Two, launches a vigorous defence against 
allegations that Russia would still harbour ‘imperial ambitions’. It is the West, in 
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particular the US, and not Russia, which really harbours imperial and indeed 
messianic ambitions - Russia just wants to pursue her legitimate national interests.  
 The notion of ‘Russian imperial ambitions’, Kortunov argues, is a tool for the 
West to exercise economic and political pressure over Russia. What the West chooses 
to regard as imperialism is in fact only Russian nationalism – and the hypocrisy of the 
West is apparent in its support of national self-determination of all the former Soviet 
states apart from Russia. Russia does however aspire to be a Great Power (velikaya 
derzhava), Kortunov affirms in his conclusion, not as a superpower but one of the five 
leading powers of the world: ‚And this is not so because some want it or don’t want 
it. It is an objective process, natural for Russia.‛ (Kortunov, 1998a:27). The shifting in 
attention to the Western/US Other  undoubtedly functions here as to take the focus 
off the complexities and contradictions of Russia and its ambiguous nationalism, a 
strategy that would increasingly define Russian official discourse in general. 
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
Among western academics, the question of empire in post-Soviet Russia has often 
been conceived of as being about ‘objective realities’ versus Russian self-perceptions 
and rhetoric  (see for example Adomeit, 1995). Some claimed that Russia now for the 
first time in its history existed as a nation-state, not as an empire; that empire and 
mission could no longer be main signifiers of Russianness. (Chulos, Piirainen, 1997:1) 
Lieven in his work Empire also views the fall of the Soviet Union as a definitive end 
of Russan empire, and argues that empire ‚doesn’t pay in today’s world‛ (Lieven, 
2000:410) and Andrei Tsygankov argues that Putin is too pragmatic to seek to build 
an empire with ‚Soviet-like grandeur,‛ instead has a ‚rational policy aimed at 
providing Russia with greater security and preparing for economic competition in 
world markets, ‛ with a position shifting between different variants of Russia as a 
Great Power but not empire. (Tsygankov, 2005:136-37, 42)  
Yet, as Lieven also notes, the whole concept of empire itself is strongly value-
laden and has ‚strong polemical connotations‛ (Lieven, 2000:1-10, 413). It is not 
always clear what Western observers respectively Russian writers mean by empire, 
nor how the two correlate. However, as Sakwa stresses with regards to Russian 
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foreign policy, the Russian perceptions of Russia’s status do matter (Sakwa, 1993, 
2000:347). If the popular and political representation of Russia as a great empire 
would prevail over the representations of Russia as a civic or nation-state, then that 
is bound to affect also its actions and policies, whether or not observers choose define 
Russia as a present-day empire.  
 
Regardless of the diverse definitions of empire, Russia with its remaining republics, 
many peoples, cultures and religions, vast population and geography, and decidedly 
ambiguous imperial legacies, and the accompanying problems of ethno-religious 
conflicts and claims for independence, undoubtedly struggles to fit into conventional 
models of collective identity construction of nation- or civic states, which fail to be 
applicable to Russia’s ambiguities.  
   
5.4.2 Russia and the World: Self and Other(s) 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
Though messianic ideology was explicitly renounced in this period, the main official 
narrative of Russia can still be placed within the broad messianic-related framework, 
given its concern with the salvation of the state, the country, and its suffering people. 
The country and its people were represented as subject to a number of imminent 
internal and external problems and threats from which the state should protect and 
save them. Among the external threats in the state addresses, the West was implicitly 
present in statements, for example, on an ‘infringement on national sovereignty in 
the guise of ‘humanitarian’ intervention’. Apart from ‚pragmatism, economic 
effectiveness, and the priority of national tasks‛, Russia’s foreign policy foundation 
was outlined as being the protection of Russia from the threats to its sovereignty: 
Thus, in the conditions of a new type of external aggression – international 
terrorism and the direct attempt to bring this threat into the country – 
Russia has met with a systematic challenge to its state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, and found itself face to face with forces that strive 
towards a geopolitical reorganization of the world. Our efforts to save 
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Russia from this danger are often interpreted in a subjective and biased 
manner, and serve as the occasion for various types of speculation. (Putin, 
Annual Address, 2000, italics added) 
The dangers presented by Putin also included separatism, the expansion into Siberia 
by Russia’s Far Eastern neighbours as well as the expansion of Islam (Shlapentokh, 
2001:378) and Russia’s demographic decline.  
But by far the largest problem according to in this period was the state itself, 
in need of deep reform, modernisation and strengthening. In the 2000 address, Putin 
drew a picture of Russia standing at a cross-roads, facing the choices of remaining 
weak or becoming strong; being a third world country or one of the leading nations; 
‚to rely on others’ advice, aid and loans, or to develop relying on our own distinctive 
character, and own efforts‛; to dwell on the past or look to the future, and made it 
clear that the state’s destiny was in its own hands, but that to overcome the problems 
and dangers would take a lot of hard work (Putin, Annual Address, 2000).  
The first two state addresses set out president Putin’s detailed plan to 
modernise and reform the Russian state so that it would function to take care of its 
citizens, at times represented by Putin as victims of empire and ideology (Putin, 
1999). So the state was casting itself as having the role to save the country, or the 
nation, from threats and dangers, and Putin himself was at times referred to as a 
saviour (Shlapentokh, 2001:378). All of this suggests that the traditional, if 
ambiguous, notion of the relationship between the Father/Redeemer-Tsar state and 
the Mother-Russia nation was as relevant as ever.  
Another ambiguity was that between the external and internal 
representations of Russia – a trend in these early addresses is also that of Putin 
allowing himself to be harsh and ‘truthful’ about Russia internally, listing negative 
Russian qualities, e.g. ‚a habit of putting off the most difficult things‛ (2002), 
‚parasitic moods‛ (2003) ‚a state that has deceived citizens in the past‛ thereby 
losing their trust (2001); and identifying many grave problems. Yet, the external 
image is nearly always positive: Russia is constructed as reliable, trustworthy and 





ii) Public discourse 
 
In public discourse too, Russia was and still is often represented as in need of 
salvation. For example, both popular political leaders Zyuganov and Zhirinovsky 
‚have composed and published several extremely detailed analyses of their personal 
plans to ‚save Russia.‛‛ (Hanson, 1997:9) But the difference between official and 
public discourse in this area was that while Putin largely focused on practical 
solutions to the multitude of threats and problems facing Russia, public discourse 
has general been more concerned with the traditional Russian question kto vinovat? 
(who is to blame? whose fault is it?)  
 As we outlined above, there has been no shortage of answers. Conspiracy 
theories - involving the West, the Jews, the Freemasons, the Antichrist (in various 
innovative combinations) and at times aliens from outer space – were not limited to 
popular discourse but was and remains an essential part of Russian public political 
discourse.46 As but one illustrative example, the Orthodox nationalist political party 
‘Holy Russia’ explicitly strives to ensure ‚the protection of Orthodoxy and our nation 
from immediate anti-Christian experiments; the salvation of the Fatherland from the 
Satanic forces of worldly evil and the seducers of the nation and plunderers of the 
state.‛
 47 Against the backdrop of this abundance of exotic theories, Putin’s persistent 
call ‚to start to living according to normal human logic and realise that we have long 
and hard work ahead of us‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2001) was certainly sobering. 
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
The considerable use of dangers, conspiracy theories and subsequent salvation in 
Russian discourse reinforces Campbell’s argument that the ‚constant articulation of 
danger through foreign policy is not a threat to a state’s identity or existence: it is its 
condition of possibility. While the objects of concern change over time, the 
techniques and exclusions by which those objects are constituted as dangers persist.‛ 
                                                 
46 Verkhovsky’s article describes the centrality of the figure of the Antichrist to Orthodox nationalism, 
how it as a negative Other it contains various useful subordinate enemies of Russia: Jews, Catholics, the 
West, the New World Order and so, on. (Verkhovsky, 2004)  See also Sidorov (2006:329), Laruelle (2004), 
and Rowley (1997).   
47 From ‘‛Za nashe Otechestvo – Za Rus’ Svyatuio‛ at the website of ‘Svyataya Rus’, http://www.sant-
rus.ru/vestnik.html [Accessed 2008-04-25]. 
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(Campbell, 1991, 1998:12-13). As discussed previously, Campbell’s also draws a 
direct parallel between the state project of security and the church project of 
salvation (bearing in mind the church’s central political role before the modern state): 
The state grounds its legitimacy by offering the promise of security to its 
citizens who, it says, would otherwise face manifold dangers. The church 
justifies its role by guaranteeing salvation to its followers who, it says, would 
otherwise be destined to an unredeemed death. Both the state and the church 
to maintain order within and around themselves, and thereby engage in an 
evangelism of fear to ward off internal and external threats, succumbing in 
the process to the temptation to treat difference as otherness. (Campbell, 1991, 
1998:50-51) 
The constructed dangers and threats facing Russia in both official and public 
discourse are both internal and external, but the discourses on danger externalizes 
them, reinforcing the demarcation between ‘self’ and ‘Other’, ‘foreign’ and 
‘domestic’, ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, thus playing a crucial role in the construction of a 
collective Russian identity.  
 As we have suggested, official discourses of danger in this period were more 
directed towards legitimising the state and Putin’s leadership, and in the public 
discourses of danger a Russian ‘self’ was being reflected in the multitude of negative 
‘Others.’ This dual function of ‘danger-salvation’ discourse – legitimising the state 
and shaping collective identity – provides another explanation for the rise of Russian 
messianic discourse in a period when the post-Soviet Russian state, Putin’s regime 
and Russian collective identity were still uncertainly established. It also suggests that 
messianic discourses of salvation should be rather common among states and not a 
phenomenon exclusive to certain states. 
 
5.4.3 Russia as Messianic 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
The state’s proclaimed rejection of ideology and messianism in this period was not 
unequivocal. In the midst of all pragmatism and detailed plans for reforming the 
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state, short paragraphs on culture and spirituality would somewhat randomly 
appear in the texts, such as this one: 
And these goals are not just material ones. Spiritual and moral goals are no 
less important. The unity of Russia is strengthened by the patriotism inherent 
in our people, by cultural traditions and common historic memory. And 
today in Russian art, in theatre and the cinema, there is a growth of interest in 
Russian history, in our roots and what is dear to us all. This, without doubt – 
I, at any rate, am certain of this – is the beginning of new spiritual 
development. (Putin, Annual Address, 2000) 
In the 2001 state address Putin again affirmed that ‚our country’s development is not 
measured only by economic successes but also, and not in the least, by its level of 
spiritual and physical health, although, of course, all of these things are interlinked.‛ 
(Putin, Annual Address, 2000)  
 These vague references to a ‚new spiritual development‛ and ‚spiritual 
health‛ do not say very much in themselves but constitute a small but defining 
acquiescence to the popular messianic discourse and its core binary couple - 
material/spiritual – as opposed to the liberal discourse that had dominated official 
discourse during the first post-Soviet decade. 
But just as Putin would also play with the meaning of liberal western notions, 
messianic concepts and themes were often invoked in the state addresses and 
imbued with meanings rather different from those in public discourse. Putin for 
example responded in the Millennium Manifesto to the vague but hugely popular 
‘Russian idea’ with his own version, claiming that ‚the new Russian idea will come 
about as an amalgamation of universal general humanitarian values with traditional 
Russian values‛ (quoted in Slade, 2006); and in the 2000 address he related to the 
popular theme of a ‘special mission’ (osobaya missiya) by stressing the need to learn to 
work together effectively, imploring all state officials ‚to treat this as their main and 
most important mission, I repeat, their most important mission‛(Putin, Annual 
Address, 2000).  
In the latter speech he also emphasised the importance of ‚balance of 
interests‛ over ‚rigid ideological dogma‛, and an ‚analysis of shortcomings‛ over 
‚soothing speeches‛, and set one of the key tasks for the state as being to ‚ensure 
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that there can be no backing away from democratic freedoms and that the economic 
course we have chosen cannot be reversed.‛  
Putin’s repeated message was that instead of trying ‘to look for a national 
idea’ and indulge in messianic philosophising, active steps should be taken to reform 
and modernise the Russian state - a message clearly aimed at these multitudes of 
intellectuals and politicians who since the Yeltsinite 1990s had taken it upon 
themselves to find the Russian national idea and provide an ideology for the new 
Russia. 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
Appraising messianism in the amorphous public post-Soviet Russian discourse is 
near to impossible. As previous chapters have concluded, Russian messianism is not 
a single, coherent ideology but a narrative framework holding a range of sometimes 
contesting discourses, which in this period ranged from the special mission and calls 
for restoration of empire to Russia’s religious and spiritual exceptionalism. As we 
concluded above, Russian messianism became mainstream from the 1990s, and as 
this framework now operates at all levels of Russian discourse it does not suffice to 
identify groups of ‚ultra-nationalists‛ as its bearers. From liberals and statists to 
communists and ultra-nationalists draw upon messianic discourse.  
Central ideological figures however in this period – some already mentioned 
– include party leaders Zhirinovsky and Zyuganov, as well as Rogozin of the Rodina 
party, Solzhenitsyn, Panarin, Dugin, the founder of the Eurasian movement, and 
Prokhanov, the editor of Zavtra.48 A common notion in public discourse at this time 
was that Russia still was undergoing a ‘crisis of identity’ and was in a state of 
’ideological vacuum’, and these and many others were ready and willing to help 
solve this alleged problem. 
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
                                                 
48 For overviews and analyses of the thought of radical political ideologists as Zyuganov, see e.g. 
Duncan (2000), Neo-Eurasianists like Dugin, Panarin and others see Laruelle (2004, 2006, 2008), 
Solzhenitsyn see Rowley (1997); and the various patriotic/nationalist foreign policy and geopolitics 




In the early period of Putin’s regime, many western academics appeared to accept 
the official proclamation of a Russian ‘end of ideology’ and commitment to pursue 
pragmatic national interests (Gorodetsky, 2003, Light, 2003), and analyses of Russian 
foreign policy discourse concluded that Russia was still ‘open to the West’ 
(Kassianova, 2001:823). As we have discussed, these tendencies were certainly still 
part of official discourse, but their contestation in public discourse, defined by 
messianic themes, was sometimes underestimated, with the hegemony of the 
messianic framework of ‘the Russian idea’ notable even in the academic world. 
(Kelly, 1999).  
 In this period we thus see considerable difference between state and society, 
official and public discourse: Russian messianic discourses abounded in public 
discourse, united by anti-Westernism, but were only occasionally finding its way 
into official discourse, and then often transformed to fit with Putin’s state-centred 
plan and message. Putin’s early references to mission, spirituality, uniqueness and 
patriotism should thus be understood in the context of the abundance of many 
different variants of messianic discourse in society, and the impossibility to construct 
a cohesive Russian collective identity by pragmatism alone. Completely rejecting the 
abundant messianic representations of Russia would mean alienating the various 
popular, messianic-based national-patriotic parties and movements, but Putin’s 
‘middle way’ managed to accommodate both them as well as ordinary people 
wanting decent living standards rather than ideological grandeur. This resulted in 
increasing ambiguity in official discourse, which will discuss further on in this 
chapter.  
 
5.5.0 2002-2003: one year West, one year East 
 
5.5.1 Russia as History, Presence and Destiny 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
The address in 2002 had a rather different tone from those in the previous two years. 
Signifiers such as ‘comfortable’, ‘safe’, ‘developed’ and ‘equal’ were juxtaposed 
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against ‘restrictions’, ‘fear’ ‘underdeveloped’ and ‘unequal’, implicitly reinforcing the 
distinction between ‘the West’ and ‘the rest’ and clearly aiming for Russia to fit into 
the first category. Several tasks for the Russian state and desired, future qualities of 
Russia could be listed, such as to become rich and strong, to make Russia a 
flourishing, affluent and safe country, to meet the best standards in the world, and to 
even create these standards (Putin, Annual Address, 2002). 
 
The 2003 address again was markedly different from the previous year, containing a 
number of glorious predicates of Russia, and drawing on various messianic 
narratives. With few exceptions, Russia was represented very positively, as 
‚continuously emerging as a strong country‛, ‚an attractive country for millions of 
people‛, ‚one of the civilised nations, fighting common threats‛, ‚a unique 
community of peoples‛, ‚a great people‛, ‚a great state but above all a modern, 
developed society‛ and, not the least, ‚one of the greatest powers on the planet.‛ 
(Putin, Annual Address, 2003) 
Though images of empire had not filtered through from public to official 
discourse as a legitimate definition of Russia, greatness and great power status certainly 
had – the very last words were that the ‚consolidation of all our intellectual, 
authoritative and moral resources will allow Russia to achieve the greatest goals. 
Great goals worthy of a great people.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2003) Russia in 
official discourse was becoming more defined, a more confident state, while still 
facing many challenges no longer ashamed of its greatness. 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
It was admitted by many national-patriots, that Russia now, as before the revolution, 
is in need of modernisation. But, as Orthodox nationalist Narochnitskaya summed 
up, the same dilemma remains: ‚whether Russia can be modernised without the 
suicidal westernisation.‛ Russia, she argues, as an Orthodox country, ‚does not 
belong to the post-Enlightenment Europe based on Descartes’ rationalism, the 
ideational baggage of the French revolution and the Protestant ethic, from which 
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Marxism and liberalism derive.‛ The answer to Russia’s future and modernisation, 
she argued, instead lies in embracing and establishing the Faith.49  
Another popular alternative in the same type discourse, is to point to Islamic 
countries as an example for Russia to follow, from a distance. Pan-Slavist Evgenii 
Troitskii admits, while denouncing globalisation and post-modernism, 
acknowledges that Russia does need actual modernisation and that Russia must 
learn from ‚an objective analysis of the experience of Iran‛ which is represented as 
‚a country of a mission, an island of spiritual health, of spiritual counterbalance‛ 
with a growing population – ‚in contrast to the people ruled by Westernizers of the 
dying Russia‛. (Troitskii, 2002)  
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
Putin’s definition of Russia as ‚a great state but above all a modern, developed 
society‛ describes his concept of Russia as a ‚normal Great Power,‛ which 
Tsygankov has analysed in detail.50 Putin was recognising that Russia, in order to be 
modernised, cannot isolate itself from the West nor seek to apply utopian, 
distinctivist economic and political models, but was nevertheless beginning to toy 
with notions from the distinctivist messianic discourse. His simultaneous use of 
distinct and sometimes contradictory representations of Russia – both great, and yet 
in need of modernisation – became a reflection of a number of the key 
representations available in public political discourse.  
 
5.5.2 Russia and the World: Self and Other(s) 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
In the 2002 address there were no anti-Western references, instead openness to the 
West defined the tone. Russia was depicted to be in ‚constant dialogue‛ with the US, 
                                                 
49 Interview article in Zavtra: ‘Rossiya - Vsegda Imperiya’ with N. Narochnitskaya, by Prokhanov (2003).  
50 Tsygankov (2005) describes how ‘Great-Power Normalisation’ as a less anti-Western foreign policy 
strategy emerged in critique of Primakov’s vision of Russia as an independent Great Power power in a 
‘multipolar world’, balancing the West’s power across the world, and how Putin embraced and 
reshaped this approach to make it his own.  
137 
 
and Putin stressed that one of Russia’s tasks was to find allies, and to change ‚the 
quality of our relations with NATO‛, specifically pointing out the Russia-NATO 
‚joint efforts‛ against international terrorism (Putin, Annual Address, 2002). Here it 
should be noted that the next month from the address, in May 2002, Russia and the 
USA announced a new agreement on strategic nuclear weapons reduction, and the 
same year Russian and NATO foreign ministers agreed to establish the NATO-
Russia Council. 
  9/11 gave Russia and the US the opportunity to unite against the construction 
of a common enemy in international terrorism. The event seemed to indicate that a 
‚new formula‛ might be found for Russian partnership with the West, and as 
Shevtsova describes, ‚Putin provoked high expectations for his new model of foreign 
policy among Russian moderates and liberals‛. (Shevtsova, 2007:163,  for an 
overview see also Sakwa, 2008) Apart from the CIS, NATO and the US, no other 
international Others were named in the 2002 address.  
The tone changed rather significantly in 2003. Now of course, the American 
war in Iraq had begun. Putin here spoke at length of ‚countries with highly 
developed economies and growing geopolitical ambitions‛, ‚countries *which+ 
sometimes use their strong and well-armed national armies to increase their zones of 
strategic influence rather than fighting these evils [international terrorism] we all 
face.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2003) The conceptual foundations of foreign policy 
also continued to evolve in 2003: ‚The main task of Russian foreign policy is to 
advance and safeguard our national interests. Here, the basic principle remains 
observance of the provisions of international law.‛  
The construction of Russia as a safe-guarder of international law would 
expand over the years, with the parallel representation of the hypocritical Other 
preaching democracy and universal values but breaching international law. A 
notable tendency in Putin’s state addresses was to represent the international system 
in terms of social Darwinism, in expressions like ‚we need to be clever and strong to 
survive in the bitter competitive struggle in the world‛ (2003) and ‚the global 
competitive battle‛ (2004), all in rather stark contrast to the narratives of Russia’s 




In 2003, with the beginning of distinctively anti-Western rhetoric, also was the first 
time in the context of the annual state address that Russia was defined as a ‚united 
multi-ethnic community of peoples‛, in line with neo-Eurasianist discourse in which 
Russia/Eurasia’s ‘harmony of different peoples and cultures’ is its strength. In the 
same speech Putin also defined the residents of the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) as ‚people of our common Russian culture‛ thus affirming the inclusive, 
supranational character of Russianness. This trend was to continue, and in 2004 for 
the second year, the Russians were defined as a multi-ethnic people: ‚the only source 
and bearer of power in the Russian Federation.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2004). 
 
But parallel with the Eurasianist representation of Russian identity continued the 
representation of Russia as a European country, a part of Greater Europe. In relating 
Russia to ‘the West’, there was a thus a differentiation between US and Europe: while 
implicitly criticising the US, Putin represented Russia as belonging to Greater 
Europe, seeking to grow ‚closer and becoming truly integrated into Europe.‛ (Putin, 
Annual Address, 2003)  
This continued in 2004, where Putin stated that ‚the expansion of the 
European Union should not just bring us closer together geographically, but also 
economically and spiritually‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2004) and in 2005 where 
Russia was repeatedly defined as a ‚major European power‛, and a ‚European 
nation, with European ideals.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2005)  
 Putin’s parallel use of two distinct discourses in representing official Russia 
shows again that collective identity is seldom coherent and free from contradictions, 
but contested, and the state in particular has to balance the different discourses with 
the impetuses behind them – contradictions which are exacerbated in the case of 
Russia with its perennially ambiguous civilisational belonging. 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
Many of the anti-Western national-patriots interpreted Putin’s rapprochement with 
the West in this period as shaped by the ‘need for survival in a globalised world’, 
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according to the social-Darwinistic logic outlined above, and a new pragmatism. 
Sergey Medvedev, after describing the recent pro-Westernism, wrote that: 
His *Putin’s+ politics should never be called pro-Western (as, for example, 
Kozyrev’s); Putin’s politics is pro-Russian, in the pragmatic sense of the 
word. If for Kozyrev rapprochement with the West was an ideological step, 
an act of belief, then for Putin it was a move of enlightened egoism: he needs 
the West for Russia to succeed in the globalised world. As is well known, one 
of the principles of judo is to use the opponents strengths in one’s own 
interest. (Medvedev, 2003:28) 
So, the West was still defined as the opponent, and Putin despite his rapprochement 
with Western powers was understood as acting within this logic of opposition, just in 
a more politically refined way. 
While the state in 2002 still appeared to be looking westwards and defining 
itself as European, neo-Eurasianist representations of Russia as the opposite of all 
things Western were still dominant in public political discourse, and Putin’s use in 
2003 of anti-Western rhetoric and Eurasianist expressions should not be understood 
only as a reaction to the Iraq war but within this context of increasingly anti-Western 
public discourse.  
Certainly, in some accounts Eurasian Russia is, as Sergey Stankevich put it in 
1992, a ‚conciliator‛, a ‚country imbibing West and East, North and South, unique 
and exclusively capable, perhaps, of the harmonious combination of many different 
principles, of a historic symphony.‛ (Stankevich, 2004, 1992) But in contemporary 
neo-Eurasianism Russia is not only represented as a harmonious peace-maker 
imbibing West as well as East, but often as the leader of an allied Eastern, alternative 
civilization opposed to Western hegemony and globalisation: ‚Russia is the 
incarnation of the quest for an historical alternative to Atlanticism. Therein lies her 
global mission‛, neo-Eurasianist founder Dugin repeatedly affirms (Laruelle, 2006:8) 
and the same is echoed by many different political writers, as here: 
At present time there are two potential sources of real opposition to the 
Atlanticist expansionism – Russia and the Islamic world. The presence of the 
Russian global factor is a commonly recognized fact. It consists of the increase 
in the all-planetary significance of the spatial-resource potential of Russia, her 
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capability of taking the role as a centrally forming force in the post-Soviet 
space and the Slavonic world, and also in the possibility of organising an 
autonomous international system of states within the framework of CIS. 
(Sokolenko, 1999:21) 
This more confrontational variant of Eurasianism comes closer to the dichotomised 
core of messianism as a narrative framework, with Russia – Orthodox, Soviet or 
other – as representing good; and the West – godless, cosmopolitan, capitalist - evil. 
As Laruelle argues: ‚For all the heterogeneity of Eurasianism, it is still possible to pin 
down its ideological matrix: restoration, a synthesis of anti-Western arguments, and 
a culturalist defence of political authoritarianism.‛ (Laruelle, 2008:221) 
Even writers with more romantic, Slavophile tendencies continuously 
reinforce this opposition between East and West, as Vasilenko, who affirms that the 
‚confrontation between the East and the West is today becoming the confrontation 
between the natural and the artificial, the technical and the spiritual, the utilitarian 
and the ethical.‛ (Vasilenko, 2000:294)  
So while the historical-political context is different today, the simple but 
compelling dichotomising framework remains the same as it has been for centuries – 
quite certainly one of the keys to the success in this period of neo-Eurasianism in 
political discourse. Its dominance in foreign policy discourse has been evident in for 
example the official programmes of Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR), 
of course the Eurasia Party, and even in an ethno-centric, Slavophile ideological 
programme such as Russkaya Doktrina, all of which have included a clause 
subscribing to the four-axis alliance Moscow-Teheran-Delhi-Beijing, justified by the 




iii) Academic interpretation 
 
The conglomerate of discourses, official and public, outlined in the above sections, 
testify to the long-standing difficulty in constructing a coherent Russian civilisational 
identity, and ambiguity on how to relate to the West. While we noted an increasing 
                                                 
51 For the LDPR Programme, see http://www.ldpr.ru/partiya/prog/969/and the Russian Doctrine see 
http://www.rusdoctrina.ru/index.php?subject=5 [Both accessed 2008-05-28]  
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‘anti-Western’ consensus in public discourse, it should be noted that there often is a 
distinction in Russian discourse between Europe and America as ‘the Wests’, 
sometimes to the effect that the Europes, or Greater Europe including Russia, should 
be together, but that Atlanticism and Eurasianism must conflict.52  
Nikolas Gvosdev discusses at length historical and contemporary Russia’s 
ambivalence to Europe, the West, the distinction in Russian discourse between them, 
and Russia’s relation to them, with Putin at times insisting on Russia’s being an 
integral part of Europe, other times calling for a dialogue between East and West. He 
concludes that this ambiguity carries significant political advantages, in that Russia 
can ‚pick and choose what European standards and institutions it wishes to adopt‛ 
and being ‚as European‛ as it wants to be. (Gvosdev, 2007:138) 
Putin’s co-optation strategy, insisting that Russia is part of the West and a 
major European power at the same time as stressing Russia’s specificity and 
deploying Eurasianist discourse has led Putin’s supporters to identify his policies in 
terms of a ‘‘Euro-Eastern’’ civilisation. Tsygankov outlines its core principles: 
First, the countries of the Euro-East, such as Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan, 
share with Europe values of a market economy and a growing middle class. 
Second, because of their preoccupation with domestic economic and social 
modernization, the Euro-Eastern area is in special need of maintaining 
political stability. Finally, domestic transformation of the Euro-Eastern 
nations requires preservation of political sovereignty and defence from 
attempts by outsiders to exploit the internal resources of the nations of the 
region (Tsygankov, 2008:772). 
This model epitomises the advantages of this ambiguity. Nevertheless, Tsygankov 
also affirms that ‘the West’ as whole, referring both to western Europe and the 
United States as a civilisation, still functions undoubtedly as Russia’s significant 
Other. (Tsygankov, 2007, Tsygankov, 2008:388) 
 
The geopolitical aspects of the main contemporary civilisational models beside Euro-
East have been quite effectively summarised in the political-sociological work edited 
                                                 
52 One example is Vladislav Inozemtsev, a prominent Russian academic discussing the difference 
between Americanisation and Europeanisation as forms of globalisation, wholly condemning 
Americanisation (the US seeks to Americanize the world as profoundly as possible, by spreading 
‘universal’ values and ideas) but passing a much milder assessment of Europe. (2006:170-71) 
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by Kolosova, Mir Glazami Rossiyan, ‘The world seen through Russians’ eyes’ (2003). 
Apart from the concepts of Russia as a part of Europe or Eastern Europe, and Russia as 
one centre in a multi-polar world, it can be argued that each falls under the messianic 
framework and together appear as new variations of the traditional messianic 
narratives, with variants of neo-Eurasianism dominating:  
In the ethno-religious accounts of Russia as a Slavonic or even just national 
Russian government she must either ‚fight for the reunification of the Eastern-Slavonic 
land‛ or ‚concentrate its strength on the national revival of the Russian people‛, and 
Russia as Byzantium is ‚the main protector of Orthodox values and the only 
independent de facto Orthodox state since the fall of Constantinople in 1453.‛ 
(2003:60-62) These representations link to both the ‘Holy Russia’ and ‘Third Rome’ 
narratives of Russia founded on Orthodoxy.  
Russia as an ‚island‛ epitomises the isolationism of ‘Holy Russia’ as opposed 
to ‘Third Rome’, and Russia’s main task in this representation is ‚intensive self-
development on the ‚island‛ and the assimilation of the Eastern (trans-Ural) 
regions‛ and to ‚decline external expansion and a ‚global mission.‛ (2003:60-62)  
Russia as Eurasia is Eurasian exceptionalism, Russia is ‚the only one of its 
kind as a cultural-geopolitical Slavonic-Turkic complex, knit together with the 
system of the continental bordering areas, but also opposing them both for economic 
reasons as well as through its special spirituality.‛ (2003:60-62) Russia as the main part 
of heartland, the core of Eurasia, represents Russia as having a special role in being the 
key to global stability, ‚a Great Power, called to serve as a bridge between the East 
and the West.‛ (2003:60-62) This could be termed Eurasian missionism – though as 
discussed above, the idea of Eurasia as an alternative civilisation rather than as a 
bridge between civilisations is becoming much more dominant.53  
 
So, in sum, while the official position still co-opted between different positions, most 
positions in public discourse related to aspects of the messianic framework, from the 
revival of the Russian nation and Orthodox mission of Russia as Byzantium to the 
                                                 
53 Mark Bassin provides an excellent discussion of the intense use of Mackinder’s geopolitical 
‘Heartland’ theory in post-Soviet discourse, its adaptation to match the ‚historical-geopolitical spaces of 
the Russian state‛ and the ideologically compelling conclusion that ‚Russia has at all times been the 
absolute center of all world-historical development.‛ (Bassin, 2006:116)  
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special spirituality of Eurasia and the overarching notion that everything depends on 
Russia. 
 
5.5.3 Russia as Messianic 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
As discussed above, the official Russia of the 2002 state address was seeking to move 
closer to the West – and this year US-Russian foreign relations were at a peak 
following 9/11 and the establishment of the NATO-Russia Council. In the same 
speech there was a complete absence of messianic and related references. While no 
general conclusions can be drawn, this nevertheless supports our conceptualisation 
of Russian messianism as a framework which does not function without ‘the West’ as 
a negative Other.  
 As discussed above, public discourse continued to be predominantly anti-
Western, but Putin in the state address did not move towards this position this year, 
instead joining Russia with the West in the anti-terrorist coalition and using the 
opportunity to represent the Chechen rebels as being on par with Al Qaeda and 
world terrorism in this global discourse of danger, thus justifying the war in 
Chechnya, which, as argued before, had been core to legitimising his own regime. 
The next year’s address saw the return of messianic rhetoric, and the war in 
Chechnya was explained within this framework. In the speech, Putin spoke out 
against the dangers of ‚populist slogans and empty promises‛, but he nevertheless 
plunged into precisely populist messianic-related narratives at the end of the 
address, speaking of the historical feat of Russia and its people – a unique 
community of peoples – and the sacrifices made to accomplish this feat.  
Speaking of Chechnya, it was again the narrative of sacrifice that was used: 
‚It is true that we have had to pay a high price to restore Russia’s territorial integrity, 
and we bow our heads in memory of our fallen soldiers and of the Chechen civilians 
who lost their lives, in memory of all those who at the price of their lives did not 
allow this country to be torn apart and did their duty right to the end.‛ (Putin, 
Annual Address, 2003)  Putin’s constructed the conflict as being between ‚the 
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simple, courageous Chechen people‛ naturally belonging to the Russian country, 
and the ‚murderous bandits‛ seeking to tear the country apart. 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
The glorification of the Russian soldiers in the Chechen war, and correlating 
demonisation of the Chechen ‘bandits’ was a reflection of typical national-patriotic 
public discourse, in which the Chechen war provided a fresh platform for the 
traditional interplay of patriotism defined in terms of Christological sacrifice against 
demonized enemies of the Motherland.54  
While Islam in the 1990s, with Eurasianist discourse dominating, had rarely 
been part of the negative Other construction, the Chechen wars saw its – rather 
contradictory – incorporation into the West as broad negative Other (Verkhovsky, 
2004). And while many political analysts, like Putin, were very concerned with 
Russia’s role in the globalised world (Kosolapov, 2004, Pavlov, 2004, Zagladin, 2000), 
this period also saw the successful incorporation of globalisation into the negative 
Other construction.  
Globalisation, as representing ‘the West,’ has come to occupy a central place 
in contemporary messianic discourse as a common negative signifier, the anti-thesis 
of spirituality, Russianness and all things good. In national-patriotic, Orthodox 
nationalist, and even the Moscow Patriarchate’s ideology, variants of Huntington’s 
theory of the ‘clash of civilisations’ often forms the basis of the narrative: one 
civilisation is godless and wants to impose its godlessness on all others – Russia as 
the leader of Orthodox or Slavonic civilisation must together with ‘the rest’ fight 
against this universalist messianism of the secular liberal West both within and 
outside Russia. (Verkhovsky, 2007:185-86)  
Evgenii Troitskii’s popular work Slavianstvo v usloviakh globalizatsii i 
informatsionnoi voiny, (Slavism under the conditions of globalisation and 
informational war) is illustrative of this type of texts locating globalisation in the 
traditional good/evil logic of opposition: 
                                                 
54 See e.g. Prokhanov (2002) on ‘the ideology of patriotism’ as being sacrifice, stoicism, undivided love 
for Russia‛ in an article in Zavtra called ‘Russkaya Pobeda’. 
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The pro-American globalisation stimulates amorality, the robbery of the 
nations, depravity, terrorism, the application of fraudulent PR technologies in 
the pre-election campaign periods in ‘the democratic society’. It influences 
wholly negatively on higher values that have been composed in Slavonic 
countries for centuries: the striving towards justice, honesty, diligence, 
spirituality, and patriotic feelings etc, which are being revived despite and in 
defiance of globalisation. (Troitskii, 2002:14) 
As we established, the function of ‘discourses of danger’ is to define the self and 
legitimise the state, and as globalisation in the Russian messianic framework is often 
seen as an ample source of dangers. It ‚promises the Slavs not only neo-colonial 
dependence on the West, but derogation, insult to their national honour and worth 
and the threat of the spreading of AIDS and other dangerous infections.‛ (Troitskii, 
2002:78)  
 Globalisation and anti-Semitism are often intertwined in this type of 
discourse, amalgamated in terms such as ‘zionist globalisation’ (replacing ‘zionist 
cosmopolitanism’) and ‚the Judeo-American anti-Rome‛ – the US, resisting Russia as 
the Third Rome (Sidorov, 2006:329, Verkhovsky, 2004). 
 
In Dugin’s ever-evolving variants of neo-Eurasianism anti-globalism is intertwined 
with geopolitics, imperialism, spirituality, conspiracy theories, cosmism, occultism 
and anti-Semitism. As its negative, opposing signifier, globalisation renders the 
Eurasian-Russian identity quite inclusive, since, to quote Dugin, ‚all anti-globalist 
tendencies are potentially ‚Eurasian‛.‛ (Laruelle, 2006:9). It should be noted that this 
radicalised us/them framework appears quite similar to George W. Bush’s statement 
on the war on terror after 9/11 that ‘those who are not for us are with the terrorists’.  
 This brings us back to the understanding of messianism, or ‘universalist 
nationalism’ characteristic of political entities in which complex social realities and 
geocultural conditions require a simplifying, radicalist self-other framework to 
legitimise the state and unify the population. Interestingly, the American absolutism 
and messianism is often highlighted in Russian public discourse: Vladislav 
Inozemtsev, a prominent Russian academic, notes that ‚the Americans have become 
accustomed to an oversimplistic vision of the world, dividing it into light and dark 
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parts, into centres of good and evil‛ (Inozemtsev, 2006:172);  Nikolai Pavlov, writes 
about the destabilising effect on international relations of ‚the black-and-white 
worldview, the messianic ideology of the United States, manifested in actual politics 
in the form of ‚Fourth Rome‛‛ (Pavlov, 2004:84); and Zyuganov has claimed the 
American ‚new world order‛ to be ‚a universal messianic, eschatological religious 
project, on a scale of planning and preparation far exceeding the forms of planetary 
utopias known in history‛ (quoted in Duncan, 2000:136). (This is another example of 
the discursive move exemplified previously by Kortunov  (1998a:27) who denied that 
imperial ambitions would have any relevance in Russia and instead attributed this 
characteristic to the Other.)  
However, in Russian discourse, the logic of opposition is arguably more 
mainstream, radical and messianic than in America – in the patriotic/nationalist 
discourse we find typical articles apocalyptically entitled ‘Tolerance of the Antichrist’ 
(Tolerantnost’ k antikhristu) and ‘The Russian Opposition to the Coming Antichrist’ 
(Russkoe Soprotivlenie gryadushchemu Antikhristu)55 where the Antichrist can be either 
the Jews/Zionists, or globalisation, or both.56 With the Other as Antichrist in this 
logic of opposition, there is also a missionary role for Russia as a Christ and Saviour: 
‚The hopeful, saving alternative to the pro-American globalization, un-spiritual, 
exploiting in its nature, stimulating international terrorism, is the highly ethical 
Russo-Slavonic conviviality (sobornost’)‛. (Troitskii, 2002:91-92)  
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
Globalisation is central to most contemporary Russian messianic discourse, as also 
Dmitri Sidorov notes. Exploring the role of the Third Rome metaphor in Russian 
geopolitics, he highlights the work of the influential writer and active anti-Semite 
                                                 
55 The first from the webpage of the party ‘Russian National Unity’ (Russkoe National’noe Edinstvo), May 
2008, http://www.rne.org/sfk/0805/0805-23.shtml [accessed 2008-05-30], the second a series in Molodaya 
Gvardiya by Oleg Platonov (2007). 
56 This is illustrated in the party ‘Holy Russia’s’ manifesto: ‚WE WANT TO LIVE IN AN ORTHODOX 
COUNTRY! WE DO NOT WANT TO LIVE AND DIE IN SODOM AND GOMORRAH! WE ARE 
AGAINST RUSSIA’S PARTICIPATION IN THE ANTI-CHRISTIAN GLOBALISATION.‛ Under the 
rubric ‘‛Za nashe Otechestvo – Za Rus’ Svyatuyu‛  at the website of ‘Svyataya Rus’, http://www.sant-
rus.ru/vestnik.html [Accessed 2008-04-25]. 
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Mikhail Nazarov, whose eschatological worldview is based on the original ‘Third 
Rome’ notion of Russia’s mission: 
Russia is opposed to the rest of the world as the only country that potentially 
could keep it from the alleged apostasy (decline) of the coming anti-Christian 
kingdom (often equated to globalisation and/or the USA). Therefore (and not 
‘just because of its natural resources’) the world conspiracy forces consider 
Russia its main enemy in their global war: without full control of Russia, the 
world ‘behind-the-scenes’ system (mirovaya zakulisa) can’t establish the 
kingdom of anti-Christ. Hence the fate of the world is dependent on the Third 
Rome, its catehon, restraining, hold-back power of the Russian empire to 
provide humanity with a light-house for salvation. 
(Sidorov, 2006:327) 
Sidorov holds that this worldview, while extreme, is representative of most 
Orthodox nationalists/fundamentalist discourse (2006:328). Both universalist 
missionism and exceptionalist messianism are woven together in this radicalised 
discourse: Russia is both the imperial Third Rome and the select, Christ-like nation. 
Laruelle further argues that Dugin’s Eurasianist geopolitical doctrine and ideology 
would not function without enemies and conspiracy theories, without ‚the new 
world order as a ‚spider web‛ in which globalized actors hide in order to better 
accomplish their mission.‛ (2006:8)  
 The radicalised logic of opposition between Russia and the 
West/globalisation as broad Other in Russian public discourse, manifested in 
spiritual/religious conspiracy and persecution theories thus both underscores the 
centrality of discourses of danger to Russian messianism as a persistent 
phenomenon.57 But the deployment of these discourses must also be understood in 
the specific context of the wider, global backlash of cultural fundamentalism against 
globalisation and American/Western hegemony (Laruelle, 2008:220). 
 
                                                 
57 Duncan suggests that Russian messianism can be understood partly as collective paranoia or a 
persecution complex, linked to a on the one hand a ‚fever of conspiracy theories, centring on world 
Jewry or the CIA, and to the fear of being excluded from Europe; on the other hand, the delusions of 
grandeur, typified by ‚Moscow the Third Rome,‛ and the belief in the October Revolution as the first 
step towards World Communism.‛ (2000:147) 
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As for the Chechen wars and construction of the negative Other, Verkhovsky 
outlines how Islam became part of the Antichrist threat framework in Orthodox 
nationalist discourse during the second Chechen war, and argues that this related 
not only to the situation in former Yugoslavia and in Chechnya, but also to an 
increase in the immigration of Muslims to ethnically Russian regions of the country. 
This discursive merger was made possible through the claim that radical Islam, not 
only coming from a flawed religion but also being a dangerous synthesis of western 
technology and eastern passion, was used as a tool by the Western Antichrist. 
(Verkhovsky, 2004) The Chechen conflict certainly bore an acute internal dimension, 
with Russia’s increasing population of Muslims, and with xenophobic, anti-Muslim 
organisations and sentiment increasingly prominent in the Russian political 
landscape. (Dunlop and Menon, 2006)  
While not at all on the same level of radicalism, Putin’s persistent threat 
construction of global terrorism certainly fitted with this development, and as we 
will outline further on, this period saw a gradual decline of Eurasianism, with its 
‘harmony of religions and cultures’ in favour of ethno-cultural discourses, both in 
public and to some extent official discourse. 
 
5.6.0 2004-2005: One year a glorious future, one year a glorious past 
 
5.6.1 Russia as History, Presence and Destiny 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
Just like the two-headed eagle on the Russian emblem, Russian messianism in its two 
master narratives looks both forward to a glorious future, and back to a glorious 
past. The 2004 address stressed newness and building for the future, and in 2005, the 
60th anniversary of the victory in the Great Fatherland War, historical continuity, 
tradition, spiritual values of forebears, and the glorious heritage prevail.  
 Putin in 2004 elaborated a narrative of the development in stages of the 
Russian state since the fall of the Soviet Union, in which the first stage was to 
‘dismantling the old system’, a difficult time; the second ‘clearing the debris from the 
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old edifice’, and the third, which Putin in 2004 declared Russia had entered, ‘rapid 
development’ and ‘creation of long-term objectives’, ‘the path of true democracy and 
sovereignty’. But, he stated, rephrasing Stalin, that Russia must still ‘catch up and 
overtake’ in economic development. (Putin, Annual Address, 2004) 
The overall narrative was one of newness, faith and hope, looking ahead to a 
brilliant future, rather than continuity. The address carried praise for the people who 
are ‚enriching our national culture and building a new country‛, echoing slogans 
from both revolutionary Bolshevism and Stalinist building of socialism.  
 
In 2005, there was a return to narratives of continuity and past glory. Russia was 
represented as a ‚unique and vast country‛ with a ‚rich cultural and spiritual 
heritage‛, and, slightly compromising the purist pragmatism, a place where ‚law 
and morals, politics and morality have traditionally been considered close and 
related concepts‛. Notably, Putin stated in the 2005 state address that ‚the collapse of 
the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century‛, discursively 
moving the official Russian image towards the Third Rome framework. (Putin, 
Annual Address, 2005) Putin’s statement, understood in the context of ethnic 
separatism in Chechnya and elsewhere (with the official construction of ‚the simple, 
courageous Chechen people‛ naturally belonging to the Russian country) suggested 
that the geopolitical disaster arose because the peoples unified under the historic 
mission of Russia had been divided on grounds of ethnicity and ‘bad’ nationalism. 
 
And in 2005 variations of the logic of opposition were intertwined with sacrifice, a 
world mission, patriotism and Russianness as Putin both opened and concluded the 
2005 state address by celebrating the memory of the Great Patriotic War, constructed 
as ‚civilisation’s triumph over fascism‛, the defence of ‚the principles of freedom, 
independence and equality between all peoples and nations‛ won ‚through the 
strong spirit of all the peoples who were united at that time within a single state. 
Their unity emerged victorious over inhumanity, genocide and the ambitions of one 
nation to impose its will on others.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2005) 
The Russian people were depicted as ‚the soldiers of freedom‛, who ‚saved 
the world from an ideology of hatred and tyranny‛, ‚fought against slavery‛, ‚for 
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the right to live on their own land, to speak their native language and have their own 
statehood, culture and traditions‛, ‚for their right to independent development‛. 
(Putin, Annual Address, 2005) Putin’s use of the narrative of sacrifice and mission in 
the context of ‚the Russian fight for the right to independent development and 
statehood‛ strongly suggested similarity between all those wanting or having 
wanted to impose their will on Russia – whether fascists or Nazis in the Great 
Fatherland War or the US and actors of globalisation today. 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
This discursive move, which is implicit in the state address, is explicit in the 
extended manifesto of NASHI, the Kremlin-sponsored youth mass movement, which 
states that the ‚victory of Russia in the Second World War created the basis for a 
world order which until recently guaranteed the world would be defended against 
global hegemony by any one country (whether Nazi Germany or the USA) and a 
repeat of a new world war."58  
 Ostensibly an NGO (the only one that can move Russian civil society 
forward, according to its manifesto), NASHI can freely propagate the populist 
messages which can only be hinted at in official discourse. And in its manifesto the 
discourses of danger are radical, unambiguous and occupy most of the text: "Today 
the U.S. on one side, and international terrorism on the other, are trying to take 
control of Eurasia and the entire world. Their sights are set on Russia. The task of our 
generation is to defend the sovereignty of our country the way our grandfathers did 
60 years ago."59  
Sacrifice plays a key role in this discourse too, as the manifesto reviews the 
historic threat against Russia from the West and Russia’s history of suffering from 
invasions. And the historic sacrifice apparently has been worthwhile, as NASHI now 
is able to define Russia as ‚the historical and geographical center of the modern 
world‛ (Ibid.). Again, Russia no longer depends on the West, but everything 
depends on Russia. 
 
                                                 
58 From the NASHI website, ‘NASHI Manifest s komentariyamy’ (2005). 
59 ‘NASHI Manifest<.’  
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Putin’s increasing representation of historical continuity in official discourse, with 
the Soviet Union firmly included in Russian historical identity, was bringing official 
discourse closer to mainstream public discourse, in which Russia typically is defined 
in terms of an organic nation where past and present are intimately linked and where 
heroes of the past hold politicians today accountable for how they take care of the 
Motherland. (See e.g. Prokhanov, 2007a) Precisely the acknowledgement of this 
organic identity marks a true Russian, Orthodox nationalist Khomolgorov argues: 
nationalists, those who dare to say that they are Russians (russkie) embrace all of 
Russia’s thousand year old history and are part of this organic being, whereas those 
that only say that they are civic Russians (rossiyane) limit Russia at best to an entity 
beginning in 1991 ‘when democracy came down like manna from heaven’. 
(Khomolgorov, 2005)  
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
This messianic narrative of the Great Patriotic war is deployed at all levels of Russian 
discourse as a signifier of true Russianness, and, as chapters six and seven will, 
certainly so among ordinary people. Chapter two argued that the stories we tell 
about ‘ourselves’, and the boundaries we inscribe between us and others have a 
crucial political function in disguising the incoherencies and contradictions of 
collective identity, instead creating the appearance of a coherent identity. The story 
of the Great Fatherland war, and the new ‚peace-keeping missions‛ to ensure human 
rights and freedoms, are precisely filling that function, within the simple messianic 
framework defining Russianness in grand, universalistic terms of the opposition to 
hatred, tyranny, slavery, for the sake of justice, freedom and independence, basically, 
the fight between good and evil. And at the same time, as noted above, the newer 
threat construction of ‘international terrorism’ (faithfully echoed in the NASHI 
manifesto) relates to a growing particularism in public discourse with the increasing 






5.6.2 Russia and the World: Self and Other(s) 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
Of the desired qualities of Russia, what Russia should be like or must become, according 
to Putin in 2004, we find ‚a true democracy‛, a ‚developed civil society‛ and, twice 
repeated, a ‚society of truly free people.‛ Russia becoming truly free suggests that its 
significant Other, the West, is not free indeed (despite freedom being a key signifier of 
American identity) and that it does not have a true democracy, as, to paraphrase 
Bruce Hall, in the repeated references to ‘true’ qualities of the self are counter-
narratives of the ‘false’ qualities of the Other (Hall, 2001:104).  
Putin masters this type of discursive strategy: taking predominantly western, 
neo-liberal concepts like democracy, human rights, and freedom, reconstructing 
them as being inherently Russian and then turning them against the West to expose 
its hypocrisy – in the 2004 address he both addressed the US, stating that fighting 
terrorism cannot be an excuse for restricting human rights; and at the same time 
affirmed that ‚no one and nothing will stop Russia on the path to consolidating 
democracy, and ensuring human rights and freedoms.‛ Russia’s ‚peace-keeping 
missions‛ belong to the same type of discourse.  
This continued in 2005 when Putin further elaborated and solidified the 
‘official’ construction of Russianness by affirming that (despite rumours that 
Russians were ‚not used to or do not need freedom) ‚the *European+ ideals of 
freedom, human rights, justice and democracy have for many centuries been our 
society’s determining values‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2005); and in the famous 
Munich speech in 2007, in which Putin stressed for example, talking about the fall of 
the Berlin wall, that this ‚historic choice‛ was made by the people of Russia, ‚a 
choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all 
the members of the big European family‛, and contrasted this to the hypocrisy of 
America, NATO and the West ‚trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on 





ii) Public discourse 
 
Numerous parallels to this type of self-Other construction can be drawn to popular 
discourse. A famous example is the penultimate scene in Balabanov’s Brat 2, a 
Russian patriotic action film from 2000 with cult-like status (that increased 
dramatically when the main actor died in an avalanche in 2002). The Russian hero, 
Danila, whilst humming a patriotic poem about the Motherland and loving 
everybody in the whole world, has killed his way to finally confront the American 
antagonist, the ‘entrepreneur’ Mr Manis, in his Chicago office.  
The American is shaking with fear (his chess companion just having been 
shot dead beside him), but Danila is calm, downing glasses of vodka and making the 
next chess move. Then, unbothered by the fact that the American cannot understand 
him, he in Russian sums up his American experience in a monologue: ‚Tell me, 
American, in what lies strength? Money perhaps? You have a lot of money<so 
what?‛ Strength actually lies in truth, Danila explains to the crying American. 
Whoever has the truth is the strongest. Someone is deceiving the Americans, making 
them think that money makes them the strongest. But they are not, because they 
don’t have the truth. (Danila then leaves with a vast amount of the American’s 
money). The hypocritical, materialistic and decadent America might think they are 
ruling the world through their money, but they are corrupt and deceived (as are the 
Ukrainans who are also villains in the film, collaborating with the Americans). 
Russia, implicit in this narrative, is strong because of its truth and honesty.  
A parallel binary opposition in Russian public discourse is between 
nationalism and liberalism, and between the poor and the rich – obviously a 
continuation of traditional Soviet discourse. Khomolgorov, again defining true 
nationalism (that is Russian nationalism, not the false nationalism of separatist 
groups or Ukraine) explains that it does not teach its nation to hate any other nation, 
whereas liberalism ‚teaches the rich to hate the poor‛ (2005); and Prokhanov 
similarly defines a patriot as someone who is on the side of the poor, not of the rich – 
unlike the ‚Russophobic bourgeois.‛ (Prokhanov, 2001) And as is well-known, Putin 
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made extensive use of this discursive opposition in his construction of the battle 
against the new internal enemies of Russia, the evil capitalist oligarchs.60 
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
Russia as true, and the West as false, is yet another variation of the traditional 
messianic logic of opposition, providing Russia with a strong, positive identity. The 
official co-optation of Western and Russian ideas had in the first years of Putin’s 
presidency appeared as an attempt to please and appease both Russian society and 
the West. But Putin’s new ‘hijacking’ of liberal Western concepts, openly playing 
with their meaning, and boldly representing Russia as fulfilling Western ideals much 
better than the West itself added a rather ironic twist to this framework, particularly 
considering that Putin’s regime had seen an increasing centralisation of the state, 
curtailment of civil liberties and the state seizing control of mass media and national 
television channels. (Shevtsova, 2007:47-65) In this specific period, in January 2006, 
Putin had signed a controversial law giving authorities extensive new powers to 
monitor the activities of non-governmental organisations and suspend them if they 
are found to pose a threat (reflecting the state’s fear of Western-backed ‘colour 
revolutions’ similar to Ukraine’s in 2005), and in April 2007 police in central Moscow 
forcefully prevented opposition activists from holding a banned rally against Putin.  
A parallel to Putin’s discursive strategy can however be drawn to 
revolutionary Europe when official Russia subscribed to the European ideals of the 
ancien regime, representing itself as more European than Europe – and to a certain 
extent also to Soviet Russia, first to try to put the European ideology of Marxism into 
practice. As for the continuous glorification of the sacrificially poor and humble (‘like 
Christ’) in Orthodox-nationalist discourse, the political function of this discourse 
could no doubt, as was suggested Chapter Two, be of a compensatory nature given 
the large part of the population living under relatively poor economic conditions. 
 
                                                 
60 See for example Shevtsova’s chapter ‘Oligarchy as Myth and Reality’ (2007) and V. Shlapentokh 
(2004). The most notable case in Putin’s  ‘purging’ of these internal enemies  was the Yukos affair – in 
October 2003 Yukos oil boss Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who had supported liberal opposition to President 
Putin, was arrested over investigations into tax evasion and fraud, and in 2005 he was sentenced to nine 




5.6.3 Russia as Messianic 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
In the 2005 address Putin explicitly stated that Russia has a mission: ‚Also certain is 
that Russia should continue its civilising mission on the Eurasian continent. This 
mission consists in ensuring that democratic values, combined with national 
interests, enrich and strengthen our historic community.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 
2005) This relates back to the infamous ‘imperial ambitions’ (closely tied in public 
discourse to the idea of a ‘special mission’) which the state so firmly had rejected in 
1999-2001, but now were finding their way into the official construction of Russia.  
 Russia was also explicitly defined as a successor of the Soviet Union, ‚bound 
to the former Soviet republics through a common history, the Russian language and 
the great culture they share and their common desire for freedom‛; and furthermore 
repeatedly defined as a nation (with ‘a thousand year history’, echoing the discourses 
on the organic Russian nation).  
 
In 2000-2001 the official construction of Russia had been vague and uncommitted to 
either master narrative, now there was a simultaneous representation of Russia on 
the one hand as Eurasia, a successor to the Soviet Union, a multi-ethnic, supra-
national entity, and on the other as a nation with its mono-ethnic, mono-cultural and 
mono-religious assumptions – a dualism added to the already ambiguous official 
representation of Russia as ‘European but not Western’ (Gvosdev, 2007). 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
The above discussed contradiction at the level of official discourse is a clear reflection 
of the same phenomenon in public discourse. While the question of empire had 
previously divided popular patriotic discourse, maintaining the distinction between 
the two master narratives, nation and empire, was becoming increasingly irrelevant. 
While one would typically expect considerable contestation between distinct 
ideological positions arguing for the definition of Russian collective identity by their 
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respective choice of diacritics, the lack thereof was, and still is, quite stark - the 
contradictions are not being managed.  
Even in a document like ‚Russian Doctrine‛ (Russkaya Doktrina), an Orthodox 
conservative project aimed to be a ‚platform for a wide coalition of societal patriotic 
forces,‛ adhered to by for example Rogozin’s new party ‚Great Russia‛ and 
allegedly supported by the authorities (Sidorov, 2006:330), stresses Russia’s specific, 
unique and peculiar qualities at the same time as the Russian Doctrine is proclaimed 
a global project, centred on the ‚integrational potential of the Russian civilisation‛, 
‚yet again called upon by History.‛
61  
Demurin, then deputy Chairman of the popular Rodina party, the precursor of 
both ‚Great Russia‛ and ‚Just Russia‛,  is one of only a few in the Russian public 
discourse to address this central issue in Russian identity construction even if only 
momentarily. He acknowledges that there are ‚individuals who will claim there is a 
contradiction between the task of expanding the influence of Russian civilization, 
which is traditionally defined in an imperial rather than national paradigm, and 
specific guidelines for reviving the national feelings of people with Russian ethnicity. 
This contradiction is superficial, however.‛(2006) 
The fault here, according to Demurin, lies at least partly with the West’s, as 
the neo-Westernizers in the 1990s, and previously the Bolsheviks in the revolution, 
‘purposefully suppressed Russia’s ethnic spirit’ in order to destroy Russia. Only by 
fostering a national spirit amongst ethnic Russians can this be rectified. Again, this 
central contradiction is avoided by shifting the focus to the Other. 
The incongruity between nation and empire is often seen as irrelevant in 
Orthodoxy-based national-patriot discourse. For example Narochnitskaya sees no 
contradiction between the Russian (russkii) and the imperial and stresses, in an 
interview by Prokhanov, that under the pre-revolutionary Orthodox, religious 
Imperial Russia the different nationalities were free to ‘pray to their gods’, and 
consciously felt belonging to and found freedom in the Tsarist state (Prokhanov, 
2003); and Khomolgorov stresses that Russian (russkii) nationalism includes the Slavs 
– Ukraine and Belarus, and is a wider cultural and religious notion (Khomolgorov, 
2005).  
                                                 




iii) Academic interpretation 
 
There are thus several dualistic representations of Russia, not only in public but also 
in official discourse, from Russia as both a multi-ethnic, multicultural, supra-national 
Great Power and a single nation with its ethnocentric and mono-religious 
connotations; to Russia as Eurasian, Slavonic and European; and both being special or 
having ‘special interest’, and being ‘normal,’ like all states. Tsygankov points to 
Eurasian/European dualism being evident in a number of post-Soviet political 
concepts, such as ‚liberal empire‛ (deployed by Anatoly Chubais), ‚civilised 
Eurasianism‛ (Alexander Panarin), ‚liberal statism‛ (Vladimir Lukin and Sergei 
Stankevich) and, Putin’s official discourse, Russia as ‚normal Great Power‛ and 
‚Euro-Eastern.‛ (Tsygankov, 2008:382)  
 As for the ‚normal Great Power‛ concept, it manages to draw from both 
positions in the traditional Slavophile/Westerniser debate, as Tsygankov explains,  
‚*t+he term ‚normal‛ signals support for Westernisers, whereas the concept ‚great 
power‛ culturally reconnects with the historical perspective of the Eurasianists.‛ 
(2008:382) He also notes that Putin’s deployment of the term ‚civilising mission‛ was 
made in relation to the narrative of Russia as together with Europe working to secure 
human rights, women’s emancipation, taking care of the weak and the poor, with 
Putin stressing that Russia not is after territories and natural resources, ‚but the 
human dignity and the quality of life of its citizens, whom it regards as its own 
cultural compatriots‛ (cited in Tsygankov, 2008:385). The multi-ethnic Russian Euro-
Eastern normal Great Power as official Russian identity thus manages to cover many 
traditionally contradictory positions. 
Slade argues convincingly that the ‚trend of the Russian state trying to co-opt 
competing principles for constructing the nation in order to establish hegemony in 
representing the national interest and the people of Russia through a new ‘Russian 
idea’ with the state itself at its base‛ is related to ‚Putin’s control of the production of 
ideas and their distribution and consumption through state control of the media.‛  
(Slade, 2006)  
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 Vladimir Shlapentokh, on the other hand, in 2001 described Putin as having 
‚deeply contradictory interests‛, being evidently ‚weak as a leader‛ and reluctant 
‚to make radical decisions‛ (Shlapentokh, 2001:390) But far from being a sign of 
weakness, Putin’s management of contradictory discourses and interests has been 
necessary to consolidate power and achieve social consensus.  
Tsygankov has argued that Putin’s representation of Russia as a Great Power 
relates to its unifying function in light of Russia’s volatile external environment and 
the threat of disintegration: ‚Great-power status is therefore not a goal in itself for 
Putin but rather a necessary condition for Russia’s more advanced engagement with 
the world.‛ (Tsygankov, 2005:134) This reiterates the explanations for Russian 
messianism put forth by Arbatov and Rieber who argued that Russia’s peculiar 
conditions render messianic ideology a necessity. (Arbatov, 2006, Rieber, 1993) 
But the historical continuities aside, as we noted earlier, some of the 
kaleidoscopic characteristics of post-Soviet Russian identity discourse are particular 
for the post-Soviet context. Mikhail Epstein noted in 1998 that ‚the ideological 
incompatibility among Marxist, nationalist and religious discourses, which sharply 
divided them in the late Soviet period, now becomes more and more irrelevant as 
these positions merge in the overarching type of radical discourse.‛ As an illustration 
he shows how in a single sentence of Zyuganov’s writings, ‚phrases imbued with 
religious meaning — "spiritual tradition," "sobornost'" and "heavenly ideals," merge 
together with "derzhavnost'" and "statehood," taken from the vocabulary of 
nationalists, and with "collectivism" and "brotherhood," the key words of communist 
jargon.‛(Epstein, 1998)  
While the contradictions of Zyuganov and other public prominent voices are 
much starker than those in Putin’s official discourse, Putin’s co-opted definitions of 
Russia – as a multinational Eurasia and part of Greater Europe, or Euro-East; a 
normal Great Power and a nation; a successor to the Soviet Union and a modern, 
civic, democratic state – are not only a result of his personal discursive strategy but 
in much a reflection of a phenomenon in post-Soviet public discourse, succinctly 
defined by Epstein as ‚polyphonic, not just pluralistic, in the sense that different 
positions and voices interact in the consciousnesses of the most creative individual 
thinkers.‛(Epstein, 1998)  
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Dmitri Sidorov also notes this phenomenon in the field of geopolitics which is 
‚characterised by frequent overlaps of ideologies: the same person often adheres to 
several ideologies‛ (2006:318) A contradictory but powerful master narrative is 
emerging, in which even Stalin, and sometimes Lenin, are not only rehabilitated 
together with the Soviet period, but represented as good Orthodox believers. 
(Shlapentokh, 2009) 
This reiterates our claim that identity is contradictory and incoherent, even at 
the level of individual thinkers, yet here the ‘stories’ are the source of, not just the 
solution to, the incoherencies. A general explanation is suggested by discourse 
analyst Michael Billig, who writes that ‚*i+f ideologies did not contain contrary 
themes, they would not provide the resources for common sense thinking, for 
thinking involves dialogic discussion, or the counter-positioning of contrary themes, 
which can both in their way appear reasonable.‛ (Billig, 2001:218)   
It is difficult to judge to what extent the ideological contradictions in Russian 
political discourse provide the ‚resources for common sense thinking‛ and to what 
extent they form part of a monopolisation of ideology which usurps all potentially 
challenging positions, no doubt both are valid explanations.  
 
5.7.0 2006-2007: Holy Eurasia? 
 
5.7.1 Russia as History, Presence and Destiny 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
The image which had emerged in the 2005 address of a strong Russia, confident in its 
history and future, and not concerned with its internal inconsistencies, was taken 
even further in the 2006 and 2007 state addresses. While each of Putin’s previous 
state addresses had contained some doses of criticism, defining a scope for 
improvement and listing desired, needed qualities of Russia and the Russians, the 
2006 and 2007 state addresses contained very little towards this end. Even the huge 
problems which had previously been spelled out were here referred to ‚ironing out 
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the imbalances that had arisen in our system of state organisation and in the social 
sphere‛ - something now basically completed (Putin, Annual Address, 2007).  
 
And the 2007 speech in particular drew upon a range of different notions pertaining 
to the Russian messianic framework. The 2006 address had almost entirely left out 
the Holy Russia master narrative, with its spirituality, morals and exceptionalism, 
but in 2007 it was brought back, with Putin emphasising the importance for 
development of the ‚spiritual unity of the people and the moral values that unite 
us‛, as well as respect for Russia’s ‚unique cultural values‛, ‚the memory of our 
forebears and for each page of our country’s history‛, all referred to as the foundation 
for strengthening state unity and sovereignty.  
 
Putin’s call to respect the memory of ‘each page of our country’s history’ with all 
likelihood related to the state’s project this year to create a single textbook and 
framework for teaching Russian history in schools – Putin’s own message to history 
teachers was not to ‚allow anyone to impose a sense of guilt upon us.‛(Ostrovsky, 
2008) Drawing on neo-Slavophile themes of messianic discourse, Putin sought to 
appeal also to the cultural intelligentsia, blaming economic crisis for the near 
disappearance of ‚many of our spiritual and moral traditions,‛ and warning that 
‚the absence of cultural beacons of our own, and blindly copying foreign models, 
will inevitably lead to us losing our national identity. As Dmitry Likhachev wrote, 
‚State sovereignty is also defined by cultural criteria.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2007) 
Yet, Putin at the same time distanced official Russia from the exceptionalism 
and isolationism of the Holy Russia narrative by yet again invoking the Eurasianist 
narrative of a spiritual harmony of cultures: 
Having a unique cultural and spiritual identity has never stopped anyone 
from building a country open to the world. Russia has made a tremendous 
contribution to the formation of European and world culture. Our country 
has historically developed as a union of many peoples and cultures and the 
idea of a common community, a community in which people of different 
nationalities and religions live together, has been at the foundation of the 
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Russian people’s spiritual outlook for many centuries now. (Putin, Annual 
Address, 2007)  
Since 2005 Putin had gradually begun to deploy this spiritual-organic, not just 
pragmatic-geopolitical, variation of Eurasianism, referring to the coexistence of 
different confessions and ethnic groups as a ‚harmony‛ and ‚symbiosis‛, the ‚roots 
of Russian statehood‛, and the strength of Russia in the context of the state 
addresses.  
 But ethno-centrism, the Russian language, and Orthodoxy were taking 
precedence over the other components of this harmony. The 2007 state address had a 
lengthy discourse on the political, spiritual, patriotic and universal values of the 
Russian language and culture – and only as an afterthought, Putin stated that ‚of 
course, it is also vitally important today to help develop the national cultures of our 
country’s different peoples, including through support for folklore groups.‛ (Putin, 
Annual Address, 2007)  
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
The contradiction between ethno-centrism and multiculturalism (parallel to that of 
nation and empire, described above) exemplified in Putin’s official discourse had 
previously divided strands of popular discourse, but was becoming evident as a type 
of managed dualism within the different strands and domains public discourse.   
 
Rodina’s Demurin, again, argues that in order to survive as an actor in the conflict of 
civilisations, Russia must ‚save and multiply its vital force, which are the ethnic 
Russians and other peoples who make up this country, many of whom are heading 
for extinction.‛ (Demurin, 2006) The mechanical adding of ‚other peoples‛ is typical 
in this type of argument – compare with Putin’s brief reference above to ‚support for 
folklore groups‛ – as it pays necessary tribute to the official multiculturalism while 
still being within a distinctively ethno-centrist framework. Similarly, the extended 
manifesto of NASHI concludes both that "multiculturalism is an important 
advantage for Russia in the modern world"; but at ‚the same time, Russians are the 
state-forming and most populous people of Russia, and for this reason the fate of 
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Russia will depend in large measure on well-being of and position occupied by 
Russians." The manifesto celebrates patriotism but condemns "aggressive 
nationalism, separatism, religious intolerance" exemplified in Ukraine, Chechnya 
and Estonia.62 There are thus two types of nationalism, one good and one bad The 
combination of militarism with Russian Orthodoxy is central also to NASHI: Project 
NASHA Armiya, Our Army, started in 2006, and has been geared towards increasing 
the status of doing military service (clips of Orthodox priests praying at army camps 
can be downloaded from the website); and the popularisation of Orthodoxy among 
youth is another core project.63 
 
Prokhanov, in an article praising Putin’s initiative to create a new, single history 
textbook for schools – as he called it, a ‘centralisation of history’, from a ‘centralist 
government’ – concluded, after making his own sweeping summary of Russian 
history, that what is needed in the present period is to complete the age-old, solemn, 
project of ‘Russian civilisation’, which, while changing form with different historical 
periods, still remains the same, and where ‘the striving for Divine Truth and 
paradisal being, the Great Revelation’ is being preserved.‛(Prokhanov, 2007a) Seeing 
Russian history as an organic coherence is central to contemporary messianic 
discourse, and Putin’s centralised history curriculum revision, which saw a strong 
and unapologetic rehabilitation of the Soviet past including Stalin, undoubtedly 
moved official discourse closer to the messianic framework. 
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
Being a supra-ethnic and supra-national ideology, contemporary Eurasianism 
seemed to fit well with the need in the multi-ethnic Russian Federation for an 
inclusive collective identity which is yet spiritual and messianic rather than civic – in 
some aspects it appears as a continuation of Soviet ideology, with the notion of the 
‘Eurasian people’ nearly identical to the ‘Soviet people’ and ‘friendship of the 
peoples’ used much in official discourse in the late Soviet period.  
                                                 
62‘NASHI Manifest<.’   
63 From the NASHI website, http://www.nashi.su/nasha_armia and 
http://www.nashi.su/pravoslavnyi_korpus [both accessed 2008-11-22].     
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 This identity mainly ties in with the Third Rome rather than the Holy Russia 
master narrative, with visions of empire and an international mission – though it is 
also decidedly exceptionalist, stressing the uniqueness of the Eurasian civilisation, 
and on closer examination reserves a special role for the ethnic and Orthodox 
Russians.  
Laruelle uses the notion of hypertrophied identity to describe the synthesization 
of all currents of Russian nationalism which neo-Eurasianism espouses, refusing ‚to 
distinguish between what is ethnically Russian, what pertains to Russia as a whole 
(rossiiskii), and what is Eurasian‛. (2008:221) As she notes, this makes Eurasianism a 
very flexible ideology indeed, which explains its success, diversity and breadth of 
coverage in the post-Soviet period. 
Inside Russia, however, Eurasianism’s claim of a harmonious unity between 
Orthodoxy and the three other ‘traditional’ religions is disproved both by findings of 
widespread religious intolerance and ethnic hostility (Karpov, 2007) and what 
Warhola and Lehning terms the ‚ecumenical hegemonism‛ of Orthodoxy (Warhola, 
2007). The Russian Orthodox Church officially supports the state’s concept of ‘four 
traditional religions’ but, as Verkhovsky argues, this relates more to its aim to 
minimize proselytising by ‘Western’ groups, and also to the construction of the West 
as enemy Other. (2007:181, 85)  
 The ethno-centric/multicultural dualism is also part of the church’s ideology 
and structure: it has contradictory politics and diacritics of Orthodox identity – 
sometimes ethno-centric, sometimes supra-national – depending on what territory it 
is operating, within Russia, within the former areas of the USSR and outside.64  
A typically ambiguous concept epitomising the dualistic official ideology of 
the ROC is ‚the united community of faith – the Orthodox nation.‛ As Verkhovsky 
explains, the ethnic ‚Orthodox nation‛ is meant to define identity where there is no 
civic ‚Orthodox nation‛ i.e. in situations of ethnic Orthodox minorities, whereas 
Russia itself is represented as a civic, supra-national ‚Orthodox country.‛ 
                                                 
64 Verkhovsky describes how in the last years, the ROC has sought to widen its influence in the so-called 
‚canonical territories.‛ The Patriarchate has a distinctively supra-national, and a de facto base for 
imperial pretensions. But on territories outside of the former USSR – as well as within Russia itself, 
though in an inclusive way – the ROC operates on the basis of ethno-cultural markers of identity. It 
doesn’t propagate nationalism as such but uses it practically to widen its influence. (2007:179) 
164 
 
(Verkhovsky, 2007:179) Again we find that precisely ambiguity of identity discourse 
has a distinctively pragmatic political function. 
So, the standard moderate Eurasianist narrative on multiculturalism, a 
harmonious unity, bridge between civilisations, etc, might be a necessary part of both 
official and public rhetoric, but is unpopular and not translated into practice 
domestically, this period sees Eurasianism – in its standard multiculturalism – partly 
giving way to more strongly Orthodoxy-based, Russo-centric discourses – Dmitry 
Shlapentokh, for example, has recently pointed to the return of Byzantium as a 
model for Russian statecraft and identity.65 
Verkhovsky sums up the political benefits of having Orthodoxy as the basis 
of Russian collective identity:  
It provides a common identity for a significant part of the population and 
includes in the role of leading partners the majority of the rest, it is closely 
related to the tradition of Russian statehood, including its imperial 
component, it represents the West as the main opponent (but not as a deathly 
enemy with which one has to war). Finally, the Moscow Patriarchate as the 
bearer of these ideas has no pretensions to control over the state, only to a 
gradual widening of its own influence. (Verkhovsky, 2007:187)  
But, he explains, while the Orthodoxy-based model is appealing for the state as it 
searches to strengthen its legitimacy, it is not ready to fully adopt it and actually give 
up secularity. He suggests that this could relate to the Soviet upbringing of many of 
those in power – they respect the church but do not actually believe in its teachings; 
and to the church being seen as an unwelcome authority, rival to the state.  
Yet, the greatest risk for adopting the church model as the basis for state 
legitimacy, he argues, is ‚building identity on a basis of religion in a not very 
religious society, where the actual growth of religiosity, though it persists, remains 
slow and unlikely to speed up.‛ (Verkhovsky, 2007:187-88) While religious beliefs are 
not necessarily a prerequisite for an identity representation based on religious 
                                                 
65 He argued that it is politically attractive as it sheds the unpopular Eurasianist symbiosis and reaffirms 
Russia as an Orthodox country; it is still imperial and inclusive and emphasises Russia as a civilisation 
in its own right, defining ‚Russianness‛ inclusively mostly by cultural/religious attributes and yet 
stresses the dominant role of ethnic Russians; it bypasses Kiev, formerly the ‚mother of Russian cities‛ 
as the capital of an independent and unfriendly Ukraine; and encompasses a more cautious and 
moderate anti-Westernism than the neo-Eurasianist model, suiting the Russian elites to whom economic 
links to Europe are still vitally important. (Shlapentokh, 2009) 
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narratives to function, the interview-based chapters will however explore strong 
counter narratives to Orthodoxy as post-Soviet Russian identity.  
  And while a centralised master narrative is emerging in which ambiguities 
(such as Stalin as a good Orthodox believer) coexist quite happily, the rehabilitation 
of the Soviet past as exemplified in the history curriculum revision is not 
straightforwardly compatible with Orthodox official ideology, in which the church 
still partly represents the Soviet period in terms of martyrdom for the church. This 
can further explain the state’s reluctance to fully adopt Orthodoxy as the model for 
collective identity. On the whole, however, the new history textbook and revised 
curriculum strongly supported the particularistic messianic framework to which 
Orthodox Russian identity also belongs. (See e.g. Wedgwoodbenn, 2008) 
 So while Russian collective identity representations in both official and 
public discourse were becoming more distinctive, and more similar to one another, 
they continued to be defined by ambiguity. 
 
5.7.2 Russia and the World: Self and Other(s) 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
Russia in the 2006 state address was constructed as a mature, responsible and reliable 
partner, a nuclear power, a peace-keeper with huge missions, both maintaining 
strategic stability (as ‚one of the most important guarantees of lasting peace‛) and 
ready to ‚settle local conflicts‛ (as could be noted in the summer of 2008), taking an 
active part in the UN and being a safe-guarder of the supremacy of international law.  
  The address hence also dwelt at length on the need for modernisation of 
Russia’s armed forces, whose ‚mass heroism‛ was constructed as a vital part of 
Russian identity, ‚part of ourselves, part of our society‛, ‚of immense importance for 
the country and for the entire Russian people‛, with the calling of a soldier 
representing ‚the national unity of the people, the will of the Russian state, strength 




And also in official discourse, the formerly implicit anti-Westernism became explicit 
and sharp. In the 2006 state address, the foreign policy threats spelled out were 
certainly extensive and mostly referred to the US. Putin stated that the US defence 
budget was almost 25 times bigger than Russia’s, and that if their idea is ‘their home 
– their fortress’, Russia ‚must build its home and make it strong and well protected.‛ 
We see, after all, what is going on in the world. The wolf knows who to eat, as 
the saying goes. It knows who to eat and is not about to listen to anyone, it 
seems. How quickly all the pathos of the need to fight for human rights and 
democracy is laid aside the moment the need to realise one’s own interests 
comes to the fore. In the name of one’s own interests everything is possible, it 
turns out, and there are no limits. (Putin, Annual Address, 2006) 
The address continued to claim that the US is ready to use any pretext to strengthen 
itself at Russia’s expense, therefore Russia must strengthen itself. This stance was 
made even more explicit at the famous Munich speech in 2007, and at the 2006 
jubilee summit of the Russo-Chinese Shanghai Organisation Cooperation (SCO, apart 
from China and Russia including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan). At the latter, Russian journalists noted the joint stance taken against the 
‘evil forces at work in the region’ and cited the concluding declaration which stated 
that ‚*h+istorically made up differences in culture and traditions, in political and 
social systems< should not be used as a pretext for interference in the internal affairs 
of other states [. . .] Particular models of societal development cannot become subject 
to export.‛(Melikova, 2006)  In this context it should be noted that from at least 2004, 
Russo-Chinese relations had grown stronger. (Ferdinand, 2007) This was reflected for 
example in sharply increasing trade, joint military maneuvers, and Putin’s ‚G3‛ 
summit with Russia, China and India, held immediately after the G8 summit in St 
Petersburg in 2006, as Shevtsova describes, ‚creating a semblance of an alternative 
club to those of the West‛ (2007:178-80).    
In the 2007 state address, the stress on pragmatism in the context of foreign policy 
continued, with Putin affirming how Russia’s ‚foreign policy is aimed at joint, 
pragmatic, and non-ideological work to resolve the important problems we face.‛ 
(Putin, Annual Address, 2007) The West as Other was again very present. Clearly 
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reflecting popular patriotic conspiracy theories warning of ‚seducers of the nation 
and plunderers of the state‛66 Putin claimed that ‚*s+ome, making skilful use of 
pseudo-democratic rhetoric, would like to return us to the recent past, some in order 
to once again plunder the nation’s resources with impunity and rob the people and 
the state, and others in order to deprive our country of its economic and political 
independence.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2007) 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
The representation of Russia as Saviour and peace-maker with a mission was 
strongly present in public mainstream political discourse. A first example is of 
television analysts proposing that Russia is actually helping to save the world from a 
third world war between civilizations because of her exceptional tolerance and 
particular culture of freedom of speech which, according to Sergei Brilev, TV-show 
host of Vestei nedeli means that she is: 
the next-to-only world player with which both sides are ready to relate to: 
only Moscow is ready to hear both the West and Iran, and only Moscow is 
able to lead negotiations with the radicals from Palestine’s winning 
movement HAMAS. *<+ Moscow’s mission is so noble and so difficult. It is 
necessary to clean up the results from others’ mistakes, preserve a unity of 
leading powers and put the radicals to listen to the voice of reason. And, of 
course, not forget about one’s own interests and tasks. Russia has the new 
strength that is needed to solve these tasks. (Cited by Varshabchik, 2006)  
In the Byzantine model, Russia’s mediator role is constructed within the framework 
of Orthodox tradition. Rodina’s Demurin, cited above, reviewing Russia’s role in the 
‘conflict of civilisations’ wrote that as ‚never before, the current situation requires a 
reasonable moderator whose actions would rely to a greater degree on cultural 
tradition and political wisdom than on material or military might.‛  
  This, of course, is what Russia is destined for: ‚Russia’s Eastern Orthodox 
religious tradition, together with the unique traditions of its community, as well as 
its entire history, where the Russian people demonstrated openness to the 
                                                 
66 Quoted from ‘Russkaya Doktrina’ 
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assimilation of neighbouring cultures, as well as religious tolerance, must lay the 
groundwork for this mediating potential.‛  
But even though Orthodox Russia must mediate between two civilisations, it 
thus favour one side: ‚On the civilizational plane, the Islamic East, or broadly 
speaking, the God-fearing Orient, confronts strong pressure – and in some cases, 
overt aggression – from a post-Christian, godless West.‛(Demurin, 2006) Thus, both 
the moderate and radical variants of Russia’s missionism place Russia together with 
the Islamic world as God-fearing civilisations, versus a godless West – the traditional 
West versus the Rest. 
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
The explicit anti-Westernism that now for so long had been mainstream in public 
discourse was now emerging steadily also in official discourse, hand in hand with 
the representation of Russia as a global peacemaker. Shevtsova asks what lies behind 
Russia’s new and unexpected self-confidence, and answers herself:  
Largely, of course, it is high oil prices and the world’s addiction to 
hydrocarbons that prompted the Russian elite to conclude that these 
fortunate circumstances could be exploited. The stabilization of Russia’s 
internal situation under Putin and the resultant social support he gained were 
also pertinent. Other external factors are relevant: the profound sense of 
disorientation in Western nations as to how to build a new world order; U.S. 
setbacks in Iraq and growing hostility to American hegemony; and the crisis 
of the ‚color revolutions,‛ which so alarmed the Russian elite in 2004-2005.‛ 
(Shevtsova, 2007:165) 
 
In both official and public discourse we find again the contradiction between 
particularism and universalism in these representations of Russia and the world – 
Russia with its ‘unique cultural values’ (official discourse), as an Orthodox 
civilisation (public discourse), objects to the universalistic, messianic aspirations of 
the secular West which, as Putin stressed, ‘seeks to export its own particular models 
of societal development’.  
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Yet, this particularistic Russia is represented as having universal qualities, 
potentially exportable, as a global peacemaker, the ‘safe-guarder of international 
law.’ In the section below we will expand on this contradiction. And, while this 
Russia must resist the homogenisation by the West and globalisation, the discourses 
of this construction both become homogenised – in that they resemble one another 
strongly across different domains of discourse, including official discourse – and 
represent a type of homogenised anti-Westernism as the answer. As for example 
Laruelle writes on Dugin: ‚in his opposition to American globalization, *he+ 
unintentionally contributes to the internationalization of identity discourse and to 
the uniformization of those theories that attempt to resist globalization.‛ (Laruelle, 
2006:8)  
This reiterates our point that contemporary Russian messianism can and 
must be understood in different discursive contexts: as discourses of danger and 
Otherness functioning to legitimate states; as ideas historically and culturally 
particular to Russia; as identity constructions typical of political entities with 
complex social realities and geocultural conditions; and also as part of a global 
discourse of anti-Westernism, anti-globalism and anti-Americanisation. 
  
5.7.3 Russia as Messianic 
 
i) Official discourse 
 
2007 had been declared as the Russian Language Year, and in the state address the 
Russian language was deployed at length as a signifier of not only of Russian 
national but also international identity, the universality rather than particularism of 
Russian and Russianness being stressed in statements like: 
Russian is the language of a historical fraternity of peoples, a true 
language of international communication. The Russian language not only 
preserves an entire layer of truly global achievements but is also the living 
space for the many millions of people in the Russian-speaking world, a 
community that goes far beyond Russia itself. As the common heritage of 
many peoples, the Russian language will never become the language of 
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hatred or enmity, xenophobia or isolationism. (Putin, Annual Address, 
2007)  
Together with the celebration of the Russian language came the creation of the 
concept and foundation Russkii Mir (the Russian World), a National Russian 
Language Foundation, and the epitomisation of the Russia produced in official 
discourse.  
A keynote speech made by Vyacheslav Nikonov, appointed by Putin as 
director of the foundation Russkii Mir (note that it is russkii mir not rossiiskii) at a 
British Slavonic studies conference in 2008, perfectly illustrated the ambiguity 
between exceptionalist and universalist notions of Russian messianism, claiming 
both that Russia is different and special, and that Russia’s values are universal, a 
model that can be exported.67  
The Eurasia narrative was religiously deployed several times, Nikonov 
stressed that Russia is multi-ethnic and multi-confessional, that there is so much 
cooperation with different religious communities such as Buddhist, Muslim, 
Protestant – but at the same time he referred extensively to the traditional, ‘Holy 
Russia’, Orthodox values of sobornost’, obshchinost’, family values and morality, and 
stressed the importance of the Orthodox Church for Russian identity both home and 
abroad. The audience was told in no uncertain terms that Russia and Russkii Mir are 
not to be built on nostalgia for the past but on dreams for a great future, of freedom, 
justice, equality and peace. Finally, the speech reinforced our argument that having a 
Western Other transcends Russia’s internal differences, as Nikonov, referring to 
foreign policy emphasised that the Russian leadership does agrees on the important 
issues: NATO, Kosovo’s independence, and the Iraq war - all things in opposition to 
America as Other. 
 
ii) Public discourse 
 
The tension between exceptionalism and universalism as Russian messianic identity 
models is also evident in Russian geopolitical discourse, and we will briefly illustrate 
                                                 
67 The speech was made at 6.30pm, March 30, 2008 at the annual conference of the British Association of 
Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES), at Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, see 
www.basees.org.uk.   
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this by looking at a chapter of Vasilenko’s Geopolitika (2003), devoted to the relation 
between geopolitics, messianism and Russian identity.68 As noted in Chapter Four, 
Vasilenko sees an historical, dialectic relationship between ‘the Slavonic self-will’ 
and longing for geopolitical freedom, on the one hand, and the ‘instinct of national 
self-preservation’ and unity on the other, typically resulting in the sacrifice of the 
Russian nation for the sake of the Slavonic state. Bridging this gap however, is the 
Russian national messianic idea, the idea of the Messiah-nation whose values and 
ideals are called for to save the humanity by showing ‘the true path’.  
As cited in Chapter One, Vasilenko argues that the national and geopolitical 
revival of Russia is related to the revival of the national idea as a universal messianic 
idea: ‚Will the Russian people be capable of understanding its national calling as 
being universal [vselenskoe], all-human [vsechelovecheskoe], interpret and protect the 
values of the Orthodox culture as all-human? [. . .] Will we be capable of protecting 
the space fought for and protected by our great ancestors?‛ (Vasilenko, 2003:73) The 
true Russian messianic idea, overcoming the gap between the Russian nation and the 
Slavonic state, is thus realised when the exceptional and particular is understood and 
realised as being universal. And all this, we understand, is intimately related to 
geopolitics, hence ‚the simplicity with which Russia in the 1980-90s gave up her 
large territories in the Baltics, Caucasus and Central Asia is explained by the defeat 
of the messianic consciousness, by the divorce from messianic ideals. To gather these 
lands anew is possible only with the help of the spiritual revival of the messianic 
consciousness.‛ (Vasilenko, 2003:72) Geopolitical expansionism thus comes hand in 
hand with the spreading of the universal spiritual values and saving of humanity, as 
the revival of messianism merges the universal and the particular. 
 
iii) Academic interpretation 
 
Interesting in the context of America as the significant Other of Russia, American 
exceptionalism just like Russian messianism has two contradicting narratives, one of 
particularism, focusing on America’s providential role and past achievements, the 
                                                 
68 Vasilenko follows Berdyaev in claiming that ‚the external is but a symbol of the internal‛, so that the 
Russian lands should be considered as ‚the geography of the Russian soul.‛ (2003:66) 
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other of universalism, having the future-looking mission of exporting American 
universal values. Williams describes the universalism of the American idea: 
The American national interest, properly understood, is — like the United 
States itself — exceptional. But it is not unique. It is part of an historic mission 
that can and should be shared by all peoples [. . . ] The culmination of this 
logic is, of course, the promotion of democracy as part of a ‘muscular 
patriotism’ based upon ‘freedom and greatness’ *. . .+ Creating an 
international order of values is good for both America and the world. 
(Williams, 2005:318-19) 
One academic noting similarities between Russian and American discourse is 
Dmitry Shlapentokh, who notes that Dugin, who has been relatively successful in 
making his variant of Russian messianism mainstream in Russian discourse, ‚is 
structurally similar to American ideologists, who, while elaborating on the glory of 
democracy – the ‚radiant present‛ – avoid discussing how implementing democracy 
would relate to economic performance *. . .+ All of them appeal either to the ‚radiant 
past‛ or ‚radiant present,‛ and conspicuously avoid, for example, discussing how 
their geopolitical programs would affect the economic performance, reflecting fear of 
the powers which neither Russia nor the USA could master – radical Islam and the 
rising economic power of China.‛ (Shlapentokh, 2007)  
This reiterates that a core function of messianic discourse is to divert attention 
from the ambiguities, contradictions and problems of statecraft and identity in large, 
multicultural political entities such as Russia and the United States, by simplifying 
complex realities into appealing and unifying narratives of based on constructed 
dichotomies. As but one general example, ‘patriotism’ is largely an outdated notion 
in European countries, but plays a central role in both Russian and American 
discourse.  
And for both these exceptionalist states their stories about themselves and 
their enemies function not only to legitimise the state and provide them with an 
identity, but are intimately linked to their geopolitical expansion – to borrow from 
Vasilenko, the ‘geography of their souls’. This is the ‚universalistic nationalism‛ 
Morgenthau was concerned with – the claim to have God, or Historical Destiny, on 
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one’s side (thus having moral universality) as the justification for ‘intervening’ in 




In the beginning of the decade, we saw considerable difference between official and 
public discourse: different Russian messianic discourses, abounding in public 
discourse and united by anti-Westernism, were only occasionally and perfunctorily 
drawn upon by Putin. The only thing that united the official and public messianic-
patriotic positions was their self-legitimisation in opposition to the liberal reforms of 
the 1990s – messianism as the ‘spiritual opposition’ (Laruelle, 2008:221) and early 
Putinism as the pragmatic negation of ideology (Prozorov, 2008:224).  
 
But, as we have seen, the official position has gradually moved away from 
pragmatism and stability as almost the sole markers of Russian desired identity, 
closer to public discourse and its incongruent yet powerful master discourse. We 
have seen how Putin in the context of the state addresses increasingly has drawn on 
– if also modified – a wide range of messianic and related narratives such as 
spirituality, sacrifice, patriotism, Russian uniqueness and distinctiveness from the 
West, conspiracy theories and discourses of danger, glory and greatness, Russian 
history as an organic whole with the rehabilitation of the Soviet past, missionism and 
Russia as a global mediator, the cosmopolitan, Eurasianist ‘harmony of cultures’ as 
well, increasingly, various Orthodoxy-based and Russo-centric narratives. 
 
Despite this gradual rapprochement, there are still differences between the official 
and public Russian discourse, especially with regards to the West as Other – even 
though Putin gradually deployed stronger anti-Western rhetoric, his position 
remained distinct in that the economy was seen more as a threat than US and 
Westernisation, and Russia continued to be defined as European. But we also noted a 
general shift in parts of Russian discourse away from the starkly anti-Western 





A tendency defining Russian discourse as a whole, in its various dimensions and at 
different levels, is ambiguity, dualism and co-optation. This chapter has outlined a 
number of dualistic representations of Russia in both public and official discourse: as 
both a multi-ethnic, multicultural, supra-national Great Power (Third Rome) and a 
single nation with its ethnocentric and mono-religious connotations (Holy Russia), 
and with Russia as Byzantium somewhere in between; as a successor to the Soviet 
Union and a modern, civic, democratic state; as Eurasian and Slavonic, and European 
(but not Western); and both being special or having ‘special interest’ and being 
‘normal,’ like all states. 
 
How then do we explain these developments? What are the functions of official 
discourse of the messianic and related narratives in seeking to resolve the post-Soviet 
Russian crisis of identity? 
First of all, the official negation of ideology – despite being initially popular 
after a decade of societal and ideological turmoil with ordinary Russians craving 
stability – effectively became a negation of identity. It left, as Prozorov points out, the 
future of Russia – as well as the question in itself of whether Russia actually has a 
future – undecided, and hence the Russian crisis of identity remained unsolved. 
(Prozorov, 2008:226)  
Contemporary variations of messianism, on the other hand, provide a 
compelling ideological basis for collective identity, with compensation for the loss of 
empire through representations of a superior Russia, and powerful narratives 
creating systems of intelligibility to make sense of what doesn’t make sense: the end 
of the Soviet order, the globalised world, and so on. 
 We argued previously that discourses of danger and Otherness function to 
unify the population and legitimise the state, and this chapter has shown how an 
abundance of conspiracy theories and narratives in public discourses at times have 
been drawn upon even by Putin, in speaking of ‘seducers of the nation and 
plunderers of the state’ constructing both internal and external enemies against 
which Russia has been defined. 
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Furthermore, we have argued that the tendency at various levels of Russian 
discourse to represent the United States and the West in terms of aggressive 
messianism, universalism, absolutism, imperialism; and to subsequently define 
Russia (or Orthodox civilisation) in opposition and as an alternative to this 
civilisation also suggests the contextualisation of Russian messianism within a wider 
global discourse of anti-Westernism, anti-globalism and anti-Americanisation. 
 
Apart from the inherently contradictory nature of discourse and general ontological 
impossibility of any coherent collective identity, discussed in Chapter Two, we have 
highlighted context-specific functions of the managed dualisms and ambiguities in 
Russian official political discourse. We argued that they both reflect the polyphonic 
but powerful master narrative in public discourse as well as Putin’s personal 
discursive strategy of co-optation, consolidating power and accommodating 
national-patriots as well as ordinary people wanting decent living standards rather 
than ideological grandeur.   
 The relationship between official and public discourse is complex, however, 
and for example the state’s increasing control of the media suggests that the master 
narrative in public discourse itself is a reflection of a centralising effort to monopolise 
ideology by usurping all potentially challenging positions into one. As Laruelle 
argues, this new patriotic doctrine’s ‚exceedingly vague theoretical contours 
highlight the Putin regime’s striving for political consensus: Cultural 
fundamentalism has become a way to avoid politics.‛ (Laruelle, 2008:221-22) 
 
We also suggested previously that messianic identity constructions are typical of 
certain large, multicultural political entities such as Russia and the United States, 
functioning to divert attention from the ambiguities, contradictions and problems of 
statecraft and identity by simplifying complex realities into appealing and unifying 
narratives of based on constructed dichotomies, and this chapter has noted structural 
similarities between Russian and American discourse, with both also having a 




Russia in official discourse under Putin began as a vague representation, defined 
mostly by civic criteria, but has gradually become more defined, a confident actor, 
still facing challenges but no longer ashamed of its greatness and past, and no longer 
dependent on the acceptance of West. And while the first state address in 2000 had 
named hardly any other political actors, Russia was in 2006 positioned and defined 
in relation to a great number of states, regions and organisations, including the 
Union State with Belarus, the Eurasian Economic Community, the EU, the US, China, 
India, the countries of the Asia-Pacific Region, Latin America and Africa, and the 
UN.  
 
This production of an identity, the story of a creation or recreation of a lost self where 
allegedly there was only vacuum, can in itself be understood in terms of messianism. 
That Putin, even after stepping down as president, enjoys an almost cult-like status 
in Russia is hard to deny: there are popular fan-websites celebrating him; the 
widespread youth movement sport iconic pictures of him everywhere; and there is 
even a popular techno song called Takogo kak Putin, on the video of which the 
Russian girl band Singing Together declare that they want a man like Putin, a man 
full of strength, who doesn’t get drunk, who stands by his word.
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Slade draws our attention to the NASHI slogan Vse Put’em , translated as ‘Everything 
is on the Way’, an obvious play with Putin’s name and the word for path or way 
(put’) (Slade, 2006). The near equation of Putin with ‘the Way’ could be understood 
as another example of Christological representation of Putin following the long-
standing Russian tradition of deifying its rulers.  
As the nationalist Prokhanov ironically commented, there is an image of a 
Putin who ‚gives medicine to the elderly, bread to the children, wages to the men 
and homely bliss to the women.‛(Prokhanov, 2002b) Ostensibly Putin has been 
distancing himself from these tendencies – the presidential website for 
schoolchildren used to particularly stress that one should only love the Motherland, 
not the president, and make sure not to hang portraits of the president on each wall 
in the house.  
                                                 
69 See the video on http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OFOPd6pgjI [Accessed 2008-11-23]. 
177 
 
Yet, even though no cult of personality can be traced in the state addresses, 
the narrative that is constructed over the eight years of Putin’s presidency – of the 
rebuilding Russia from the debris of the ‘old edifice’; of rescuing Russia from various 
dangers; of rejecting the false and finding the true way; of uniting divergent political 
positions against one enemy; and restoring greatness and strength – is a narrative of 
a big mission, and of a Saviour completing it. As Putin affirmed in his last address: 
‚In untangling the complex knots of social, economic and political problems, we 
have at the same time built a new life.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2007) In conclusion 
we can thus say that while the Russian ‘crisis of identity’ not is over, the official ‘end 
of ideology’ certainly is. 
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6.0.0 Russia: History, Presence and Destiny 
 
‚Each and everyone of us have a very hard life, because we were born in a very hard country, 
a very difficult country, and we have a very difficult history. In my opinion, history as a 
discipline does not suit our country. Because any regime change means a change of history. 
So history is a variable value. We have been deceived so much, and held in forms of terror. 
These are complexes and cannot but be reflected in the character of Russian people. 
Nevertheless, I somehow believe in the justice, goodness and generosity of the Russian people, 
and consider that Russians are a good nation.‛ (C142-M49) 
 
‚[A]ll other countries have passed their peak of development, but Russia is only beginning to 
develop, and it is quite possible to imagine that there is something big in front of us. But it’s 
also quite possible that there isn’t.‛ (C39-M19) 
 
‚But Putin – he is an educated, young, talented, and strong-willed person. I don’t know what 
he is thinking within himself, where he wants to take Russia – whether he wants to take 
Russia anywhere at all – I don’t know these things. But either way, the outward things, that 




Chapter Five looked at the way messianic discourse is used in the state production of 
Russian identity, comparing and contrasting the state’s official discourse with public 
political discourse. This and the following two chapters will continue to explore the 
role of messianic discourse in contemporary Russian identity, moving from political 
to popular discourse.  
Based on extensive interview material, we will look at some of the ways in 
which ordinary and semi-elite people, Soviet and post-Soviet generations, use or 
reject, the available messianic and related discourses to define Russia, and 
themselves as Russians, comparing the different categories. 70 
                                                 
70 Interview cases with details and summary of coded answers are listed in Appendix II. Where a case 
study is available in Appendix III, this is indicated by an asterix at the end of the case number, e.g. C1-




One of the core dilemmas constituting the Russian crisis of identity is the question of 
history, in Tsygankov’s words, ‚finding a historically sensitive solution to the 
question of Russia’s national identity‛ as ‚until Russia knows what it is and until it 
clearly defines its post-Soviet values, it cannot successfully pose, let alone solve, the 
question of its larger civilisational identification.‛ (Tsygankov, 2007:380) 
This chapter specifically explores perceptions of Russia as a temporal-social 
entity. As contended in the previous chapter, there has for several years been a 
strong drive in political discourse, both public and official, to present Russians with a 
cohesive collective identity, which would provide a sense of stability and historical 
continuity, as well as legitimise the state itself. Putin’s narratives in the state 
addresses gradually turned from stressing newness and the need to build for the 
future to history, tradition and a glorious heritage, alongside with introducing a 
gradual rehabilitation of the Soviet era. We will explore how these narratives 
resonate among ordinary and semi-elite people, and will seek to answer the 
following questions:   
o How do Russians today define Russia as a temporal-social entity, as 
something in history? Which narratives do they use to describe and define 
their country, its past, present and future? 
o How do they conceive of the relation between contemporary and past 
Russias, in particular the Soviet Union – in terms of coherence or incoherence, 
stability or disruption? 
o What is the function and role of messianic discourse (both as single narratives 
and the wider framework) drawn upon in the interviews in the context of 
Russian temporal-social identity? 
Among a significant number of the semi-elite interviewees, a story was told about 
finding a lost identity. A change appears to have taken place; the uncomfortable, 
indefinable and often humiliating post-Soviet years to be over and new and more 
positive period has begun. There is no need to apologise for the Soviet past 





Among ordinary people, we encountered a still widespread lack of tools with which 
to make sense of the past and present in Russia. Their stories were not as clear, the 
past not as clear – though there was a deep nostalgia for the Soviet period – and 
neither was the present or the future. Also evident was a great diversity and 
fragmentation of opinion, and often stark contradictions within single interviews. 
But various tendencies can be discerned, the foremost of which is a steady 
rehabilitation of the Soviet past, based much on nostalgia, as well many the 
resorting to the familiar Russian messianic discourses. 
 
6.2.0 Semi-elite Russians 
 
To recap from Chapter Five: in 2005 – the same year the interviews took place – Putin 
in the annual address to the nation had turned from stressing newness and the need 
to build for the future, to narratives of historical continuity and past glories, 
representing Russia as a ‚unique and vast country‛ with a ‚rich cultural and 
spiritual heritage‛, a place where ‚law and morals, politics and morality have 
traditionally been considered close and related concepts‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 
2005).  
Very similar notions were present in many of the interviews with semi-elite 
Russians. Narratives could be discerned of finding of a lost identity, of becoming 
decidedly comfortable with Russia’s history and present, as well as fairly hopeful of 
its future destiny. There was a clear tendency to stress Russia’s long historical 
continuity, its great national and religious heritage, and particularly its over 
thousand years old history – ‚When,‛ a business director exclaimed, figuratively 
addressing all Americans, ‚was your country founded, and when was the Bolshoi 
Theatre founded?‛ (C3-M26e) ‘New Russia,’ then, is not based on representations of 
Russia as a ‘young’ country (opposed to ‘old’, decadent Europe) or ‘new civilisation’ 
(Soviet) but is by the interviewees repeatedly constructed through discourses on 
historical ancientness and grandeur.  
 
Similarly, the official rehabilitation of the Soviet period – Putin describing the 
collapse of the Soviet Union as ‚a major geopolitical disaster of the century‛, the 
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states official revision of history books, etc. – was also reflected in different degrees 
among a large number of the interviewees, in their own views and in their 
perceptions of views in society. Only four out of the 30 semi-elite interviewees 
considered the Soviet period to ‘a mistake and lost time’, with another four 
considering it to be ‘both an important part of Russian history, and a mistake and 
lost time.’
71  
Most sought to provide a balanced view of the Soviet period, typically 
stressing that history is history; that while there was a lot of bad during the Soviet 
Union, there was also a lot of good points and achievements that ought not to be 
forgotten; that there must have been a higher reason for what happened and that one 
should learn from this (e.g. C1-F36e*). Some openly regretted the fall of the Soviet 
Union, others presented the Soviet Union and its rapid industrialisation as the 
natural and necessary basis and predecessor for the advancing ‘New Russia’ (C13-
M36e).  
The essentialist idea of an organic, ‘true Russia’, which historically suffers 
attempts from hostile, false forces to pervert or change its essence, was present also 
at this level of popular discourse. One of our thirty semi-elite interviews was with 
Archbishop Chaplin, deputy director of external relations of the Moscow 
Patriarchate (C14-M37e). He strongly condemned the discourse which categorically 
rejects the entire Soviet period as ‘un-Russian’.  
Instead, he argued, a distinction must be made between roughly two periods 
of the Soviet Union: 1917-1941, and 1941-1991. 1917-1941 Marxist ideology prevailed 
and this period must be seen a disruption of Russia’s history; but with the Second 
World War, Russia ‚became herself again‛, and although Russia formally remained a 
Communist state 1941-1991, she began to develop according to her historical 
traditions. With Chaplin as a well-known spokesman for the Patriarchate, we can 
assume that this partial rehabilitation of the Soviet period represents its official 
stance. 
Chapter Five outlined how in political discourse a change has taken place: 
while a quite common view in early post-Soviet Russian discourse was that the 
Soviet period should be seen as a disruption to the otherwise unbroken history of 
                                                 
71 The question was ‚Seventy years of Soviet rule – is it a mistake and lost time, or an important part of Russian 
history?‛ (Moscow, St Petersburg, Aug-Oct 2005, N=160) 
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‘true Russia’, it is now often the fall of the Soviet Union, and the brief Yeltsin period 
that is seen as the disruption.72  (M42e, see also C18-M39e) Likewise, for some 
interviewees it was with the fall, not the beginning, of the Soviet Union that Russia 
ceased to ‘be herself’, and many considered the early post-Soviet years to be the most 
tragic period of Russian history.  
 
As but one example, a retired physicist, neither positive nor negative about the 
Soviet period, stated with emphasis that ‚the most terrifying in the history of Russia 
is the Yeltsin rulership. Overnight all became bandits.‛ (C29-M71e*) This shift in 
assessing Russia’s history is reflective of the widespread disappointment with the 
results from the much anticipated ‚return‛ to Europe and the West, and the social 
and economic difficulties of that time.  
But the rehabilitation of the Soviet period also constitutes the basis of a much 
stronger and more cohesive collective identity, in that it produces the image of 
historical continuity. Our interview material supports our hypothesis that this is 
achieved largely through messianic-related representations of Russia as being 
chosen, different and special; exceptionally religious, moral and spiritual; and a 
strong empire.  
Two semi-elite interviews in particular epitomised this tendency, though it 
could be noted in several interviews. Both drew on a number of different, and often 
contradictory, popular and often messianic discourses, and subsequent chapters will 
return to them – they are also detailed in the case studies on Appendix III. The first 
one was with a young businesswoman from Moscow – wealthy, generally very pro-
Western, and, interestingly, not the least happy with Putin:  
I consider, first of all, that Russia inevitably is a peculiar country [. . .] Russia 
has always been an empire of territories that she united with herself [. . . ] I 
believe that it was happened that way, that God decided that there should be 
such a country, such a big country. And because of this we suffer (you know 
our history, all the problems) but from it we are also in a very advantageous 
position: we have all natural resources. All that the world is prepared to buy 
from us, God gave us for free. And I believe that Russia has a great 
                                                 
72 Ostrovsky, (2008) ‘Flirting with Stalin’ 
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responsibility. She has always been a large empire, it historically happened 
that way. [. . .] Considering our many centuries of culture and our history: we 
are still not such an ancient country as for example Greece. In comparison to 
Greek or Roman culture, though contemporary Italy and ancient Rome are 
two different things, their history dates back to the birth of Christ. Officially 
our history starts only from the ninth century. Within this period of time 
Russia has been able to contribute much to world culture and the Russian 
soul (I think many people have mentioned this to you) – we live between East 
and West.  (C8-F31e*). 
The seventy years of Soviet rule is in her account is partly a mistake, but nevertheless 
part of the historical continuity as being one of Russia’s many difficult but necessary 
missions – Russia’s responsibility is to show the world both ‚how to live, and how 
not to live.‛ 73  The Soviet era appears as but a brief moment of history when 
considering Russia’s centuries of contributions to world culture – and any mistakes 
due to its godless ideology fade when one instead focuses on Russia’s God-given role 
as an empire.  The second, messianically stereotypical interview was with a young 
director and owner of a Moscow PR company: 
Russia can be proud of any of her periods. Russia has always been a very 
powerful country, a very religious country, both on the level of Orthodoxy 
and on the level of Islam. Russia has always acted in a certain manner: she 
fought wars of liberation and she was attacked a vast amount of times, and 
she won basically all these wars, because Russia is not a simple country - as 
any other country. We have nothing to try to be ashamed of. We probably 
acted incorrectly sometimes, but I think that to a large extent was a question 
of the level of education. There is not one country which one could say has a 
clear conscience. The Americans for example – I cannot imagine how it was 
possible to drop two nuclear bombs on two peaceful cities, what moral level 
their population must have. [. . .] If we talk about the Christian world – 
Catholics, Protestants and Orthodox - It seems to me that at present, in the 
sense of spirituality, Russia’s potential is a lot bigger, from the point of view 
of moral-ethical principles and norms. *<+ Europe relates so tolerantly 
                                                 




towards things like abortions, homosexuality and public prostitution – it 
surprises me, and I wouldn’t want it to be like that in Russia. We are quite a 
lot more conservative here. [. . .] What makes a Russian in Russia is in much 
Orthodoxy, the principles that Orthodoxy propagates. Orthodoxy is first and 
foremost an orientation towards the outside world – to help, care for, share a 
crust of bread, and help one another. (C7-M31e*) 
In this abstract one is reminded of Putin’s message to history teachers not to ‚allow 
anyone to impose a sense of guilt upon us‛ – there is no need to apologise to the 
West for the Soviet past anymore, and no need to be ashamed of the present.74  
Here, any problematic aspects of the Soviet period are diminished with the 
deployment of the traditional messianic framework of West – bad, Russia – good, 
West – amoral, Russia – moral and religious, etc. In both interviews historical 
continuity and Russian collective identity relate to notions of God and religion.  
Obviously, the incorporation of the Soviet legacy into the representation of 
historical continuity with Russia as a divinely chosen, religious, ancient empire 
ought logically to be marred by the materialist, atheist basis of Communist 
ideology. 75  But, like in official discourse there is little concern about this 
inconsistency, as the above interviews also indicate – in itself a reflection of a greater 
collective confidence. 
As we noted in Chapter Five, the messianic master narrative in public 
discourse incorporates the Soviet period fully with ‘true’ Russian history, at times 
even through representations of Stalin and Lenin as good Orthodox believers.76  This 
point was never made among the interviewees, yet for example one male 
interviewee, when asked about the Soviet period in general, straightaway pointed 
out that while the one Orthodox Patriarch was thrown out by Peter the Great, one 
Patriarch actually appeared under Lenin in 1917 (C20-M48e).  
 
Religiosity, Orthodoxy and related notions such as sobornost’ (communality) and 
morality appear in many interviews as important markers of Russian identity. As 
one interviewee, a male company director from St Petersburg, summarised: ‚Russia 
                                                 
74 Ostrovsky, (2008) ‘Flirting with Stalin’ 
75 One solution is of course as Chaplin above (C14-M37e) to divide the Soviet into a revolutionary ‘un-
Russian’ period (1917-1941) and a period when ‘true’ Russia is restored (1941-1991). 
76 Dmitry Shlapentokh (2009) ‘Orthodox Stalin on the Wall’ 
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without faith is impossible. No matter how hard the Communists sought to separate 
the people from faith in God, they couldn’t make it even in the years they were in 
power.‛ (C18-M39e) A third of the semi-elite interviewees defined Russianness in 
directly terms of spirituality, Orthodoxy or faith and a third also agreed with the 
statement that thanks to the Russian Orthodox Church, Russia’s spiritual potential is 
greater than other countries’.  
Many talked about Russian Orthodoxy as being spiritually stronger than 
other religions because of its strictness – comparisons were made with Muslim 
Ramadan festivities at night, Catholic traditions of penance and indulgence (‘buying 
oneself off sin’), and Western secularity in general: ‘in Britain they turn churches into 
houses’ (C8-F31e*). There was thus a definite resonance among the semi-elite of the 
public discourses deploying Orthodoxy as a marker of Russian identity, whether 
Orthodox nationalist, the official ideology of the Orthodox church, or the 
overarching master narrative of ‘Holy Russia’.  
In conclusion: the fact that the official representation of Russia described in 
the previous chapter is reflected in so many semi-elite interviews is not unexpected, 
as it likely to have been disseminated early to these educated and typically politically 
aware semi-elite interviewees, and to at least a small extent also been shaped by 
views at this level of discourse. 
 
6.3.0 Ordinary Russians 
 
Compared with the semi-elite interviewees, the representations of Russian collective 
historical identity were a lot more diffuse among ordinary people, with even greater 
diversity and fragmentation of opinion, and again often with contradictions within 
single interviews. One interviewee, a journalist, summarised popular attitudes to the 
Soviet past this way: 
People still haven’t realised what that period means, they are only beginning 
to approach consciousness of it. So there are people who consider that it was 
a great epoch, when we were strong and mighty and the whole world feared 
us. And there are people (especially those who have someone who suffered 
under Bolshevik terror and the Stalinist repressions) who consider these 
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seventy years to be a gradual destruction of Russia. And in my opinion there 
is no kind of united view in society. (C23-F41e) 
Judging from our interviews with Moscow and St Petersburg residents, analysed 
both qualitatively and quantitatively, this is a fairly accurate assessment.  
 
 
  ‚Seventy years of Soviet rule – is it a mistake and lost time, or an important part of 
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Answers to this question were quite evenly spread between post-Soviet and Soviet 
generations, the educated and uneducated, men and women.78  Thus, if a broad 
generalisation is to be made, it is that all categories of people hold different views on 
the Soviet past, at all levels of society. When the interviewees were asked to assess 
general views in society about the Soviet past, a similar picture emerged. 
 
 
                                                 
77 Of course, as many interviewees pointed out, it is rather problematic to define a historical period as a 
mistake, and most periods, good and bad, are important. However, the question and its framework 
were typical for post-Soviet discourse, perfectly well understood by all interviewees, and generated 
clear, unambiguous responses about the Soviet legacy.  
 
78 However, slightly more males considered the Soviet period ‘a mistake and lost time’ and more 
females ‘an important part of Russian history’; and more young people were not sure. 
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‚What, in your opinion, does the majority of Russians think about [the Soviet 
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Young people are positive; old negative 
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The diverse responses across generations to this question point to a lack of a cohesive 
Russian collective identity representation. Nevertheless, the interviews did to a 
significant extent reflect the gradual official rehabilitation of the Soviet period, with 
the 41% of all interviewees who considered the Soviet era without doubt an 
important part of Russian history, and the 27% who believed most people are 
nostalgic about the Soviet period.  
 
As among the semi-elite, there was a tendency to turn away from the extremes, 
relatively few either glorified the era or rejected it completely. A young student 
provides a typical quote: ‚On the one hand, during these 70 years colossal industries 
were built. Russia went from agriculture to an industrial society, and we finally won 
the war: the victory in the Second World War cannot be measured. But there were 
also other moments which were not altogether positive. There was both one and the 
                                                 
79 This was an open question – the categories of answers were created after the interviews. 
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other. On the whole, the idea was good. How they realised it – that is a different 
question.‛ (C100-M20) Overall, appraised both positively and negatively, the Soviet 
Union appeared in the interviews as the doubtless predecessor of today’s Russia – 
and an often recurring answer about the Soviet past was that ‘one can never remove 
a line from a poem’, or ‘so it was and so it had to be’.  
 
As among the semi-elite, the first decade of the post-Soviet period was quite often 
singled out as the misfit in Russian history, rather than the Soviet period. ‚Russia can 
be proud of her history‛, one quite strongly anti-Western post-Soviet interviewee 
summed up, ‚up until 1917, and from 1917 to 1991.‛ (C95-M26*) And as among the 
semi-elite, many of the ordinary people expressed that they felt things had changed 
compared to the 1990s, and that Russia under Putin was now on a new and different 
path of development – though it was seldom clear what kind of development.  
  One interviewee, a female pensioner and former English teacher epitomised a 
common sentiment: ‚Putin – he is an educated, young, talented, and strong-willed 
person. I don’t know what he is thinking within himself, where he wants to take 
Russia – whether he wants to take Russia anywhere at all – I don’t know these 
things. But either way, the outward things, that which I can see on television, I like 
very much.‛ (C153-F67) (For a similarly ambivalent attitude to Putin, see case study 
C157-F65*). The disavowal of the 1990s and, by extension, the West, thus appears as a 
unifying marker of collective identity.80  
 
Generational differences appear when we move beyond the statistics of the interview 
answers. On the whole, the answers of Soviet interviewees (aged 30 and above) were 
much less reflective of grand ideology, and much more of everyday life social issues, 
than those of the post-Soviet generation (whose answers were often closer to those of 
many of the semi-elite). Nostalgia for the past and disappointment with the present 
pervaded many interviews with the older generation, particularly with regards to 
social relations: ‚You see, there was no hatred of anyone, but now, it seems to me, we 
have those things.‛ (C157-F65*)  
                                                 
80 This reflects the whole of contemporary Russian political discourse, which, as Prozorov has pointed 




One middle-aged man said with emphasis that all his friends and acquaintances 
agree that it was better during the Soviet Union; people thought less about money, 
all things could be settled in a friendly way. Even though all wasn’t perfect, people 
were warmer and relations friendlier. ‚Because of this, people born the same time as 
me or before agree with the view that the Soviet Union was a better country. Not just 
better, but the very best.‛ (C119-M45) Similarly, a slightly older woman stated with 
regret: ‚We do not all live for people, as we used to live. Overall it was difficult, we 
lived worse, but nevertheless we cared for one another. And now it is all just money, 
money, money.‛ (C143-F55) The West is implicitly linked in these narratives to the 
perceived deterioration of social relations in Russia, with the westernisation of the 
1990s ushering in capitalism, individualism, and so on, contrasted with Russia’s own 
way defined by collectiveness, social cohesion, etc.81   
 
For many of the interviewees, both old and young, the idea of ‘Eurasia’ appeared 
attractive simply because ‘it’s good to be together’ and ‘it is basically like the 
friendship of the Soviet peoples.’ (e.g. C31-M18*) Comparisons between the Soviet 
period and contemporary Russia were often framed in terms of the unity and order 
of the past versus the disunity and disorder of the present (e.g. C82-F20).  
  After listing disorder, lawlessness, robbery and embezzlement of state 
property as constituting the greatest dangers to Russia, one 76-year old interviewee 
stated about the Soviet past: ‚I’m for Stalin, who kept order.‛ (C160-M76) In total, 
seven percent of Soviet respondents considered disunity and social fragmentation to 
be the greatest danger to Russia (compared to none among post-Soviet interviewees). 
 In view of this it easy to comprehend popular origins of slogans such as Putin’s 
‘dictatorship of the law’, as well as the overall Putinist striving for stability and social 
consensus as opposed to grand ideology (see e.g. Prozorov, 2008). ‘Unity’, 
‘friendship’ and ‘order’ are thus positive signifiers attributed to Soviet Russia which 
help explain its gradual rehabilitation in a society many perceive as fragmented.  
 
                                                 
81 Here we must note the distinction between different accounts of the Soviet period – when represented 




Interviewees of the post-Soviet generation to a larger extent painted a more positive 
picture of Russia and appeared to perceive more social cohesion.82 Their answers 
more often reflected messianic discourse and related nationalist ideas. Having not 
experienced Soviet life as adults, yet being subject to state-promoted historical 
revision, these young people could afford to have a rather utopian view on the Soviet 
past. As a 20 year old female explained: ‚It is doubtless an important part of Russian 
history, when Russia learnt to exist independently, and became able to display its 
ability to accumulate and unify. This is part of the Russian mentality - the 
commonality of spirit [obshchnost’ dukha+.‛ (C79-F20)  
 
The narrative of Russia’s ancientness and peculiarity that emerged in the semi-elite 
interviews was similarly reflected among many ordinary young people. One 
example of these was a male economics student from Moscow, who declared in the 
interview that ‚the Russian nationality is not comparable to any other; it has its own 
take. The Germans are an older nation, but in our thousand year old history we have 
had many different wars, and that has given us a certain experience and certain 
traditions. They are uncommon, peculiar to the Slavs, not only the Russians.‛  
  Asked to define what makes a Russian Russian, he answered that ‚if we look 
purely historically, then the Russian person has always been honest, always ready to 
help others, and has always been with God.‛ As can be seen in the case study of this 
interview, this student furthermore believed that Russia has a mission consisting in 
Cold War; that Russia can be proud of the imperial and the Soviet past; that Russia 
will become a source of power internationally; and that Russia’s spiritual potential is 
greater than other countries’ thanks to the Orthodox Church since ‚the Orthodox are 
in favour of uniting many nations.‛ (C48-M19*)  
 
We highlighted in the previous section how some semi-elite interviewees, in line 
with much of both official and public political discourse, used messianic-related, 
religious notions to build a narrative of historical continuity for Russia. Among 
                                                 
82 About 45% of the interviewees identified themselves with what they perceived as the majority of 
people in general,  holding that most people think the same as themselves about the Soviet era, 
regardless of view, and about 41% in total believed that most people in general hold the opposite view 
of themselves. The first group comprised of relatively more post-Soviet than Soviet interviewees, so if 
we consider the attitudes to the Soviet legacy as being a central factor to post-Soviet collective identity, 
these data suggest that slightly more young people perceive a more cohesive collective identity.  
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young ordinary people there was also a significant degree of religious and historical 
determinism in answers to the question of the Soviet past, with answers such ‚if it 
happened, then it was meant to happen‛ (C39-M19), and ‚without Communism 
there would have been no Russia, and no history<but as it happened<the Bible 
says that everything comes from God. So God had a plan for Russia. And God made 
it so that there were seventy years of Communism.‛ (C88-M22)    
  The latter statement is testament to the presence of the polyphonic, 
postmodern phenomenon in Russian political discourse of the merging of 
traditionally contradictory discourses also among ordinary people. There are no 
dilemmas: New Russia can owe everything both to godless Communism and to the 
God of the Bible.  
 
But Orthodoxy appeared still as an ambiguous marker of Russian collective identity 
among ordinary people. Many talked positively about the revival of church-going, 
especially among young people, but answering the question ‛What makes a Russian 
Russian?‛ only 3% of ordinary interviewees answered in terms of ‘Orthodoxy’. (Yet 
an additional 15% answered this question literally in the wider messianic terms of 
‘spirituality’, ‘soul’ or ‘faith’ – see Chapter Eight on how many stressed the difference 
between the Church and the inner Russian spirituality.83)  
 
Again, the historicity of this marker of Russian identity was often stressed: ‚Now, 
overall, Rus’ was spiritual from the very beginning, always. When was the 
Christening of Rus’, which year? I think it was in 989. And there, we are doing all 
right. We try, at least. The country is trying to be spiritual.‛ (C76-M25) The Russian 
Orthodox Church was however accredited with a central role in Russia’s spirituality, 
the potential of which one in two post-Soviet interviewees considered greater than 




                                                 
83 Most people gave answers in terms of ‘culture’, ‘literature’, ‘history’, ‘life in Russia’, ‘mentality’, 
‘patriotism’, ‘roots’, ‘hospitality’ and ‘understanding of Russianness’. 
192 
 
‚Is Russia’s spiritual potential greater than other countries’ thanks to the Russian 
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Many interviewees mentioned the revival of the Russian Orthodox Church, its 
religious seriousness compared to Western Churches and its great popularity among 
young people – and as is indicated in Table 6-3, there was a notable difference 
between generations in attitudes to the ROC. The traditional framework of Western 
negative, materialist and secular values versus Russian positive, religious and 
spiritual values based on sobornost’ (commonality) and which was used among the 
semi-elite also surfaced in many interviews with the post-Soviet generation, and to a 
smaller extent among the Soviet generation.  
 
As in public political discourse, the West was typically accredited with the negative 
tendencies in post-Soviet society. Russians are becoming more like people in the 
West, and the values distinguishing Russians from others are being lost, a young 
female graduate described with dismay – but this used not to be so: ‚In Western 
countries money always played the key role, everything was oriented towards this, 
but for the Russian person it is not the key factor, all relations were based on purely 
human relations, on the Bible, on all people helping one another regardless of status 
in society. All would say ‚Good day!‛ but now nobody greets others. I find it a very 
negative factor.‛ (C68-F22). This is yet another example of the implicit inclusion of 
the Soviet period in the narrative of temporal-social Russia as a very religious, 




Interestingly, people who voted for Putin were much more prone to believe in the 
superior spirituality of Russia and the Orthodox Church, indicating a discursive 
closeness between official discourse and Orthodox and messianic discourses. 84 Fairly 
typical among the post-Soviet interviewees who voted for Putin and believe in the 
spiritual potential of Russia and the church was an 18-year old male student from 
Moscow, who also believed that Russia is a source or example of spirituality for the 
rest of the world; that Russia has a mission: ‚so that there was peace everywhere‛; 
that America poses the greatest danger to Russia today and that Russia should 
oppose the West (C65-M18). Another person in this category, yet not Orthodox 
herself, was a 20-year old female graduate from St Petersburg:  
The majority goes precisely to the Orthodox Church. Spirituality in Russia is 
one of the most important peculiarities. [. . .] See why the foreigners travel 
here to visit< I saw some Frenchmen with their map, planning to travel to 
Novgorod to see all the churches< I don’t know, they probably haven’t got 
an as developed spiritual culture, and it is interesting for them to see our 
customs, as far as you can visit them: people going to church, praying< I 
myself am not very much into the Orthodox Church, i.e. I’m not christened, 
but it is undoubtedly an example for other countries. (C82-F20) 
These cases indicate a more consolidated role of the Orthodox Church in post-Soviet 
urban society, and a relative success of the promotion of Orthodox messianic 
discourse. However, it should also be noted that several Soviet and post-Soviet 
interviewees made a clear distinction between on the one hand, Russian or Orthodox 
culture, and on the other, the institution of the Russian Orthodox church, presenting 
the culture or the people rather than the church as the reason or source of Russia’s 
spiritual potential (See for example C137-F46).  
Likewise, Verkhovsky has noted that many Russians, both elites and ordinary 
people, respect the church and Orthodox religion, but do not necessarily believe in or 
follow its teachings, and this notion was supported by our interviews such as (C82-
F20) above, and others – one 40 year old man for example, explained with pathos 
                                                 
84 Of those that answered ‘Yes’ to the question whether Russia’s spiritual potential is greater than other 
countries’ thanks to the Russian Orthodox Church, 73% said that they voted or would have voted for 
Putin in the last presidential elections (compared to only 54% of those that answered negatively). 
Furthermore, one out of five interviewees believe both that Russia’s spiritual potential is greater than 
most countries thanks to the Russian Orthodox Church, and that Russia will aspire to be a mighty 
empire, compared to one out of ten believing neither. 
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that he supports the church financially as it is an important social and moral 
authority, but is a staunch atheist himself (C130-M40).  
 
The Great Fatherland War also appeared as a very important narrative in collective 
memory, often referred to in answers to different questions, from being one of the 
most tragic periods in Russian history and/or one that Russia can be most proud of, 
to the completed mission of Russia (defeating fascism and Hitler, saving Europe), 
and in many other contexts, by interviewees from across all backgrounds. It is a 
powerful narrative which, with its unifying enemy representation and theme of 
sacrifice, again transcends the differences between the previously divisive issues 
surrounding Russian collective historical identity – the Soviet legacy, ethnicity and 
imperialism, religion etc. 
 
The interviews did not go into detail about questions of ethnicity – this was mainly 
explored through the question on what defines Russianness (What makes a Russian 
Russian, Chto delaet russkogo russkim), and only a handful out of the whole sample 
chose to define Russianness by ‘roots’, ‘blood’, ‘birth’ or similar ethnic identity 
markers.  
Nine out of 160 chose Russian language as the main marker of identity, and a 
large part of the sample gave answers in terms of socio-cultural markers, such as 
mentality, culture, or similar, sometimes explicitly renouncing Russian ethnicity: 
‚Russians, in fact, are not a nationality. [. . .] Russians are a worldview 
(mirovozzrenie). This does not depend on ethnic things.‛ (C100-M20) And quite a few, 
as stated above, answered in terms of faith, spirituality and Orthodoxy, as well as 
many in terms of patriotism.  
The fluid nature of these markers of identity makes it hard to assess ethno-
centrism among the interviewees – Orthodoxy, as Chapter Five established, works 
both as an ethno-centric and supra-national marker of identity, depending on the 
context, and Russian language – strongly promoted as a marker of identity through 
projects like Russkii Mir, is not a biological identity marker but still Russo-centric. 




On the whole, we encountered many ambiguities and dualistic representations of 
Russia’s past, present and sometimes future within single interviews, and this 
tendency is shown in more detail in the case studies in Appendix III.    
 
6.4.0 The Other side 
 
If messianic discourse is on the rise, as well as a gradual rehabilitation of the Soviet 
period, which are the discourses that run counter to these tendencies, responding to 
and opposing them (as well as being responded and opposed to)? The idea of an 
organic Russia with a coherent history was opposed by some with general 
uncertainty about history itself: 
In my opinion, history as a discipline does not suit our country. Because any 
regime change has meant a change of history. So history is a variable value. 
We have been deceived so much, and held in forms of terror. These are 
complexes and cannot but be reflected in the character of Russian people. 
(C142-M49) 
The uncertainty not only about Russia’s present but also about its past is 
understandable, and, as the as the official revision of history books in 2007 pointedly 
illustrates, warranted. Many interviewees expressed distrust of the present 
government and of any Russian government, often following the traditional 
distinction between the ‘bad’ state and the ‘good’ people, as the male quoted above 
who concluded with hope: ‚Nevertheless, I somehow believe in the justice, goodness 
and generosity of the Russian people, and consider that Russians are a good nation.‛ 
(C142-M49)  
The attitude to the Soviet past, as well as the question of empire and nation, is 
what principally divided the nationalism of the late Solzhenitsyn from the neo-
imperialists in the early post-Soviet period; and a similar divide in discourse could to 
some extent be noted in the interviews, though the followers of the ‘Solzhenitsyn 
model’ (or ‘Holy Russia’) were outnumbered also at this level by the ‘imperialists’ (or 
‘Third Rome’), and a majority fell somewhere in between, often in the contradictory 
combinations of the two models.  
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The rehabilitation of the Soviet period was thus by no means uniform, 18% of 
the total sample agreed with the statement that the Soviet period as being ‚a mistake 
and lost time‛ (see table 6-1) and by some, mainly religious interviewees of different 
denominations, the Soviet period was even defined either as ‚God’s punishment‛ or 
at least as a direct result from people turning away from God. (e.g. C11-M34e, C19-
M37e, C24-F47e). The same interviewees often picked it, or parts of it, as the most 
tragic period in Russian history.  
What is notable is that while this type of discourse runs counter to the 
arguably messianic discourses of rehabilitation of empire and the Soviet past, it 
nevertheless does so from within the framework of Russian messianism, but as part 
of its other, exceptionalist model – God is ever so much present in the picture, and in 
a sense, Russia again becomes similar to the chosen Israel of the Bible, repeatedly 
punished for its sins and then forgiven. Another popular representation echoed in 
many interviews was seeing the Soviet experiment as a mission in itself, the mission 
to show what not to do (see previously quoted C8-F31e*, also for example C121-F43, 
C130-M40).  
And as there was disagreement on the past, there was also disagreement as to 
the present, and future. Not everyone could feel the hope and great expectations of a 
restored, arising Russia. As one male interview concluded: ‚We have great scholars, 
great writers and great poets. We cannot elude history. But at present, we have 
nothing left.‛ (C142-M59)  
Putin figured in very many interviews as the hope of Russia and the provider 
of its new stability, which testifies to the success of the official discourse representing 
him precisely as such. But at the same time, many, semi-elite as well as ordinary 
people, expressed their fear that the stability was not to be depended on, that Russia 
could at any time be thrown into another period of turmoil and disaster – 
particularly after the next presidential elections. The retired physicisist, having 
criticized some aspects of Putin’s regime while still being very positive towards 
Putin himself claimed that it was ‚scary‛ to think about what would happen beyond 
2008. (C29-M71e*)  
Another interviewee, a female Russian Korean also used the word scary: ‚I 
even now consider, that nobody else should ever be put as head of the state. When 
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the term finishes and we must elect someone new – I don’t even know. I will vote for 
Putin, but that vote will not count. It is very unpleasant, because it is only now that 
Russia quietly begins to stand on her feet, and it is just scary – will there suddenly be 
someone who tears it down? Tearing down is easy, restoring very difficult.‛ (C121-
F43) One interviewee, a journalist for Nezavisimaya Gazeta, defined Russia as a 
peculiar society, always in transition. ‚She continues her existence in an empty space, 
having lost her foundations.‛ (C5-M26e, see also C28-F60e on the dangers of 
transition.) 
 
Counter narratives of Russia as temporal-social entity, and Russianness, defined by 
Orthodoxy and the related notions of religious superiority, abound, both among 
ordinary and semi-elite Russians. They include doubts about the sincerity of the 
majority of the Orthodox believers; and cynicism about the church, both its practices 
and links to the political leadership. A half Azerbaijani Russian described that ‚the 
majority of Russians go to church not for the sake of elevating their spirit with God 
or Christianity, but because it is fashionable. They smoke, drink, curse, rape, steal, 
and at the same time go with their family to church Saturday and Sunday. This is 
called hypocrisy, that’s it. *. . .+ The deception is bigger than the faith.‛ (C122-F45)  
Another paradox was raised by a sociologist who noted with disbelief the 
illogical intermingling of contemporary Orthodoxy with astrology and various New 
Age practices as well as the church’s readiness to bless cigarette and vodka factories 
(C15-M38e, see also C21-M42e). Many, contrary to the typical narrative outlined 
above, thus found the church itself rather lacking in strictness, as this prominent Old 
Believer priest: 
We consider that the official Church of the Moscow Patriarchate has inflicted 
monstrous losses to our spiritual potential, because just as the Eurasianism of 
Dugin takes the position of compromise with the Muslims, so is the position 
of the Moscow Patriarchate a position of compromise with the contemporary 
world. The are willing to turn a blind eye to everything; they are willing to 
forgive any vices and weaknesses of the society; they are willing to be led by 
the contemporary world, but they have completely lost the accuracy of the 
strict Orthodoxy that was 200-300 years ago – which is why we cannot say 
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that they preserve some kind of potential, that they make its preservation 
possible. No. (C6-M29e)   
Some claimed that Russia would fall behind the Muslim world in religious strictness: 
for example, on the question whether Russia’s spiritual potential is greater than other 
countries, a 76 year old male answered: ‚No. The Muslims outdo Russia. *. . .+ The 
Muslims have greater strength and more righteousness on their side.‛ (C160-M76). 
 
The previous chapter also discussed how ethno-centric and Orthodoxy-based 
discourses have become increasingly central not only to public but also official 
discourse, and this was noted by some interviewees such as this Jewish writer and 
editor who pessimistically viewed Orthodoxy as simply the state’s ersatz communist 
ideology and who also pointed to ethno-centric nationalism and xenophobia being 
closely related to this discourse:  
There was a period of religious spirituality, then there was the period of 
political spirituality, ideological. And now what happened? First the Church, 
then after the Church - Father God Lenin, then instead of Lenin - Father God 
Stalin, and the Party as the Holy Spirit. After that they drove out Lenin, drove 
out Stalin, drove out the Party, and there was nothing left. Society can’t stand a 
vacuum. A vacuum can’t exist. They try to drag up the Russian Orthodox 
Church again. And the fact that they at this stage so much are pulling out the 
Russian Orthodox Church also leads to the well-known slogan of England for 
the English, America for the Americans, Russia for Russians. And for the rest of 
us? We are living the past. (C30-M75e)    
This rather swift transition from communism to – a by some seen as superficial – 
Orthodoxy as state ideology was thus received rather cynically. As one man noted: 
‚Our leadership at present treats the question of faith artificially. It is amusing to 
watch the leadership, who used to beat their chests and consider themselves atheists, 
now take part in church ceremonies and similar. It is simply blasphemous, in my 
opinion.‛ (C142-M49) 
These interviewees belong to the groups that the state in the early years of 
Putin’s presidency was reaching out to through the official renunciation of grand 
ideology, imperialism and messianism, but who now clearly perceive the return of 
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ideology, only in a new shape. The many rejections of messianic and related 
discourses are thus testament precisely to their increasing prevalence in Russian 
society. 
 
6.5.0 Interpretation  
 
As described in the previous chapter, Neumann argues that in post-Soviet Russia the 
Westernizers eventually lost the battle for political power and Russian identity to the 
national-patriots, despite their material and institutional advantages, because ‚the 
nationalist representation came complete with references back to an unbroken and 
proud national history‛ (Neumann, 1999:169). Our interviews certainly reflected a 
longing for a coherent historical identity. 
We have shown that particularly semi-elite and post-Soviet Russians use 
narratives similar to those deployed in official and public discourse to describe and 
define their country, its past, present and future, contrary to the views of ordinary 
Soviet people who differed more internally and were often more critical and 
pessimistic about both past, present and future. If many semi-elite, and some post-
Soviet interviews reflected the more positive and historically coherent official 
construction of Russia – as derived from the state addresses – of 2004-2005 and 
onwards, the interviews with ordinary people as a whole, rather reflected the earlier 
official construction of Russia of 2000-2001, with its vagueness and general absence 
of signifiers of Russia and Russianness.  
Chapter Five outlined the messianic master narrative of an organic Russia, 
merging previously incommensurable discourses: ethno-centrism and 
multiculturalism, Communism and Orthodoxy, empire and nation, etc. This master 
narrative was reflected in the interviews, particularly among the post-Soviet 
generation and some semi-elite interviewees. As we have seen, it took the form of 
religious historical determinism, spiritual identity markers, and the contradictory 
rehabilitation of both Soviet Union and of Orthodoxy, exemplified by statements like 
‘God made it so that we had 70 years of communism’, ‘the Russian people have 
always been with God’, and in representations of a long, unbroken history of glory 
and greatness.  
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The presence of this type of profiles among young urban people can partially 
attributed to the then emerging ideological youth movements such as NASHI 
(founded in 2005) basing, as we saw in the previous chapter, their ideology on this 
common master narrative with strongly positive representations of Russia pitted 
against stark enemy representations.85 
 
While religious narratives were drawn upon by many interviewees, Orthodoxy does 
not form an unequivocally accepted model for Russian collective identity. We found 
that many commend and respect the Church, and testify to its popularity and greater 
spirituality than that of Western churches, but there is also a lot of cynicism about the 
church, and about the quick religious conversions by formerly atheist political 
leaders. We thus find some support for Verkhovsky’s argument that the Soviet, 
atheist upbringing both of those in power and the rest of the population, is one of the 
things that stop the state from fully adopting the church model as basis for Russian 
collective identity, despite its many advantages. (Verkhovsky, 2007:187-88)  
 
Another way of constructing a coherent historical identity was through defining 
different periods of Russian history in terms of being truly Russian, or false, with the 
either implicit or explicit linking of the West to the ‘un-Russian’ periods. A common 
representation was that of the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Westernising 
Yeltsin period (rather than as previously, the Soviet period itself) as the disruption to 
‘true’ Russia’s history 
We also noted how the quiet nostalgia for the Soviet past among the less 
ideologically enthusiastic Soviet generation also implicitly links to the core of the 
messianic framework of Russia-good, West-bad and the compensatory function of 
messianic discourse, with the narratives of a past when ‘all took care of one another’ 
and ‘there was no hatred’, the disappointment with the present where ‘it’s all about 
money, money, money’, and with the West – ‘in Western countries money always 
played the key role’ reflecting the traditional narratives of the Other with its negative 
values of materialism, secularism and individualism.  
 
                                                 
85 ‘NASHI Manifest<.’ 
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While there was a clear tendency among the semi-elite to construct a coherent 
historical identity for Russia by using messianic-related markers of identity, only 
traces of this tendency could be noted among ordinary people; there appeared still to 
be a widespread social fragmentation and lack of discursive tools with which to 
makes sense of the collapse of the previous order of things, reflected in very 
ambivalent, uncertain representations of past, present and future.  
On the whole, ordinary people are not quite sure of where Putin is taking them, 
apart from away from the 1990s. So, a disavowal of the Yeltsinite 1990s and, by 
extension, the West, and a gradual rehabilitation of the Soviet period function to 
unite many – but there is no vision of the future. As Prozorov argued in the previous 
chapter, this is inherent in early Putinism: through the evasion of ideology, Putinism 
becomes a ‘period of meaningless stability’. (Prozorov, 2008:222)  
In view of the perceived social disorder and lack of cohesion, we can 
understand not only the initial popularity of the Putinist striving for stability and 
social consensus as opposed to grand ideology (Prozorov, 2008), but also the uses of 
messianic and related discourse among ordinary Russians. As Catherine Merridale 
sums up: 
Russians have good reason to feel helpless in the face of spiralling and 
unpredictable inflation, organized crime, widespread corruption, and a long 
tradition of official disinformation. Rather than trying to control it all, many 
have given up, preferring escapist romance, including romantic versions of the 
past, as a counterbalance to their daily gloom. They do not trust their 
government, they do not understand their historians, and they are tired of 
dissecting their own souls. (Merridale, 2003:14) 
As we have seen, and which is further illustrated in the case studies in Appendix III, 
many messianic and related discourses resonate among ordinary Russians, but often 
in ways very different from in public discourse. Eurasia, for example, was a concept 
little known among ordinary people, but perceived positively in terms of its 
similarity with Soviet Russia, defined by many in terms of ‘unity’, ‘friendship’ and 
‘order’ – positive signifiers in a society many perceive as fragmented, with an 




In sum, while there are still many diverse and contradictory representations of 
Russia as a temporal-social entity – some defined, some vague; some reflecting 
official and public discourse, some critical of them; some hopeful, some pessimistic – 
among ordinary and semi-elite Russians, many of them are still somehow framed 
within the pervasive traditional messianic framework.   
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7.0.0 Russia and the World: Self and Other(s) 
 
‚I hate this Americanisation, all this stupidity. It is better to be oneself than to try to appear 
like someone else.‛ (C59-M18) 
 
‚She is right now stepping out as a powerful empire. Do you have a problem with that?‛ 
(C135-M43) 
 
‚The word ‘empire’ is somehow not completely clear for me, but the dominant role always has 
and always will be played by Russia.‛ (C20-M48e) 
 
‚The whole continent of Eurasia lies in Russia. This must all be united and some new product 




Chapter Two set out the basic theoretical premises for our study: that stories at all 
levels of discourse, often reproduced over a long time, about who ‘we’ are, and who 
‘we’ are not, i.e. competing narratives of a collective self, as well as stories about 
threats, dangers and enemies, function politically both as to construct the appearance 
of a cohesive collective identity; as well as to legitimise the existence and actions of 
the state claiming to represent this collective. In the case of Russia, we suggested that 
messianic discourse has predominantly filled these functions in Russian identity 
construction.  
 
The previous chapter explored some of the stories which define Russia as something 
in history, as a temporal-social entity. Based on the same sample of interviews with 
Moscow and St Petersburg semi-elite and ordinary Russians, this chapter will move 
to explore the stories which define Russia as something in political space, and 
legitimate it as state and international actor.  
There are numerous political dimensions to this subject and countless 
competing, complementing narratives of Russia as a spatial-political entity, and this 
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chapter will only cover some of the central themes which are most closely related to 
messianism: empire and ‘imperial ambitions’, the perennial question of Russia’s 
relation to and location between East and West, Eurasia, ‘the West’ as broad Other, 
and discourses of danger and enmity. These are all central signifiers to the spatial-
political dimension of Russian identity and are, as Chapter Five sought to 
demonstrate, inextricably linked to each another and to the overarching notion of a 
Russian special mission (osobaya missiya).  
We will explore if and how these narratives, central to public and also official 
discourse, resonate among ordinary and semi-elite people, and will seek to answer 
the following questions:  
o How do Russians today define Russia as a spatial-political entity, as 
something in space? Which images, narratives and metaphors do they use to 
describe and define their country as a state and international actor, and how 
do these relate to the representations of Russia as a temporal-social entity?  
o How do representations of Russia as an empire or with ‘imperial ambitions’ 
resonate among Russians? What aspects of empire are invoked, in what 
contexts? 
o How Russians define Russia’s civilisational belonging? How do they relate to 
the idea of Eurasia? And how do they conceive of the relation between Russia 
‘the West’ as broad Other – in terms of enmity or friendship, inferiority or 
superiority, normality or exceptionalism?  
o Which are the perceived dangers to and enemies of Russia, and how do these 
relate to danger and enmity representations in official and public discourse?  
o What is the function and role of messianic discourse (both as single 
narratives, such as ‘mission’, and the wider self-Other framework) drawn 
upon in the interviews in the context of Russian spatial-political identity? 
As in the previous chapter on temporal-social Russia, we find ambiguous, 
contradictory and kaleidoscopic representations of spatial-political Russia. The 
interviews strongly reflect the tension between exceptionalism and universalism 





7.2.0 Semi-elite Russians 
 
Among many of the semi-elite interviewees, there was a perception that something 
was changing for the better in Russia, that a kind of restoration from past 
humiliation was taking place. It was often (then) President Putin who was given 
credit for the change. ‚We don’t need one Putin, we need a hundred Putins!‛ a 
young business director exclaimed, and said with pathos that if Putin could find a 
way to run for a third term, he himself would vote for him again, whether or not this 
would be constitutional. (C3-M26e) Another category of interviewees were deeply 
pessimistic both about society, politics and Russia’s international role, comparing 
Russia’s role in the world to Zimbabwe, and will be examined in section 7.4.  
 
The previous chapter, analysing our interview material, argued that the 
representation of an ancient and cohesive Russian historical identity, with the fall of 
the Soviet Union (rather than the Soviet period) as its disruption is constructed to a 
significant extent through notions of continuity such as religiosity, culture, 
spirituality and tradition, as well as notions of empire and greatness, which define 
contemporary Russia as the successor both of the Tsarist and Soviet Empires.  
But empire not only defines Russia as something in history, but also as 
something in political space. In both these aspects, Russian discourses on empire 
closely relate to the messianic notion of a mission – as Chapter Four showed, in the 
historical Moscow Third Rome framework temporal-social Russia as a mighty 
empire must save or convert the world in one way or another, and as Chapter Five 
showed, in contemporary Russian political discourse, spatial-political Russia has a 
special mission (osobaya missiya) typically relating to Russia’s special geopolitical 
location.  
 
As for official discourse, Chapter Five also showed that while the concepts of empire 
and imperialism under Putin were still officially unacceptable as markers of Russian 
identity, greatness and great power status became legitimate early on, at least in 
2003-2004. Among the interviewees, the question on empire and imperial ambitions 
was received as perfectly natural and relevant, and on the whole, there was an 
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expectancy that Russia will be defined, or seek to be defined, as precisely an empire 
in political space. As the young female estate agent described: ‚Some kind of event is 
taking place *. . .+ it will lead to some kind of imperial form.‛ (C2-F26e) Of the semi-
elite interviewees, one out of 30 said that Russia already is an empire; 12 out of 30 
said they believe that Russia will step out internationally as a mighty empire, seven 
out of 30 said that it will be as a great power not empire; five of 30 said that Russia 
will attempt to step out as an empire but will fail; and only three of 30 said they 
believe Russia will decline imperial ambitions.  
 
Many expressed that they personally desired Russia to be treated as an empire or 
great power, and others testified to this tendency in society (e.g. C27-M58e and C13-
M36e). A typical example is a businessman from SPB who was certain that Russia 
would not decline any imperial ambitions, and explained why: ‚No, she will not 
decline, of course not. At present it is impossible without imperial ambitions, 
without defined military possibilities etcetera to talk about and claim anything at a 
world level. I am not saying that you have to step out in a position of active force, but 
if there is nothing behind you, you won’t be talked to, you won’t be taken as a 
serious state.‛ (C18-M39e)  
 
Precisely the desire to be taken seriously internationally was evident in many 
interviews, testifying to the importance of recognition by the West as Other for 
Russian identity. Some resented the use of the word ‘empire’, as the young owner of 
a Moscow PR-company quoted in the previous chapter, who argued vehemently that 
Russia would not seek to step out as an empire, and also that the idea of a mission is 
not the least popular in Russia. Nevertheless, asked why Putin might use the concept 
‘civilising mission on the Eurasian continent’, he explained the following:  
The thing is that Russia occupies a very specific location between Western 
Europe and China and is a bridge between the shores of these poles. She 
can counterbalance these sides, interact, and be a terrific mediator in 
disputes and solving conflicting situations. Then Russia is also the country 
which is richest in resources and potential in Eurasia, which means that she 
cannot but influence both Europe and Asia right up to India. There is 
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nothing surprising about this. *<+ Putin wanted to say that everything 
depends on Russia – fully rational thinking. *<+ Strong states don’t have a 
peaceful life, ever. (C7-M31e*) 
The image is very similar to Putin’s construction of Russia in the 2006 state address 
as a mature, responsible and reliable partner, a nuclear power, a peace-keeper with 
huge missions, both maintaining strategic stability (as ‚one of the most important 
guarantees of lasting peace‛) and ready to ‚settle local conflicts‛, taking an active 
part in the UN and being a safe-guarder of the supremacy of international law.  
On the whole, as is outlined in more detailed in the case study in Appendix 
III, the above interview was an epitome of the polyphonic Russian political 
discourse, touching here on several of its key contradictions: Russia doesn’t have a 
mission, nor is this idea popular, but everything depends on Russia (not the West), 
the mediator between West and East; Russia is not an empire but must influence all 
of Europe and most of Asia; Russia must be strong, powerful and rationally 
conceivable, taking a leading political and economic role on the Eurasian continent – 
yet also take on the task to be a spiritual and moral example to the world. (For the 
same type of argument in political discourse, see Kortunov, 1998a)  
 
The second interview, also available as case study, epitomising the tendency to draw 
on a number of contradictory, popular and often messianic discourses, was with the 
young pro-Western, anti-Putin business woman from Moscow, who also presented 
an image of Russia as having an important, peculiar political role as a benevolent 
empire: ‚Russia has always been an empire of territories that she united, always 
conquering her neighbours. And naturally, it never happens that one becomes great - 
like the lion, the king of the wild animals – without having special tasks and peculiar 
relations. Some are afraid of you, some love you, some are waiting for you to cleanse 
the savannah and some wait for you to take care of them.‛ (C8-F31e*)  
Later in the interview she argues however that Russia – despite always 
having been an empire – should deny the imperial ambitions but still ‚be very 
independent, with a clear structure – otherwise America will take over the whole 
world, if there is not some kind of opposition on our level.‛ These two interviews are 
examples of the tensions present in many interviews between conflicting 
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representations between traditional Russian ideals of statehood and modern Western 
ideals of what is acceptable or ‘normal’ among states.  
There was an awareness in many interviews that ‘imperial ambitions’ are 
perceived as negative according to the modern Western model (which is why many 
were quick to say that ‘we are a great power not an empire), yet the self-representation 
of Russia as having an imperial-messianic role (as world mediator, opposing 
America, peculiar Russia with special tasks, Russia on whom the whole world 
depends) had a very strong appeal. From the interviews, it appears that this is partly 
so as it is in this role Russia is perceived to be able to compete on more equal terms 
with the USA, as the state embodying ‘the West’ – the interviews held many 
comparisons between Russia and the USA. It should also be noted that the notion of 
empire was popular also among explicitly liberal and pro-Western interviewees, 
both semi-elite and ordinary, as various case studies in Appendix III exemplify. 
Implicit in these contradictions was the question (often made explicit by 
Putin) why America, and the West as a whole, can set out the norms for international 
society, and be quick to condemn perceived Russian imperial ambitions, yet show 
many of the characteristics of an empire, with a civilising mission itself. The tensions 
between representations of Russia as a state or spatial-political entity and Russia as a 
civilisation or temporal-social entity, present across the sample of semi-elite and 
ordinary interviewees, should therefore be partly understood through its relation of 
continued rivalry with America and ‘the West’ in general.  
 
Representative of a more Westernising positions among the semi-elite was 
the interview with Professor Tatyana Zonova, head of the diplomacy department at 
MGIMO, Moscow (C28-F60e*). She rejected for example the exceptionalist narratives 
of Russia as an empire, and as Eurasia, as being ‚anachronisms in the contemporary 
world‛ and damaging to Russia’s image, and yet embraced culturalist 
fundamentalism by representing Russia in terms of an ‚Eastern Christian 
civilizational model.‛ Throughout the interview there was a tension between on the 
one hand the celebration of cultural and civilisational specificity and on the other the 
adherence to civic diacritics, secularism and joint international ‘objective’ 
responsibilities. It strongly echoed official discourse, defined by these contradictions 
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between Russia as a ‘normal’ spatial-political entity and as a ‘particular’ temporal-
social entity. (For a useful discussion, see Tsygankov, 2005) 
 
As outlined previously, post-Soviet political discourse has been heavily dominated 
by Eurasianist ideologies, based firmly on this core dichotomy of Russia-good/West-
bad, and closely linked with the discourses on empire and civilisation: Russia is 
typically represented as having a global mission as the alternative to Atlanticism – an 
alternative world civilisation, the alternative model of statehood, even in some 
accounts, the alternative international system of states. (Laruelle, 2004, Shlapentokh, 
2007, Sokolenko, 1999:21) 
 But there are different variants, and Chapter Five outlined specific 
geopolitical representations of Russia as Eurasia: the isolationism of Russia as an 
‚island‛  which nevertheless argues for Russia’s ‚assimilation of the Eastern (trans-
Ural) regions‛; the exceptionalism of Russia as Eurasia with Russia as ‚the only one of 
its kind as a cultural-geopolitical Slavonic-Turkic complex, knit together with the 
system of the continental bordering areas, but also opposing them both for economic 
reasons as well as through its special spirituality‛; and the missionism of Russia as the 
main part of heartland, the core of Eurasia, with Russia as having a special role in being 
the key to global stability, ‚a Great Power, called to serve as a bridge between the 
East and the West.‛ (Kolosova, 2003:60-62)  
Often these variants are mixed together in mainstream political discourse, for 
example with various political parties and movements subscribing to the political 
vision of a four-axis alliance Moscow-Teheran-Delhi-Beijing justified by the social 
argument of Russia’s ‘harmony of cultures, peoples and religions.’ Among the semi-
elite, all these different variants of Eurasianism were brought up in different 
interviews, typically heavily overlapping with the discourses on Empire and Great 
Power, indicating a successful dissemination of mainstream political discourse into 
these strata of society.  
 
The idea of Eurasia in some form as constituting Russia’s main mission was 
advocated by a handful of the 30 semi-elite interviewees, compared to only a couple 
of the 130 ordinary interviewees. More broadly viewed, the mission could be 
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anything from taking care of small, dependent countries, being an example of 
harmonious multi-culturalism, standing against America and saving the world from 
globalisation to simply ‘being different’ – often articulated in terms of Eurasianism 
and Russia as being Eurasia (C1-F37e*, C9-M34e, C15-M38e, C29-F36e, C8-F31e*).   
 
Asked the age-old question of whether Russia is a Western or Eastern country, a 
whole 14 of the 30 semi-elite interviewees chose to define Russia as something 
different from both East and West (compared to five who said ‘Western’ – the 
remainder would not answer, were not sure or said ‘both’, and only ordinary 
Russians said ‘Eastern’.) Though not a majority view, it was recurrently expressed 
that ‘someone’ has to take on the task to counterbalance to, or compete with, the 
West: ‚As far as at present the most developing *as in progressive+ countries are 
located in Asia, and Russia can soon be counted to them, then together, having 
united, these countries will be able to overtake the leading countries.‛ (C25-M42e) 
Another interviewee, a businessman, hadn’t heard about the concept of Eurasia as 
such but thought the idea of Russia uniting with the ex-republics of the Soviet Union 
and with some Asian countries was possible; the question is just to find the right 
forms for it. (C18-M39e)  
Another interviewee explained: ‚We cannot at all relate to Europe, even 
though in Eurasia sixty percent of the population live there. I consider it to be a very 
big question.‛ (C20-M48e) The mainstream exceptionalist arguments of the organic 
complex of cultures and symbiosis between Russian, Turkic and Muslim worlds, and 
of Russia as a bridge between civilisations, surfaced in quite a few of the semi-elite 
interviews, including with interviewees that were cynical about other variants of 
Eurasianism (e.g. C30-M75e).  
 
In the interview with another owner of a PR-company, the idea of Eurasia as the 
main part of heartland, the bridge between the Eastern and Western civilizations was 
the key theme, but accompanied neither by the typical celebration of Russia’s 
spirituality, nor of praise for Putin’s regime. He explained Russia’s mission as 
follows: ‚I think that Russia can be a real bridge between the East and the West. This 
is according to its mentality, and because you Europeans apprehend of us as 
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Europeans; yet the Asian mentality is quite comprehensible to us: I bear in mind 
China, the Near East, Japan, Chorea etc. I find it rather easy to relate to Japanese 
colleagues, or Chinese.‛  
Later he described that ‚Russia is a multi-cultural and multi-confessional 
country, which is why it is rather easy for us to conduct negotiations with Muslim 
governments, because we have a Muslim community, which I believe is second only 
to the Christian Orthodox. Which is why our relations can be absolutely friendly and 
understandable.‛ He was however reluctant to discuss the West – asked about how 
he thinks Russia’s relations to the West will unfold he said that it depends on the 
personalities of politicians and from real political forces both there and here.  (C9-
M34e) Resonance of discourses on Eurasia are thus not necessarily linked to official 
discourse or the messianism in public discourse. 
 
Less pragmatic, more utopian Eurasia-based visions for Russian statecraft were also 
represented by a couple of semi-elite interviewees. The first one, a young, wealthy 
female estate agent, was quoted in the previous chapter. She based her apparently 
newfound ideas on a popular book series of fiction (Sokrovishcha Val’kirii by Sergey 
Alekseev), and likened the world to a magnet with two poles – the East and the West 
– explaining at length how every magnet is held together by a centre which acts as its 
neutraliser:  
I consider that it certainly is not logical, with the existence of a certain magnet 
where there is polarity between East and West, that there is an absence of 
middle, as is the case with the present magnet. There must be some kind of 
centre, which neutralises and holds the magnet together. To be honest, I was 
only recently acquainted to this idea; although I had thoughts [before] that 
there was something that did not add up. And the thought of Russia as of a 
third civilisation straight away filled this gap, and a number of historical 
events became clear to me. (C2-F26e)    
The world and its two poles believe they can do without the centre which 
Russia/Eurasia constitutes. But logically, the magnet will split without the centre.86 
                                                 
86 Similar narratives abound in public discourse. Here for example Serguei Oushakine quotes sociologist 
Subuetto: ‚‚As the Eurasian civilization, Russia is the center of world stability and instability. If the 
mondialist strategic plan to confederate Russsia were to succeed,<instability would settle here. The 
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The interviewee described how Russia/Eurasia as the centre of the magnet is subject 
to attempts by both poles, East and West, to make it forget ‘its own’ *rodnoe], to forget 
its spirituality and mission. The discourse implies that neither Asianism nor 
Europeanism is viable: both imply assimilation for Russia. As in the discourse Russia 
as an ‚island,‛ Russia must instead hold fast to ‘its own’, withstand the forces from 
the poles which do not comprehend that their own survival depends on the spiritual 
abilities of the centre they seek to subordinate, and isolate itself.  
It is interesting to note that the interviewee feels that these ideas have helped 
her understand various historical events - the transcendental concept Russia as a 
third civilisation thus appears here to answer both the spatial and the temporal 
questions of Russian identity (for a summary of these questions, see Tsygankov, 
2007:380).   
 
A more optimistic variant of the East/West spiritual dichotomy and Russia’s role 
within it was provided by the previously quoted businesswoman, one of those 
whose interview epitomised the polyphonic contemporary Russian messianic 
discourse. She managed to infuse the traditional Eurasianism with an ambitious 
messianic project:  
We have both the Eastern wisdom and the Western pragmatism, and such a 
desire to do business. These are necessary to combine, as the West is more 
practical and less spiritual. The East is too spiritual – they have forgotten 
about the material there and they are in poverty. I think it has been so 
destined, that Russia should unite both in her. She lies between the East and 
the West, between Europe and Asia – Eurasia. The whole continent of Eurasia 
lies in Russia. This must all be united and some new product given to the 
world. To competently convert all there is in the West and all there is in the 
East. And my sincere conviction is that we are able to do this. So that the 
world became united, and, sometime in the golden millennium of humanity, 
we got one world government. (C8-F31e*) 
                                                                                                                                            
West and the East would clash [. . .] A geopolitical havoc (smuta) of grand proportions is to happen, 
then.‛ To stop a potential worldwide catastrophe *. . .+ one needs to understand that the model of 




Russia as Eurasia is thus not just an unchanging feature of Russia’s energetic-
geographical position, but also a particular mission for a particular time. The 
previous extract (C2-F26e) stresses Russia-Eurasia’s particularism (Russia must 
retain its ‘own’), whereas this one stresses its universalism – which can pave the way 
for a united world government. In both extracts, Russia’s messianic Eurasian role is 
of global importance, but the latter interviewee, the businesswoman, argued that 
active engagement with both East and West, not isolationism, must be the way 
forward – preferably beginning with a unification with Europe.  
 
While the discourses on Russia as Eurasia did not resonate among all semi-elite 
interviewees, it nevertheless appeared that there is considerable support some 
aspects of Eurasianism. The appeal of Eurasianist discourses relate to the perennial 
question of Russia’s ambiguous relation to the West. The above quoted 
businesswoman’s optimism about Russia’s unifying world mission was not 
unambiguous – later on in the interview she revealed strong doubts about the 
desired unification: ‚I understand perfectly well that the world will never unite with 
Russia. Not in the nearest future. Because I cannot yet imagine that Europe would 
like to be together with Russia. Because Europe is so much smaller than Russia [. . .] 
Europe would feel very small in comparison to such a large territory as Russia.‛ (C8-
F31e*) Russia as an international actor was in this interview partially constructed as 
large, spiritual, having a lot to offer to the world, wanting even to unite the world 
and especially be friends with Europe, but is misunderstood by the world and scares 
away Europe by its sheer size.  
 
We must note that ‘the West’, etc, was also in the interviews – as in public discourse 
– used ambiguously, to loosely represent both America and Europe, sometimes 
together (often as in a wider sense a civilisation and value-system), but also 
sometimes as distinct from one another. Since the rise of the United States there has 
of course been two ‘Wests’, and on the whole in official and public discourse, Russia 
wants to compete with one and be close to the other: to rival America in size and 
power, and as a civilisation, but be part of Europe and European culture (for a useful 
discussion, see Gvosdev, 2007:134-36). Various aspects of the contradictory notion of 
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the West are illustrated further in the case studies, from the distinction between 
Europe and America, to the extremist amalgamation of globalisation, Americanism 
and zionisation.   
Another, more sophisticated than in C8-F31e*, but similarly ambiguous 
representation of Russia’s relation to Europe was given in the interview with a 
young, prominent Old Believer priest from Moscow: 
Europe does not want Russia to become part of her, which is why the 
relations will unfold with difficulties. You see, it is like an adopted child in 
the family. The parents took an alien child to bring up at their home. Maybe 
[the child] wants them to love him, maybe he wants to become completely 
theirs – but there is a certain barrier that hinders this from taking place. [. . .] 
Russia is trying; and the parents kind of smack her hands to keep her off - 
which is why the relations will be difficult. If Europe does not catch the fact 
that Russia is just as European as her<you understand? *. . .+ Europe loves 
Russian artists, and Russian ballet. So all we have that is European, Europe 
loves, but she does not count us to be part of her, see? And when Turks will 
walk the streets of Stockholm and Swedes will hide so as not to be killed – 
then they will finally understand what a mistake they made rejecting Russia 
as a friend because Russia is historically a buffer between East and West. One 
should not ignore this buffer or despise it, spitting on it, it will be really bad. 
(C6-M29e) 
The use of family analogues to define Russia’s relation to Europe is common practice 
in the Russian tradition – for the Slavophiles, Russia was the cousin from the 
countryside, ‘just a bit broader in the beam. The idea of Russia as a rejected child that 
grows up into a resentful, problematic teenager corresponds well to contemporary 
Western media representations of Russia as a rebellious or at least unpredictable 
state in the international system. 87  
There is also a relation here to the perennial representation of Russia as 
always being in transition, always young, always just about to become ‘normal’, a 
                                                 
87 For example Tony Halpin (2007) ‘President Putin rattles nuclear sabre at Nato’, The Times, 2007-11-27, 




democracy, just having joined the West. The discourse on Europe and the West 
continued in the following way in this interview:  
Globalisation is the standard of European thinking that after the war came 
also to us in Russia. It is of course very dangerous to Russia, it destroys our 
roots. *. . .+ In a few years time we will be turned into Americans that don’t 
speak English. It will be a horrible catastrophe     [. . .] If you don’t want to 
one day wake up in a faceless country where all speak English, where the 
Vikings are forgotten, where the runes are forgotten, where Astrid Lindgren 
is forgotten, where they watch cartoons with Mickey Mouse and chew 
chewing-gum; then all should unite against this. It is horrific, all should fight 
against it. (C6-M29e) 
As can be seen, these two interviews exemplify the ambiguity of the relation to ‘the 
Wests’. In the businesswoman’s account, similar to much of public and official 
discourse, Russia would like to – but cannot – unite with Europe, yet must oppose 
America. In the priest’s account, there are furthermore different Europes – 
globalisation as ‚the standard of European thinking‛ is defined as the main threat to 
Russia’s civilisational existence, yet Russia is defined (but simply not recognised) as 
‘just as European as Europe’. There is also again the tension between the 
representations of Russia as normal, or European as Europe, and Russia as 
exceptional, the buffer between East and West. As the priest implicitly warned not to 
spit upon Russia-the-sacrificial-historical-buffer, the businesswoman too hinted at a 
darker side of the otherwise so benevolent Russia, warning that ‚if the Russian bear 
wakes up, it will be bad for all.‛ (C8-F31e*)  
 
Chapter Five noted how globalisation now holds a central position in the traditional 
framework of Russia-good/West, as the common signifier of all evil, the anti-thesis of 
spirituality and Russianness (see e.g.Troitskii, 2002:14), and many of these interviews 
support our view that globalisation as a signifier is useful precisely because of its 
ambiguity: it can be used both with and without the face of a specific state. In 
representations of Russia as a civilisation, not only a state, globalisation, rather than a 
specific state, functions effectively as a threat or enemy against which Russian 




For example the young female estate agent in C2-F26e, who discussed Russia as a 
third civilisation, considered globalisation to be a definite threat to Russia, twice 
using the word strashno (terrifying) when relating to it. In total, 10 of the 30 semi-elite 
interviewees said they consider globalisation to be dangerous to Russia (a further 7 
said it depends). Among these generally highly educated people, globalisation’s 
threat to Russian culture, civilisation and economy was typically discussed at length, 
as in C6-M29e above, using the more moderate narratives available in public 
discourse (i.e. not the radicalist discourses involving the Antichrist).  
But globalisation was not perceived to be the main danger to Russia. When 
asked the broader question to say what or who poses the greatest danger to Russia, 
only one of 30 picked something related to globalisation. Four out of 30 picked 
corruption, rulers or bureaucrats; another four terrorism or Islam; and 11 said, often 
without any hesitation, that Russia itself or the Russians themselves poses the 
greatest danger to Russia. This will be discussed in section 7.4 of this chapter. 
 
In sum, we find that the ambiguous uses among many semi-elite Russians of the 
notion of ‘the West’ – representing Europe, America and globalisation – in many 
respects are similar to those in public discourse, and go hand in hand with the 
equally ambiguous representations of Russia as both normal and exceptional. 
 
7.3.0 Ordinary Russians 
 
How do ordinary Russians today define Russia as a spatial-political entity? Our 
interview material suggests that dreams of restoring Russia as an empire unite 
Russians from very different strata of society: from elite to ordinary people, from the 
educated to unskilled labourers, from old to young generations.  
Not all ordinary interviewees longed for Russia to step out as a mighty 
empire – but many did, and there was a clear sense that this would serve as a 
compensation for the humiliation of losing the Cold war, and the low status of 
Russia in the first post-Soviet decade. Well over half of the Russians interviewed in 
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our study believed that Russia either is an empire or will step out to be an empire or 
great power, as is shown in the table below.  
 
“Will Russia become a mighty empire on the international arena or give up its 





Russia is already an empire 
Yes, Russia become an empire 
Will become a great power, not empire 
Russia will keep imperial ambitions but won’t make it 
Will decline/has already declined imperial ambitions 
Not sure 
     
        5%     
      40% 
        8% 
      14%   
      17% 
      13%                          
 
Believing that Russia objectively will become an empire doesn’t automatically mean 
supporting or desiring that. However, in the interviews a large number of ordinary 
Russians, including young and educated people clearly expressed their desire for 
Russia to become a mighty empire.  
Similarly, as Chapter One noted, an opinion poll from 2003 asking 1600 
Russians if they would ‚like to see Russia first and foremost a great power, respected and 
feared by other countries, or a country with a high standard of living, even if not one of the 
strongest countries in the world?‛, showed 54% stating they preferred high standard of 
living to great power status, and 43% who would prefer Russia to be a great power, 
respected and feared. (New Russia Barometer XII, 2003) One many holding this view 
of our interviewees was a sociology student, with liberal views, from a wealthy 
family: ‚I would really, really like that – Russia to be a mighty empire. And I’m sure 
those in authority really want that as well. Because it would allow that mission, of 
which we are speaking, to be formulated, and it would be clearer to people what 
they are able to do. Pride is a sin according to the Bible, but pride is a very serious 
motive for action – one must only keep feeding it all the time.‛ (C83-M21*,  C95-M26 
also similar)  
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The interviewee argued that the idea of a mission would bring purpose to the 
Russian people so that they would know their function in society. As in public 
discourse, empire often goes hand in hand like this with the idea of a mission. 
Around 1/5 of all interviewees believe both that Russia has a mission and that it will 
step out as an empire. The mission is a broad notion and can encompass anything 
from survival of the nation to Saviour narratives, as in the extract from the interview 
with retired female Communist Party worker: 
 Russia certainly has to be a powerful empire because if not then other 
countries will simply crush us. I mean Germany, America and the rest. Being 
a powerful empire is an absolute necessity. When the mighty Soviet Union 
existed the US didn’t meddle in other countries affairs and wage wars. And 
now we have changed, disarmed, and allowed others to come and look here 
and there88 – here you go: Iraq. There were no nuclear weapons there, but 
they destroyed it. And how do the people live there now? If only Russia were 
stronger, like before, then the Americans would never have touched Iraq. 
(C156-F60)   
As among some of the semi-elite, an image of a benevolent protector-empire 
emerges: Russia, as the Soviet Union during the Cold War, needs to be empire to be 
able to protect vulnerable states from American hegemony.  
Among the ordinary interviewees, it was common for pensioners to talk 
about how Russia is always there to help other countries. A man in his sixties, 
defending the legacy of the Soviet Union, concluded that ‚at the end of the day, were 
it not for the Soviet Union, then fascism would not have been defeated worldwide, 
and this is not just German fascism *<+ But most importantly, both Asia and Africa 
would still be in the cage of colonialism.‛ (C151-M60) Here Russia’s role of a saviour 
is extended from just saving Europe from fascism to liberating the dependent world 
from colonialism, a theme typically recurring in pan-Slavist writings. (See for 
example Troitskii, 2002:96-99)  
 
                                                 
88 It refers to a change of policy for foreign visitors: before they were restricted as to what they could and 
could not visit on the territory of USSR. Now foreigners not only travel freely, but delegations of foreign 
officers visit the Russian military bases. All this is considered a weakness by many Russians.   
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Though a longing for the restoration of empire (and, as the previous chapter showed, 
in many cases the Soviet Union) could be discerned among a significant part of both 
the semi-elite and ordinary interviewees, there was a certain difference between the 
two categories as to which aspects of empire they related to. Asked what unites the 
different peoples in Russia of different nationalities, religions and cultures; many 
more ordinary than semi-elite interviewees would claim economic factors such as 
‘money’, ‘work’ or even ‘poverty’, as opposed to cultural or historical factors, as well 
as more than ten percent stating  ‘nothing at all’.  
 
The idea of empire among ordinary people appears then to resonate more strongly in 
its international aspects (with missionist discourses of saving Europe or the world, 
etc) than in its domestic aspects, whereas semi-elite interviewees often invoked 
Eurasianist arguments about Russia’s long-standing multicultural realities.  
 
The ambiguity of Russia’s civilisational belonging and relation to ‘the West’ was 
evident across the whole interviewee sample. This was noted for example in 
attitudes towards Ukraine – the so-called Orange revolution had taken place only 
months prior to the interviews, and a large part of the ordinary interviewees felt very 
negatively about Ukraine’s ‚turning away from Russia to the West.‛ But there was 
also a longing to know how the Russian self was reflected in the Other: ‚How do 
they perceive of us there in the West?‛ many asked their ‘Western’ interviewer.  
 
The common distinction, discussed in the previous section, between Europe and 
America, with Europe much more positively represented that America, was evident, 
but for some, ‘the West’ undoubtedly meant Europe but not America; whereas for 
others it was the other way round; and for some it was both Europe and America 
and even including Japan. And as to what Russia herself is – Western, Eastern, 
Eurasian, or something different – there was, as ever, even less agreement. Asked 
whether Russia is an eastern or western country, the largest group, around 35% of 
the total sample, perceived Russia to be western, or becoming more western; around 
28% that Russia is just ‘Russia’ – neither eastern nor western, ‘Eurasia’, or a ‘northern 
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country’; 18% that it is an eastern country; and 15% that she is part eastern, part 
western.  
As an 80-year old female explained: ‚As far as I see it, we still do not 
understand who we are: Europe or Asia. It seems like it has not been settled yet, we 
can’t say who we are.‛ (C159-F80) Another Soviet female interviewee explained: ‚We 
are not the West. It is this spirituality, soul, that hinders us from being the rational 
West. And some kind of constraint of ours hinders us from being Asians. We are 
neither.‛ (C155-F67) Despite, or perhaps because of the uncertainty of Russia’s 
civilisational belonging, there was at this time (2005) a relatively limited resonance of 
discourses on Eurasia among the ordinary interviewees, especially in comparison 
with the semi-elite. 
 
Have you heard anything about the concept of Eurasia?   
















Has heard about Eurasia  
Has heard little or nothing 
about Eurasia 
Generally positive 
towards the idea* 




     42% 
     58% 
 
     25% 
 
     15% 
     25% 
     32%  
 
     32% 
     68% 
 
     22% 
 
     18% 
     16% 
     44% 
 
     52% 
     48% 
 
     30% 
 
     13% 
     35% 
     23% 
 
     77% 
     23% 
 
     30% 
 
     26% 
     30% 
     15%  
 
* Interviewees who said they had heard little or nothing about the concept were given the following 
outline: ‚The idea basically suggests that there is a special civilization – Eurasia – between East and 
West. Eurasia is not only a continent, but also a harmonic unity of the former Soviet republics in which 
Russia is the centre. Possibly, this includes some Islamic countries and some Asian countries. What do 




As can be seen in Table 7-1, there was little awareness among ordinary people, 
particularly the younger generation, even of the concept of Eurasia. Many thought it 
referred to unification between Russia and Europe. Of others who were positive to 
the idea of Eurasia, and specified why, many talked about how good it was when all 
were together. Unity/disunity was a constantly recurring binary opposition in the 
discourses of both young and old: ‘it was better when we were all together,’ ‘nobody 
wants to unite anymore’ and similar expressions were repeated in many interviews. 
If Europe won’t unite with Russia, Eurasia is the second best option, seemed to be a 
conclusion to draw among many ordinary interviewees. Unsurprisingly, those that 
had heard about the idea of Eurasia were typically people with higher education, 
and they would often mention Gumilev, Trubetskoy and the early Eurasianists.  
Around 14% of all respondents equalled Russia with Eurasia, and they 
typically drew on the traditional narratives of the historical mix of European and 
Asian values; Russia as the bridge between Asia and Europe; and variants of the 
East-Spiritual/West-material dichotomy. As for the latter, it was not always with 
East-good/West-bad connotations typical of public discourse: for example one 
interviewee explained that when he sees anything rational or progressive, he 
associates it with Europe, and when there is some craziness of some sort, or 
something destructive, like the disregard for human life, he emotionally associates it 
with the Asiatic. (C107-M38) It is possible that this negative variant of the East/West 
dichotomy is part of the explanation for much of the negative or irresolute attitudes, 
with fears of isolationism from Europe, and the desire to be European.  
 
As can be seen above, when presented with the idea of Russia as a third civilisation 
in alliance with Eastern countries, the vast majority did not know what to say. 
Similarly, the conception of Eurasia as a harmony of cultures and peoples appeared 
to have a fairly small resonance among the ordinary interviewees.  
Answering the question ‚Russia is a multi-national country where peoples of 
different cultures, religions and traditions coexist. What, in your opinion, unites 
them all?‛ around 10% said that nothing whatsoever unites them and another 10% 
did not know at all. Only 4% mentioned some kind of Eurasian or spiritual idea and 
another 7% gave answers like ‘patriotism’, ‘love’, ‘humanity’ or ‘friendship’. Most 
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people (30%) answered ‘territory’, ‘statehood’, ‘Russia’, ‘Russian language’ or ‘life 
here’.  
A certain number of post-Soviet Russians were however positive towards 
these ideas of Eurasia. For example, a 26-year old optician (C95-M26*) had not heard 
anything about the concept as such, but when presented with the idea of ‘a 
harmonious unity between the former Soviet republics with Russia as centre, 
possibly also with some Islamic countries and some other Asian countries in union 
with Russia’ was most positive about it. Russia is neither Eastern nor Western, he 
stated, and expressed hope that Russia will one day become an empire. ‚The state, 
situated on the other side of the ocean‛ posed the greatest danger to Russia in his 
opinion. Here he used the word protivopolozhniy, ‘contrary’ or ‘opposite’ which in 
Russian conveys a meaning of polarity and negativity. Cold war imagery was 
evoked of two states facing each other, diametrically opposed. (East-West)  
When asked, later, what relations would be desirable with the West for 
Russia he answers with the formal ‚I struggle to answer.‛ He was not representative 
of the majority of young Russians in our sample, but of the significant group who 
desire for Russia to become an empire, are interested in the general ideas of Eurasia 
and want Russia to rival the West.  
Another interviewee of the same age group, a computer programmer, 
explained: ‚As far as I understand, at the moment there are active negotiations with 
China and India, and a large triangle [troika] of the three most powerful Eastern 
states is being organised. The three together form a very important power, which can 
stand against the US and Europe.‛ When asked if this would be desirable for Russia, 
he says: ‚Yes, undoubtedly. You have to make friends with somebody *nado s kem to 
druzhit’+‛ (C70-M27*) Again: if the West doesn’t want to accept Russia, Russia will 
find other friends. Interestingly, only post-Soviet interviewees considered ‘America’ 
or ‘the US’ as the greatest danger to Russia at present.
89 This is notable as it could 
have been expected that more Soviet interviewees would cling on to a Cold War 
framework with the US as the main threat, not the younger generation.  
But several young people embraced various Cold War discourses; for 
example a 19-year old male who affirmed that Russia has a mission and that it 
                                                 
89 11 interviewees out of 160 in total: C37-F19, C44-M18, C54-F17, C65-M18, C67-F18, C77-M21, C80-F20, 
C86-F24, C95-M26, C97-M23, C103-M28. 
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consists in Cold War, as ‚in the world there ought to be parity. There can’t be one 
country that leads and commands – someone needs to restrain it.‛ (C48-M19). Later 
he added that Russia together with the EU should restrain America. A 15-year old 
male claimed that Russia can become a mighty empire as ‚we have our cool [krutye] 
rockets, which leave the Americans quiet, and we can show Bush our fists.‛ (C63-
M15)  
Yet another young male, an 18-year old from Moscow, stated that America 
poses the greatest danger to Russia today, thought that Russia should oppose the 
West; also believed that Russia has a mission - ‚so that there was peace everywhere‛ 
- and affirmed that Russia will be a mighty empire. (C65-M18)  
 
As we have emphasised, the United States as a state is only one incarnation of ‘the 
West’ as Russia’s negative Other. This broad signifier also incorporates globalisation 
and internal Others such as the Jews and at times even other ethnic minorities in 
public discourse. As among the semi-elite, globalisation as a discourse of danger 
resonated strongly among the post-Soviet respondents. 35% of them considered 
globalisation to be dangerous to Russia, and of these, many showed, like many 
among the semi-elite, that they equal globalisation to Americanisation.  
One 18-year old female explained that the danger lies in that many young 
people dream of living somewhere in the West or in America and that she disagrees 
with these dreams; a 15-year old male said he sees a great danger in that people 
forget about Russian culture, and that Moscow is like a real Los Angeles with Mc 
Donald’s everywhere. An 18-year old male from St Petersburg: ‚I hate this 
Americanisation, all this stupidity. It is better to be oneself than to try to appear like 
someone else.‛ Quite a few explained that they do not fear the economic aspects 
globalisation at all as much as the ideological war they perceive globalisation really 
is about. (Similar cases were C31-M18*, C39-M19, C68-F22)  
 
The radical danger representation of ‘the West’ from national-patriot discourse as 
‘the Judeo-American Anti-Rome’ was only marginally represented in the interviews. 
A handful of interviewees explained how Russia’s problems are due to the Jews 
being in power and having all the money. A 76-year old male concluded: ‚To cut it 
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short: there are too many Jews in power. Putin could be a Jew too; he can’t do 
anything against them. All power is with the Jews and the money as well.‛ (C160-
M76) When asked about the levels of anti-Semitism in Russia, a male teenager 
replied: ‚I am actually very worried about it, and I think it is something we don’t 
need. The Jews have become very numerous in Moscow; they are in the leadership 
and everywhere.‛ (C64-M15) Lastly, a 55-year old male lawyer of Caucasian origin 
stated that with ‚Zionism as the founding politics of this state, Russia is doomed to 
fail.‛ Asked to define Zionism, he explained: 
It is when a handful of Jews acquire all wealth, though the population 
consists of other nationalities as well. Without giving anything in exchange, 
they collect everything for themselves and create for themselves a separate 
state – what we just talked about – globalisation. This means the establishment 
of international forces, the establishment of political forces, international 
banks from which they will control and increase in the name of this their 
Zionist, Jewish nightmare. (C147-M55*)    
He went on to explain that Russia fears the Muslim factor not because of her own 
fear, but because of the fear of those Zionists who take the capital and thereby create 
so called conflicts between Muslims, Orthodox and other confessions. This further 
reflects the radical neo-Eurasian view of the Jews as an anti-people, which here 
disturb the Eurasian harmony between Orthodox and Muslims. 
 
Many interviewees perceived that anti-Semitism has risen over the last years. 
Protestant leader Riakhovsky described the scape-goating of the Jews common in 
Russian discourse: 
Who has plundered Russia? The Jews. And all this is cultivated and 
propagated in the press, in mass media, that the Jews have plundered Russia, 
that Putin, or Yeltsin, was put by their governors and so on. The politics in 
Russia, unfortunately, is very immoral, and the corruption and infinity of 
bureaucracy has already reached its peak. I believe that if the president 
doesn’t do something soon<people cannot go on like this. Nothing is done 
without bribes, such corruption. And the Jews are very successful, they are 
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intelligent, they are artists, writers singers; and then it is asked: ‘Who is to 
blame?’ (kto vinovat). The Jews. (C26-M49e) 
Not only anti-Semitism appears to be rising among Russians, but also general racism 
and Islamophobia (Karpov, 2007), and this is consistent with the persistent official 
production of terrorism as a main danger to Russia. Among ordinary people, this 
danger construction has been relatively successful: 19% of all interviewees 
considered terrorism, Islam, or the two conflated, as Russia’s greatest danger.  
 
In sum, resonating the messianic framework of Russian public discourse were the 
mainly semi-elite and post-Soviet interviewees who perceived of globalisation as 
being dangerous to Russia and Russian identity, and the small group of people who 
perceived ‘the West’, ‘America’ or ‘the Jews’ as Russia’s enemy; and resonating both 
official and public discourse were the large group of people seeing terrorism and/or 
Islam as Russia’s main threat. But, quite contrary to their glorious, messianic and 
Anti-Western role of Russia in much of unofficial discourse, the most central danger 
representation in the interviews came from within, as the next section will show.  
 
7.4.0 The Other side 
 
Answers to the open question ‘What or who poses the greatest danger to Russia at 
present’were quite evenly spread between men and women, and over generations, 
especially in most popular answer. According to 21% of the interviewees, it is neither 
the West, nor the Jews nor globalisation that poses the greatest danger to Russia. 
Rather it is Russia itself, or the Russians themselves – answers were literally and 
unhesitantly given in these terms (the 21% excludes answers of ‘corruption’ or 
‘bureaucracy’. Terrorism, the Muslim world and Islamic fundamentalism came next 
with 19%.) The fact that 1 out of 5 respondents (1 of 3 of the elite interviewees) see 
the country itself or the own countrymen as the main danger to the country (and that 
they tell a foreigner this) is remarkable.  
This takes even further the rift between ordinary people and the political elite 
that Piirainen noted in his study. He found that, in general, ordinary Russians do not 
share the strong anti-Westernism of the right-wing elite nor subscribe to the right-
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wing theories of a ‚global struggle between ‘Eurasianist’ and ‘Atlantist’ forces‛. ‚The 
antagonists – the corrupt bankers and politicians – are more likely to be found inside 
Russia instead of being powerful and aggressive outer enemies.‛ (Piirainen, 
2000:192)  
In 2005, the enemy is not only found inside Russia – it is Russia itself. So side 
by side there is an increasingly stronger political discourse in which Russia is the 
solution for the world, and an increasing tendency among the population to see 
Russia as a threat to itself. Russia is indeed, as many pointed out in the interviews, a 
country of stark contrasts.  
In for example one semi-elite interview, with the female manager of one of 
Russia’s major marketing agencies, two very different Russia’s emerged. On the one 
hand was the true Russia, strong, beautiful, helping others (e.g. taking care of 
ungrateful republics) with loads of potential, on the other, was a very conflict-ridden 
country of lazy Russians and corrupt politicians, its own greatest enemy. This 
appears a new variation on the traditional Russian distinction between the state, 
embodied in the ruler, and the nation, constituting the Russian people in symbiosis 
with the soil and the land. (C1-F36e*)  
Dichotomies of this kind are useful in that they provide at the same time an 
explanatory locus for all kinds of negative conditions and happenings of the country 
– ‘it’s the fault of this bad regime’ – and a locus for positive self-representation, e.g. 
in ‘the suppressed Russian nation’. But few interviewees elaborated on why they see 
Russia as its own greatest danger. Of those that did was a young female student who 
explained her answer by describing post-Soviet Russia as an empty room from which 
one could drag away anything, and now this room is being crammed with quick 
things, with no room for reflection. Because there has been no reflective moment in 
this period, Russia now poses a danger to herself, as it is incomprehensible where 
Russia is going. (C102-F22) Another interviewee, a Soviet male, explained his answer 
in the following way: 
Russia herself poses the greatest danger to herself, in my opinion. Russia still 
has not learnt to speak openly about the things that are bad here. In Russia, if 
someone gains power, he considers that he finally somehow has become tsar. 
There is probably a strong remembrance of monarchism in Russia. Each of 
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them becomes tsar. And each who stands nearby, and further down, and 
further down<they all want to become tsars. And therefore, when they get 
there, they reckon that they can receive everything from this country that is 
due. (C21-M42e) 
Part of the mentality described here are, in a sense, Russia’s ‘imperial ambitions’, an 
expression well known in Russia today, which also had its counter-discourse. The rift 
between the ruling powers (often described as in the quote above as corrupt and 
power-hungry), and the people was illustrated by the fact that many, 14% in total, 
predicted that Russia will not let go of imperial ambitions, yet they will come to 
nothing. As this ex-diplomat explained: ‚Russia, with her current politicians, will 
attempt to preserve the imperial way in the international relations with other 
countries, but economic weakness and the greed of the ruling politico-financial 
group are leaving little room for this‛ (C27-M58e).  
Similarly, a Jewish editor argued that Russia lags behind too much 
economically to yet again become a superpower: ‚Russia is no longer a superpower, 
even though some in the leadership, in the establishment would very much want it 
to be. But that’s impossible. It doesn’t matter that we have nuclear arms, because it is 
not about weapons but about economic power. (C17-M39e)  
Another female Jewish journalist described: ‚So we will shake our fists but 
our bottom will be naked.‛ (C23-F41e) In Western media from 2006 and onwards, 
similar pictures have been painted, of Russia as a rebellious teenager (obviously 
dependent on the parents but refusing to admit it), and, as we noted, of Putin as 
engaged in empty ‘sabre-rattling’ to please the masses at home.90 Indeed, many of 
these interviewees noted the popularity of empire discourses around them:  
Russia is no longer an empire, and neither will she become an empire for 
many, many years, in my opinion. But she will not refrain from imperial 
ambitions in the nearest future. Because people think somehow, that Russia is 
the strongest, mightiest country. They just think so, but it’s nothing like that 
in reality. (C21-M42e) 
Similarly, many explicitly pro-Western interviewees, noted a growing anti-
Westernism such as this editor predicting Russo-Western relations: ‚I hope that they 
                                                 
90 Halpin (2007) ‘President Putin rattles nuclear sabre at Nato’, 
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will be revived in a positive direction and that there will be no confrontation. 
Although at the same time I can see that very many people desire precisely 
confrontation.‛ (C17-M39e) (Among these he mentioned certain parts of the 
Orthodox leadership.) Of these interviewees, discussing Eurasia and empire, many 
jokingly said they had not heard about Eurasia but were familiar with Aziopa 
(‘Asiope’). Tatyana Zonova, head of diplomacy at MGIMO is another of the few 
contemporary ‚Westernisers‛ who did not support the imperial ambitions: 
I hope that she will decline the imperial ambitions, because, to begin with, the 
very imperial structure itself is an anachronism in the contemporary world, 
and one country cannot today become an Empire, as the world is so 
interdependent and the processes are becoming global, where there are so 
many different actors; and even such a powerful state as the US, I believe, is 
not on its own capable of dealing with all problems existing in the 
contemporary world. [. . .] As for Russia – it is complete nonsense. It is a 
country which is in a difficult enough economic situation, unstable, and has 
complex relationships with all former USSR republics that it has borders 
with. What empire are we speaking about here? (C28-F60e*)  
Several interviewees expressed the wish that Russia should decline its fruitless 
imperial ambitions, its greed, and seek to become an ‘ordinary country’ (many gave 
Norway as an example) instead, as this Soviet female: ‚I would like, regardless of 
whether she is Eastern or Western, that she were a state that is not only powerful but 
also just, that she created [good] conditions for people, for every person, not just for 
those who have money or power. That Russia strived towards and arrived at this. I 
hope.‛ (C121-F43) Another interviewee, a Soviet male explained that if ‚people 
didn’t fill their pockets with goods, money and useful contacts, if they only thought 
about the country, then everything would happen a lot faster.‛ (C142-M59) A young 
male journalist expressed similar hopes (‘I think people deserve to live well, receive 
pensions and so on’) and wanted Russia to abandon exceptionalism and embrace the 
(western) universalism:  
I consider globalisation to be Russia’s salvation. By yielding to globalisation, 
she becomes stronger. She becomes more competitive, and comes at last 
closer to the world’s life standards. The quicker Russia forfeits her specifics, 
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the better off people in Russia will be. I wholly and fully support 
globalisation and am ready to be its agent; to produce globalisation in life: to 
walk around and tell people: ‚Drink Coca-Cola!‛ I am not joking. (C5-M26e, 
also C19-M37e) 
Another pessimistic yet hopeful interviewee, in his time a leading physicist, 
predicted that Russia will decline its imperial ambitions and that the question today 
is rather whether Russia will remain in the number of leading states of the world or 
glide down to the third or fourth line of the most ‚left over‛ states. 91  Yet, he 
countered later with some optimism: ‚The very worst has past. Of course, there are 
still many difficulties. [. . .] But it will rise up – I am an optimist. And believe! If we 




How do Russians today define Russia as a spatial-political entity, as something in 
space? Was there a resonance among the Russian interviewees of the images from 
public national-patriot discourse of the messianic empire of Eurasia? And how can 
we summarise the function and role of messianic discourse in the interviews in the 
context of Russian spatial-political identity? We have seen how a few of the semi-
elite interviewees speaking about Russia as Eurasia used representations very similar 
to those in public discourse, but how among the majority of the ordinary 
interviewees, messianic ideas of Russia as Eurasia were little known and on the 
whole not very popular.  
However, many both ordinary and semi-elite interviewees drew messianic-
relating images of Russia as (mainly) benevolent protector-empire, with a mission to 
protect vulnerable states from American hegemony and from globalisation; and 
there was on the whole strong longing for the restoration of empire. The interviews 
reinforced the notion that messianic discourse representing Russia as having a 
special geopolitical role and mission functions as a sort of psychological 
compensation for the humiliating breakup of Soviet Union and the rapid erosion of 
                                                 
91 Another interviewee, a male teenager, also defined Russia, twice, as ‚backward‛ (otstalaya), choosing 




its real geopolitical status, giving in Bassin’s words the false hope that ‚Russia would 
regain the status of a great power without special efforts, on the basis of its 
geographical position alone.‛ (Bassin, 2006:112) This compensatory function 
reiterates our basic theoretical assumption that identity is relational and defined in 
difference, i.e. self versus Other, and that messianic discourse is based on a 
radicalised self-Other framework where the Other is ‘the West’ defined broadly. 
And, as one interviewee succinctly noted, the function of the idea of a mission for 
Russia as an empire would precisely ‘to bring purpose to the Russian people so that 
they would know their function in society’ (C83-M21*).  
This again reiterates our basic tenet that messianic discourse can be 
understood as a form of story-telling particular to multicultural states – such as 
Russia and the United States – with complex social and geo-cultural conditions 
where more traditional identity markers such as ethnicity fail to unify the population 
and create a sense of collective identity. And, as discourses of danger and Otherness 
are central to identity construction and state legitimacy, it is not surprising that just 
as the vague, faceless yet demonised enemy in the ‘War on Terror’ functions as an 
effective Other for the United States, so does the vague, faceless but radicalised 
construction of ‘globalisation’ for Russia, represented as a civilisation – as this 
chapter noted, this discourse of danger resonated strongly among both post-Soviet 
and semi-elite interviewees, alongside with terrorism and Islam. On the whole, as in 
the previous chapter, views resonating the messianic framework from public 
discourse tended to come from post-Soviet and semi-elite interviewees rather than 
Soviet, ordinary interviewees.  
 
How do the representations of Russia as a spatial-political entity relate to those of it 
as temporal-social entity? Tsygankov has stated that ‚until Russia knows what it is 
and until it clearly defines its post-Soviet values, it cannot successfully pose, let alone 
solve, the question of its larger civilisational identification.‛ (Tsygankov, 2007:380) 
And yet, judging from the interviews, Russian spatial-political identity in some 
senses is more defined than its temporal-social identity – the longing, across the 
sample, for the restoration of Russian empire or great power status in the world 
appeared much more unifying than for example the popular but somewhat uncertain 
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temporal-social identity marker in Orthodoxy. Of course, the temporal-social and 
spatial-political cannot be divorced from one another – the emerging representations 
in Chapter Six of a long, unbroken Russian history of glory and greatness, together 
with the rehabilitation of the Soviet Union are very much connected to Russia’s 
geopolitical role and international status – but the concern with empire and Russia’s 
international status simply seemed stronger and more deeply anchored, despite 
distinct counter discourses.  
And yet, ambiguity and contradictions are central also to the spatial-political 
representations of Russian identity. Across the sample of interviewees, recurring in 
many different questions, was a tension between on the one hand, traditional, 
exceptionalist Russian ideals of statehood, and on the other, modern Western ideals 
of what is acceptable or ‚normal‛ among states, reflecting the central dilemma for 
Russian identity outlined in the previous chapter of ‚how to reconnect with its 
European roots while remaining a distinctive cultural entity‛ (Tsygankov, 2007:380); 
and what can be referred to as Russia’s oscillation between messianic hubris and 
utter dejection. In some sense we can actually understand this tension as being 
between the temporal-social identity, defined by particularity, and the spatial-
political, a dimension mainly governed by Western universalistic norms of 
statehood.  
This tension was particularly evident in the questions of Russian empire. 
While many expressed a longing for restoration of empire, there was a clear 
awareness that ‚imperial ambitions‛ are perceived as negative according to the 
modern Western model, leading many to say that ‘we are a great power not an empire’. 
And interviewees from the ‘the Other side’ saw imperial and messianic ambitions, in 
some senses like Putin as he appears in the Annual Addresses, as the main obstacle 
to Russia’s modernisation, represented as the prerequisite for ‘real’ great power 
status.  
But the question is not solely a choice between on the one hand a Russian 
model, presumably defined by exceptionalism and empire, and on the other a 
Western model, defined by universalism and modernity. Much of the ambiguity of 
Russian contemporary identity and relation to the West as Other stems from the 
contradictions in American identity, defined both by empire and exceptionalism on 
232 
 
the one hand, and universalism in the model it exports globally on the other. (There 
were even in the interviews many comparisons between Russia and America, and 
some implicit questions of why America or the West can set out the norms for 
international society, and be quick to condemn perceived Russian imperial 
ambitions, yet show many of the characteristics of an empire itself.)  We argued in 
previous chapters that Russian messianism cannot be understood apart from 
Western messianisms, and discussing the West and Russia’s role in the world with 
Russians, this notion was reinforced.  
To use analogies offered by interviewees, Russia wants to be accepted in 
international society (defined by Western universalism) – like an alien, adopted child 
– and therefore agrees to reject imperial and messianic ambitions. But at the same 
time Russia constantly compares itself with America, with its imperial role, mission, 
messianic Manifest Destiny and civilisational model, and thus produces new and 
reproduces old versions of itself as having an alternative world leading role, mission 
and sometimes even civilisational model. 92   Many interviewees thus wavered 
precisely between wanting Russia fit in political space as a ‘normal’ state, and to 
compete with America in its different roles. The tensions between representations of 
Russia as a state or spatial-political entity and Russia as a civilisation or temporal-
social entity, present across the sample of semi-elite and ordinary interviewees, 
should therefore be partly understood through its ambiguous relation with America 
(and the West in general).  
 
Our perhaps most notable finding was these starkly contradictory representations of 
Russia within single interviews, which clearly reflects the same phenomenon in both 
official and public discourse. While Russia is great, becoming stronger and more 
powerful, there is also looming sense of danger from within, as the country itself, 
and the Russians themselves, are seen to pose its/their own greatest danger. These 
contradictory self-representations flow together in an almost schizophrenic way, 
testament to the relative success respectively failure of Russian statehood.  
 
                                                 
92
 See the Shevtsova‟s chapter „Russia and the United States: In search of a new paradign‟ for a 




8.0.0 Russia as Messianic 
 
In fact people in Russia constantly talk about spirituality indeed and strive to formulate a so 
called Russian national idea – and this idea is a spiritual one. But somehow it is something 
difficult to formulate, its pursuit results in nothing.  (C26-M49e) 
  
‚Everyone says that some kind of spirituality is hidden in the depths of our consciousness, I 
don’t know.‛ (C148-F57)  
 
‚It is clear that there are two nations chosen by God: the Jews and the Russians. That’s what 




The previous two chapters have highlighted Russians’ use of discourses related to 
the messianic framework in the contexts of Russian temporal-social identity (e.g. the 
rehabilitation of Orthodoxy, of the Soviet Union and glory and greatness) and 
spatial-political identity (e.g. empire, discourses of danger and the East-West 
question). But do ordinary Russians actually embrace and use explicitly messianic 
discourses? Or is this done only, as our introductory chapter asked, by intellectuals 
living, so to speak, in a world of their own, detached from everyday Russian life? We 
seek to find out if messianic discourses resonate at all among ordinary (and semi-
elite) Russians, and if so, what their relation to them is, and how their messianic 
representations converge with and diverge from those in public and official 
discourse.  
 
Chapter Five noted how the overtly messianic narratives sometimes appear to 
transcend core contradictions of Russian collective identity: between Russia as social, 
historical entity and as a geopolitical entity; between Russia as particularistic, an 
empire and/or civilisation and as ‘normal’ or universal, in the Westernised sense of the 
word, a modern state and international actor. Chapters Six and Seven pointed to 
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these and other contradictory representations of Russia being present in many 
individual interviews with ordinary and semi-elite Russians.  
 
This chapter will explore the manifestations and resonance among ordinary and 
semi-elite Russians of the explicitly messianic narratives deployed in Russian public 
and official discourse, compared to public and official discourse; and seek to explore 
further how messianic representations among Russians function in relation to the 
temporal-social and spatial-political aspects and other contradictions of Russian 
identity. We endeavour to seek to answer the following questions for this specific 
chapter:  
o How, if at all, do Russians today define Russia as a messianic entity, as 
something beyond time and space, and themselves as a messianic people?  
o In which ways and how strongly do explicitly messianic notions and discourses 
such as Russian spirituality, faith, exceptionalism, mission, sacrifice and suffering 
resonate among Russians today? 
o How do messianic representations among Russians relate to, and function in 
relation to, the temporal-social and spatial-political aspects of Russian identity?  
o What do the findings in the interviews tell us about contemporary Russian 
messianism?  
We find the same pattern as in the previous chapters: the messianic-related 
discourses which abound in public discourse and are present in official discourse 
resonate among many both semi-elite and ordinary Russians, but with much more 
varied evaluations. The messianism which appears radical, clear and dichotomised 
in national-patriot public discourse is generally vague and ambiguous among 
ordinary people. 
 
8.2.0 Semi-elite Russians 
 
As has been evident in the previous two chapters, messianic-related notions had 
strong resonance among many of the semi-elite interviewees – more than among 
ordinary people. This was so also for some of the explicitly messianic notions and 
discourses, which appeared as central to many semi-elite Russians’ understanding of 
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themselves and their country, even though their deployment often was different 
from in public discourse. One interviewee, a journalist, explained that messianic 
narratives are popular among the Russian intelligentsia (to which many of our semi-
elite interviewees belong) because of a common self-identification with a peculiar, 
exceptional Russia: ‚That is, they consider themselves to be Russia itself, to which 
refers the phrase ‚The Russia that we lost‛, the Russia that somewhere in the depths, 
in the villages, has been preserved. But it is not so.‛ (C5-M26e) In the interviews, we 
used a widely known verse from a poem as basis to explore Russian exceptionalism 
(the first question in each interview, apart from personal details), and further on also 
asked interviewees to define what makes a Russian Russian.93 
 
Tyutchev writes:   
Russia cannot be understood with the mind, 
Nor can she be measured with the ordinary yardstick. 
There is in her special stature: 
You can only believe in Russia.94 
 
Do you agree with this expression? 
 
Fedor Tyutchev’s (1803-1873) poem is so well known that it has become a cliché – the 
Russian advertisements for Slavyanskaya Vodka in 2005, the year of the interviews, 
read ‚Russia cannot be understood with the mind – but one can give it a try.‛95 But 
even as a cliché – or perhaps because of it – the lines have powerful ideological 
content. ‚I believe in Russia‛ was the title of on of Communist party leader 
Zyuganov’s key books (1995). Tyutchev’s famous verse is powerful because it 
epitomises the exceptionalism of Russian messianism, and Russia’s relation to the 
West: Russia cannot be understood by the [rational] mind [but by the heart and soul], 
                                                 
93 Chto, po vashemu, delaet russkogo russkim?  
94 Umom Rossiyu ne ponyat’ 
Arshinom obshchim ne izmerit’ 
U nei osobennaya stat’ –   
V Rossiio mozhno tol’ko verit’ 
 
95 Umom Rossiyu ne ponyat’ – a mozhno poprobovat.’ 
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nor can she be measured by the ordinary [Western] yardstick.96 It reproduces the 
stereotypical yet powerful representation of the West or Europe as rational, 
organised, soul-less and the norm; and Russia as mystical, spiritual, and different, even 
somehow as an object of religious worship.  
As such, it served as a useful springboard from which interviewees, both 
semi-elite and ordinary people often talked at length about their perceptions of their 
country, of the West as Other, and of their identity. As one interviewee summarised, 
‚this is the epitome of our culture, our national culture, which cannot be easily 
understood.‛ (C27-M58e) 
 
Of the semi-elite interviewees, 18 out of 30 agreed with the lines. Their messianic 
claims resonated strongly for example with the businesswoman quoted in the 
previous two chapters who responded to them with a long monologue in which she 
managed to include the majority of the most typical messianic narratives: Russia as 
ordained by God; Russia as a special empire, with missions and responsibilities, 
taking care of the world and of the weaker nations; Russia as Eurasia, and the East-
West dichotomy with the East as spiritual and the West as material yet Russia 
overcoming it by uniting both, even uniting the whole world; Russia suffering 
sacrificially for others; and the Russian soul. (C8-F31e*) The sheer concentration and 
intermingling of messianic discourse in this monologue – by a businesswoman, not 
an intellectual – was very similar to the merging of overlapping and contradictory 
messianic narratives which is taking place in public discourse, and which evidently 
had begun to be disseminated in popular discourse.  
 
A for the interviews more typical example among the semi-elite was the sales 
manager of a tobacco company, who agreed with Tyutchev’s lines and said that it is 
certainly very difficult for non-Russians to understand Russia, as life in Russia is not 
‚schematic‛ and explained that: ‚Russia is developing without laws, which is to say 
without defined mechanisms of development. But she still develops somehow.‛ 
(C21-M42e) This is a Russia which defies the norm, with success. A similar response 
                                                 
96 As Groys argues, Russian philosophy and thought has seen as its calling to restrict Western 




came from a businessman who illustrated the extremes, both the irritant and the 
awesome, of Russia’s exceptionalism:    
Because the simplest decisions or simplest tasks are in Russia frequently 
solved in incredibly complicated ways, where it could be done so easily. And 
on the other hand, impossible things, which are practically unrealistic to 
achieve, these take place in Russia. So of our exploits we have<turning 
Siberian rivers to run the opposite way, well you have to stumble on some 
serious idea to do that; or fly to outer space – there are many things on a 
similar level. So, we have difficulties solving simple tasks, in my reasoning, 
but solving difficult tasks we probably do better than everyone else. (C18-
M39e) 
These extremes hark back long in Russian discourse, from Gogol’s depiction of the 
incomprehensible Russian bureaucracy to Fedorov’s plans to literally resurrect the 
dead. As previous chapters have made clear, the customary self/Other dichotomy 
with Russia as the exception and the West as the norm was evident in most 
interviews, particularly so in the answers to the questions on Tyutchev and 
Russianness.  
The difference between interviewees lay primarily in how they related to the 
West – the traditional Russian dilemma. For many, being different from the West and 
other countries was perceived as a positive attribute. One interviewee, a business 
director, chose to define Russianness explicitly by difference from Others, by 
‚knowledge of Russian traditions and not striving towards imitating some other 
countries, and a corresponding way of life: Russians have more spirituality and are 
more attentive to what surrounds them.‛ The same interviewee also believed that 
Russia is both a source and example of spirituality to the rest of the world; that it is 
possible that Russia’s spiritual potential is greater than other countries’ thanks to the 
Russian Orthodox Church; and that Russia has a mission, which – again – consists in 
‚not becoming like the rest of the world.‛ (C25-M42e)  
And also, dissimilar to the many grand claims of this Russian exceptionalism 
in public discourse, many interviewees provided their own, much less positive, 
interpretation of it. An ex-diplomat of the Soviet Union linked the exceptionalism to 
the suffering of the Russian people: ‚Yes I agree. The particularity of Russia lies in 
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her tragic fate, in the poverty of the people to the background of great riches, in the 
survival of the wide, free Russian soul under the conditions of the harshest 
despotism and centuries of serfdom.‛ (C27-M58e) Another, a female Jewish 
evangelical pastor, also agreed: ‚It is certainly the case that one cannot understand 
what is going on in Russia. It is a peculiar country, with a peculiar path, and all our 
hope is just for one thing: that the Lord will deal with all that goes on here.‛ (C24-
F47e)  
But as is evident here, even the more critical, negative representations of 
Russian exceptionalism contain different elements of Russian messianism: the notion 
of the suffering of an enslaved people with a wide, free soul, and a hope that God 
will intervene in Russia. The idea of Russia as being different and exceptional thus 
appeared as central to the self-understanding of most of the semi-elite interviewees, 
even though it did not always have the same positive and grand connotations as in 
public discourse.  
 
As Chapter Four showed, Russian exceptionalism has traditionally been closely 
related to the elusive notion of Russian spirituality, and spirituality likewise 
appeared as central to the self-understanding of many of the semi-elite interviewees: 
a whole eight out of 30 defined Russianness explicitly in terms of spirituality or 
faith.97 Notions of spirituality, and of spirituality as defining Russianness, were not 
only invoked by those who consider themselves to be religious.  
One semi-elite interviewee, a cinematographer, explained that while he 
considers himself to be an atheist, not a believer, he is still a spiritual person and 
holds that those who are religious ought to be supported, ‚because one of the first 
things is spirituality for a Russian person – if through this the general climate in the 
country is improved, then I consider that to be useful.‛ (C20-M48e) The sales 
manager of a tobacco company, who noted that it is very hard to find a spiritual 
person among Russian church-goers, provided a very reflective discussion on 
spirituality based on the conventional East/West dichotomy: 
[T]here is spirituality in the West and from the point of view of a Western 
person it is a high spirituality. To me it seems more like higher morals. And 
                                                 
97 Cases C3-M26e, C6-M29e, C8-F31e, C20-M48e, C21-M42e C25-M42e, C26-M49e, C27-M58e. 
239 
 
in Russia, spirituality<It seems to us that we are very spiritual people, that 
we are not pragmatists, that we think according to the heart, according to the 
soul. It is possible that it is just terminology – I don’t know, it is hard for me 
to say. Generally speaking, intellectual Russian people consider themselves to 
be spiritual, and that their spirituality is rather higher than that of a Western 
person. It’s harder to compare with the East. Historically we assess it this 
way: the East, it seems to me, has the greatest spirituality. Russia is 
something intermediate between the West and the East. The West is 
mentality, it’s reason, it’s mind. Probably something like that. (C21-M42e)  
Some interviewees acknowledging the stereotypical status of Russian messianism 
typically disagreed strongly with it; but some, as this interviewee (see also e.g. C70-
M27* in Appendix III), neither rejected nor fully embraced the messianic discourse 
discussed, holding both a certain distance both from it and from the Russian 
collective represented, using expressions like ‚it seems to us that we are very 
spiritual‛ and reflecting, in Prozorov’s apt words, ‚slightly sympathetic scepticism‛ 
(2008:227). 
 
The discourse on Russian spirituality has both traditionally and in contemporary 
Russia incorporated a ‘spiritual mission’ or a mission to be spiritual – as we have 
seen, since the Slavophiles, a dominant mission narrative has been for the backward 
but spiritually superior Russia to lead the modern, materialistic and decadent Europe 
to spiritual redemption. Archbishop Chaplin in Moscow, often interviewed and cited 
as a spokesman of the Patriarchate, dwelt at length in the interview on the world’s 
need for the spiritual Russia and on the Russian mission:   
The world overall does not understand that it needs a source of spirituality. 
So far Europe considers that she lives well and that she will always live like 
that. On the other hand, both the economic contradictions, the social 
contradictions and much of what goes on around us in the sphere of 
international relations – the challenge of Islam – permit us to think that the 
stable and peaceful life in Europe will not be for ever, not even continuous. It 
is possible that many eyes, in the search of spiritual and fundamental ideals, 
will be turned towards Russia then. Already now many separate people are 
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drawn here: intellectuals, believers and others. I believe that the West is still 
to understand that it needs spiritual influence. (C14-M37e) 
Again we see the theme of Russia as the source of spirituality being misunderstood 
by Europe/the West which does not recognise its urgent need of Russia’s spiritual 
influence (also outlined by C6-M29e). The idea of Russia as the protector of Europe 
from Islam also recurred in other interviews with Orthodox clergy and believers, 
often with explicit reference to the Mongol Yoke and the notion of Russia as Europe’s 
sacrificial Saviour. Chaplin like many other interviewees made explicit the 
stereotypical Russia-spiritual/West-material dichotomy which defines the Russian 
messianic framework: 
I think that this mission above all is spiritual – to be a source of spiritual 
energy, to be a source of spiritual outburst in the life of many nations. This 
mission, in my opinion, is rather more important than military, political and 
similar tendencies, which relate only to the earthly world and to pragmatic 
interests. At the end of the day, it is not the pragmatic interests that define the 
interests of the world today. The conflicts that are going on are conflicts of 
ideas.  Of course, they are related to oil, to geopolitics and to military 
influence, but there is no way they would be so serious were it not for their 
being conflicts of ideas. On the other hand, of course, this spiritual mission 
must be inflamed in us. Russia will perish if she becomes a machine to 
produce money and goods, even more so oil and gas. It is very hard for a 
Russian to live without higher purposes: be it mastering outer space, saving 
Africa, establishing a just world order, or something of the kind. (C14-M37e) 
Similarly, the businesswoman quoted previously stated that the ‚greatest danger to 
Russia *. . .+ is to forget one’s roots and be oriented towards the material alone *. . .+ it 
is dangerous to forget about spirituality.‛
98 (C8-F31e*) So Russia as a messianic entity 
must take prevalence over Russia as a material, pragmatic geopolitical entity. In 
other words, if Russia becomes like the West she will perish. As the business director 
quoted previously explained, Russia has a mission not to become ‚like the rest of the 
world.‛ (C25-M42e)  
                                                 
98 The same interviewee, elaborating on spirituality, described a balance between the cosmic world and 
the material world which is upheld by Russia alone, because of the [undefined] qualities endowed upon 
her by nature. Together with reviving its spirituality and allowing others to be drawn towards these 
peculiar spiritual gifts, this is what Russia’s mission consists in.  
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This obviously is quite contrary to the much of official discourse which 
repeatedly has represented as a main danger to Russia not a decreasing spirituality, 
but rather its failure to efficiently produce money and goods.99 But Russia as a 
spiritual, messianic entity still needs the pragmatic state to be able to fulfil certain 
missions: mastering outer space, saving Africa, establishing a just world order. 
 Archbishop Chaplin during the course of the interview explicitly talked 
about the Russian state as the historical bearer of a distinct mission, developed in 
relation to other centres of political power (the Golden Horde and the West) and 
religious power (Byzantium); at the same time as defining Russianness by the search 
for a higher mission which must supersede the pragmatic state. Having a higher 
mission thus appears at times as something which, at least in theory, joins spiritual, 
temporal-social Russia and its people with the state as a spatial-political entity.  
 
8.3.0 Ordinary Russians 
 
A vast majority of the ordinary interviewees - 74% - answered that they agree with 
the expressions of the Tyutchev’s famous verse (a whole 84% of all teenagers); and 
their various responses suggest that despite the cliché like status of the verse, notions 
of exceptionalism form part of ordinary people’s self-understanding. Some, typically 
post-Soviet interviewees, stating things like: ‚Russia is large, and nobody 
understands what is going on in it‛ (C57-F17) related Russia’s incomprehensibility 
and uniqueness to its vast territory; others to its position between East and West, 
mixture of diverse peoples and mentalities, describing it as ‚a country of contrasts‛ 
(C75-F22), often using the traditional Eurasia narrative: ‚You also have to consider 
that Russia is located on the border between Europe and Asia, and she is both one 
and the other. This is why she is difficult to understand. One has to find this balance, 
probably.‛ (C101-M22)  
Another young male student explained that he agreed with Tyutchev 
‚because Russia is a civilisation, that is, we are located between West and East. 
                                                 
99 ‚The economic weakness of Russia continues to be another serious problem. The growing gap 
between leading nations and Russia pushes us towards becoming a third world country. The figures of 
current economic growth should not be any cause for comfort: we continue to live in conditions of 
progressing economic lag.‛ (Putin, Annual Address, 2000) 
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Therefore we do neither fall under the Western value system, nor under the Eastern 
value system. So all our history, our whole development went in zigzags‛. (C100-
M20) Again we see the views of younger interviewees being more similar to those of 
the semi-elite, more strongly resonating messianic-related discourses than ordinary 
interviewees of the Soviet generation.  
 
And conventional variants of the Russia/West self/Other opposition – such as soul 
versus reason and spirituality versus materialism – were deployed by many very 
different interviewees across the sample in response to Tyutchev’s verse: ‚We don’t 
get things through the head, but through another place.‛ (C59-M18) ‚Well yes, you 
can’t understand us Russians. The soul is wide, Russians make decisions not with the 
mind but with the soul.‛ (C113-F38) ‚Because we all still live by emotions, not by 
reason. A Russian person, as far as I know, lives without any good sense. For us, the 
emotional is the main thing, emotions rule over reason.‛ (C105-F29) ‚Well yes, 
Russia can’t be understood with the mind. *. . .+ I am very patriotic, and I think, that 
in our people we have that spirit that Americans cannot understand.‛ (C63-M15) 
‚We are not the West. It is this spirituality, soul, that hinders us from being the 
rational West.‛ (C155-F67)  
 
But while the exceptionalism of the Russia/West self/Other opposition resonated 
very strongly among ordinary people, it was often with variations from the 
traditional narratives, with much more ambiguity than among the semi-elite and in 
public discourse – for individual case studies, see Appendix III. Many referred to 
poor Russian living conditions and the inefficiency and incomprehensibility of its 
state system and structures. One young female student affirmed: ‚Well, the Russian 
people are definitely uncommon compared to America. The Americans work, work 
and work to get money to live a good life, while the Russians also work, but live 
badly all the same, and it’s incomprehensible why that is. *<+ Yet the Russians live, 
and don’t want to leave, because somehow it’s still Russia, one’s own.‛ (C82-F20)  
A middle-aged man in the same way described Russia as ‚an irrational 
country as opposed to the Western world. The Western world is pragmatic. There 
people trust that if you work hard, you will have success in life. In this country it is 
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somehow not like that.‛ (C124-M47) (See section 6.4 for more examples of 
exceptionalism defined negatively.) Many defined the positive characteristics of an 
open Russian soul, hospitality and generosity as the positive side of the coin of the 
negative incomprehensibility of the state (also e.g. C27-M58e among semi-elite).  
 
For good or for bad, Russia is distinct from the West through its soul and spirituality; 
and precisely this spirituality as a vague but overarching identity marker recurs in 
and ties together most messianic discourses. It is a cliché insofar as many Russians 
acknowledged the prevalence of this discourse but distanced themselves from it – see 
the next section – but a large number of Russians also drew upon this discourse, 
reproducing it and sometimes transforming it.  
 
Answering the question ‚What makes a Russian Russian?‛ 15% of the ordinary 
interviewees answered literally in the terms of ‘spirituality’, ‘soul’ or ‘faith’ (18% if 
we include ‘Orthodoxy’ among the answers). This was considerably less than among 
the semi-elite, with the figure of 27% (33% with ‘Orthodoxy’) and reiterates our 
notion that messianic discourse is more strongly resonant among the semi-elite or 
intelligentsia – but is still notably high.  
Similarly, of those that believe that Russia has a mission (28% of the whole 
sample, 31% of ordinary people), 1 in 4 specified that the mission consists in 
spirituality – being spiritual, making the world more spiritual, which shows that the 
representations from semi-elite cases quoted above of Russia’s higher spiritual 
mission are not completely uncommon among ordinary people.  
In what ways did ordinary people resonate narratives of this spirituality? As 
among the semi-elite, notions of spirituality were not necessarily linked to religion 
and the Orthodox Church, and often explicitly distinguished there from. A male 
teenager, one of many saying the same thing, explained: ‚I do not consider that it is 
particularly thanks to the Russian Orthodox Church *that Russia’s spiritual potential 
is greater than that of other countries], it seems to me that there is inherent to Russia 
itself, that people here are more spiritual than in other countries. But this does not 
depend on religion but is something inherent.‛ (C31-M18*)  
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The engineer and aspiring astrologist, quoted above, said similarly that ‚in 
any of our people, even of the most hopeless cases, you find a drop of our 
spirituality. And the right relation to religion in anyone.‛ (C119-M45) Russians, by 
virtue of their being Russian, born in Russia, are thus represented as being naturally 
endowed with this mystical spirituality. Sometimes this connoted the historical 
messianic idea of Russia as the God-bearing nation (narod Bogonoset’), outlined in 
Chapter Four, as with a female lorry driver claiming that ‚faith was born only with 
Russia‛ (C161-F37)100; and a young male student who concluded, tongue in cheek: 
‚It is clear that there are two nations chosen by God: the Jews and the Russians. 
That’s what they say. *. . .+ There are people who believe in the so-called Russian 
idea, in Russia’s special mission.‛ (C100-M20)  
On the whole, Russian spirituality and messianism among ordinary people 
were typically present in exceptionalist, particularistic variants: Russians are different 
because they are spiritual, and have a mission to be so.  
But grander, universalistic variants of messianism were also reflected among 
some ordinary people, both directly and indirectly. Indirectly, as one post-Soviet 
male interviewee noting that ‚there exists this assumption that Russia ought to save 
the world and make it more spiritual‛ (C70-M27); and directly as and an 
unemployed builder affirming that in Russia ‚you find people whom God has 
chosen, through whom God will save the whole world. [. . .] Here there still is a 
spiritual channel, from which one can draw revelations from God and bring to other 
countries and help other countries.‛ (C138-M40)  
Another interviewee, a female pensioner and ex-Communist party member 
quoted above agreed that Russia has a mission towards the rest of the world, and 
provided an interesting response: ‚First there was the socialist *revolution+, now 
with time these revolutions will take place in other countries, including America; and 
we will do something more spiritual, and later all the others will follow us.‛ (C156-
F64) Russia as a messianic entity is here represented as a universal model– not the 
sacred, isolationist, suffering Holy Russia, but the strong Third Rome, the leader 
whom the whole world must follow. Historical mission after mission is completed – 
and yet here too spirituality is next on the agenda. This example reinforces how the 
                                                 
100 This interview was aborted half-way through and has not been counted in the statistics. 
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temporal-social and spatial-political aspects of Russian collective identity sometimes 
are fused through the messianic discourse of a historical world mission relating to 
spirituality.  
 
Closely related to the questions of a Russian mission are long-standing notions of 
sacrifice, suffering and patriotism, and these echoed among many of our ordinary 
interviewees, in various contexts – very often in relation to the Great Fatherland War 
and Russia’s general history of sufferings and hardships. Russia as a country was 
often described as sacrificial in the interviews, and its people too were often defined 
by their patriotism and readiness to sacrifice, as these examples, on male and one 
female Soviet interviewee, indicate: ‚I consider that a true Russian doesn’t think 
twice about giving his life for his Motherland.‛ (C142-M59) 
Surely we have got a mission, certainly. Do you know what it is about? It is a 
spiritual, orthodox one. [. . .] A man is ready to sacrifice his life, to defend his 
children, his country, his Motherland. For example he can fall on an enemy 
machine gun to block it in order to give a chance to comrades in arms to 
break through and to achieve a victory – as people did in times of the Civil 
war. A Russian man is ready to sacrifice his life for the sake of something, 
and in such a case he has no fear of death at all. (C161-F37) 
Apart from patriotism, sacrifice was also referred to in more general terms. What 
cannot be ‘understood by the mind’ – such as, described above, Russians’ low living 
standards in comparison with the West despite their hard work, – can be justified 
through the sacrificial mission, or Saviour, narrative. As described by a female 
pensioner from Moscow: ‚There is *a mission+, but for some reason all other peoples, 
it seems to us old people, hate us. But why? You know, our government always 
helps everyone; our pensions are low, maybe, because of this, but there you go.‛ 
(C157-F65*)  
From another generation, two male teenagers described that ‚Russia is the 
most generous country, always seeks to help people in catastrophes and all that‛ 
(C53-M18) and ‚someone always depended on Russia; she was always needed by 
someone.‛ (C53-M17*) Russia always helps others, and her people pay the price both 
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materially for it – low pensions etc – and emotionally, as ‘all other peoples’ are 
ungrateful and hate them.  
This type of narrative – ‘we are behind but only because we saved Europe 
from the Mongols/ Napoleon’ or ‘we are suffering but because we are building world 
Communism/ saving the world from fascism’ thus still serves among many ordinary 
people as an explanation for Russia’s perceived backwardness compared to the West, 
and for the many miseries the country has undergone. 101   
 
8.4.0 The Other side 
 
The above sections suggest that there is a strong resonance of messianic discourses 
among semi-elite and ordinary people: spirituality, exceptionalism, missionism, 
sacrifice and suffering appear as central to the self-understanding of many Russians. 
However, it must be noted that not everyone agrees with the various messianic 
narratives – in fact, many strongly disagree with them, people from all levels of 
society, people who are, in Merridale’s apt words, ‛tired of dissecting their own 
souls.‛ (2003:14) Yet, their responses are testament to the popularity precisely of the 
messianic discourses. A young manual labourer put it succinctly: ‚I’d say that half of 
all Russians think that Russia has a special mission, but in reality it’s just nonsense.‛ 
(C84-M27) A 40-year old female French teacher elaborated on the same theme: 
How much did we not want, how much did we not say, that we have some 
particularly spiritual roots (which, possibly, even exist), yet at this moment 
Russia is not any source of spirituality. My view will contradict the view of 
the vast majority of people, because the vast majority consider that we are 
terribly spiritual *<+ They will tell you, that Russia is a special country, and 
our task is to conquer America. It is like that at all levels [of society].  
(C125-F42) 
We find in this single quote alone explicit references to both spirituality (‚we have 
some particularly spiritual roots‛) and exceptionalism (‚Russia is a special country‛) 
as well as the self/Other dichotomy (‚our task is to conquer America‛). This shows – 
                                                 
101 The idea is that thirteenth century Russia had rescued Europe from the Mongols ‘by absorbing the 
enemy into her own flesh and blood’ and from Napoleon, portrayed as the Anti-Christ. As Chapter 
Four showed, these idealized versions of Russian history were especially popular in the dissident 
movement of the 1970’s, see Brun-Zejmis (1991). 
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even though they are referred to derisively – how different messianic discourses go 
hand in hand also in popular discourse, and indicates the gradual, successful 
dissemination of the contradictory messianic master narrative from public discourse, 
discussed in Chapter Five.  
 
Many interviewees explained that Russia had at some point in its history been 
spiritual but that this could not apply anymore. A young student explained: ‚There 
is this view that all of the sacred, spiritual Russia left for Europe in 1917. So at this 
point in time it is difficult to talk of some spirituality.‛ (C100-M20, see also C86-F24) 
Others pointed out the elusiveness of the famous Russian spirituality, as Sergey 
Riakhovsky, leader of one Russia’s main Protestant unions: ‚In fact people in Russia 
constantly talk about spirituality indeed and strive to formulate a so called Russian 
national idea – and this idea is a spiritual one. But somehow it is something difficult 
to formulate, its pursuit results in nothing. ‚ (C26-M49e) 
 
In the previous section we suggested that messianic narratives of mission and 
sacrifice can function as compensation and explanation for Russian low living 
standards. Interviewees of the Other side would not be satisfied with being a 
messianic country with a special standing. As noted in Chapter One as well as the 
previous chapter, an opinion poll from 2003 indicated that 43% of Russians would 
prefer Russia to be a great power, respected and feared, while 54% preferred high 
living standards to great power status. (New Russia Barometer XII, 2003) The views 
from Other side thus represent this silent majority. As one interviewee put it: ‚I 
would like, regardless of whether she is Eastern or Western, that she were a state that 
is not only powerful but also just, that she created [good] conditions for people, for 
every person, not just for those who have money or power. That Russia strived 
towards and arrived at this. I hope.‛ (C121-F43, similar views also in C5-M26e)  
Another, quoted above, was one of many explaining that any grand 
messianic ideals have to take a backseat to more pressing pragmatic concerns: ‚There 
exists this assumption that Russia ought to save the world and make it more 
spiritual. But at the moment Russia is concerned with how to survive and economical 
issues – how to develop the economy and come to a more civilised level.‛ He also 
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disagreed with Tyutchev’s famous lines saying that ‚it is possible to measure 
*Russia+, it’s rather the Russian people that want to consider themselves special.‛ 
(C70-M27*) Interestingly, a handful of unrelated interviewees mentioned Norway as 
the country of their ideals: small (and happy to be small), quiet, pragmatic and 
wealthy, the opposite both of the messianic, sacrificial suffering of Holy Russia and 
the grandiosity of the Third Rome.  
 
Those that disagreed with Tyutchev’s lines on Russian exceptionalism and messianic 
discourse in general could, as interviewees in Chapter Seven, broadly be categorised 
into optimists and pessimists, those critical both of messianic pretensions and of the 
state, and those positive about Russia’s present and future and uncritical of the state. 
The optimists were concerned about Russia’s image and less willing to bring 
to the fore any negative representations of their country. They typically appeared at 
least partly in favour of westernisation and pragmatism, complained about the 
longevity of the messianic stereotypes and were eager to show that Russia is 
comprehensible, well on the way to modernisation, strong and capable of competing 
or cooperating with Europe and other international actors. Not surprisingly, two of 
these were staff at MGIMO (Moscow State Institute of International Relations). The 
first, a co-ordinator, disagreed strongly with Tyutchev and with the notion of 
Russian spirituality: 
Russia in the contemporary world is now a country subject to world common 
laws of development and economics. And that we would consider some kind 
of exceptionalism – in the contemporary world it is not quite like that. [. . .] 
This disturbs us a lot. [. . .] I disagree with this view [Russia as spiritual] 
because the role and place of any country in the contemporary world no 
longer depends just on spirituality, but of development of its society and 
economy. (C22-M45e)  
This Russia is modern and normal, with its times and not behind in some past era, 
subject to universal laws, the same as everyone else, not exceptional. Note however 
that the interviewee acknowledged the presence of exceptionalist discourse by 
saying that it ‚disturbs us a lot‛.  
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Secondly Professor Zonova, quoted previously, said that if one wants to it is 
actually possible to understand Russia: ‚If you know her historical development, her 
location, present, the stages of establishing her statehood, culture and so on and so 
forth, you will be able to make draw some conclusions about Russia.‛ (C28-F60e*) As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the entire interview with Zonova contained the 
tension between representations of Russia as normal, part of the contemporary 
world, and as a unique cultural (Orthodox) civilisation. Even starker contrasts were 
present in the much quoted interview with a PR-company manager, which drew on a 
whole range of messianic-related narratives (see also C8-F31e*). Yet below the 
interviewee strongly rejected messianic stereotypes: 
It’s not our task to prove that our path is better, something different. Nobody 
thinks about these things. There are some certain stereotypes, making out that 
we do. Russia thinks only about these things when she finds herself under 
very difficult economic and political conditions and has to somehow 
compensate for her weak position in domestic or foreign politics, for that sake 
allowing ideas of some kind of different path. But there has never been 
anything *real+ about this. *<+ We are on a well-trodden road and Russia 
does not harbour these ideas, Russia doesn’t need to prove anything to 
anybody. We live, develop and solve our tasks. (C7-M31e*) 
Russia as a state and international actor here and now, disturbed by clichés from the 
social, organic, historical Russia. As in C2-M45e, the interviewee acknowledged the 
presence of the messianic discourse, and even touched on a traditional explanation 
for the phenomenon: psychological compensation for economic or political 
‘backwardness’.  
Archbishop Chaplin, who previously in this chapter outlined Russia’s high 
spiritual mission to the West, nevertheless disagreed with this variant of 
exceptionalist discourse: ‚I disagree with the idea that Russia is such an irrational 
existence, which does not let herself be understood by a thinking person‛ and 
explained that Russia is a country which has always lived according to spiritual, 
evangelistic ideals, but that there is nothing inconceivable about this, ‚it can be both 
understood with the mind and felt with the heart.‛ (C14-M37e) What these 
contradictory interviews show is the deep Russian conflict between wanting to be 
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different and between wanting to be normal; and between wanting to be beyond 
understanding, and to actually be understood. 
 
The pessimists pointed both to Russia’s spiritual and economic decline, representing 
Russia as a backward country ‚worse than Zimbabwe‛, whose only mission left is 
survival; and mocked the messianic pretensions. A retired senior physicist, who in 
Chapter Six complained about everyone becoming bandits overnight with Yeltsin, 
had no particular opinion on Tyutchev’s statement, but added: ‚But all know that 
Russia consists of fools and has bad roads. See this statement I am in complete 
agreement with.‛ (C29-M71e*, see also C53-M17* in Appendix III)  
Similarly, an alternative statement was provided by the previously quoted 
Jewish journalist: ‚I agree in principle, but I think that this should be changed. As 
our contemporary poet Igor Guberman rephrased Tyutchev (I beg your pardon – it 
has indecent words) ‚It’s high time, you motherfuckers / To understand Russia with 
the mind‛ *davno pora / ebena mat’ / umom Rossiyu ponimat’+‛ (C23-F41e) If Tyutchev’s 
verse epitomise the discourse on Russian exceptionalism, the above alternative 
statements epitomise the sentiments among the pessimistic or critical Russians from 
the Other side. A female teenager summarised: ‚I agree, in principle, and there is this 
idea about the enigmatic Russian soul – which to some extent is true – but you can’t 
account for whatever stupidities go on in this country by the enigmatic Russian 
soul.‛ (C40-F17) And for some agreeing with Tyutchev’s verse, it had deeply 
pessimistic connotations: ‛Yes, it is all we have left now – to believe.‛ (C130-M40) 
 
As discussed in the previous section, many agreed about Russia’s having a distinct 
mentality, but for them this had definitively negative connotations: Russians are 
lazier, poorer, unhappier, work differently, think differently, and Russia is because of 
this different from the efficient, rational West where things function well:    
The most significant, probably, is that we want to be worse than everybody 
else. ‚The worse – the better‛ it’s called. Somebody will say: ‚Nothing grows 
for me in my allotment‛ and another grandma will say: ‚Yes, yes, but I am 
even worse off.‛ And one must never, ever, show oneself to be better off than 
somebody else. Nobody ever praises anything, all just complain. And that is 
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poverty. Another thing is that we never act; we always look for excuses not to 
act. If there is a problem: the American will define the problem and formulate 
steps and methods to solve it, and then follow this gradually. And at the 
same time the solved problem becomes some kind of system. Here, if there is 
a problem, discussions will begin about why it is impossible to solve this 
problem. (C114-F31)  
This statement can also be seen as a cynical variant of the narrative of suffering and 
sacrifice: instead of suffering sacrificially, as a Christ to the nations, Russians in this 
variant just like to whinge. Chapter Six outlined similarly cynical counter narratives 
to the common representation of Russia and Russians as highly religious, moral, and 
defined by various Orthodox traits; and of the Russian Orthodox Church as 
exceptionally strict and spiritual: rather than having exceptionally high moral 
standards, the ROC is defined by compromise, hypocrisy and political ambitions, its 
priests blessing cigarette- and vodka factories and its supposedly pious followers 
decadent, hypocritical and ignorant – even the Muslims are more righteous.  
 
What must be noted, however, is that many of these voices from the Other side 
which are critical of Russia as a state, critical of the Soviet period, critical of the 
present day Russia with its immorality, lack of spirituality, etc, and deride the 
popular messianic pretension, still ring from within the messianic framework – see 
again section 8.2 of this chapter.  
 
Even the most extremely pessimistic discourses are often in some way messianic: 
Russia as messianic, the divinely chosen nation with a mission, has a very distinct 
antithesis, voiced by two semi-elite interviewees, both protestant leaders. As all 
messianic narratives it joins Russia as a state and a geopolitical mission with Russia 
as temporal entity – here a nation not only of ancient history but of divine destiny. 
In this narrative, Russia is represented as the Biblical northern country 
Magog, or its prince Rosh, which, following its divine mission, sets out to destroy the 
nation Israel in the end-times, joined by Persia and other nations. But as God in this 
account is against them from the beginning, he sends confusion upon them, and their 
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army is destroyed completely, the bodies of its soldiers left to rotten. After this the 
Messiah is supposed to return (C24-F47e, C26-M49e).  
It is this failure, even of severe critics of Russia, to escape from messianism 
which has warranted our definition of Russian messianism as a dominant discursive 
framework, holding a range of kaleidoscopic, sometimes complementing, sometimes 




How, if at all, do Russians today define Russia as a messianic entity, as something 
beyond time and space, and themselves as a messianic people? And in which ways 
and how strongly do explicitly messianic notions and discourses such as Russian 
spirituality, faith, exceptionalism, mission, sacrifice and suffering resonate among 
Russians today?  
This chapter has seen many stereotypical Russian messianic discourses 
reproduced, earnestly and derisively, positively and negatively, in various forms and 
contexts, and often in ways unconventional compared to public discourse.  We have 
seen a small but articulate group of mainly semi-elite interviewees who would draw 
upon a whole range of typical messianic and related narratives from public 
discourse, using the same style and concepts, thus illustrating a certain 
dissemination of the new kaleidoscopic master discourse from public to popular 
discourse. The majority of the interviewees however had more diverse and balanced 
views and would often reject several of the typical messianic and related narratives, 
but embrace perhaps one or two others, or framing their disavowal of the Russian 
present and/or of messianism in terms of apocalypse or sacrificial suffering, i.e. 
messianism in another form.  
What is important to note thus, is that messianic and related discourses are 
reproduced, over and over again, by Russians of different generations, from very 
different strata of society, testifying to their centrality in post-Soviet Russian identity 
production – precisely many of the negative renditions of messianic ideas were made 
by interviewees recognising their popularity in society in general. The messianic 
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framework is thus certainly in place at different levels of contemporary Russian 
discourse.  
 
Many academics have noted the enormous popularity in post-Soviet Russia of 
various notions of spirituality and millenarian forms of messianism (Merridale, 
2003:24) alongside with religion in various forms (Agadjanian, 2001a:473-74,77). 
Spirituality appeared more widely accepted as Russian identity marker than the also 
popular Orthodoxy discussed in Chapter Six. This reiterates that Russian messianism 
as an identity framework goes far beyond the confines of national Orthodoxy and 
religion.  
As we have seen, the idea of Russia as being different, exceptional also 
appeared as central to the self-understanding of most of the semi-elite and many of 
the ordinary interviewees, illustrated in recurring comparisons by diverse 
interviewees between Russia and ‘the West’.  
However, for a number of interviewees, Russian exceptionalism did not have 
the same – for Russian identity largely positive – connotations as in public discourse; 
the messianic discourses on the whole do not resonate well among all Russians, 
many of whom would prefer higher domestic living standards than messianic 
greatness.  
In some senses, the negative exceptionalism could be seen as framed by the 
internal opposition between the state as a spatial-political entity, and the 
Motherland, or the people, as a temporal-social entity. As the previous chapter 
showed, a very significant number of both semi-elite and ordinary Russians perceive 
Russia to be its own greatest danger. The state was often represented in these 
interviews as the source of the negative incomprehensibility (poverty, corruption, 
bureaucracy, inefficiency) but for which social, historical, organic Russia, the nation, 
compensates with its – also unfathomable – open soul, generosity and patriotism.  
The essence here is still that Russia is not like the West, only with negative 
connotations. If in the tradition there is a marriage between the Father Tsar (Batiushka 
Tsar’) and Mother Russia (Matushka Rus’), this union today appears like an abusive 
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relationship, with the martyr like wife suffering yet still believing that the violent 
husband might one day change.102  
 
Vladimir Pozner, a popular talk show host, is one of few in public discourse who 
voices the questions asked by the Russians from ‘the other side’, those who are tired 
of dissecting their souls and would prefer better living standards to great power. He 
asks: ‚Why is there so much dirt around? Why are the rubbish bins so badly 
collected? Why does it smell so bad in many doorways? Why are people’s shoes so 
badly polished? Why is there such disgrace in public toilets? You could ask many 
questions like that. Why do people drink so much? Why, why and why? And at the 
same time – why do some people consider us to be above others, to be more 
spiritual? Why?‛
103  
Pozner’s answer is that the Russians have a colossal inferiority complex, and 
describes how only Russians complain with so much pleasure about their own 
people, but also that only Russians talk with such scorn about all other peoples. As 
Chapter Four noted, one key function of Slavophile discourse on Russian spirituality, 
etc., appeared to be precisely compensation with regards to Europe as Other. And in 
the previous chapter, Bassin noted that the idea of Russia’s messianic geopolitical 
role functions as a sort of psychological compensation for the breakup of Russia 
(2006:112). This long-standing inferiority/superiority complex towards the Other 
thus appears as key to of explaining the persistence and revival of messianic 
discourse with its compensatory functions. 
 
Another key aspect of Russian exceptionalism and its compensatory functions are the 
narratives of suffering and sacrifice of the Russian people. These themes, as argued 
previously in this thesis, have for long been central to Russian discourse (see e.g. 
Serbinenko, 2001:6) and it should thus not be surprising that suffering, sacrifice and 
                                                 
102 This gendered state/people opposition often extends to the realms of precisely religion and 
spirituality. A masculine God (Gospod, Bog) sides with the state, the Tsar, the Fatherland (Otechestvo) and 
organised religion; and the feminine Mother-of-God (Bogomatery) sides with the Motherland, (Rodina), 
associated with a range of feminine signifiers such as the soil (zemlia), and various ancient, mystical 
spiritual rituals. The masculine and feminine spiritualities with all what they entail can coexist despite 
conflicts. (Baehr, 1991:10) Interesting in this context is that Russianness was defined by manifold 
interviewees in terms of ‘thinking with the heart’ etc.  
103 'Vremena' with Vladimir Pozner, Channel One Russia, broadcast Sunday 2006-11-26, 18.00, transcript 
available at  www.1tv.ru/owa/win/ort6_main.print_version?p_news_title_id=87933 
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patriotism, or the idea of a higher purpose or mission, appeared also in many of our 
interviews as markers of Russian identity. We have suggested that Russian 
messianism can be understood in terms of its legitimising, justificatory function for 
the existence, policies and indeed failures of Russia as a state, including things which 
‘cannot be understood with the mind’ but only believed in, and many of our 
interviews support this hypothesis – e.g. the female pensioner concluding that 
perhaps their pensions are below existential minimum because of the Russian state 
always helping others (C157-F65*).  
 
In sum, the uses among ordinary and semi-elite Russians of discourses of Russian 
exceptionalism, spirituality, mission, etc, reiterate the relativity of identity, the 
centrality of the Other in the perceptions of the collective self: Russia can only be 
exceptional because ‘the West’ is the norm. Correspondingly, Russian spirituality 
and soulfulness as markers of Russian identity do not function without Western 
materialism as their antithesis. This, one could argue, is why Russian spirituality, 
and messianic discourse on the whole, generally appears so elusive and indistinct: it 
is defined by a negation. Protestant leader Riakhovsky emphasised in his interview 
that the searches for a spiritual, national idea often lead to a deadlock precisely 
because of Russia’s uniqueness as ‚a country of many spiritual searches, many 
religions, many confessions, many nationalities, nations and peoples‛. (C26-M49e)  
But as we have suggested previously, precisely because of this elusiveness 
and ambiguity, spirituality is very functional as an identity marker:  while it is often 
deployed in implicitly ethno-centric and particularistic terms, it can just as well be 
associated with the supra-national Eurasianist discourses, or be the merger of the 
temporal-social and spatial-political aspects of Russian collective identity through a 
salvific spiritual world mission.  
In short, it can be anything to anyone, which helps explain its persistence, 
revival and centrality to Russian identity reproduction at all levels of discourse in a 
diverse, complex society where there is little to unite people but an inferiority 
complex towards the West nostalgia for the past, uncertainty with the fledgling 







9.1.0 Back to the beginning    
 
Our introduction noted various curious tendencies in Russian discourse of the first 
decade of the new millennium: despite various proclamations that only pragmatism 
should guide Russian politics and foreign policy, politicians and writers kept on 
referring to a Russian historical mission, along with more general claims to Russia’s 
peculiarity and spirituality; and even Putin began to ‘fuse’ traditional Russian ideas 
with pragmatism. Despite many ordinary people apparently being tired of grand 
messianic ideology and longing to live in a ‘normal’ country, there was a shift of 
popular attitudes pointing towards a longing for the restoration of Russia as a great 
power at the expense of living standards; as well as a revival of religion and esoteric 
spirituality; and the persistence of the ambiguous idea of Russian messianism was 
located within these trends. We asked if these tendencies in post-Soviet Russian 
society and discourse could be linked with each other, and if so if we could usefully 
conceive of them as a single phenomenon. All of this led us to examine the elusive 
but persistent notion of Russian messianism, questioning whether it is somehow a 
necessary part of Russian political and cultural identity.  
As was argued in the introduction, Russian messianism is a problematic 
subject of study, especially given its populist reproduction and its elusive and never 
quite tangible character. But, we argued, it is nevertheless a highly relevant subject 
due to the Russian crisis of identity following the collapse of the Soviet order; as well 
as being representative of a the wider crisis of collective identities under 
globalisation. We asked whether perhaps we could better understand the wider 
issues of the post-Soviet Russian state and collective identity by studying the 
phenomenon and concept of Russian messianism. The aims we articulated were: 
firstly, to provide a conceptualisation of Russian messianism which would help us 
understand some of its key functions and forms; secondly, to increase our 
understanding of contemporary Russian collective identity at different levels of 
discourse; and thirdly, to enhance our understanding of contemporary Russia as a 
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state and international actor. In order to achieve these aims we developed a number 
of hypotheses and research questions which were addressed throughout the chapters 
of this study. This chapter will now conclude the thesis by looking at each research 
question and summarise how we addressed the question; what answers are available 
according to the research findings and how that relates to the hypotheses. We also 
hope to offer some contribution to discussion of the wider implications for IR and 
Russian studies of the findings. 
 
9.2.0 Discourse and collective identity      
 
The first part of the thesis – the theory and methodology chapters, and the historical 
overview – endeavoured to provide a comprehensive conceptualisation of Russian 
messianism from an IR perspective. We argued that all definitions of Russian 
messianism essentially fall under the broad and functional category of discourse, 
which has the function of incorporating the various domains of social interaction in 
which collective identities, as social realities, are produced. From this conception we 
set out to investigate how the study of discourse in its different forms could enhance 
our understanding of Russian collective identity and statecraft, examining 
messianism as discourse, ideas, identity and their relation to politics from key 
perspectives of International Relations theory. We concluded that neither 
mainstream constructivism, assumed to be concerned with identity, nor neo-realism, 
assumed to be concerned with the political, were helpful to apply to our problem 
and questions, as both ultimately fail to take into account the politics of identity. 
Instead we argued that the shared emphasis on interest, discourse and power, 
defined in broad social terms, of classical and culturalist realists, poststructuralists 
and other related approaches would form a more useful theoretical basis for our 
study.  
Some of the simple but fundamental insights about discourse, identity and 
statecraft from these approaches were that opposition, contradiction and incoherence 
are inherent to language, discourse and identity. Collective and state identity is thus 
problematic, without given foundations. A state has to be justified and legitimised, 
and furthermore, the state’s specifics, roles and interests are anything but given, 
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requiring continuous negotiation between complex interests to uphold political 
stability. States are thus in constant reproduction, and this reproduction is ordered 
through telling essentialising ’stories’ of a collective identity, given meaning through 
binary oppositions, so that the Self is defined not only by what it is but also what it is 
not,  and constructed in discourse as it is defined and situated in relation to various 
Others or signifiers. In disguising the incoherencies and contradictions of collective 
identity, story-telling (or more broadly speaking, discourse) in the form of 
stereotypes, ideas, narratives and ideology thus has a crucial political function.  
These insights led us to propose an inclusive conceptualisation of Russian 
messianism as constituting a historically dominant discursive (interpretive and 
narrative) framework, based on a radicalised logic of opposition and holding a range 
of both contesting and complementing narratives and signifiers. These narratives 
represent different interests but overall, function to legitimise the state through the 
continuous construction, contestation and reproduction of Russian collective identity 
in relation to Others; thus creating a system of intelligibility, making sense of the 
world for the state as well as for ordinary people.  
Addressing Hypothesis H1, we located different broad aspects within which 
Russian messianism can be understood, according to the new conceptualisation of a 
discursive framework, as a necessary part of Russian political and cultural identity. 
These were categorised as the universal aspects (in the sense of being common to all 
states) such as the oppositional character of discourse and identity and the overall 
ambiguities and complexities of political and social life; and the both historically and 
structurally specific aspects and conditions, notably ideas of ‘empire’ and ‘civilisation’ 
as exceptionalist types of political entity, within Russian discourse on its own and as 
part of wider social, cultural and intellectual movements.  
Using our conceptualisation of messianism as global idea having resonance 
throughout the history of Russia as people, place and state, we proceeded to trace 
Russian messianism and its key characteristics, narratives and categories in history 
and the secondary literature of diverse disciplines, in order to be able to identify and 
locate contemporary narratives and themes, and their functions, within the historical 
tradition. This was part of investigating hypothesis H3 – that one of the core 
explanations for the persistence of Russian Messianism is as a legitimising discursive 
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framework for the existence and policies of Russia as a state actor in ambiguous 
relation to a broad Western Other. This was addressed by research question Q4, on 
how we should understand and conceptualise Russian messianism, its functions and 
role in relationship to Russian statecraft, especially towards the West. We showed 
how the production and reproduction of messianic narratives has been persistent 
across centuries, but taking place in different contexts, for different purposes, 
centring on inherently ambiguous, vague notions such as ‘spirituality’ and ‘mission’;  
and how, as such, it was impossible to define messianism as a single ideology.  
Our brief review of the literature showed a broad consensus on the centrality 
of the ambiguous-dichotomous relationship to the West as signifier for Russian 
identity. Our exploration of Russian messianism in different contexts and at various 
levels of discourse across the centuries affirmed the usefulness of the concept of a 
Self/Other framework that defines Russia in relation to a ‘significant Other’, and has 
been organised by reference to a longstanding religious framework of good vs. evil, 
with a range of connoted binary oppositions. A particularly important insight, 
explored at length in Neumann’s work (1996) is the continued ambivalence, and not 
only logic of opposition, in the Russian relation to Europe as Other. We concluded 
that the relation of the Russian self to the Other in messianic discourse is thus one of 
intense ambiguity which can be conceived within a continuum from radical 
opposition and superiority, to equality or inferiority; a relation where not only the 
West, but earlier also Byzantium and Israel, played the role of Other.  
Evidence of a radical self/Other opposition was found in a number of contexts 
and discourses, including Byzantium and Israel as rejected, godless messianic 
states/peoples; in the ‘geography of good and evil’ inherent in the paradise myth; in 
the great schism in Russian Orthodoxy triggered by the Petrine reforms, with Peter 
the Great represented as the Antichrist; in Panslavism and early Eurasianism as well 
as in the doctrine of world revolution, pitting a superior Russia against a decadent 
Western civilisation; and later in the Soviet Cold war discourses.  
How did these findings help us understand the functions of Russian 
messianism, defined within this framework, in relation to Russian statecraft?104 
                                                 
104 We had already we suggested in the theory chapter that the messianic framework as a dichotomising 
‘geography of good and evil’  legitimates the state (and earlier the church) through ‘discourses of 
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Drawing on the works of diverse scholars, we found that messianic and religious 
narratives, including the paradise myth and the image of Russia as a ‚perfected 
theocracy‛ functioned precisely to legitimise the Muscovite state and the status quo 
(Baehr, 1991:ix, 18-19); that the Biblical framework as a whole functioned to give 
meaning to events and define and legitimise  the Muscovite state (Rowland, 1996); 
that the function of the original Holy Russia discourse was counter-hegemonic in 
nature, aimed at ‚the reigning doctrine of Moscow as the Third Rome‛ (Neumann, 
1996:8-9); that messianic discourses, Slavophilism and other ideologies, had a 
compensatory function in Russia’s relation to Europe; and finally that messianism in 
different contexts has been intimately linked both to Russian empire, in terms of a 
diverse, multicultural political entity needing ideological assimilation, as well as 
Russian imperialism, in terms of geopolitical expansionism, in need of justification.  
Chapters Two and Four thus pointed both to a centrality of Russian 
messianism as a discursive framework for Russian statecraft and identity, and to its 
historical persistence at different levels of discourse. Applying these findings to 
contemporary discourse, we formulated hypothesis H2: that the messianic 
framework is in place at different levels of contemporary Russian discourse as a 
response to the crisis of social and political relations in Russia. 
Based on the insights from Chapter Two about discourse and collective 
identity formation, Chapter Three outlined a qualitative methodology based on 
discourse analysis for selection and analysis of contemporary Russian messianic 
discourse.  The chapter assessed and detailed the best methods for studying Russian 
messianism. We introduced and justified our intellectual and evidence categories, 
and outline a methodology based on strands of discourse analysis and self/Other 
studies.   We developed three broad intellectual categories to structure the 
presentation and analysis of each of the seven presidential annual addresses in 
Chapter Five, and to each form the basis for the three interview-based chapters. 
These categories were based on the distinction between the temporal and the spatial 
dimensions of Russian identity: ‘Russia: History, Present and Destiny’ has sought to 
explore Russia as a temporal-social entity; and ‘Russia and the world: Self and 
Other(s),’ has looked at Russia as a spatial-political entity. Finally, ‘Russia as 
                                                                                                                                            
danger’ or ‘evangelism of fear’ (Rieber, 1993); justifies expansionism (Arbatov, 2006); and ideological 
assimilation of a diverse population in a country of complex geocultural realities (Prozorov, 2008:220). 
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messianic,’ looked at resonance of explicit messianic discourse, based on the 
assumption that in it, the temporal-social and spatial-political dimensions at times 
often converge.  
 
9.3.0 Messianism among ordinary Russians  
 
Our introduction suggested that what ordinary people in Russia think, feel and 
perceive is important for, and reflective of, state and collective identity as a whole, 
particularly so in terms of state stability; and that the role and functions of messianic 
and related narratives in relation to the crisis of social and political relations are 
likely to be better understood by also studying their ‘common sense’ deployment 
and resonance among ordinary Russians. Certainly, the interviews, with their 
breadth, depth and diversity, provided unusual insights into views and perceptions 
of people in contemporary Russia, showing both convergence and divergence of this 
popular level with public and official levels of discourse. 
While the categories we used to separate the chapters – ‘Russia as history, 
presence and destiny’ (Chapter Six), ‘Russia and the world: self and Other(s) 
(Chapter Seven), and Russia as messianic (Chapter Eight) – all overlapped, they 
nevertheless helped us navigate between different and complex issues of Russian 
collective identity, from finding a coherent Russian historical identity, to establishing 
Russia’s place in the globalising world, to the ever-present tensions between 
universalism and exceptionalism.  
We will first provide a very brief summary of the findings each of the three 
interview-based chapters provided to research question Q3, on the manifestation and 
resonance at this level of discourse of the messianic and related narratives. Then we 
will outline the general tendencies across the chapters, with reference both to 
research question Q3 and the hypotheses of messianism as a necessary part of 
Russian political and cultural identity (H1) and as a response to the crisis of social 
and political relations in Russia (H2). Section 9.5 will then conduct a discussion of the 
overall findings of the thesis with regards to the broader hypotheses, and research 
question Q4, on how we can understand and conceptualise Russian messianism, its 
functions and role in relationship to Russian statecraft, especially towards the West. 
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Chapter Six explored contemporary narratives of Russia’s past and future. It 
revealed an absence of, and longing for, a cohesive historical identity. We 
highlighted some of the narratives and techniques deployed to construct the image 
thereof, including the rehabilitation of the Soviet period, and Orthodoxy, with its 
identity markers of sobornost’, morality, religiosity, spirituality; both often woven 
together in narratives of ancientness, religious historical determinism, and empire; as 
well as the demarcation of ‘true’ versus ‘false’ periods of Russian history. But despite 
these deployments of discourse, there appeared still to be a widespread social 
fragmentation and lack of discursive tools with which to makes sense of the collapse 
of the previous order of things, reflected in very ambivalent, uncertain 
representations of past, present and future. And, as we stressed, narratives of 
Orthodoxy do not form an unequivocally accepted model for Russian collective 
identity, with many expressing cynicism about the church and its followers. So, 
Chapter 6 revealed a disavowal of the Yeltsinite 1990s and, by extension, the West, 
and a gradual rehabilitation of the Soviet period function to unite many – but there is 
uncertainty about the present and no vision of the future. 
Chapter Seven explored the messianic and related narratives that are part of 
defining Russia’s place in the world, or its spatial-political identity. The Eurasia 
representations that are so central in public discourse were not resonating strongly 
among ordinary people, only among a few of the semi-elite interviewees. But many 
both ordinary and semi-elite interviewees drew messianic-relating images of Russia 
as a benevolent protector-empire, with a mission to protect vulnerable states from 
American hegemony and from globalisation; and there was on the whole strong 
longing for the restoration of empire which appeared much more unifying than for 
example the popular but somewhat uncertain identity marker in Orthodoxy. Across 
the sample of interviewees, recurring in many different questions, was a tension 
between on the one hand, traditional, exceptionalist Russian ideals of statehood, and 
on the other, modern Western ideals of what is acceptable or ‚normal‛ among states, 
reflecting the central self/Other dilemma for Russian identity.  
Chapter Eight saw many traditional Russian messianic discourses 
reproduced – spirituality, mission, suffering, sacrifice and patriotism – by Russians 
of different generations, from very different strata of society, testifying to their 
263 
 
centrality in post-Soviet Russian identity production. We showed how 
exceptionalism appeared as central to the self-understanding of most of the semi-
elite and many of the ordinary interviewees, illustrated in recurring comparisons by 
diverse interviewees between Russia and ‘the West’, reiterating the relativity of 
identity and the centrality of the Other in the perceptions of the collective self: Russia 
can only be exceptional because ‘the West’ is the norm. But the exceptionalism and 
other messianic discourses did not have solely positive connotations among the 
interviewees, many of whom would prefer higher domestic living standards of e.g. 
Norway rather than messianic greatness. Nevertheless, many of the negative 
renditions of messianic ideas were made by interviewees who recognised their 
popularity in society in general, and who often instead would use other messianic 
narratives to frame their views and make sense of the world, such as the suffering 
Russian people pitted against the corrupt – and implicitly foreign – state. So, while 
there are still many diverse and contradictory representations of Russia among 
ordinary and semi-elite Russians – some defined, some vague, some reflecting 
official and public discourse, some critical of them – many are still somehow framed 
within the pervasive traditional framework.   
 A key conclusion that must be drawn from analysing the interviews regards 
the great diversity of views, across generations, class and gender and individual 
interviews, rendering most generalisations (save about the general fragmentation of 
views in society) quite difficult. The messianic-related discourses which abound in 
public discourse and are present in official discourse do resonate among both semi-
elite and ordinary Russians, but with more varied evaluations and more 
ambivalence, and often in ways very different from in public discourse.  
We have nevertheless identified some broad trends. There was a tendency 
among many of the semi-elite to construct a cohesive historical identity for Russia by 
using messianic-related markers of identity, whereas among ordinary people there 
appeared still to be a widespread fragmentation and lack of tools with which to 
makes sense of the past, present and future. Interestingly, messianic and related 
narratives from public discourse resonated more strongly among post-Soviet (born 
after 1975) and semi-elite Russians than among ordinary people from the Soviet 
generation, which could be attributed to the semi-elite, or the Russian intelligentsia, 
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being more politically aware and closer to circles public discourse, and to the 
attempts at political or ‘patriotic’ mobilisation of young people through youth 
movements such as NASHI.   
Perhaps the most notable finding was these starkly contradictory 
representations of Russia within single interviews: one person could draw upon 
several different and often contradictory discourses, categorising interviewees 
according to their worldviews and ideas was quite impossible. Russia could, as we 
saw, be represented as great, becoming stronger and more powerful, and defined by 
various messianic identity markers, and yet at the same time be defined as its own 
greatest danger; it could be the natural continuation of the communist Soviet Union, 
and at the same time owe its destiny to God of the Bible; it could be an exceptional 
and special Great Power, and at the same time ‘a country like all others’ – each 
contradiction within single interviews. 
On a universal level, this reiterates our general claim that collective identity, 
as an extension of discourse through which it is constructed, is inherently 
contradictory –and this type of dialogism can also explained in terms of the basis for 
intelligent, constructive thinking (Billig, 2001). Further than that, this tendency 
appears clearly to be a context-specific reflection of the ‘polyphony’, not just 
pluralism of contemporary Russian political discourse with its various dualisms.105 
This showed a clear convergence of this popular level with public and official 
levels of discourse. However, in political discourse, the dualistic representations of 
Russia tend however to be more much more positive, if yet contradictory – not like 
the interviews’ often  deeply pessimistic views of Russia and its people; the 
representations of Russian society as amorphous and apathetic; distrust as to official 
representations of the past; and disillusionment with corrupt bureaucracies and 
government; all paradoxically mixed – in single interviews – with extremely positive 
representations of a Russia defined by sobornost’ and various other positive and 
messianic-related traits. These contradictory self-representations in popular 
discourse flow together in an almost schizophrenic way, testament to the relative 
                                                 
105 Chapter Five outlined a number of dualistic representations of Russia in both public and official 
discourse: as both a multi-ethnic, multicultural, supra-national Great Power (Third Rome) and a single 
nation with its ethnocentric and mono-religious connotations (Holy Russia), and with Russia as 
Byzantium somewhere in between; as a successor to the Soviet Union and a modern, civic, democratic 
state; as Eurasian and Slavonic, and European (but not Western); and both being special or having 
‘special interest’ and being ‘normal,’ like all states. 
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success respectively failure of Russian statehood, as well as reflecting the 
ambivalence towards the West as Other, i.e. the paradoxical self/Other framework 
with the discussed ‘inferiority-superiority complex’ towards the West.  
Hypothesis H2 – that the messianic framework is in place at different levels of 
contemporary Russian discourse as a response to the crisis of social and political 
relations in Russia – was formulated to help us understand the wider problem of 
post-Soviet Russian state- and collective identity, i.e. the crisis of social and political 
relations in Russia following the collapse of the Soviet order. Russian messianism, 
we argued, needs to be understood in its wider discursive social and political 
contexts, and at the same time its study can help us understand those contexts better. 
The analyses of the interviews, treated both as survey material and individual 
discourses, suggest strongly that the growing popularity of messianic discourse in 
Russia should be understood precisely against the backdrop of social fragmentation 
and lack of discursive tools with which to make sense of the collapse of the previous 
order of things. And here the role of the Other in the discursive framework has been 
illustrated in various contexts, across social- and age categories of interviewees. 
We have shown how even the quiet nostalgia for the Soviet past among the 
‘Other side’, or the less ideologically enthusiastic Russians, also implicitly links to the 
ambivalent self/Other: The narratives of a past when ‘all took care of one another’ 
and ‘there was no hatred’, and the disappointment with the present where ‘it’s all 
about money, money, money’, and with the West – ‘in Western countries money 
always played the key role’ reflect the traditional narratives of the Other with its 
negative values of materialism, secularism and individualism and implicitly attribute 
the perceived deterioration of social relations in society to the westernisation which 
followed the fall of the Soviet Union. As Oushakine for example pointed to in 
Chapter Eight, the genres and discourses of Russian tragedy, Christological suffering 
and sacrifice, or ‘ethnohistories of trauma,’ seek to demonstrate the non-Russian (i.e. 
Western) character of its national/state institutions, and as such function as an 
effective cultural apparatus through which people in post-Soviet Russia can 
conceptualise the sudden collapse of the order of things, the ‚unmaking of Soviet 
life‛. (Oushakine, 2007:178) This reiterates the key function of messianic discourse of 
creating systems of intelligibility.  
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On the whole, the diverse resonances of messianic discourse, and the 
‘polyphony’ and fragmentation of views across Russian society, showed that 
pragmatism and striving for state stability alone would not suffice to resolve the 
Russian crisis of identity.  
 
9.4.0 Messianism, official discourse and the crisis of identity  
 
The Russian crisis of identity following the collapse of the Soviet order was 
enormous. It had been no means been resolved during the 1990s – certainly not for a 
lack of identity representations available from public discourse, but rather because 
that state under Yeltsin, while trying out various identity options did not fully adopt 
any of them. In light of having just discarded one world-historical ideological project, 
embarking on and consistently pursuing any specific ideological project indeed 
turned out difficult. And the ambiguous end of ideology in many senses continued 
with Putin, who in essence had said that there was no need to resolve the Russian 
crisis of identity: what Russia needed was pragmatism, stability and modernisation, 
not grand ideology.  
Indeed, the regime had posited and legitimised itself as the negation of the 
intense 1990s as a ‘time of troubles’ – as we saw also in the interviews, often 
represented as a ‘lost’ decade.
106 But even though Putin has been hailed – as we have 
seen also in the interviews – as the provider of stability and restorer of the strong 
state; pragmatism, efficiency and stability alone would not – as the interviews also 
clearly showed – suffice to unite society. Many Russians still perceive society as 
being fragmented – one in five interviewees either perceived that ‘nothing at all’ 
unites Russia’s peoples of different cultures, religions and traditions, or didn’t know, 
and many contrasted the unity, cohesion and stability of the Soviet Union with the 
disunity and fragmentation of the present. Remizov has captured the essential 
problem of the ‘end of ideology’ under Putin:  
The fractured society clumsily asks [the President] how to become whole, and 
he answers that it must become wealthy. Strictly speaking, the president’s 
                                                 
106 We argued that the narrative constructed over the eight years of Putin’s presidency – of rebuilding 
the state; rescuing Russia from various dangers; rejecting the false and finding the true way; uniting 
divergent political positions against one enemy; and restoring greatness and strength – could be 
interpreted in terms of messianism in the sense of the completion of a big mission by a Saviour. 
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response is tautological: he refers to efficiency, while the question is about 
charting that very social unity, which subsequently may be found efficient or 
inefficient. *<+ To declare pragmatism as the ideology of power in today’s 
Russia is merely to put the cart before the horse. (Remizov, quoted in 
Prozorov, 2008:220) 
Our interviews pointed to the popularity of the idea of a mission in Russian society. 
As one young student explained, people need to know their purpose and function in 
society, and a mission, if it was formulated and made clear, especially in relation to 
Russia as a mighty empire – would help them to do so (C83-M21*).  
This study revealed that the official position has gradually abandoned the 
proclaimed pragmatism, moving closer to public discourse and its incongruent yet 
powerful master discourse. The messianic and related discourses drawn on – but also 
modified – in the annual addresses included spirituality, sacrifice, patriotism, 
Russian uniqueness and distinctiveness from the West, conspiracy theories and 
discourses of danger, glory and greatness, Russian history as an organic whole, the 
rehabilitation of the Soviet past, missionism and Russia as a global mediator, the 
Eurasianist ‘harmony of cultures’ as well, increasingly, various Russo- and Slavo-
centric narratives; and we have seen the then President co-opting them and 
navigating around their inherent dualisms and ambiguities.  
Our study asked how we can understand the functions of official discourse of 
these messianic and related narratives in relation to the Russian crisis of identity 
(research question Q3). First of all, this gradual change in official discourse can thus 
be explained in terms of a response to the persisting crisis of identity in a fragmented 
Russian society. Gradually acquiescing to developments from public discourse 
where messianism had become mainstream, the state could tap into this assortment 
of compelling ideological themes and narratives which, much better than the 
pragmatism alone would create the ostensible appearance of a ‘whole’ society. This 
development is in a sense a repetition of the 1990s where, as Chapter Five noted, the 
state, though ostensibly having adopted Western liberalism striving, gradually was 
transformed by, and modified, the national-patriot position (Neumann, 1999:169). 
Secondly, we argued that the official deployment of these loose, flexible notions, and 
the co-optation of the various dualistic discourses in Russian contemporary 
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discourse as a whole, becomes in essence a monopolisation of ideology and an 
effective evasion of the political.107 By taking over all positions through co-optation, 
accommodating national-patriots as well as ordinary people wanting decent living 
standards rather than ideological grandeur, no room is left for opposition. These thus 
appear as the key functions of official discourse of the messianic and related 
narratives in seeking to resolve the Russian crisis of identity and achieving social 
consensus.108  
In sum, our exploration of popular discourse through the interviews with 
ordinary and semi-elite Russians, and of official discourse through Putin’s annual 
addresses compared with various texts from public discourse, thus affirm 
Hypothesis H2, that the messianic framework is in place at different levels of 
contemporary Russian discourse as a response to the crisis of social and political 
relations in Russia. 
 
9.5.0 Messianism, Russian statecraft and the West  
 
i) The broad conceptualisation of a complex phenomenon  
 
No academic enquiry can ever be objective, but is always theory- and value-laden 
(Shapiro, 2002). Nevertheless, the starting point of our study was relatively open – 
our aim has not been to vindicate a particular theory – either about Russia and the 
Russians, or Russian messianism, or about IR. Rather, we have genuinely sought to 
understand the curiosities of messianism in Russian identity: both the contemporary 
deployments of messianic notions in a state supposedly defined by the negation of 
ideology (Hypothesis H2 109 ), and their historically persistent reproduction 
                                                 
107 For Putinism and the ‘end of ideology’ as the evasion of the political, see Prozorov (2008:224); and for 
cultural fundamentalism as a way of avoiding politics, see Laruelle’s conclusion (2008:221-22). 
108 An IR note: in a way not too dissimilar of the simplified messianic framework in contemporary 
Russian discourse, so constructivism and neorealism as theories of international relations become 
evasions of the political by ignoring the complexities and contested nature of identity formation. The 
social consensus and stability Putin has been striving to achieve through his co-optation of ideologies, 
including messianic discourses, is a balance of power which truly matters in IR.  
109 H2: The messianic framework is in place at different levels of contemporary Russian discourse as a 
response to the crisis of social and political relations in Russia. 
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(Hypothesis H1110). And rather than to ask the common and unhelpful question on 
whether Russian messianism has directly informed Russian foreign policy, we have 
asked more broadly how we can conceptualise Russian messianism, its functions and 
role in Russian statecraft and, by extension, foreign policy.111  
The result of this theoretically open approach has been a very broad multi-
disciplinary conceptualisation of Russian messianism as a broad discursive 
framework through which Russian identity is constructed, contested and 
reproduced. We have argued that it by no means can be seen as a single ideology, 
given its diverse range of both contesting and complementing narratives, themes and 
signifiers, but that it nevertheless has key characteristics which warrant this 
overarching term: a core logic of opposition and an ambiguous-dichotomous relation 
to the West as broad Other, both reflected in a range of interrelated binary couples 
such as good/evil, spiritual/materialistic, Messiah/Antichrist, East/West, nation/state, 
etc; central and persistent themes of spirituality, mission, the idea of being ‘chosen,’ 
Christological suffering and sacrifice; and the master narratives Moscow Third Rome 
and Holy Russia, parallel to (yet intertwined with) a tension between exceptionalism 
and universalism.  
Focusing on one narrow aspect of Russian messianism, from a singular 
theoretical framework, would undoubtedly have led to a simpler, more manageable 
conceptualisation. But by drawing on diverse academic disciplines – international 
relations based on social theory, history and philosophy of history, geography, 
anthropology – we have been able to both identify non-particular characteristics of 
Russian identity construction functioning across different levels of discourse and 
periods of time; as well as contingent manifestations which must be understood in 
their particular social, historical, political and intellectual contexts, both those 
particular to Russia and as broader intellectual and social movements, helping us 
understand the persistence of the reproduction of messianic ideas, themes and 
narratives in relation to Russian identity and statecraft.112 
                                                 
110 H1. The persistence, and contemporary revival, of messianic ideas in Russian public discourse 
suggests it is a necessary part of Russian political and cultural identity.  
111 The question is unhelpful, because direct causal relationships between ideas and foreign policy are 
notoriously hard to establish. 
112 E.g. Slavophilism as the Russian variant of European Romanticism; Russian thought as a whole as 
criticism of and resistance to the Western claims to universality of reason; the original Holy Russia 
narrative as a contestation of the hegemonic Third Rome narrative. 
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The very basic insights about general collective identity formation and 
statecraft from social theory are furthermore important for Russian, and formerly 
Soviet studies, where Russian messianism has for long been represented as 
something peculiarly and uniquely Russian – a representation which as a self-
fulfilling prophecy arguably has reinforced a host of negative stereotypes and 
increased the alienation of Russia from the West. The thesis has thus identified and 
explored several aspects of Russian messianism and of its functions and roles in 
relation to Russian statecraft, particularly towards the West, and will here briefly 
summarise them and some of their different spatial and temporal contexts, finally, 
discuss their wider implications both for Russia as a state actor. 
 
ii) Russian messianism conceptualised in terms of discourse, general identity 
construction and state legitimisation 
 
As summarised in section 9.2 of this chapter, based on our theory exploration we 
argued that frameworks of the type with which we equate Russian messianism are in 
one sense normal and indeed necessary to any state as a collective identity. Any state 
needs to legitimise its own existence and actions; any state faces the need to mask the 
ontological impossibility of a ‘collective self’ and the complexities and ambiguities of 
politics in its widest sense, the intricate balancing of multiple interests. And in all 
states, this is done through telling essentialising stories about the self in the form of 
discourses of danger, national myths, political ideologies etc, stories containing 
different types of signifiers, locating the self in relation to Others – symbolic, 
threatening, inferior, etc – stories which may vary over time, and which are contested 
in nature, but whose central logic is replicated over and over again as their crucial 
political functions remain.  
Chapter Four too pointed both to a centrality of Russian messianism as a 
discursive framework for Russian statecraft and identity, and to its historical 
persistence at different levels of discourse. Our findings through exploring discourse 
and identity in IR theory, and Russian messianism from a historical perspective, thus 
affirm hypothesis H3: that one of the core explanations for the persistence of Russian 
Messianism is as a legitimising discursive framework for the existence and policies of 
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Russia as a state actor in ambiguous relation to a broad Western Other. This 
hypothesis was further affirmed by our explorations of official and popular 
discourse, showing how an abundance messianic-related discourses, even conspiracy 
theories, from public discourse at times have been drawn upon even by Putin, and 
resonate among both post-Soviet and semi-elite interviewees.  
  
iii) Messianic story-telling as a necessary for a complex, multicultural state 
 
Our review of secondary sources from geography, history and international relations 
theory led us to identify a second, closely related to the above, key aspect of this 
broad conceptualisation. Russian messianism, as a type of discourse or story-telling 
particular to large multicultural political entities with complex geo-cultural 
conditions – i.e. empires and/or civilisations – where more common identity markers 
such as ethnicity fail to legitimise the state, unify the population and create a sense of 
collective identity.  
Many interviewees stressed the complexities of Russia as an exceptionalist 
political entity, describing it as ‚large, and nobody understands what is going on in 
it‛ (C57-F17); ‚a civilisation located between West and East‛ which ‚neither falls 
under the Western value system, nor under the Eastern value system‛ but whose 
history and whole development went in zigzags‛ (C100-M20); and ‚a country of 
contrasts‛ (C75-F22). Certainly, Russia’s geographical vastness and diversity, 
complicated history, and heterogeneous social fabric all contribute to a continuous 
risk of internal tensions and social disorder. Messianic identity constructions, we 
argued, affirming hypotheses H1 and H3, can thus be understood as a necessary part 
of Russian cultural and political identity, functioning to legitimise the existence, 
policies and indeed failures of Russia as an exceptionalist state; and to divert 
attention from the ambiguities, contradictions and problems of its statecraft and 
identity by simplifying complex realities – i.e. what ‘cannot be understood with the 
mind’ – into appealing and unifying narratives of based on constructed dichotomies.  
Furthermore, our exploration of both official and popular discourse noted, 
though did not explore in depth, structural similarities between Russian and 
American identity construction, with both having a contradiction between 
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exceptionalist and universalist master narratives; as well as a radicalised opposition 
between self and Other, characteristic of states defined by the ‘universalistic 
nationalism’ that was a central concern for the theorist Morgenthau (1967). The 
interview-based chapters showed for example how globalisation as a discourse of 
danger, often framed in messianic terms, resonated strongly among both post-Soviet 
and semi-elite interviewees, and argued that as the vague, faceless yet demonised 
enemy in the ‘War on Terror’ functions as an effective Other for the United States, so 
does the vague, faceless but radicalised construction of ‘globalisation’ for Russia, 
represented as a civilisation.  
 
iv) Understanding contemporary deployments of Russian messianism: the 
post-Soviet context 
 
Because the aims of this thesis have been not only to conceptualise Russian 
messianism generally, but also to enhance our understanding of contemporary 
Russian collective identity and of Russia as a state and international actor, the focus 
of the core of the research has been on contextualising contemporary Russian 
messianism. Though, as we noted above, Russia is a complex state to start with, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union obviously made identity construction even more 
complex, leading us to investigate the functions of messianic discourse in relation to 
the crisis of Russian political and cultural identity (hypothesis H2).  
As discussed above, the analyses of the interviews on the whole suggest 
strongly that the growing popularity of messianic discourse in Russia should be 
understood precisely against the backdrop of post-Soviet social fragmentation, i.e. 
that messianic stories for example about a glorious past and a great mission are 
deployed both as a kind of escapism from the dysfunctional present, where there is 
little to unite people but an inferiority complex towards the West, nostalgia for the 
past, uncertainty with the fledgling stability of present, and absence of visions for the 
future. We also conceptualised the official contemporary co-optation of the various 
dualistic messianic discourses in terms of a monopolisation of ideology and evasion 




v) Understanding the functionality of messianism as story-telling 
  
Why do precisely messianic narratives, with their particular characteristics, have 
such an important role in these different contexts of Russian identity construction? 
We have suggested that most messianic themes and notions are very functional as 
identity markers because of their elusiveness and ambiguity, showing for example 
how the famous Russian spirituality can connote ethnocentric Orthodoxy just as well 
as a multicultural Eurasian ‘spiritual harmony’. Spirituality, mission, sacrifice are 
thus flexible notions which can be deployed in very different contexts, by different 
actors, for different purposes, yet create the appearance of a coherent identity.  
This flexibility due to ambiguity helps explain the persistence, revival and 
centrality of messianic narratives discourses to Russian identity reproduction at all 
levels of discourse, and their subsequently important role also in Russian statecraft, 
constructed and legitimised in discourse. For example, as we noted above, the 
elusiveness of the near-hegemonic contemporary Russian messianic master narrative 
with its co-optation of contradictory political positions renders impossible any 
concrete political goals – and yet (or therefore) it is highly political precisely in its 
evasion of politics and difference.113 But as we have stated, one thing is required for 
the messianic narratives and markers of identity, with all their elusiveness, to 
function.  
 
vi) Russia, messianism, and the West as broad Other 
 
Just as the word ‘light’ is brought meaning by the word ‘darkness’, ‘exception’ by 
‘norm’, ‘good’ by ‘evil’, so the ‘Russian soul’ is brought meaning only by the 
‘Western soullessness’, ‘Russian spirituality’ by ‘Western materialism’, and Russia as 
‘chosen’ only by the West as ‘rejected’. Research question Q4 asked how we can we 
understand and conceptualise the functions and role of Russian messianism in 
relationship to Russian statecraft, especially towards the West. ‘The West’ is 
                                                 
113 This brings us back to Morgenthau, who, as Williams argued, developed his defence of political 
realism and politics as a sphere of contestation and difference much in response to the danger of 
universalistic nationalism – or messianism – as being the monopolisation of truth and identity 
(Williams, 2004). While Russia under Putin largely appears to have disavowed grand messianic 
universalism in favour of civilisational particularism alongside with state stabilisation and restoration, 
universalist narratives tendencies could also be noted, such as in the creation of Russkii Mir. 
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paramount to Russian statecraft and identity, and we have argued that Russian 
messianism functions as a framework through which Russian identity, is produced, 
negotiated, and produced in ambivalent relation to the West as broad Other. The 
dichotomous structure of this framework forms the compelling core of the Russian 
messianic framework and explains its historical persistence as a legitimising 
discursive framework (Hypothesis H3), and the ambiguous-dichotomous self/Other 
in multiple ways transcends and connects the various different aspects within which 
we have sought to conceptualise and contextualise Russian messianism.  
We have used the term ‘broad Other’, given the inclusive, ambiguous uses of 
‘the West’ as a concept, incorporating a civilisation, states as the U.S.A and/or 
Europe, Atlanticism, globalisation, and even the Jews in terms such as ‘the Judeo-
American Anti-Rome’. (Sidorov, 2006) From a historical perspective we have argued 
that Russian messianism must be understood in relation to and as an emulation and 
rejection of Judeo-Christian variants of messianism: of Judaism and the first ‘chosen 
nation’ and Western Christianity; of the Western concept of universalism and 
progress (Walicki, 1994:82); and that the more recent ambiguous relation to America 
follows this pattern. We have highlighted the tendency at various levels of Russian 
discourse to represent the United States and the West in terms of aggressive 
messianism, universalism, absolutism, imperialism; and to subsequently define 
Russia/Eurasia/ Orthodox civilisation in opposition and as an alternative to this 
civilisation. Russian messianism must also therefore be understood as forming part of 
the wider global discourse of anti-Westernism, anti-globalisation and exceptionalist, 
culturalist fundamentalism.114  
So, both in the contemporary context of globalisation, as well as the in the 
Enlightenment, centuries back, Russia continues to be exceptional because Europe 
and/or the West is the norm. We have shown how the tensions between universalism 
and exceptionalism, between representations of Russia as a state or spatial-political 
entity and Russia as a civilisation or temporal-social entity, are present across the 
different levels of discourse: popular, public and indeed official. This ambivalence 
                                                 
114 Laruelle, for example, notes how Eurasianism – as we have shown, one of the key contemporary 
Russian messianic discourses – can be understood both as ‚a short-term psychological compensation for 
the disappearance of the Soviet Union‛ and as being on par with Islamism, the Christian 
fundamentalism of American evangelical movements, and European calls for ethnic and religious 
communitarianism, all as part of ‚the great backlash against eighteenth century theories of progress‛ 
(2008:220-21). See also Shevtsova (2007:42-43).  
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was, as we noted in the interview chapters, particularly evident in the questions of 
Russian empire, with many Russians expressing a longing for the restoration of 
empire, yet aware that ‘imperial and messianic ambitions’ do not fit in with the also 
desired modern Western model. And interviewees from the ‘the Other side’ saw 
imperial and messianic ambitions, in a way similar to Putin, as the main obstacle to 
Russia’s modernisation, represented as the prerequisite for ‘real’ great power status. 
However, the study revealed that few Russians see the question as a choice 
between on the one hand a Russian model, presumably defined by exceptionalism 
and empire, and on the other a Western model, defined by universalism, modernity 
and state sovereignty, due to the contradictions in American identity, defined both 
by empire and exceptionalism on the one hand, and universalism in the model it 
exports globally on the other.  Many interviewees thus wavered precisely between 
wanting Russia to be accepted in international society as a ‘normal’ state, with decent 
living standards, and to compete with America with its imperial, messianic and 
superpower role, mirroring the very same tendency in official and public discourse.  
Chapter Eight heard Vladimir Pozner, the popular talk show host, voiced the 
common question why, with so much dirt around, such smelly doorways, such 
disgrace in public toilets, people drinking so much, some people consider Russians 
to be above others, to be more spiritual. Our study has shown how the functions and 
role of Russian messianism in relationship to Russian statecraft can also be 
conceptualised in terms of an inferiority-superiority complex towards the West as 
Other, exacerbated with humiliating breakup of Soviet Union, and manifest at all 
levels of discourse from ordinary people to the state. This ambivalent relation to the 
Other is thus a core explanation for the persistence and revival of messianic 
discourse with its compensatory functions. 
  
vii) A messianic Russia in the world? 
 
What then are the implications for Russian as an international actor of our findings of 
the deployment of messianic discourse in official discourse? Are we to predict that 
Russia will seek to take over the world by becoming a spiritual empire, a modern 
Third Rome? We have mainly stressed the key domestic functions of the messianic 
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discourses: to legitimise the state, assimilate the population domestically, and create 
systems of intelligibility, making sense of what doesn’t make sense, whether the 
collapse of the Soviet Union or identity in a globalised world.115 But, we have also 
argued that Russia and its messianic discourses have been not only ‘imperial,’ with 
empire as a permanent Russian geocultural condition necessitating messianic 
discourse for assimilation and legitimacy, but also in some contexts ‘imperialist,’ 
legitimising Russian and Soviet expansionism. 
 
In sum: our introduction showed how Putin sought to avoid Russian messianism 
and the traditional Russian pastime of searching for a national idea. Our thesis has 
sought to demonstrate why this has been impossible, and why Russian messianism 




                                                 
115 Our theory chapter pointed to a number of constructed truisms in International Relations theory, a 
key one being the opposition between domestic and international politics, or inside/outside, following 
Walker’s seminal work (1993). Though we noted a tension between the temporal-social and spatial-
political aspects of Russian identity, there is no doubt that one cannot be divorced from the other, and 




Appendix I - Interview Schedule 
 
Used in Moscow and St Petersburg, August-November 2005 
 
i) Background and formulation 
 
The interview questions were developed and piloted with assistance from native 
Russians with sociology and psychology backgrounds. The interviews were thus 
structured: the same questions were given, in the same order, to each respondent, 
though for some questions there were different follow-up questions depending on 
the answer. While it is usually considered bad scientific practice to have clearly 
value-laden questions (Silverman, 2001:232-34) this practice was a conscious choice 
made during the piloting of the interview questions. When the pilot questions were 
shorter and more neutral, the interviewees tended to either ask for the question to be 
more concrete, or answer in monosyllables. For example, when the pilot question ‚Is 
Russia spiritual?‛ was changed into ‚Is Russia today a source or example of 
spirituality for the rest of the world?‛ it immediately generated more and clearer 
response. In order to make abstract concepts like ‘Eurasia’ and ‘globalisation’ 
graspable for non-educated respondents, and to provoke answers in either one or 
another direction, many questions were allowed to be of a more journalistic 
character, subjective and containing generalizations.  
The main point, however, is that most generalizations and values expressed 
in the questions are not those of a Western academic, but such that are common in 
present Russian culture and every-day language. They are biases that most Russians 
recognise and can relate to, and they have been a consciously used tool for 
stimulating response, as in for example the following question: ‚Seventy years of 
Soviet rule: do you consider it a mistake and lost time, or an important part of 
Russian history?‛ Of course, as many interviewees have pointed out, an historical 
period cannot be a called a mistake, however tragic – yet the expression of ‘mistake 
and lost time’ is commonly used for the Soviet period and the question has in most 
cases stimulated clear, unambiguous answers to how the interviewees relate, or want 
to show that they relate, to their Soviet past. The question ‚Was it bad that the Soviet 
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Union collapsed?‛ was tried out as a less provocative alternative, but the answers 
then were mostly related to the way the Soviet Union collapsed, which for most 
people was a painful way, whatever they thought of the Soviet era as a whole. The 
question on Ukraine, ‚Ukraine: after the last events there it seems as if Ukraine has 
turned away from Russia and has taken a pro-Western path. How do you feel about 
this?‛ presupposes that Ukraine has turned away from Russia, that Russia is not on a 
pro-Western path, and that the interviewee feels something about this. This 
formulation has, as was intended, provoked the interviewees to either agree or 
disagree with the statement and then explain what his or her view is on the matter. 
So asking leading and even provocative questions has been a conscious step in order 
to get people to talk. The great variety of answers should testify that if the questions 
are leading, they certainly are not leading in a single direction. 
 
 
ii) Translated into English 
 
1.  What is your name? 
2.  a) Are you Russian? 
b) (If not) Of which nationality are you? 
3.  How old are you? 
4.  Where were you born? 
5.  Where do you live? 
6.  Do you have higher education? 
7.  What is your occupation? 
 
8.  Tyutchev writes:  
‚Russia cannot be understood with the mind 
Nor can she be measured with an ordinary yardstick 
She has a special stature: 
In Russia one can only believe‛ 
             a) Do you agree with this expression?  




9.  Is Russia today a source or an example of spirituality for the rest of the 
world? 
 
10.  a) It is said that on Russia has befallen a mission in relation to the rest of the 
world. Do you agree with this?  
b) (If yes) What does it consist of? 
c) (If no) What do you think, is this idea popular at some levels of society?  
d) (If yes) At which levels? 
 
11.  What, in your opinion, poses the greatest danger to Russia? 
 
12.  a) What do you think: seventy years of Soviet rule: is it a mistake and lost 
time, or is it an important part of Russian history? 
b) What in your opinion do most Russians think about this? (Are there 
generational differences?) 
 
13.  In your opinion, which historical periods can Russia be proud of: Imperial 
Russia, Soviet times, the Eltsin era, or other periods? 
 
14.  What period of history was especially tragic for Russia? 
 
15.  a) Have you heard anything about the concept Eurasia? 
b) (If yes) What do you understand by this concept? 
c) (If no or very hesitant) The idea basically suggests that there is a special 
civilization – Eurasia – between East and West. Eurasia is not only a 
continent, but also a harmonic unity of the former Soviet republics in which 
Russia is the centre. Possibly, this includes some Islamic countries and some 
Asian countries. What do you think about this idea? 
 




17.  What do you reckon: will Russia in the near future become a powerful empire 
on the international arena, or decline imperial ambitions?  
 
18.  What line of policy towards the Muslim governments would in your opinion 
be more desirable for Russia? 
 
19.  a) Do you consider that thanks to the Russian Orthodox Church, the spiritual 
potential of Russia is greater than of other countries?  
b) (If yes) What is the role of Russia: to stand against the West or to become 
for it a source of spirituality and true faith? 
  
20.  a) In Europe many talk about the danger of globalisation. Countries become 
more and more alike each other, people wear jeans, eat at McDonald’s and 
watch Hollywood films. It becomes impossible for local producers to compete 
with for example Coca-cola and Adidas. Do you think that globalisation is 
dangerous for Russia? Or is the Russian culture stronger? 
b) (If yes to danger) Can Russia counter pose globalisation on a world scale? 
 
21.  In the nearer future, how do you think that Russia’s relations to the West will 
unfold? 
 
22.  What, in your opinion, makes a Russian Russian? 
 
23.  Russia is a multinational country: in her territory live many peoples of 
different cultures, religions and traditions. What, in your opinion, unites 
them all? 
 
24.  In your opinion, can the Russian Orthodox Church play a significant role in 
the creation of a harmonious union between the Orthodox and 
representatives of other religions (Muslims, Jews, Buddhists) in the territory 




25.  The Muslim population of the Russian federation is growing fast. In what 
ways, in your opinion, does this affect the future of Russia? 
 
26.  a) What do you think: is there any significant anti-Semitism in Russia today?  
b) (If so) Is there more or less than in Soviet times? 
 
27.  Ukraine: after the last events there it seems as if Ukraine has turned away 
from Russia and has taken a pro-Western path. How do you feel about this? 
 
28.  Do you believe in the unity of the Slavonic republics – Russia, Ukraine and 
Belarus? 
 
29.  a) Did you vote in the last presidential elections? 




iii) Original version in Russian 
 
1.  Как Вас зовуг? 
2.  a) Вы – русский?  
b)  (если нет) Вы какая национальность? 
3.  Сколько Вам лет? 
4. Где Вы родились? 
5. Где Вы живете? 
6.  У Вас есть высшее образование?  
7.  Кем Вы работаете? 
  
8.  Тютчев пишет:   
«Умом Россию не понять 
Aршином общим не измерить 
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У ней особенная стать  
В Россию можно только верить»  
а) Вы согласны с этим выражением?  
b) (если ла) Что в ней особенное? 
 
9.  Является ли Россия сегодня источником или примером 
духовности для остального мира?  
 
10.  a) Считается, что на долю России выпала миссия по отношению к 
остальному миру. Вы с этим согласны?  
b) (если ла) В чем она заключается? (Или Россия уже выполнила 
свою миссию?)  
c) (если нет согласны) Как Вам кажется, эта идея популярна в 
некоторых слоях общества?  
d) (если ла) B каких?  
 
11.  Кто по-Вашему представляет сейчас главную опасность для 
России?   
 
12.  а) Как Вы считаете: 70 лет советской власти – это ошибка и 
потерянное время или это значимая часть Российской истории?   
b) Что по-вашему думает большинство русских по этому поводу?   
 
13.  Какими историческими периодами, по Вашему мнению, может 
гордиться Россия: Имперской Россией, советскими временами, 
эпохой Ельцина?  
 




15.  а) Вы что-нибудь слышали о концепции Евразии? Как Вы 
понимаете эту концепцию?  
b) (Если  нет) Идеа в основном предполагает, что существует 
особенная цивилизация – Евразия - между Западом и Востоком. 
Евразия – не только континент, а гармоничное единство бывших 
советских республик в котором Россия является центром. 
Возможно, это перерастет в союз России, некоторых 
мусульманских стран (как Иран) и некоторых азиатских стран. Что 
вы думаете об этой идее?    
 
16.  Как Вы считаете, Россия западная или восточная страна? 
 
17.  Как Вы считаете: в ближайшей перспективе Россия будет 
выступать на международной арене как мощная империя или 
откажется от имперских амбиций?  
 
18.  Какая линия поведения с мусульманскими государствами по-
Вашему была бы наиболее желательной для России?  
 
19.  а) Считаете ли Вы, что благодаря Русской православной церкви 
духовный потенциал России больше, чем у других стран?  
b) (если да) В чем по-Вашему роль России: противостоять Западу 
или стать для него источником духовности и истинной веры?   
 
20.  а) В Европе много говорят об опасности глобализации. Разные 
страны становятся похожи друг на друга: люди носят джинсы, едят 
в МакДональдсах и смотрят голливудские фильмы. Местным 
производителям невозможно конкурировать с Кока-Колой или 




b) Может ли Россия противостоять глобализации в мировом 
масштабе?  
 
21.  В ближайшей перспективе как по-вашему будут складываться 
взаимоотношения России с Западом?  
 
22.  Что, по-Вашему делает русского русским? (По каким признакам 
Вы отличаете русского от других национальностей?) (Россиян) 
 
23.  Россия – многонациональная страна: на ее территории живет 
много народов разных культур, религий и традиций. Что, по-
вашему, их всех объединяет?  
 
24.  Как, по-вашему, может ли русская православная церковь сыграть 
значительную роль в создании гармоничного союза православных 
с представителями других религий (мусульманами, иудеями, 
буддистами) на территории Российской Федерации?  
 
25.  Количество мусульман в Российской Федерации быстро растет – 
как, по-Вашему это влияет на будущее России?  
 
26.  Как Вы думаете, существует ли значительный антисемитизм в 
России сегодня?  
 
27.  Украина: после последних событий складывается впечатление, что 
Украина оторвалась от России и стала на прозападный путь.  
Что Вы чувствуете по этому поводу?  
 
28.  Вы еще верите в единство славянских республик (Россия, 




29.       a) Вы голосовали на последних президентских выборах в России?  
 b) (Если да) За Путина или за другого кандидата? 
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Case Sex Age 2 29 b) 8a) 9 10a) 10 b) 11
.C1-F37e F 30-39 Russian - Yes Yes Mission not exceptional Eurasia Russia, the Russians
.C2-F26e F 20-29 Russian - Yes Yes Mission not exceptional spirituality Materialism
.C3-M26e M 20-29 Russian Yes Yes Yes No - Terrorism, Islam
.C4-M28 M 20-29 Russian - Not sure No No - Doesn't know
.C5-M26e M 20-29 Russian - Yes No No - Russia, the Russians
.C6-M29e M 20-29 Russian No Yes No No - Terrorism, Islam
.C7-M31e M 30-39 Russian Yes No Yes No - Nothing 
.C8-F31e F 30-39 Russian No Yes No Yes Eurasia Communist generation
.C9-M34e M 30-39 Russian - Yes No Mission not exceptional Eurasia Russia, the Russians
.C10-M34e M 30-39 Russian - No No No - Russia, the Russians
.C11-M34e M 30-39 Russian - Yes Yes Yes spirituality Russia, the Russians
.C12-F36e F 30-39 Russian - Not sure Yes Not sure - Nothing 
.C13-F36e M 30-39 Russian ? Yes Yes Yes spirituality Drugs, alcohol
.C14-M37e M 30-39 Russian ? No Yes Mission not exceptional spirituality Russia, the Russians
.C15-M38e M 30-39 Russian No Yes No Mission not exceptional oppose West Economy / poverty
.C16-M39e M 30-39 Georgian Yes Yes Yes No - Nothing 
.C17-M39e M 30-39 Jewish No Yes No No - Corruption
.C18-M39e M 30-39 Russian - Yes No Mission complete - Economy / poverty
.C19-M37e M 30-39 Russian Yes Not sure No No - Russia, the Russians
.C20-M48e M 40-49 Russian No Yes No Mission complete Saviour Disunity etc
.C21-M42e M 40-49 Russian         Yes Not sure No - Russia, the Russians
.C22-M45e M 40-49 Russian Yes No No Mission complete Eurasia Terrorism, Islam
.C23-F41e F 40-49 Jewish No Not sure No Mission not exceptional - Russia, the Russians
.C24-F47e F 40-49 Jewish - Yes No No - Fascism, extremism
.C25-M42e M 40-49 Russian - Yes Yes Mission not exceptional be different Terrorism, Islam
.C26-M49e M 40-49 Russian Yes Not sure No Yes example of survival Russia, the Russians
.C27-M58e M 50-59 Russian No Yes Not sure Yes warning example Rulers, bureacrats
.C28-F60e F 60-69 Russian Yes No Yes Mission not exceptional influence the world Russia, the Russians
.C29-M71e M >70 Russian Yes No No No - Corruption
.C30-M75e M >70 Jewish - No No No - Rulers, bureacrats
.C31-M18 M 15-19 Russian - Not sure Yes Yes spirituality Russia, the Russians
.C32-F17 F 15-19 Russian - Yes No Yes independence Doesn't know
.C33-F19 F 15-19 Russian Yes No No Not sure improve the world -
.C34-M15 M 15-19 Mixed Yes Yes No Yes improve the world Fascism, extremism
.C35-M15 M 15-19 Russian - Yes Not sure No - War
.C36-M17 M 15-19 Russian - Yes Yes Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C37-F19 F 15-19 Russian - Yes No No - The US
.C38-M18 M 15-19 Greek Yes Yes Yes No - Terrorism, Islam
.C39-M19 M 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No Yes - Western ideology
.C40-F17 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No Yes spirituality Russia, the Russians
.C41-F19 F 15-19 Russian - Not sure No No - Doesn't know
.C42-F15 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No Not sure - Rulers, bureacrats
.C43-F19 F 15-19 Ukrainian - Yes Yes Mission complete Saviour Nothing 
.C44-M18 M 15-19 Korean Yes Yes Not sure Not sure - The US
.C45-M18 M 15-19 Russian No Yes No Not sure - Russia, the Russians
.C46-M19 M 15-19 Russian ? Yes - Mission not exceptional - Russia, the Russians
.C47-M19 M 15-19 Mixed No Yes Yes No - Rulers, bureacrats
.C48-M19 M 15-19 Russian Yes Yes Not sure Yes oppose West Terrorism, Islam
.C49-M19 M 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No No - Rulers, bureacrats
.C50-F18 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No No - Rulers, bureacrats
.C51-F19 F 15-19 Russian No Not sure Yes Mission complete Saviour Economy / poverty
.C52-F20 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No No - Russia, the Russians
.C53-M17 M 15-19 Russian No No No Mission complete influence the world Russia, the Russians
.C54-F17 F 15-19 Russian - Yes Yes No - The US
.C55-F16 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No Yes - Doesn't know
.C56-M18 M 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No Not sure - Other
.C57-M17 M 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C58-F15 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes Yes Not sure - Terrorism, Islam
.C59-M18 M 15-19 Russian Yes Yes Not sure Yes Saviour Nothing 
.C60-F18 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C61-F16 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes No No - Terrorism, Islam
.C62-F16 F 15-19 Russian Yes Yes Yes Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C63-M15 M 15-19 Russian ? Yes No Yes preach gospel Nothing 
.C64-M15 M 15-19 Russian - Yes Yes Not sure - Doesn't know
.C65-M18 M 15-19 Russian Yes No Yes Yes multiculturalism The US
.C66-M18 M 15-19 Russian Yes Yes Yes Not sure - Chechnya
.C67-F18 F 15-19 Russian No Yes No No - The US
.C68-F22 F 15-19 Russian ? Not sure Yes Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C69-M26 M 20-29 Russian No Yes No No - Terrorism, Islam
.C70-M27 M 20-29 Russian Yes No No Yes spirituality Rulers, bureacrats
.C71-M26 M 20-29 Russian ? Yes No Yes improve the world Drugs, alcohol
.C72-M27 M 20-29 Russian No Yes Yes Not sure - Russia, the Russians
.C73-F21 F 20-29 Russian Yes Yes No No - War
.C74-M21 M 20-29 Russian - No Yes Yes - Nothing 
.C75-F22 F 20-29 Russian - Yes Not sure Not sure - Rulers, bureacrats
.C76-M25 M 20-29 Russian Yes Not sure - No - -
.C77-M21 M 20-29 Russian Yes Yes Yes Yes - The US
.C78-M28 M 20-29 Russian Yes Not sure No Yes influence the world Terrorism, Islam




Case 12 a) 12b) 15 a) 15 b,c) 16 17 19 a) 20 a) 20 b)
.C1-F37e It's history differently Yes matter of fact Eastern Yes No Yes Not yet
.C2-F26e Important - not much matter of fact other Not sure Yes Yes No 
.C3-M26e It's history - Yes matter of fact other Yes Yes No Not sure
.C4-M28 Mistake, lost time differently Yes negative not sure Yes Yes No Not yet
.C5-M26e It's history differently Yes not sure not sure Yes No No No need
.C6-M29e Mistake, lost time differently Yes negative - Decline No Yes Yes
.C7-M31e It's history - Yes matter of fact - Great Power only Yes No No need
.C8-F31e Both - - - other Great Power only No Depends Not sure
.C9-M34e Important differently Yes positive other Yes No Depends No need
.C10-M34e Mistake, lost time differently Yes negative Western Yes but will fail No No No 
.C11-M34e Mistake, lost time - Yes - other - Yes Yes Not sure
.C12-F36e Important - not much negative other Already empire Yes No -
.C13-F36e Important differently Yes positive other Yes Yes No Yes
.C14-M37e It's history - Yes matter of fact - Great Power only Yes Depends No 
.C15-M38e Important - Yes matter of fact other Yes No Depends -
.C16-M39e It's history same - positive - Great Power only No No No need
.C17-M39e It's history same Yes positive Western Yes No No Yes
.C18-M39e Important - not much positive - Yes No Yes No 
.C19-M37e Important - not much not sure other Yes No No No need
.C20-M48e Not sure - Yes positive other Yes No Yes No 
.C21-M42e It's history - not much matter of fact other Yes but will fail No Depends .
.C22-M45e It's history not sure Yes not sure Western Great Power only - No No need
.C23-F41e Both - Yes negative Western Yes but will fail No No No need
.C24-F47e Important differently not much negative other Yes No Yes No 
.C25-M42e Both not sure Yes positive - Great Power only Yes Yes Not yet
.C26-M49e Important - Yes negative other Yes but will fail Yes Depends -
.C27-M58e It's history - Yes - other Yes but will fail No Yes No 
.C28-F60e It's history - Yes negative Western Decline No Depends -
.C29-M71e Both - Yes positive - Decline Not sure Yes No need
.C30-M75e Important - Yes matter of fact both Great Power only Yes No No 
.C31-M18 Both - not much positive Eastern Great Power only No Yes No need
.C32-F17 Important same not much not sure not sure Yes Yes No Yes
.C33-F19 Not sure same not much positive other Decline Not sure No Not sure
.C34-M15 Mistake, lost time differently not much positive Western Yes No No Yes
.C35-M15 Important not sure Yes positive other Decline Yes No Not sure
.C36-M17 Important not sure not much positive Western Not sure No Yes Yes
.C37-F19 Mistake, lost time - Yes - other Yes but will fail Yes Yes No 
.C38-M18 Both same Yes - other Yes Yes Depends Yes
.C39-M19 It's history differently not much negative other Yes No Yes No 
.C40-F17 It's history - not much not sure other Yes but will fail Yes No No 
.C41-F19 Both - not much not sure Western Decline Yes No No need
.C42-F15 Important same not much not sure Western Not sure Yes No Yes
.C43-F19 Important same not much positive other Decline No No No 
.C44-M18 Important same Yes positive Western Yes Yes Yes No 
.C45-M18 Both differently not much matter of fact Western Decline Yes Yes No 
.C46-M19 It's history same Yes negative Western Yes Not sure Yes No 
.C47-M19 Both same not much matter of fact Western Yes No No Yes
.C48-M19 Important same Yes - Western Great Power only Yes Yes Yes
.C49-M19 Mistake, lost time same Yes matter of fact - Yes Yes Yes No 
.C50-F18 Not sure - Yes not sure Western Decline No Not sure No 
.C51-F19 It's history - Yes matter of fact Western Great Power only No Depends -
.C52-F20 Important not sure not much not sure Western Yes Not sure Yes Yes
.C53-M17 Mistake, lost time same not much not sure other Not sure No No -
.C54-F17 Important same not much not sure Western Yes Yes Yes Yes
.C55-F16 Important - not much - Eastern Yes Not sure No -
.C56-M18 It's history differently not much not sure Western Yes but will fail Yes Depends Not yet
.C57-M17 Mistake, lost time same not much not sure both Already empire Yes No Yes
.C58-F15 Not sure - not much not sure other Decline Yes No No need
.C59-M18 Mistake, lost time same not much not sure Western Yes Yes No No 
.C60-F18 Not sure not sure not much not sure both Decline Yes No Yes
.C61-F16 Mistake, lost time same not much not sure Eastern Decline Yes No No 
.C62-F16 Important differently not much not sure Western Yes Yes No Yes
.C63-M15 Mistake, lost time differently not much negative Western Yes Yes No No 
.C64-M15 Mistake, lost time same not much negative Western Decline - Yes No 
.C65-M18 Not sure - not much not sure Western Yes Yes Yes No 
.C66-M18 Not sure not sure not much positive - Not sure Yes No No 
.C67-F18 It's history same not much negative other Yes but will fail Not sure Yes No 
.C68-F22 Important differently not much negative both Yes Yes Yes No need
.C69-M26 Mistake, lost time same not much matter of fact Western Yes No No No need
.C70-M27 Important same not much positive Western Yes Not sure No Yes
.C71-M26 It's history same not much positive Eastern - No No Yes
.C72-M27 Important same Yes matter of fact both Not sure Not sure No No need
.C73-F21 Important same not much negative Eastern Yes Yes Yes Not sure
.C74-M21 Mistake, lost time differently not much not sure both Decline No No No 
.C75-F22 It's history - not much positive other Yes No Not sure Not sure
.C76-M25 Both differently not much not sure - Already empire No No No need
.C77-M21 Mistake, lost time differently not much not sure Western Yes Yes No Yes
.C78-M28 Important same not much not sure Western Yes Yes Yes No 





Case 21 22 23 28
.C1-F37e Positively, normally mentality etc patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C2-F26e Negatively roots, birth Eurasian or spiritual idea Yes
.C3-M26e Positively, normally patriotism life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C4-M28 Pragmatically not sure history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Partly
.C5-M26e Pragmatically nothing life: territory, statehood, language No
.C6-M29e Negatively spirituality, soul history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Partly
.C7-M31e Pragmatically Orthodoxy nothing No
.C8-F31e Unification spirituality, soul history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C9-M34e Not sure mentality etc life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C10-M34e Pragmatically Russian language life: territory, statehood, language No
.C11-M34e Positively, normally Orthodoxy history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C12-F36e Positively, normally Russian language life: territory, statehood, language Not sure
.C13-F36e Pragmatically patriotism other Yes
.C14-M37e Pragmatically missionism - -
.C15-M38e Positively, normally good citizenship history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C16-M39e Pragmatically patriotism patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C17-M39e Pragmatically Russian language life: territory, statehood, language No
.C18-M39e Positively, normally undescribable other No
.C19-M37e Positively, normally roots, birth nothing No
.C20-M48e Pragmatically spirituality, soul life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C21-M42e .         . .
.C22-M45e Positively, normally undescribable life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C23-F41e Positively, normally Russian language hiistory, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C24-F47e Not sure Russian soil life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C25-M42e Not sure spirituality, soul life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C26-M49e - spirituality, soul life: territory, statehood, language -
.C27-M58e Pragmatically spirituality, soul history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C28-F60e Positively, normally sense of history history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C29-M71e Pragmatically undescribable not sure Yes
.C30-M75e Pragmatically - economy, work, poverty -
.C31-M18 Unification mentality etc Eurasian or spiritual idea Yes
.C32-F17 Not sure patriotism patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C33-F19 Positively, normally cultural other Yes
.C34-M15 Positively, normally patriotism other Yes
.C35-M15 Positively, normally Russian language other Yes
.C36-M17 Positively, normally undescribable life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C37-F19 Positively, normally material welfare nothing No
.C38-M18 Pragmatically patriotism history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C39-M19 Negatively patriotism other Yes
.C40-F17 Pragmatically patriotism nothing Partly
.C41-F19 Positively, normally love other No
.C42-F15 Pragmatically vodka not sure Yes
.C43-F19 Positively, normally mentality etc Eurasian or spiritual idea Yes
.C44-M18 Positively, normally cultural life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C45-M18 Positively, normally not sure patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C46-M19 Positively, normally cultural life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C47-M19 Positively, normally love Eurasian or spiritual idea Yes
.C48-M19 Positively, normally spirituality, soul not sure Yes
.C49-M19 Positively, normally not sure history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C50-F18 Positively, normally sense of Russianness other No
.C51-F19 Unification spirituality, soul other Partly
.C52-F20 Positively, normally laziness etc economy, work, poverty No
.C53-M17 Pragmatically patriotism economy, work, poverty Yes
.C54-F17 Positively, normally hospitality etc not sure Yes
.C55-F16 Not sure cultural not sure Partly
.C56-M18 Pragmatically Russian language life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C57-M17 Positively, normally patriotism life: territory, statehood, language No
.C58-F15 Positively, normally mentality etc economy, work, poverty Yes
.C59-M18 Positively, normally vodka nothing Not sure
.C60-F18 Not sure intellectualism not sure Yes
.C61-F16 - faith, general economy, work, poverty No
.C62-F16 Positively, normally not sure not sure Yes
.C63-M15 Unification spirituality, soul economy, work, poverty Yes
.C64-M15 Pragmatically intellectualism life: territory, statehood, language No
.C65-M18 Not sure - life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C66-M18 Positively, normally spirituality, soul nothing No
.C67-F18 Not sure not sure life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C68-F22 Positively, normally irrelevant other Yes
.C69-M26 Negatively not sure not sure No
.C70-M27 Pragmatically not sure life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C71-M26 Not sure mentality etc history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C72-M27 Positively, normally undescribable history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C73-F21 Not sure spirituality, soul not sure No
.C74-M21 Positively, normally vodka history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C75-F22 Negatively hospitality etc life: territory, statehood, language No
.C76-M25 Positively, normally unpredictability life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C77-M21 Positively, normally spirituality, soul economy, work, poverty Yes
.C78-M28 Positively, normally hospitality etc not sure Yes
.C79-F20 Positively, normally cultural history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No  
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Case Sex Age 2 29 b) 8a) 9 10a) 10 b) 11
.C80-F20 F 20-29 Russian No Yes Yes Yes spirituality China
.C81-F20 F 20-29 Russian Yes Yes Yes Mission not exceptional - Other
.C82-F20 F 20-29 Russian Yes Yes Yes Yes be different Corruption
.C83-M21 M 20-29 Russian No Yes Yes Mission not exceptional - Russia, the Russians
.C84-M27 M 20-29 Mixed No No Not sure No - Nothing 
.C85-F21 F 20-29 Russian Yes Not sure Not sure No - Doesn't know
.C86-F24 F 20-29 Russian No Not sure Yes Mission complete spirituality The US
.C87-F24 F 20-29 Russian Yes Not sure Yes Not sure - Doesn't know
.C88-M22 M 20-29 Russian Yes Yes No Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C89-M22 M 20-29 Russian Yes Not sure Yes No - Terrorism, Islam
.C90-M23 M 20-29 Artunets Yes Yes No Mission complete - Russia, the Russians
.C91-F22 F 20-29 Russian No Yes Yes Yes cultural influence Russia, the Russians
.C92-F20 F 20-29 Russian Yes Not sure Yes No - Russia, the Russians
.C93-F22 F 20-29 Jewish - Yes No No - Russia, the Russians
.C94-F24 F 20-29 Russian Yes Yes No Yes warning example -
.C95-M26 M 20-29 Russian No Yes Yes No - The US
.C96-M22 M 20-29 Russian - Yes No No - Ecological problems
.C97-M23 M 20-29 Russian No Yes No Yes evil empire The US
.C98-M28 M 20-29 Russian Yes Not sure Not sure No - Nothing 
.C99-M25 M 20-29 Armenian Yes Not sure No No - Nothing 
.C100-M20 M 20-29 Russian No Yes No Mission complete warning example Nothing 
.C101-M22 M 20-29 Russian Yes Yes Not sure No - The US
.C102-F22 F 20-29 Russian No No No No - Russia, the Russians
.C103-M28 M 20-29 Ukrainian Yes Not sure No Not sure - The US
.C104-M25 M 20-29 Mixed - Yes No No - Russia, the Russians
.C105-F29 F 20-29 Russian ? Yes No Not sure - Rulers, bureacrats
.C106-M32 M 30-39 Mixed Yes Yes Not sure Not sure Eurasia -
.C107-M38 M 30-39 Russian Yes Yes No No - Corruption
.C108-M35 M 30-39 Russian No Yes Yes Yes be different Russia, the Russians
.C109-M31 M 30-39 Mixed Yes No No No - Russia, the Russians
.C110-F31 F 30-39 Russian Yes Yes No No - -
.C111-F37 F 30-39 Russian - Not sure No Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C112-F37 F 30-39 Russian Yes Yes No Yes - Corruption
.C113-F37 F 30-39 Russian Yes Yes Not sure Mission not exceptional - Nothing 
.C114-F31 F 30-39 Russian ? Yes No Not sure - Russia, the Russians
.C116-M30 M 30-39 Russian - Yes Not sure Not sure - Doesn't know
.C117-F30 F 30-39 Russian - No No No - Disunity etc
.C118-F32 F 30-39 Russian Yes Yes No Yes improve the world Terrorism, Islam
.C119-M38 M 40-49 Russian - Yes Yes Yes influence the world Rulers, bureacrats
.C120-F40 F 40-49 Mixed - Yes No No - Disunity etc
.C121-F43 F 40-49 Korean Yes Yes Not sure Not sure - Terrorism, Islam
.C122-F45 F 40-49 Mixed No Yes Yes Not sure - -
.C123-M41 M 40-49 Russian Yes Yes No No - Russia, the Russians
.C124-M47 M 40-49 Russian ? Yes No No - Terrorism, Islam
.C125-F42 F 40-49 Russian No Yes No Mission complete warning example Terrorism, Islam
.C126-M46 M 40-49 Russian - Yes Yes Yes - Terrorism, Islam
.C127-F43 F 40-49 Russian Yes Not sure Yes Not sure - Terrorism, Islam
.C128-M48 M 40-49 Russian Yes Not sure Not sure No - Other
.C129-M43 M 40-49 Russian - Yes Not sure No - Rulers, bureacrats
.C130-M40 M 40-49 Russian - Yes No No - Drugs, alcohol
.C131-F47 F 40-49 Russian No No No No - Rulers, bureacrats
.C132-F45 F 40-49 Russian No Yes Not sure No - Nothing 
.C133-F47 F 40-49 Russian ? Yes Not sure Not sure - Terrorism, Islam
.C134-M42 M 40-49 Russian Yes Not sure No Not sure - Russia, the Russians
.C135-M43 M 40-49 Russian Yes Not sure Yes Not sure - Doesn't know
.C136-F42. F 40-49 Russian Yes Yes No No - Russia, the Russians
.C137-F46 F 40-49 Mixed Yes Not sure No Yes preach gospel Sin
.C138-M40 M 40-49 Jewish - Yes Yes Yes preach gospel Fascism, extremism
.C139-M48 M 40-49 Russian Yes Yes Not sure Yes multiculturalism Terrorism, Islam
.C140-F59 F 50-59 Russian Yes Not sure Yes No - -
.C141-F54 F 50-59 Russian Yes Yes - No - Disunity etc
.C143-F55 F 50-59 Russian No Yes No Yes - Nothing 
.C144-F51 F 50-59 Russian Yes Yes Not sure Not sure - Russia, the Russians
.C145-M50 M 50-59 Tadjik - Yes Not sure Not sure - -
.C146-M55 M 50-59 Russian - No No No - Corruption
.C147-M55 M 50-59 Caucasian - Yes No No - Zionism
.C148-F57 F 50-59 Russian Yes Not sure No Mission not exceptional - Disunity etc
.C149-F52 F 50-59 Russian ? Not sure No No - Terrorism, Islam
.C150-M60 M 60-69 Russian Yes Yes No No - Rulers, bureacrats
.C151-M60 M 60-69 Russian No Yes Yes No - Russia, the Russians
.C152-F68 F 60-69 Russian Yes Yes No Yes warning example Russia, the Russians
.C153-F67 F 60-69 Russian Yes Yes No No - Doesn't know
.C154-M67 M 60-69 Russian Yes Yes No No - Terrorism, Islam
.C155-F67 F 60-69 Russian Yes Yes Yes Yes improve the world War
.C156-F64 F 60-69 Russian No Yes Not sure Yes spirituality Terrorism, Islam
.C157-F65 F 60-69 Russian Yes Yes No Yes Saviour Terrorism, Islam
.C158-F70 F >70 Russian - Yes Yes Not sure - Doesn't know
.C159-F80 F >70 Russian No Yes No No - Terrorism, Islam




Case 12 a) 12b) 15 a) 15 b,c) 16 17 19 a) 20 a) 20 b)
.C80-F20 Important differently not much negative other Yes Yes Yes No 
.C81-F20 Important differently not much not sure Eastern Yes Not sure No Yes
.C82-F20 It's history differently not much not sure other Yes but will fail Yes Yes Yes
.C83-M21 It's history - Yes positive both Yes Yes Depends Not yet
.C84-M27 Important differently not much negative Eastern Yes but will fail Not sure No No need
.C85-F21 It's history differently not much not sure other Not sure No No No 
.C86-F24 Important - Yes negative Eastern Yes but will fail No Yes No 
.C87-F24 Important - not much not sure Eastern Decline Yes No No 
.C88-M22 It's history differently not much not sure Eastern Yes No Yes Yes
.C89-M22 It's history - Yes not sure Western Yes Not sure No Not yet
.C90-M23 Important same not much - Western Yes but will fail No Yes No 
.C91-F22 Important - not much positive both Yes No Yes Not sure
.C92-F20 It's history differently Yes positive both Yes No Yes No 
.C93-F22 Important same not much not sure both Not sure No Yes Not sure
.C94-F24 Important - Yes matter of fact - Not sure Yes No No need
.C95-M26 Important same not much positive other Yes Yes No No 
.C96-M22 Important not sure Yes matter of fact Western Yes Yes Yes Yes
.C97-M23 Important same Yes not sure other Yes No No Yes
.C98-M28 It's history - not much not sure both - - No No 
.C99-M25 Mistake, lost time same not much not sure Western Yes No No Yes
.C100-M20 Both not sure Yes matter of fact other Decline Not sure No Yes
.C101-M22 Both - Yes matter of fact Western Decline No Depends No 
.C102-F22 Both - Yes negative Western Yes but will fail Yes No No 
.C103-M28 Not sure - not much not sure Eastern Decline Yes No Yes
.C104-M25 Important - not much matter of fact both Great Power only No No No 
.C105-F29 It's history - not much negative both Already empire No Yes No 
.C106-M32 Both differently Yes negative Western Yes but will fail No Depends No 
.C107-M38 It's history same not much not sure both Decline No No No need
.C108-M35 Important differently not much negative Western Yes Yes No No 
.C109-M31 It's history differently not much negative Western Already empire No Yes No 
.C110-F31 Important differently Yes negative - Yes No No -
.C111-F37 Important - not much positive Western Not sure Yes No Not sure
.C112-F37 Important - not much not sure other Not sure No Yes No 
.C113-F37 Both - not much negative Western Yes Not sure No Yes
.C114-F31 Mistake, lost time - Yes negative Eastern Yes No Yes No 
.C116-M30 It's history - not much positive not sure Yes Yes Yes Yes
.C117-F30 It's history - Yes negative other Yes but will fail No - No 
.C118-F32 Important - not much negative not sure Yes Yes Yes Yes
.C119-M38 Important same not much negative both Yes Yes Yes Yes
.C120-F40 Important - not much not sure Eastern Decline No No -
.C121-F43 It's history - not much negative - Not sure No No -
.C122-F45 Important same Yes matter of fact - Decline No Yes No 
.C123-M41 It's history - not much positive - Yes Yes Depends No 
.C124-M47 Both differently not much positive Eastern Yes No No No 
.C125-F42 Important same Yes matter of fact Western Yes but will fail No Yes No 
.C126-M46 Important differently not much negative other Yes Yes Yes Yes
.C127-F43 Mistake, lost time same not much negative Western Not sure Yes No Yes
.C128-M48 Important same Yes not sure Western Yes No No Yes
.C129-M43 Important differently Yes positive Eastern Decline No Yes No 
.C130-M40 It's history - Yes negative both Yes but will fail Not sure No -
.C131-F47 Mistake, lost time - not much positive Western Yes but will fail No - -
.C132-F45 Mistake, lost time differently not much negative Western Yes No No -
.C133-F47 Important not sure not much negative Western Not sure Not sure No Yes
.C134-M42 It's history - Yes not sure both Yes Yes No Yes
.C135-M43 It's history differently not much not sure Eastern Already empire Not sure Not sure -
.C136-F42. Important - not much not sure other Yes Yes No Not yet
.C137-F46 Important not sure Yes not sure other Not sure No No -
.C138-M40 Mistake, lost time differently Yes positive Eastern Not sure No Yes Not sure
.C139-M48 Mistake, lost time same Yes positive Western Decline No No -
.C140-F59 Both same not much not sure Western Yes but will fail No Depends -
.C141-F54 Mistake, lost time differently Yes - both Yes but will fail No No -
.C143-F55 Important same not much positive Western Decline Not sure Not sure No 
.C144-F51 Important not sure not much not sure - Yes but will fail Yes Not sure No need
.C145-M50 Important - not much not sure not sure Not sure Yes No Yes
.C146-M55 Important same Yes positive Western Yes No No No need
.C147-M55 Mistake, lost time - Yes negative other - No Yes Yes
.C148-F57 Mistake, lost time not sure Yes matter of fact both Not sure Not sure Depends No 
.C149-F52 Important - not much not sure other Yes No No No need
.C150-M60 It's history differently not much negative - Decline No Yes Yes
.C151-M60 Important not sure Yes matter of fact both Great Power only No Not sure Not sure
.C152-F68 Mistake, lost time differently not much negative other Decline No No No need
.C153-F67 It's history differently not much negative other Yes No Yes Not sure
.C154-M67 Mistake, lost time - Yes positive other Great Power only No No No 
.C155-F67 Important same not much positive - Yes Yes No Yes
.C156-F64 Important same Yes positive Western Yes Yes No No need
.C157-F65 Important same not much not sure not sure Not sure Yes Not sure Not sure
.C158-F70 Important differently not much not sure other Already empire Not sure No Yes
.C159-F80 Mistake, lost time same Yes not sure both Not sure Yes Yes Not sure





Case 21 22 23 28
.C80-F20 Positively, normally patriotism life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C81-F20 Positively, normally patriotism life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C82-F20 Positively, normally mentality etc life: territory, statehood, language No
.C83-M21 Positively, normally mentality etc history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C84-M27 Pragmatically Russian language history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Partly
.C85-F21 Not sure sense of history economy, work, poverty Yes
.C86-F24 Positively, normally spirituality, soul nothing Yes
.C87-F24 Not sure Orthodoxy other No
.C88-M22 Pragmatically vodka other No
.C89-M22 Positively, normally undescribable life: territory, statehood, language No
.C90-M23 Not sure nothing history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C91-F22 Pragmatically not sure life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C92-F20 Positively, normally spirituality, soul life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C93-F22 Pragmatically mentality etc Eurasian or spiritual idea No
.C94-F24 Not sure mentality etc nothing Yes
.C95-M26 Not sure spirituality, soul life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C96-M22 Unification not sure patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C97-M23 Negatively vodka not sure No
.C98-M28 Not sure lifestyle nothing No
.C99-M25 Positively, normally not sure life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C100-M20 Pragmatically mentality etc history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C101-M22 Positively, normally roots, birth nothing Yes
.C102-F22 Pragmatically cultural history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C103-M28 Positively, normally faith, general economy, work, poverty Not sure
.C104-M25 Pragmatically life here life: territory, statehood, language No
.C105-F29 Not sure vodka hiistory, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C106-M32 Positively, normally lack of culture life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C107-M38 Positively, normally Russian language life: territory, statehood, language No
.C108-M35 Pragmatically not sure history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Partly
.C109-M31 - spirituality, soul nothing No
.C110-F31 Pragmatically intellectualism life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C111-F37 Positively, normally sense of history other Yes
.C112-F37 Positively, normally not sure history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C113-F37 Positively, normally spirituality, soul not sure Yes
.C114-F31 Pragmatically poverty mentality history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C116-M30 Pragmatically not sure other Yes
.C117-F30 - not sure history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Partly
.C118-F32 Positively, normally spirituality, soul history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C119-M38 Pragmatically undescribable life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C120-F40 Positively, normally cultural other Yes
.C121-F43 Positively, normally - history, nostalgia, Soviet rule No
.C122-F45 - hospitality etc not sure Yes
.C123-M41 Positively, normally patriotism other Yes
.C124-M47 Positively, normally cultural life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C125-F42 Positively, normally fascination with West history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Partly
.C126-M46 Positively, normally Orthodoxy life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C127-F43 Positively, normally Russian language not sure Yes
.C128-M48 Positively, normally love patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C129-M43 Pragmatically unpredictability economy, work, poverty No
.C130-M40 Positively, normally spirituality, soul life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C131-F47 - - nothing Yes
.C132-F45 Positively, normally roots, birth life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C133-F47 Positively, normally spirituality, soul economy, work, poverty Yes
.C134-M42 Positively, normally unexisting idea life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C135-M43 Positively, normally Orthodoxy life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C136-F42. Positively, normally Orthodoxy life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C137-F46 Not sure faith in God patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C138-M40 Not sure Russian language Eurasian or spiritual idea Yes
.C139-M48 Positively, normally undescribable - Yes
.C140-F59 Negatively spirituality, soul not sure Not sure
.C141-F54 Pragmatically - nothing No
.C143-F55 Positively, normally roots, birth other Partly
.C144-F51 Positively, normally mentality etc life: territory, statehood, language Partly
.C145-M50 Not sure not sure patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Partly
.C146-M55 Pragmatically mentality etc other Yes
.C147-M55 Not sure poverty nothing No
.C148-F57 Positively, normally cultural life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C149-F52 Positively, normally roots, birth history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C150-M60 Positively, normally not sure life: territory, statehood, language No
.C151-M60 Positively, normally patriotism life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C152-F68 Not sure unpredictability life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C153-F67 Positively, normally mentality etc patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C154-M67 Positively, normally undescribable history, nostalgia, Soviet rule Yes
.C155-F67 Positively, normally cultural life: territory, statehood, language Yes
.C156-F64 Positively, normally faith, general patriotism, friendship, love, humanity Yes
.C157-F65 Positively, normally life here economy, work, poverty No
.C158-F70 Positively, normally love other Yes
.C159-F80 Not sure cultural nothing Partly




 Appendix III – Interview Case Studies 
 
We have selected fourteen case studies from the interviews on the basis of their 
contribution to answering three of the research questions (Q4 is omitted as it 
concerns a different level of discourse). They constitute a varied sample of 
interviewees from different social and age backgrounds, and with very different 
views, to illustrate the nuances and diversity in perceptions of Russian identity and 
manifestation of messianic discourse. 
 
i) Q1. How can the study of discourse (as ideas and narratives) enhance 
our understanding of the collective identity of Russians? 
 
Interpretive analysis of the interviews based on strands of discourse theory makes 
possible the identification of themes and narratives that appear as central to the 
interviewee and their possible relation to each other and to other levels of discourse; 
and representations of Russia and of other actors in relation to which Russia is 
defined. Through the semi-structured interview format interviewees are able to talk 
at length, and when they want to diverge from the exact question to talk about what 
is important to them, drawing on and constructing different narratives in the 
process. These ‘texts’ provide an opportunity to identify and understand complex 
issues of Russian collective identity which opinion polls and surveys are unable to 
grasp. These cases of semi-structured interviews, with interviewees from extremely 
different backgrounds, all illustrate common ambiguities and dualisms of post-Soviet 
Russian identity construction with various internal contradictions in the – often 
deeply pessimistic – representations of Russia, the Russians, Putin and the 
government, indicating that the crisis of social and political relations is not yet over.  
 
C1-F36e*: Svetlana, 36, manager of PR company, Moscow 
Svetlana draws a lot upon the Eurasia discourse: as Russia is situated between East 
and West she has both the Asian and European mentalities, and her mission lies in 
uniting these mentalities and spiritualities. But Svetlana’s image of Russia is not 
unproblematic: Russia is a source of spirituality for the rest of the world but as a 
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nation it is ridden by a deep, inner conflict. For Svetlana, the Russians themselves 
pose the greatest danger to Russia. She describes that many are so used to having 
someone else make decisions for them that they have become incapacitated, lazy and 
poor, feeding on nostalgia. Few, including the politicians, think long-term; all want 
quick gains. Svetlana expresses deep resentment against the idea of Russia as being 
democratic – the presidential elections, she explains, is a farce, a theatre and already 
pre-arranged. Nobody’s voice changes anything. She admits that there was a lot of 
negative things during the Soviet period, but argues that there also was a lot of good 
points and achievements that ought not to be forgotten and suggests that there must 
have been a higher reason for what happened. The discourses on Slavonic 
brotherhood and civilization have little resonance with Svetlana as she openly 
admits that she even loves ‚Jews more than Ukrainians.‛ She uses analogues of 
prostitution to describe Ukraine, and other derogatory terms about the former Soviet 
republics; whereas Russia, on the other hand, is described in the terms ‚strong, 
beautiful and very original.‛ The discourse on Russia helping others and sacrificing 
herself is drawn upon as Svetlana describes how Russia took care of the republics 
that were only ungrateful. Now they regret leaving Russia but it is too late for them. 
But as for Russia, she both has potential and future. She admits that there was a lot of 
negative things during the Soviet period, but argues that there also was a lot of good 
points and achievements that ought not to be forgotten and suggests that there must 
have been a higher reason for what happened. In Svetlana’s account two different 
Russia’s are constructed: on the one hand the true Russia, strong, beautiful, helping 
others, with loads of potential, whose native soil is pulling back the Russians who 
left for America during the perestroika; on the other, the conflict-ridden Russian 
nation of lazy Russians and corrupt politicians.  
 
C53-M17*: Sergei, 17, unemployed, Moscow 
Sergei, who was interviewed in a park in central Moscow where he was hanging out 
with a group of prostitutes and skinheads, paints a gloomy, far from heroic, picture 
of Russia. Only money counts for influence, he argues, and many political and 
scientific people that should be influential are not because they don’t have money. 
Asked whether Russia is a source or example of spirituality, Sergei responds: ‚No. 
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She never was, and for another twenty-five years won’t be either. We still haven’t 
understood what it’s like to be civilised.‛ This echoes the Western discourse on the 
uncivilised Orient in relation to which the civilised (and civilising) West is defined, 
as analysed by Edward Said. Again we see a young Russian resorting to Western 
discourses on Russia to criticize it. Russia might have a mission though, even if she is 
not civilised: in the textbooks, Sergei explains, someone always depended on Russia, 
she was always needed by someone. So neither civilised, nor a source or example of 
spirituality, but always needed and depended on by someone. Yet Sergei, like so 
many others, sees the Russian people itself as the main danger to Russia. He picks 
the Chechen war of 1998 as one of the most tragic periods in Russian history. When 
asked about Eurasia, Sergei responds that neither membership of a Eurasian Union 
nor of the EU will change Russia – Russia will still be ‚left-over‛ (otstalaya). And 
asked whether Russia is a Western or Eastern country, he says the same: ‚Rather left-
over.‛ Sergei chooses not to use any of the available, traditional categories like 
East/West or the alternative Eurasia but creates his own Russia, left-over even by 
categorisation. Yet he believes that Russia will, in a distant future, become a mighty 
Empire – not in his own lifetime though. ‚Russia has always sought to rule everyone, 
but with her brains that’s impossible.‛ When asked about globalisation, Sergei states 
that Russia is dependent upon Europe and America. He says jokingly that there are 
more McDonalds’s than shops in Russia which he sees as positive, ‚since our 
industry is dead already, the kolkhozes broke up under Eltsin and are not needful to 
anyone.‛ Sergei does not trust any of the political parties in Russia, saying that they 
are all financially dependent. ‚They promise a lot but when they get power it’s all 
the same.‛ Does Sergei believe in Russia? ‚I believed, but now, no. She’s dying. She’s 
comparable to South Africa.‛  
 
C29-M71e*: Igor, 71, physicist and engineer, Moscow 
Asked about Tiutchev’s famous lines, Igor says that he had heard them often but that 
he has no opinion on them. ‚But all know that Russia consists of fools and has bad 
roads. See this statement I am in complete agreement with.‛ Asked whether Russia is 
a source or example of spirituality for the rest of the world he answers ‚In no case 
whatsoever. Opposite.‛ He doesn’t think that Russia has a mission, or that the idea of 
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a mission is popular. The greatest dangers to Russia, he says, is that part of the 
Russian people that has access to state resources and steal them. He is neither wholly 
negative nor positive to the Soviet era. Instead, ‚the most terrifying in the history of 
Russia is the Eltsin rule. Overnight all became bandits.‛ The concept of Eurasia 
appears good to Igor and he credits Putin for the recent dynamics in the discussions 
about it and the concrete steps that have been made. He believes however that Russia 
will decline its imperial ambitions and that the question today is rather whether 
Russia will remain in the number of leading states of the world or glide down to the 
third or fourth line of the most ‚left over‛ states. He sees the Russian Orthodox 
Church as a positive factor that should be discussed more and given more 
significance. As ethics is an infected question in Russia, he explains, precisely the 
Church could play a large and significant role here. Igor believes that globalisation is 
dangerous for Russia but that it is not for Russia to stand against it. A key theme for 
Igor is the revolution of 1991 – ‚this thuggish revolution‛, since which he believes all 
has gone downhill for Russia, and people began to show their very worst 
characteristics – it is so serious that he is pessimistic even about defining traits of 
Russianness. This is without in any way glorifying the Soviet era. He criticizes some 
aspects of Putin’s regime but is on the whole very positive towards Putin and says 
that ‚it’s scary‛ to think about what will happen after 2008, who will come after 
Putin.    
 
C157-F65*: Vera, 65, pensioner, Moscow 
Vera has been a pensioner since 1994 – she used to work with technical 
documentation for a State Bureau. She continuously talks about ‚us old people‛, ‚the 
people from our area‛ and answers in plural: ‚we don’t like<‛ and so on, 
constructing the image of a cohesive group identity. She wouldn’t call Russia 
spiritual (‚that idea is about something entirely different‛) but her rather sacrificial 
Russia does have a mission: ‚There is, but for some reason all other peoples (it seems 
to us old people) hate us. But why? You know, our government always helps 
everyone; our pensions are low, maybe, because of this, but there you go.‛ She thinks 
that those who steal and kill, and the terrorists, pose the greatest danger to Russia. 
Asked whether she considers the seventy years of Soviet rule to be a mistake and lost 
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time or an important part of Russian history, she answers: ‚I don’t know. I cannot 
answer. I am uneducated, therefore I don’t know.‛ Asked instead whether it was 
good or bad that the Soviet Union fell, she says: ‚Bad, of course. And overall this 
break-up< It seems to me: as people used to live they should have been left to live. 
You see, there was no hatred of anyone, but now, it seems to me, we have those 
things. *. . .+ People don’t like it. Everything was normal, and it’s not understandable 
why, what for. On the contrary, we, the people, live peacefully and do not divide 
anything. It seems that it is our government *that does+.‛ But even if the government 
is guilty of causing divisions and disunity, Putin favourably described: ‚We are very 
happy now, that Putin is so young and all [chto u nas Putin takoi: molodoi, ne takoi]. But 
we are a little bit unhappy, that even though they are increasing our pensions they 
are still barely sufficient. If they would only give us at least the existential minimum. 
Apart from that we are so pleased with Putin.‛ On most other questions - of empire, 
Eurasia, Ukraine and others - she says that she doesn’t know. She notes that people 
are going to church much more now and agrees that Russia’s spiritual potential to be 
greater than other countries. Finally, asked for whom she voted, she says: ‚We voted 
for Putin, all our area.‛ 
 
 
ii) Q2. What is the manifestation and resonance among ordinary Russians 
of the messianic and related narratives deployed in Russian public and 
official discourse?  
 
The first case is representative of a relatively small but vocal group of interviewees 
who in the course of their interviews managed to draw upon the whole range of 
typical messianic and related narratives from public discourse, using the same style 
and concepts, thus illustrating a certain dissemination of the new kaleidoscopic 
master discourse from public to popular discourse. The following four cases are 
more illustrative of the more diverse and balanced views of the majority of the 
interviewees, who would often reject several of the typical messianic and related 
narratives, but embrace perhaps one or two others, yet do so in ways and contexts 
unconventional compared to public discourse – such as be strongly pro-Western and 
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liberal, yet desire Russia to become a mighty empire. The second and fourth cases 
indicate a widespread (among educated interviewees) awareness of precisely the 
popularity of messianic notions in Russia. The sixth, last case is very different and 
reflects the in Russian messianic discourse radicalised representation of the Other as 
the both internal and external ‘Judeo-American’ enemy. It also shows a near 
apocalyptic representation of contemporary Russia.  
 
C7-M31e*: Oleg, 31, owner and manager of PR company, Moscow 
Oleg is young, educated and rich – and very eager to prove that neither he nor 
Russia harbours any messianic ideas or ambitions but that it can be understood 
rationally. Below Oleg explains the function of messianism in Russia, and at the same 
time declares that there is no need for it in Russia now:         
It’s not our task to prove that our path is better, something different. Nobody 
thinks about these things. There are some certain stereotypes, making out that 
we do. Russia thinks only about these things when she finds herself under 
very difficult economic and political conditions and has to somehow 
compensate for her weak position in domestic or foreign politics, for that sake 
allowing ideas of some kind of different path. But there has never been 
anything [real] about this.  
In the course of the interview, Oleg builds on various messianic narratives: Russia is 
a moral haven, America is amoral: ‚at present, in the sense of spirituality, Russia’s 
potential is a lot bigger, from the point of view of moral-ethical principles and 
norms‚; Russia is different and ‚not simple‛ (even though he also states that Russia 
is just a ‘normal’ country); as well as Eurasianist ideas. As many of the elite 
interviewees, Oleg believes in Russian Orthodoxy and a recurring theme in the 
interview is the Russian sobornost’ (conciliarity or communality), the particular 
mentality ascribed to Russians by virtue of their Orthodoxy. Discussing the concept 
of mission, Oleg argues that it is not the least popular in Russia – but shortly after 
outlines a specific mission for Russia (on whom ‚everything depends‛) based on 
Russia’s rich resources and very specific location between Western Europe and 
China, and subsequent ability to ‚counterbalance these sides, interact, and be a 
terrific mediator in disputes and solving conflicting situations.‛ The interview is an 
299 
 
informative example of a tendency noted in several interviews: attempts to reject 
stereotypes of Russian messianism contradictorily mixed together with clear 
embracement of precisely messianic narratives and ideas, suggesting that in some 
senses Russian messianism, for all its stereotypical status, is a necessary part of 
Russian political and cultural identity.  
 
C70-M27*: Sergei, 27, computer programmer, St Petersburg 
Sergei belongs to the still relatively small Russian middle class and enjoys economic 
freedom without renouncing the Soviet past. Throughout the interview, he shows 
sophisticated awareness of the persistence of many stereotypical messianic 
discourses in Russia, rejecting them, but embracing empire, Eurasia and a degree of 
anti-Westenism. Sergei disagrees with Tyutchev and says that ‚it is possible to 
measure *Russia+, it’s rather the Russian people that want to consider themselves 
special.‛ We Russians are special in what we like to do, he says, that we don’t like to 
work. He doesn’t believe that Russia is a source or example of spirituality for the rest 
of the world but recognises the popularity of the idea of a mission: ‚There exists this 
assumption that Russia ought to save the world and make it more spiritual. But at 
the moment Russia is concerned with how to survive and economical issues – how to 
develop the economy and come to a more civilised level. But aside from that – yes, 
this idea has been preserved.‛ He says that quite a few people consider Russia to 
have a ‘special standing’ *osobennoe polozhenie] though not necessarily a mission. 
Sergei likes the idea of Russia, China and India uniting as an alternative power to the 
US and Europe. He hasn’t heard anything of the concept of Eurasia but when 
presented with the idea as formulated in the questionnaire, he says that: 
it doesn’t lack sense, as Russia is situated between Eastern and Western 
countries, and despite the fact that it with all its strength strives towards the 
West (we have always, since the time of Peter I, been striving westwards) we 
cannot escape our Eastern characteristics, which is why they need to, insofar 
as it is possible, somehow harmoniously be combined in ourselves (I mean in 
Russia).  
As for Russia stepping out as an empire he says ‚she will, of course. Because since 
the time of the USSR we have been used to consider ourselves< The USSR was as a 
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mighty power, ruling a seventh of all dry land, and now, doubtlessly, no-one wants 
to yield the position, and Russia will do all possible so that she was taken into 
account in the international society.‛ Sergei thinks that the seventy years of Soviet 
history are important, hopes that they will have taught them something, and 
cherishes his happy USSR childhood, but does not regret the break-up of the Soviet 
Union: ‚Life was hard. As far as freedoms are concerned, Russia has moved far 
ahead in comparison with the USSR. People can travel all over the world, freely work 
together money, own private property – it’s all very good.‛ He finds it hard to say 
what makes a Russian Russian and what unites peoples of different cultures, 
traditions and religions in Russia, himself elaborating on the great diversity of 
people in Russia, from nomads to city-dwellers, but says it would probably be 
desirable if some common national idea united them other than the insufficient top-
down attempts to use sport as a national idea. Sergei thinks it’s bad that Ukraine has 
turned away from Russia and explains that Russia ought to exercise its influence, 
including through gas and oil ultimatums, in order for Ukraine to be oriented not 
towards the West or America but towards Russia.  
 
C12-F36e*: Alexandra, 36, ‘New Russian,’ St Petersburg 
Alexandra travels extensively to the West, enjoys the ‚Westernisation‛ of Russia and 
is at the same time quite happy with Russia being ‚a pretty serious empire.‛ 
Alexandra says that the Soviet period was rather an important part of Russian 
history than a mistake, but asked whether the break-up of the Soviet Union was 
positive or negative, responds: ‚Depends who you ask – personally, I’m not against 
living in New Russia.‛  Alexandra says that Russia can be proud of all her periods of 
history as she has always been strong, and an empire. The positive valuation of 
Russia as a strong empire is restated later on in the interview where Alexandra states 
that: ‚We are already stepping out as a pretty serious empire,‛ then adds, ‚And why 
not?‛ Alexandra hasn’t heard much about the concept of Eurasia and appears little 
keen on the idea of a union between Russia and some Asian and Islamic states. She 
thinks that Russia’s relations with the west are improving, in that the West’s attitude 
to Russia has changed for the better. She agrees that Russia is both an example and 
source of spirituality for the rest of the world but doesn’t know what kind of mission 
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Russia could have. Alexandra appears open and inclusive in her views on ethnic 
difference, indicating that there is so much mixing that there is no point to use 
ethnicity as a diacritic of Russianness, but rather accurate Russian language. And she 
is not bothered about Ukraine’s turn away from Russia: ‚Let them live as they want.‛ 
The interview with Alexandra shows how the discourse on Russia as a strong and 
mighty empire is not always accompanied by the anti-Western and pro-Eurasia 
discourses.  
 
C83-M21*: Mikhail, 21, St Petersburg, sociology student, marketing agent  
Mikhail comes from a wealthy background and is happy with the fact that someone 
is asking this kind of questions about Russia. The key theme in the interview with 
Mikhail is the break between Soviet Russia and New Russia – he keeps stressing that 
society today is totally different from 15 years ago, and the contemporary Russia he 
portrays is modern. Throughout the interview he thoughtfully analyses Russian 
society and the issues facing it, using various modern sociological theories. Mikhail 
says that the history of Russia certainly is an example of spirituality, but that it 
difficult to say about today. As for a mission, it certainly exists and is very important 
but is ‚completely incomprehensible.‛ The idea of a mission is popular he says, and 
likens Russia to a company in which people need to know their purpose and 
function. There are those who seek to find the mission, formulate and bring it out, 
but for various reasons of which social fragmentation is one, the mission remains 
unformulated and incomprehensible. As many of his compatriots, Mikhail sees the 
greatest danger in the Russians themselves, in their own ‚careless decisions and 
actions.‛ He is hoping for Russia to step out as a mighty empire:  
I would really, really like that – Russia to be a mighty empire. And I’m sure 
those in authority really want that as well. Because it would allow that 
mission, of which we are speaking, to be formulated, and it would be clearer 
to people what they are able to do. Pride is a sin according to the Bible, but 
pride is a very serious motive for action – one must only keep feeding it all 
the time. 
He answers ‚yes‛ to the question whether Russia has a greater spiritual potential 
than other countries thanks to the Russian Orthodox Church. He later, however, 
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discusses its politicisation and concludes that the Church is always about power. 
Mikhail enjoys today’s Russia, it fits him and he fits into it. In the presidential 
elections he voted liberal, for Khakamada. As can be noted, having liberal views, 
high education and already a starting career within marketing can without apparent 
conflict be combined with ‚really, really‛ wanting Russia to become a mighty empire 
and believing that Russia’s spiritual potential is greater than other countries’.  
 
C31-M18*: Alexander, 18, student, St Petersburg 
Alexander lives with his family in one of the slightly better areas of St Petersburg. He 
appears a bit nervous and gives short answers, but relaxes as we talk. He believes 
that in some sense Russia is a source or example of spirituality, and though he can’t 
give an example of it he says that compared to the US, it seems to him that Russia’s 
level of spirituality is higher. He’s not sure about Russia having a mission, but thinks 
it could be that each country has a mission and that Russia’s is to raise the level of 
spirituality. On the question of spiritual potential, he answers: ‚I do not consider that 
it is particularly thanks to the Russian Orthodox Church *that Russia’s spiritual 
potential is greater than that of other countries], it seems to me that there is 
something lain inside of Russia itself, that people here are more spiritual than in 
other countries. But this does not depend on religion but is something lain inside.‛ 
The most important for Russia, in terms of dangers, in Alexander’s opinion is 
to not err in the choice of path of development. He admits however that he doesn’t 
know which path this should to be. He reckons that Russia is both Eastern and 
Western but closer to the East and he also considers Russia to a large extent to be a 
Muslim country, which is why Russia should have good relations with other Muslim 
countries – but he hasn’t heard anything about the concept of Eurasia. He thinks, 
however, that unification, if it enhances the development of inside relations between 
peoples and of society as a whole, is good in any case.  
He reckons that Russia in the future, when it is stronger economically, will 
play a pretty important role internationally, but not as an empire, rather as a 
conciliator. Globalisation he sees as harmful and dangerous to Russia. As for Russia’s 
relations with the West he can’t see opposition but rather a tendency towards unity. 
Making Russians Russian is their peculiar style of behaviour in society. Uniting all 
303 
 
different peoples in Russia is again spirituality and also their relation to and role in 
the world, and the consciousness of belonging precisely to Russia. Alexander does 
believe in a unity of the Slavonic republics. The Soviet period, he argues, can be seen 
as an important experience both for Russia and other countries.  
  
C147-M55*: Marshan, 55, Moscow, lawyer 
The interview with Marshan, from Caucasian, is dominated by three interrelated 
themes: the poverty of the Russian people, the near end of Russia as a state, and 
zionisation. He agrees with Tiutchev’s lines, saying that Russia is peculiar in that 
despite many riches there are so many poor people. ‚People are good, but they are 
hungry, cold and poor and it’s shameful.‛ He does not believe that Russia is a source 
or example of spirituality, and to the question of whether or not she has a mission he 
answers ‚What mission?! I don’t know, and I don’t agree. How can Russia fulfil a 
particular mission when the people starve, and live badly?‛  
On the questions of Russianness and what unites the peoples in the Russian 
federation he continues to talk about the poverty and the bad relation of the state 
towards the people, and says that the only thing uniting people is [trying] not to die 
by starvation. On what poses the greatest danger to Russia, he initially answers 
Zionism and Wahhabism, and later adds more detail, drawing a near apocalyptic 
vision of Russia:  
There is a complete corruption of power. Deceit, poverty, devastation, lack of 
culture, immorality, drugs, debauchery. There are very many drug addicts 
and AIDS-bearers, homeless children, alcoholism. These phenomena do pose 
a danger to the Russian state. This is why my prognosis is that Russia will 
disintegrate. There will be some administrative-territorial formations, where 
they will sit as lords and rulers, competing about who has the biggest wallet. 
If the people consciously will not understand where we are heading - either 
towards disaster or towards normal life – then Russia will be doomed to 
destruction, because I can’t see anything good here now. 
He sees globalisation, furthermore, as very dangerous: ‚It’s a very bad tendency. I 
consider both McDonalds and globalisation to be very bad phenomena. It’s the 
politics of Zionism.‛ Zionism, he explains, is ‚when a handful of Jews acquire all 
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wealth, though the population consists of other nationalities as well. Without giving 
anything in exchange, they collect everything for themselves and create for 
themselves a separate state – what we just talked about – globalisation. This means the 
establishment of international forces, the establishment of political forces, 
international banks from which they will control and increase in the name of this 
their Zionist, Jewish nightmare.‛ On the seventy years of Soviet rule he says that ‚it 
was probably a group of Zionists that seized power and created a state like that.‛ 
Yet, out of various periods of Russian history, he says that Russia can be 
proud of the Soviet times. He says that he has heard of the concept Eurasia, and 
defines it as when ‚five percent of the rich people unite their capital, and without 
thinking about their people, increase their riches. Rich people play cards, receive big 
money and put them in their pockets.‛ On whether Russia belongs to the East or the 
West he says that ‚Russia is both Eastern and Western, from the point of view of 
geography. From the point of view of political thinking, Russia has no relation 
whatsoever neither to the East nor the West. It is a rich country with poor people.‛  
 
   
iii) Q4. How can we understand and conceptualise Russian messianism, its 
functions and role in relationship to Russian statecraft, especially 
towards the West?  
 
The first case illustrates how Russian messianism can be understood as a discursive 
framework, holding a kaleidoscopic range of both complementing and sometimes 
contradictory narratives. The representation of Russia as large, spiritual, 
misunderstood, sacrificing itself for others, with a mission to unite the world in 
general and specifically to become a partner of the West, coexists both in this 
interview and in Russian discourse as a whole – with the more threatening 
representation of the Russia that should not be disturbed or messed about with, the 
Russia that needs to stand against America. Through and in this framework, Russia 
is defined and appears to be legitimised as a state actor with special roles and 
responsibilities in ambiguous (here varyingly oppositional and positive, both inferior 
and superior) relation to the West as Other.  
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The following two cases show a more clearly dichotomised self/Other 
framework, typical among many young people, where the Russians as a people with 
a rich culture who have ‚always been with God‛ and Russia as a state has a mission 
to restrain or stand against America, as in Soviet times – but move closer to Europe – 
and with resentment against Ukraine for turning away from its Slavonic heritage and 
turning towards the West.  
In the last case, the Europeanist interviewee explicitly denounces messianism 
in the form national-patriot visions of Eurasia and imperial ambitions as being 
‘anachronisms in the contemporary world’, showing how Russian messianism are 
often perceived as hampering Russia’s image as a ‘normal’ international state actor. 
Yet the interview also illustrates very strongly the tension in both Russian 
messianism and discourse as a whole between exceptionalism, in the form of 
culturalist fundamentalism, and the ‘universalism’ of western international relations. 
The semi-structured interview format allows us not only to simply measure 
attitudes towards other state actors, but to explore how particular narratives and 
metaphors are deployed in the process of constructing Russian state identity in 
relation to Others, and how these deployments compare to other levels of discourse.  
 
C8-F31e*: Irina, 31, business woman and project manager, Moscow 
Irina, a very wealthy, educated and fashion-conscious businesswoman, the manager 
of a large building project called Russkaya Britannia – Russian Britain – could be 
described as a typical post-modern Russian messianist. She picks Eastern spirituality 
but leaves the asceticism (‘in the East they are too spiritual’). She classifies herself as 
Orthodox, but is involved in various New Age practices – the interview began with 
her explaining the necessity of having a Rose quartz - the stone of unconditional love 
– to secure love and eternal happiness. Spirituality is a key theme in her discourse 
and is much elaborated on later in the interview, with constant comparisons to the 
secular West (e.g. ‘in Britain they convert churches into houses’).  
Answering the first question on Tyutchev’s famous lines on Russia’s 
peculiarity, Irina in the course of two minutes, manages to draw the whole range of 
typical Russian messianic discourses: Russia as chosen by God; Russia as an empire, 
with special missions and responsibilities, taking care of the world (as the lion of the 
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savannah) and of the little ones (Russia is now more prepared for a mission having 
gone through the stages of both tsarism and communism); Russia even uniting the 
whole world; Russia because of this suffering for the sake of others; the Russian soul; 
Russia as Eurasia, and the East-West dichotomy with the East as spiritual and the 
West as material yet Russia overcoming it by uniting both (the whole extract is 
unfortunately too long to be included). God is a master signifier in Irina’s discourse, 
and the other key actors are the West, the East and Russia, also Eurasia.  
The sheer concentration and mixing of messianic discourse in this first 
answer alone is reflective of the gradual formation of a messianic master discourse in 
public discourse, as are the dualistic representations both of Russia itself and of the 
West. Russia is constructed as large, spiritual, having important things to offer to the 
world, but the world does not understand it. Russia wants to unite, be friends, but 
scares away Europe by its sheer size.  
Russia is both quite old (though not as old as Greece and Italy) and relatively 
young; Russia both is Eurasia already, uniting the spirituality of the East and the 
practicality of the West, and must, in the future, ‚competently convert all there is in 
the West and all there is in the East‛ and ‛give some new product to the world‛; 
Russia is large, friendly, spiritual and misunderstood, and at the same time the 
dangerous, sleeping bear (which Ukraine should watch out for, having become 
strangers to Russia by going to the West): ‚If he sleeps, don’t bother him, because if 
he wakes up, it will be bad for everyone.‛ 
The great ambivalence to ‘the West’ – sometimes meaning Europe, sometimes 
America, sometimes Western civilization as a whole in Russian identity discourse is 
epitomised in this interview – Irina on the one hand emphasises the positive values 
Russia has got from ‘the West’ hopes for closer relations, even a unification, between 
Russia and Europe, yet believes that Russia must stand against America, and 
believes that the materialism and Americanisation of Russia’s youth is a key danger 
to Russia. That the stories we tell about ourselves are not necessarily coherent 






C48-M19*: Vladislav, 19, student, Moscow 
Vladislav, studying economics, agrees with Tyutchev’s lines, ‚because the Russian 
nationality is not comparable to any other, it has its own take. The Germans are an 
older nation, but in our thousand year old history we have had many different wars, 
and that has given us a certain experience and certain traditions. They are 
uncommon, peculiar only to the Slavs, not only the Russians.‛  
He feels bitter about Ukraine’s turn-away from Russia but still believes in the 
unity of the Slavonic republics.  Vladislav believes that Russia has a mission and that 
it consists in Cold War: ‚In the world there ought to be parity. There can’t be one 
country that leads and commands, someone needs to restrain it. It used to be the 
Soviet Union; though there were extremes, it was very powerful.‛ Later he adds that 
Russia together with the EU should restrain America, and also considers that Russo-
European relations will get closer and closer. Russia will step out as a source of 
power internationally, he believes.  
He considers the seventy years of Soviet rule to be an important part of 
Russian history, and thinks that most people think the same, and also thinks that 
Russia can be proud over the Imperial and the Soviet past. He understands ‚Eurasia‛ 
as the fusion of European and Asian ideals. He answers ‚yes‛ to the question on 
Russia’s spiritual potential being greater thanks to the Orthodox Church; and 
explains that ‚the Orthodox are in favour of uniting many nations. Catholicism has 
similar traits, but there it’s more stress on money. If a person is successful – it means 
God is helping him. In Russia it’s not like that.‛ He doesn’t think that globalization is 
dangerous to Russia. Asked what makes a Russian Russian, he answers that ‚if we 
look purely historically, then the Russian person has always been honest, always 
ready to help others, and has always been with God.‛  
   
C95-M26*: Sergei, 26, optician, Moscow   
Sergei gives short but affirmative answers. He believes that Russia certainly is a 
source and example of spirituality for the rest of the world, as she has such a rich 
culture. Seventy years of Soviet power is according to Sergei not lost time but a very 
important part of Russian history, and he believes that most Russians feel the same. 
Russia can be proud of her history, he says, ‚up until 1917, and from 1917 to 1991.‛ 
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Sergei has not heard anything about the concept of Eurasia, but when 
presented with the idea of ‘a harmonious unity between the former Soviet republics 
with Russia as centre, possibly also with some Islamic countries and some other 
Asian countries in union with Russia’ he is very positive towards it. Russia, in his 
opinion, is neither Eastern nor Western. He says that he is hoping that Russia will 
one day become an Empire. ‚The state, situated on the other side of the ocean‛ poses 
the greatest danger to Russia in Sergei’s opinion. Here he uses the word 
protivopolozhniy, ‘contrary’ or ‘opposite’ which in Russian conveys a meaning of 
polarity and negativity. Cold war imagery is evoked of two states facing each other, 
diametrically opposed. When asked, later, what relations would be desirable with 
the West for Russia he answers with the formal ‚I struggle to answer.‛ He does not 
believe that globalisation poses any danger to Russia.  
Sergei says that ‘the soul’ makes a Russian Russian. As for the other 
nationalities, ethnicities, religions and cultures, he says that what unites them in 
Russia are the common territorial borders. He agrees with the statement that Ukraine 
has turned away from Russia and thinks it is bad, but believes however in the unity 
of the Slavonic republics. There is significant anti-Semitism in Russia according to 
Sergei. And he voted for Putin. In sum, Sergei appears to accept much of the 
discourse on Russia as spiritual and soulful at the same time as expressing his desire 
for a Russian Empire and being positive to the idea of a Eurasian Union (though not 
perceiving any particular unity between different peoples and nationalities in Russia 
at the moment). The US for him functions as a main enemy and other, and he would 
rather have Russia move closer to the Islamic world.  
 
C28-F60e*: Tatyana, 60, Head of Department of Diplomacy at MGIMO, Moscow 
The main discourse in the interview with Tatiana Zonova is about the European 
roots of Russia, about culture and international relations in the contemporary world. 
The macro-proposition could go: ‘We *states+ are all different, we are all special and 
we are all the same.’ Throughout the interview there is a tension between on the one 
hand the celebration of cultural and civilisational specificity and on the other the 




She stresses difference between countries, in terms of culture and civilization 
e.g. talking of ‚this Eastern Christian civilisational model.‛ What makes a Russian 
Russian is for Tatyana ‚his own history, the history of his civilization, his 
worldviews – correspondingly, orthodoxy, Christianity, the culture he is brought up 
with.‛ What unites all peoples of different cultures and religions is their common 
history, and the Russian influence – as example she mentions that what is taught in 
Russian schools is mainly based on Russian and Christian culture. Later she states 
that whether one is Muslim, Jew or Orthodox doesn’t matter at all as Russia has got a 
secular state – each group can have their own organisations inside Russia.  
Tatyana rejects the idea of Russia as being a Eurasian civilization, on the basis 
of Russia’s Christian foundation. She says that national-patriotic ‘Eurasianist dreams’ 
appear to her anachronistic in the contemporary world, as does the imperial 
structure – she hopes that Russia will decline imperial ambitions. A concern about 
the negative stereotype-making of Russia and other countries is another theme that 
runs throughout the interview.  
Tatyana stresses similarity, in terms of states’ international roles and 
responsibilities. ‚The Americans reckon that they have a certain mission, and the 
French have a certain mission, and the Italians have a certain mission, and so, 
evidently Russia too has her mission. So each occupies its own place in the world, 
seeks space, and seeks itself friends, and attempts to somehow influence the 
development of events. In this, I suppose, consists this mission: to take active part in 
international relations, in my opinion. To play one’s role in the contemporary world, 
to understand the contemporary tendencies of development, to bring one’s own 
input to this development.‛ What characterises this contemporary world? ‚The 
world is so interdependent and processes are becoming global in which there are 
many different actors, and not even such a mighty power as the US, I believe, is 
capable of managing by itself with all the problems that exist in the contemporary 
world.‛ She sees globalisation as an objective process, a fact of everyday life with 
both good and bad, which it would be absurd to try to oppose.  
Relations with the West, she reckons, are unfolding very positively, as Russia 
is ‚quite a predictable partner, which is important.‛ There is some discrepancy in her 
discourse between Russia as an international actor – a predictable partner – and 
310 
 
Russia from within, as she believes the greatest threat to Russia is the situation in 
Russia itself and describes the dangers of quick transitions from one system to 




Appendix IV – Transliteration Table 
 
 Russian letter or letter combination  English transliteration  
А (а)  A (a)  
Б (б)  B (b)  
В (в)  V (v)  
Г (г)  G (g)  
Д (д)  D (d)  
Е (е)  E (e)  
Ж (ж)  E (e)  
Ж (ж)  Zh (zh)  
З (з)  Z (z)  
И (и)  I (i)  
Й (й)  I (i)  
К (к)  K (k)  
Л (л)  L (l)  
М (м)  M (m)  
Н (н)  N (n)  
О (о)  O (o)  
П (п)  P (p)  
Р (р)  R (r)  
С (с)  S (s)  
Т (т)  T (t)  
У (у)  U (u)  
Ф (ф)  F (f)  
Х (х)  Kh (kh)  
Ц (ц)  Ts (ts)  
Ч (ч)  Ch (ch)  
Ш (ш)  Sh (sh)  
Щ (щ)  Shch (shch)  
ъ (твжрдый знак)  "  
Ы (ы)  Y (y)  
ь (мягкий знак)  '  
Э (э)  E (e)  
Ю (ю)  Yu (yu)  
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